The Latest from Iran (9 January): Watching Carefully

2225 GMT: More on Khamenei Speech (see 1445 and 1850 GMT). An EA reader who watched the Supreme Leader's address today sends an interesting e-mail, "His speech did not sound aggressive. It sounded more as a request for calm and acting with wisdom after the fallouts of Ashura. It appeared that he was lacking in confidence. Same for the crowd."

2220 GMT: Halting the Mothers of Martyrs. An Iranian activist reports that, during their weekly march in Laleh Park, about 30 of Mothers of Martyrs in the post-election crisis and their supporters were arrested and taken to Vozara detention centre.

2200 GMT: Mortazavi --- Scapegoat or Valued Official? Iran-watchers may want to set aside a few moments for former Tehran prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi, whose future may turn upon the developments in the internal contest amidst conservatives and principlists.

Days after Mortazavi was reportedly named as prime "suspect" in the Parliamentary investigation of the deaths of Kahrizak detainees, he was formally named as President Ahmadinejad's advisor to combating smuggling of drugs and currency.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Sharif University Demonstration (9 January)
Iran: Four Responses to the “Wrong Questions” of the Leveretts (Lucas)
Iran: “What is This Opposition?” Right Answers to Wrong Questions (Shahryar)
The Latest from Iran (8 January): Karroubi Under Attack

Interpretation? Mortazavi is now the proxy in the battle between key conservatives/principlists and Ahmadinejad. The President wants him as a sign of Ahmadinejad's authority and as a firewall to any move by Parliamentary challenges; Ahmadinejad's critics see Mortazavi's downfall as a necessary victory in their battle.

Another marker in the dispute is a statement by a "pro-Government" student organisation criticising Ahmadinejad for the appointments of Mortazavi and for Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, the former First Vice-President --- a few days after his appointment, he was removed from office amidst vehement criticism from the conservatives/principlists  who may be aiming at Mortazavi ---  who is now Ahmadinejad's chief of staff.

2150 GMT: A Release. An EA reader writers that Reza Najafi, an Iranian translator, was released from jail on Thursday. Najafi worked for Caravan Publishing, which is owned by Arash Hejazi, the doctor who tried to save the life of Neda Agha Soltan.

1920 GMT: The Khamenei Manoeuvre (Part 2). This article, from Payvand, should be read in conjunction with the passage of the Supreme Leader's speech offering some rhetorical concession on violence:

Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani has criticized the people who made derogatory remarks about Mohsen Rezaei in regard to his recent letter to the Supreme Leader about Mir-Hossein Mousavi's recent proposals. Larijani made the remarks at a meeting with national police chiefs in Qom on Thursday.

"Rezaei has been a real mujahid (one who struggles in the cause of Islam) and strived wholeheartedly during the (1980-1988) Iran-Iraq war. Naturally, since he has entered the political scene, some of his ideas may be criticized. But why do some political figures question his career as a mujahid?"

"Today, society needs convergence not discord and not steps meant to undermine recognized figures' positions," he added.

It is not too speculative to treat Larijani as a channel for the political views of the Supreme Leader, and this manoevure is a clear call --- "Back Off" --- to those "hard-liners" who have criticised Rezaei for suggesting that a deal may now be struck with Mir Hossein Mousavi.

And there's more. Larijani said, "We should not call anyone who has different views a dissident and a hypocrite. In line with the Supreme Leader's directives, all people should try to create unity in the country to prepare the ground for economic activities, investment, and development."

That passage walks hand-in-hand with this week's declarations by high-profile MP Ali Motahari, on video and in print, calling for some negotiation of views and approaches to get out of the current post-election difficulties.

1850 GMT: Mixed Messages. Borzou Daragahi of The Los Angeles Times picks up on a passage from today's Supreme Leader statement (see 1445 GMT) that may point to some pull-back from all-out confrontation:

Relevant bodies should fully respect the law in dealing with the [post-election] riots and the ongoing events. Those without any legal duty and obligations should not meddle with these affairs, Everyone should hold back from arbitrary acts and everything should go within the framework of the law.

The obvious connection to make is that Khamenei's message is, first and foremost, to the conservative/principlist politicians who have been pressing for some sign of regime concession on the crackdown. That has including Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei's letter and the challenge of member of Parliament Ali Motahari (covered in this week's EA updates).

