Iran Analysis: What Now for the Green Movement?

Mr Verde writes for EA:

Three days after Bahman, we are still trying to pin down the size and significance of the events. Some claims can be dealt with as exaggerations: the regime's assertion that up to 50 million Iranians, in a country of 70 million, came out in support of the regime appears to be the silliness of spiralling rhetoric. Others can't be verified: the opposition argues that many of the people on the streets on that day were actually Green supporters who were marching in silence.

What we can "know", from the amateur footage that has had to substitute for a banned or restricted foreign media, is the heavy security presence on the streets of Tehran and elsewhere in Iran and the brutal suppression of opposition supporters. Those images were  reinforced in a series of interviews by two of Mehdi Karroubi’s sons (the third was arrested and beaten)  describing the attack on their father's entourage and the greatest security clampdown since the June elections.

We can surmise from Google's satellite photo of Azadi Square and surrounding streets at the time of the  main rally that there were sparse crowds in the square and that who were attending had been brought in by the large numbers of parked buses in the area