Doesn't look like this part of Khamenei's message has filtered down through the ranks, however. Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Naqdi, the head of the Basiji militia, preferred to pick up on the Supreme Leader's passage praising action against the "corrupt" and "rioters":

Now, all our people expect the security and intelligence organs as well as the judiciary to take action. People will jump to the fray if they feel these bodies are lax in their duties. People are critical of the laxness of security and judicial bodies against conspirators.

And Islamic Revolution Guard Corps commander Brigadier General Abdollah Araqi has proposed involving the Basiji militiamen, who are now within the Revolutionary Guard, in some IRGC operations.

Most Basijis are not inclined to militarism and so we have trained those interested in military activities separately within the framework of several battalions. The most-trained Basijis are now with Imam Hussein Battalions and their employment in security issues could be influential.

1840 GMT: Getting It Right About the Opposition. Following our responses to this week's attempt by Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett to promote the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government by belittling the opposition, Abbas Milani adds his critique in The New Republic. The take-away quote: "The U.S. can either stand with the people of Iran, and support their quest for democracy—a democracy, incidentally, that offers the only solution to the nuclear problem as well—or it can side with those who defend the moribund regime."

1815 GMT: The University Demonstrations Continue. Compared to the tumult of last month, Iran's universities have been relatively muted in terms of open protest (though not, it should be noted, signed of opposition such as exam boycotts). Today, however, students at Sharif University came out in a show of protest over detentions of their classmates.

We've posted three clips.

1510 GMT: I'll be back in a couple of hours to round up latest news and analysis. Thanks to EA readers for keeping the information coming in.

1500 GMT: For Mahmoud, It's the Nukes. President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, is staying away from (or being kept from) the internal situation, as he declared in his nationally-televised speech that that further UN Security Council sanctions will not deter Iran from pursuing its nuclear programme:

[Other countries] issued several resolutions and sanctioned Iran ... They think Iranians will fall on their knees over these things but they are mistaken....We are not interested in conflicts (but) you are continually demanding things.

They should not think they can put up obstacles in Iranians' way ... I assure the people ... that the government will whole-heartedly defend Iran's rights and will not back down one iota.

1455 GMT: Reza Razaghi, one of the members of the central legal committee of Mir Hossein Mousavi, was arrested early this morning and moved to an unknown location.

Yadoolah Eslami, a former member of Parliament, has also been arrested.

1445 GMT: Khamenei's Back. Just arrived back in snowy Birmingham to find that, a few thousand miles away, the Supreme Leader has appeared publicly for the first time since Ashura. (You can have a peek at the video.)

Textbook stuff from Ayatollah Khamenei, speaking to visitors from Qom, about how appropriate it is to come down hard on the demonstrators: "The officials of the three forces saw for themselves what the nation is asking for, therefore, they must perform their duties well towards the corrupt and the rioters." (Note: I would be grateful if readers could verify whether Khamenei referred to Ahmadinejad by name.)

The Supreme Leader also played the foreign-spectre-behind-the-opposition card: "The U.S. and Britain and other arrogant powers, as well as their domestic misguided (allies), acted under the banner of struggle against the Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) and the revolution since the very beginning of the victory of the Islamic revolution. The situation is the same now."

0320 GMT: The Newest Deal has an analysis, which matches up with some information I've received, of the offering-up of former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi as a sacrifice for the deaths of detainees at Kahrizak Prison. A broader way to consider this is that Mortazavi's fate is a "firewall" for the Ahmadinejad Government. If he is punished, the line might be held against pressure on others, including the President.

0300 GMT: Friday was a day, apart from the drama of the gunfire at Mehdi Karroubi's motorcade, to pick up pieces of information and put them together. I had the pleasure of a long chat with a couple of top Iran-watchers. Parts of the discussion will be shaping analyses in forthcoming days, but the two general lines of note were "marathon, not sprint" and "change is coming".

Meanwhile, some of those pieces to note before making my way back to Britain....

The Western media is now responding quickly to headline news from Iran: within hours of the Karroubi incidence, The New York Times, The Times of London, and The Guardian of London, amongst London, had posted stories.

Iran human rights organisations reacted by building the incident into another demand on the Government, referring to possible Basiji and Revolutionary Guard involvement in the events in Qazvin and calling on the regime to ensure the safety of opposition leaders. Reformist members of Parliament, such as Mohammad Reza Tabesh, are asking Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to safeguard "insulted" legislators.

The Government is definitely going to use the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO) "terrorist" line as a battering ram against the opposition: state media indicated on Friday that 5 Ashura detainees going on trial will be charged with membership of the organisation.

More news is emerging of students at Iran universities boycotting final examinations in protest at detentions of classmates.

Comments

[Barry]

The start of real sanctions??

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126300336665822669.html

These Companies like to do business with Iran - but they will have more interest in continuing their business activities in US.

Barry

[The Latest from Iran (9 Januar]

[...] View original here: The Latest from Iran (9 January): Watching Carefully | Enduring … [...]

[Arshama]

Thanks, Barry, that is good news. Hopefully it affects the IRGC mafias, plundering our country.

Attacks on dissident clerics continue in Yazd, this time on ayatollah Saddughi (FP) bureau, but also on the SL's representative bureau in Yazd province:
http://www.parlemannews.ir/index.aspx?n=7063
I wonder, why the regime does not recognize that it is playing with fire. Unleashing the Bassidji thugs will cause mayhem and and destabilize the country even more.

[Catherine]

@ Arshama
Thanks for all your great links. I read (and appreciate) as many of the English-language articles you suggest as I have time for. Here's something from a Persian blog that intrigues me - apparently about goings on in EshratAbad Prison. Can you give a brief summary of the contents?
http://arasnews.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post.html

[Arshama]

Hmm, quite quiet here today ...
Even more than a week after Ashura, Tehran is under siege, haunted by mobile patrol units and bassij motor-bike plainclothesmen. But the people continue to spread anti-government graffiti, and municipality employees are tired of cleaning up the walls, overpasses, traffic signs and campaign banners: http://www.roozonline.com/english/news/newsitem/article/2010/january/08//tehran-under-siege-of-security-agents-1.html

[Catherine]

RE 0320 GMT: A broader way to consider this is that Mortazavi’s fate is a “firewall” for the Ahmadinejad Government. If he is punished, the line might be held against pressure on others, including the President.

But what about reports that "pro AN basiji students question his decision to appoint Mortazavi as head of Drug Police" (via http://twitter.com/sbelg)? If true, maybe they're too late building the firewall.

[Arshama]

@ Catherine
You're welcome. Already yesterday a blog reported on 500 Ashura detainees held under terrible conditions in Eshrat Abad garrison, here a picture (unconfirmed):
http://persianarchives.blogspot.com/2010/01/blog-post_8956.html
arasnews reports further that Eshrat Abad is an illegal detention centre of IRGC and Bassij forces, and that these prisoners are not on the list of security forces. Two persons died within 48 hours after arrest because of severe torturing, which is continued. All reports call it a second Kahrizak.

[shangool]

SL speech in Qom

http://mikverbrugge.tumblr.com/post/324995061/in-qom-sls-first-appearance-since-ashura

http://www.twitlonger.com/show/33h8f

[ange paris]

Shangool
If it's true, I thing our friend, SL, have wake up a little bit too late ! Iranians people have lost a lot in this fight !
All the people who have killed, tortured or raped have to be punished; himself has to be removed , Iran is not a " dynasty" respecting our constitution and also his sharp and clever president Mr AN has to have this same fate ! and only, in these conditions our innocent people could forgive what has happened in our country and forget the hell in wich they have lived for too long time !

[ange paris]

Shangool
sorry for my mistakes ! replace "thing" by "think" and " have wake up" by "has waked up", sorry again!

[Arshama]

NIOC refuses to import Venezuelan petroleum due to low octane percentage and high shipping costs. http://fardanews.com/fa/pages/?cid=100196
Perhaps AN visited Bahrain to demand increased imports, the Emirates and India being actually Iran's main fuel providers.

[Arshama]

Shangool & Ange Paris
Reuters' headline on SL speech reads quite different: Iran Supreme Leader urges firm action over riots / http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE6080VJ20100109?sp=true
Did they listen to a different speech?

[Thomas]

Who is Saeed Mortazavi's spirtual advisor?

[Catherine]

@ Arshama
Thanks. I'd been reading reports about a missing 500 Ashura detainees for a while and was indeed afraid the tweets I saw yesterday about Eshrat Abad as a "second Kahrizak" might be related. I wonder whether the SL is in control at all anymore...

[kevina]

FYI, the LA Times seems to view KH's speech in a way similar to Verbrugge.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nation-and-world/la-fg-iran-khamenei10-2010jan10,0,5472926.story" rel="nofollow">Linky

[Arshama]

@ Catherine
Peyke Iran published this news on 4 January already, filed as an incoming report. http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=11708
Unfortunately no additional information so far. I have no idea, who is ruling this country neither.

@ Scott
Welcome back!
Apparently the SL did not mention AN in his speech, at least no indication in Mehr News or False News: http://www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID=1013939
http://www.farsnews.net/newstext.php?nn=8810190966

[Arshama]

Sorry for this Persian line, but it is too funny:
بارالها، ما حال نداریم به راه راست هدایت شویم، خودت راه راست را به سوی ما کج کن
O Lord, we are not in the mood to be directed to the right path, turn it off to us yourself ;-)

[Hossein]

The Eshratabad disaster is true, innocent people mostly youth are being tortured to death--a few have died to date. The picture in the link given by 7 is of Kahrizak though. I strongly urge anyone with more information to send them.

[ange paris]

Ashama
I have heard your #18 as a joke ; it's the story of an opium man who prays and says :

بارالها، ما حال نداریم به راه راست هدایت شویم، خودت راه راست را به سوی ما کج کن
O Lord, we are not in the mood to be directed to the right path, turn it off to us yourself ;

Because an opium man , through force of circumstance ( smoking a lot) becomes motionless !!(kouharekat !)

[Scott Lucas]

A big thanks to all of you for serving as EA reporters today. I haven't have time yet to pick up on all your links and lines of analysis but will do so in an analysis to start the day tomorrow.

S.

[Samuel]

Interestingly Juan Cole who is certainly no friend of the IRI defends the Leverett piece and the Authors even as he openly disagrees with their assesment of the Greens.

"I concur with much of what Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett say in their piece, which argues that Iran gives no evidence of being on the verge of revolution. I should say that I know and admire them, and share their conviction that the Obama administration should engage the government in Tehran, whatever it is. We had diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and face to face talks all through the 1980s, at a time when that regime really was on the verge of falling. You can't know the future. Diplomacy, as Kissinger correctly observed, is a game played with the pieces that are actually on the board at any one time.

But I do not share their dismissive attitude to the Green movement. I think it is big, nation-wide, multi-class and significant. And I fear that they have fallen for the regime's phony counter-demonstration on Dec. 30 as a sign of wide and deep support for the regime."

http://www.juancole.com/

[Samuel]

With all due respect to EA I think it owes the Leveretts the courtesy of posting their very thorough response to their critics.

LEVERETTS RESPOND TO CRITICS
Posted on January 7th, 2010 Our Op Ed, “Another Iranian Revolution? Not Likely”, in The New York Times on January 6 is eliciting very strong reactions from many quarters. Much of the reaction is critical, which is fine and was very much what we anticipated, given the subject. We thought it might be useful to respond to some of the more widely displayed themes in the critical commentary on our piece.

One theme, which was especially prominent in Dan Drezner’s commentary on our Op Ed that was posted on his blog at ForeignPolicy.com , was the notion that we “cherry picked” numbers comparing the crowds participating in the Ashura protests of December 27 and those in the pro-Islamic Republic rallies on December 30. In particular, Dan says that we left out a report of “hundreds of thousands” of anti-government Ashura protestors in The New York Times and a report of only “tens of thousands” participating in the December 30 pro-Islamic Republic rallies published in the Los Angeles Times.

On this issue—first of all, we did not cite the New York Times and Los Angeles Times pieces mentioned by Dan because the crowd numbers they used were not sourced in way. Moreover, the reference to “hundreds of thousands” of Ashura protesters in the New York Times piece—which was reported from Toronto—appeared to us to conflate the large numbers of people who were on the street for Ashura (something that happens every year in Tehran and other Iranian cities) with those who came out under cover of the Ashura crowds to protest. This is, in our view, a critical distinction that needs to be drawn in any analysis of the events of December 27.

For our own analysis, we decided to use crowd figures for both the Ashura protests and the pro-Islamic Republic demonstrations on December 30 that came from sources inside Iran. For the Ashura protests, we drew on a range of figures—the upper limit, drawn from anti-government websites, was “tens of thousands”, not the unsourced “hundreds of thousands” used by the New York Times journalist filing from Toronto. That formulation—“tens of thousands”, and citing opposition websites—was also used in several Western wire service stories. We also had Iranian sources who said that the actual number of Ashura protestors—as opposed to people who were out on the streets for normal Ashura commemorations—was much smaller; those sources that defined the lower end of the spectrum of figures were found from sources inside Iran.

With regard to the crowd figures for the pro-Islamic Republic rallies on December 30, the “tens of thousands” figure used in the Los Angeles Times story referenced by Dan Drezner is not attributed to any source. When we reviewed figures available from sources inside Iran, it was striking to us that a conservative website that is widely read in Iran, well-regarded by many across the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum for the quality of its coverage, and had opposed Ahmadinejad’s re-election reported that one million people participated in the pro-Islamic Republic rally in Tehran. (That website is Tabnak which is associated with Mohsen Rezae—who ran against incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in last year’s presidential election.) Our own contacts in Tehran and photographic evidence of the crowd and its distribution over specific parts of the city bolstered our assessment that the figure of one million participants was very plausible. (For those who wish to view photos of the December 27 protests and the December 30 rallies, we posted some on www.TheRaceForIran on January 6; click here .)

Others, including Andrew Sullivan and Scott Lucas, criticized our comparison of the December 27 and December 30 crowds by discounting the larger numbers who turned out to support the Islamic Republic on December 30 on the grounds that some of the participants in the pro-Islamic Republic rallies were reportedly ordered to take part and received free transport, cake, and tea. From a strategic perspective, the most important point here is the comparison between Iran today and in 1978-1979: when protests started against the Shah, there was no level of state coercion or any amount of tea, cake, or free transportation that could bring significant numbers of people into the street to rally for the Pahlavi regime. By contrast, the Islamic Republic retains an obvious and demonstrable capacity to elicit such manifestations of support—and that reinforces our argument that the Islamic Republic is not imploding. In this regard, we would note the following passage from Daniel Larison’s “Eunomia” blog, published by The American Conservative:

As expected, Andrew [Sullivan] didn’t like the Leveretts’ Op Ed, which he calls part of “their campaign to diminish the significance of the Iranian uprising”. They might say that they are interested in correctly assessing the significance of any uprising in order to make their policy recommendations as realistic as possible. After all, if Western policymakers start banking on domestic political unrest to undermine the Iranian government in a major way, they will pursue policies that would be very different than if they assume that the current Iranian government is not changing and not going anywhere…Of course, it might have some bearing on the real power of the Iranian government vis-à-vis the opposition that it can conjure up a crowd of a million “supporters” to the opposition’s tens of thousands. Andrew is right that the opposition protestors face far more risks and dangers, which is why the immediate post-election protests seemed so impressive and why the latest cycle of protests points to the steady weakening of the opposition.

We are indeed interested in correctly assessing the significance of the “uprising” in order to make our policy recommendations as realistic as possible. And, in that regard, we agree with the assessment that the opposition is getting weaker, not stronger, over time. Conversely, we respectfully disagree with Juan Cole and others who argue that the ground is shifting in favor of the Green movement and against the regime. We have learned much from Juan’s scholarship and writing over the years and appreciate his statement of admiration for our work and support for our argument that “the Obama administration should engage the government in Tehran, whatever it is”. But we do not believe that we have “a blind spot toward the most significant movement of popular mobilization in thirty years”. Rather, we are not persuaded that this movement will have a strategically determinative influence on Iranian politics or foreign policy.

We would use an important historical precedent to underscore this point. In 1997, Khatami’s victory in the Islamic Republic’s presidential election surprised virtually everyone—including, by all accounts, the Supreme Leader and other power centers in Tehran—and was widely interpreted in the West as something that the Leader and Iranian conservatives were “forced” to accept. The following year, the assassination in Iran of four dissident intellectuals and the wife of one of the four by what Khatami described as “rogue” intelligence agents prompted considerable public outrage. A year later, the Islamic Republic experienced unprecedented and nationwide student protests. The accumulation of these events led many observers in the West to conclude that the Islamic Republic’s political structure was surely losing its foundations in Iranian society and that momentum was on the side of those who wanted fundamental political change. But this was wrong.

In the first years of the George W. Bush administration’s tenure, we heard then-National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice say that the United States should not engage with Khatami’s administration—comparing Khatami to Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union’s last days and arguing that engaging Khatami would only “prop up” a collapsing system and prevent the United States and its allies from reaping the benefits of fundamental political change in Iran. Rice’s misreading of the internal situation in Iran at that time and her corresponding policy recommendations are eerily similar to arguments offered today that the United States should not pursue serious engagement with the Islamic Republic because it is imploding. (Again, that is not Juan Cole’s position, and we enjoyed his reference to Henry Kissinger’s observation that “diplomacy is a game played with the pieces that are actually on the board at any one time”.)

We have seen, literally, no evidence that those who protested the results of the June 12, 2009 presidential election—much less those who are now calling for the Islamic Republic’s replacement by a (presumably secular) “Iranian Republic”—represent anything close to a majority of Iranians. On this point, even the dissident journalist Akbar Ganji warns Iranian oppositionists that “it should not be forgotten that most of Iran’s people are still religious…Activists from the Green Movement should be very careful not to say anything that would result in a deeper divide based on religion”.

With regard to the U.S. policy debate, it is certainly true, as one of our correspondents pointed out, that not everyone in the United States who believes America should be supporting the opposition in Iran advocates military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets and defining “regime change” as the ultimate goal of U.S. policy toward Iran. But, just as clearly, neoconservatives and others who have long opposed U.S. engagement with the Islamic Republic and instead advocate military action and support for regime change in Tehran are using what we believe is an increasingly widespread misreading of Iranian political dynamics in the United States to promote their preferred policy agenda. Of course, we have long been opposed to the neoconservative policy agenda on Iran, and have worked for some time to define an alternative course for U.S. policy—strategically grounded engagement with the Islamic Republic, with the aim of resolving U.S.-Iranian differences and realigning U.S.-Iranian relations. On this point, we would also note Daniel Larison’s observation that negotiating with Iran is

the only realistic option there is. The hostage crisis ended 29 years ago, and the barracks bombing in Lebanon was over 26 years ago, and by this time after our war with Vietnam we had already normalized relations and had begun engaging in commerce with them. Considering how much more reason many Americans had to dislike and distrust Vietnam’s communist government, it is extraordinary that it has taken us less time to bury the hatchet with Hanoi than it has with Tehran.

Some say that our policy preferences have unduly skewed our analysis of Iran’s internal dynamics. Others have written to say, in what seem to us non-specific terms, that we do not understand Iranian society or current conditions on the ground in the Islamic Republic. There is certainly much that we do not know about Iran, and we welcome challenges that improve our understanding and knowledge base. However, we would ask that those who want to challenge our analysis of this critically important country do so by putting facts, data, information, and relevant history on the table, as we have tried to do—and not by making vague and unsubstantiated claims about our competence or motives.

We saw, first hand, as career U.S. government officials detailed to the National Security Council in George W. Bush’s White House, how prominent neoconservatives distorted and misused intelligence to support a particular policy agenda—and how many in Congress, the media, and the commentariat failed to ask hard questions about the rush to war in Iraq. We cannot speak for others in the media or commentariat today. For ourselves, however, we can say that we are determined to be as rigorous as possible in our assessment of Iranian developments and arguments about the best course for U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic.

We look forward to continuing the conversation.

–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett

[Ali]

Forget all the useless metaphors the Leveretts are using, there is one central point in their argument that completely renders everything they're saying obsolete:

"the opposition is getting weaker, not stronger, over time."

If anything, the events on the ground are proving the exact opposite. This is a marathon and time is on the opposition's side. The government is losing more of its legitimacy every single day. There's more infighting happening as time goes by. The economy is getting weaker, which means more people will start voicing their dissatisfaction, and the regime will finally collapse once this spreads to the bazaar.

[Barry]

"On this point, even the dissident journalist Akbar Ganji warns Iranian oppositionists that “it should not be forgotten that most of Iran’s people are still religious…”."

This is true!!! - but it is not the whole truth. Indeed, it shows a very shallow understanding of the many aspects of a human being's existence. Religion is just one of them.

There have been many times in past history when a nation of people have co-existed with their evil controlling Government. There have even been many cases where the majority probably did even support that Government. Largely, people just wish to get on with THEIR life and survive. In the case of, say, East Germany, the Government held all of the cards. The majority of people didn't like it - but they did not have much choice in the matter. BUT - a Government and country such as East Germany cannot prosper. And sooner or later, the pain that the people feel through that lack of prosperity becomes greater than the pain that the Regime inflicts upon them. Then - they emerge from their homes.

It is true that at this stage, the masses in Iran (religious or not) still have not emerged from their homes. Many of them still benefit from the Iranian Regime - while others are still not hurting enough. Their personal cost/benefit ratios are still not negative enough for them to emerge and take action.

But change is coming! No doubt about it - from now on, it will be all about the declining Iranian economy, something that the Regime is not able to control. They still have the security apparatus functioning - as did the East Germans right up to the fall of the wall. But strict control of security and religion is not what holds countries together long.

Barry

[Bozorg]

The gist of Khamenei's speech: we need to suppress with more finesse.

Anyone who thinks this intransigent crook will make any genuine concessions needs a cold shower. The flurry of so-called conciliatory gestures is a ploy to stifle the opposition's momentum. I really hope people don't fall for it.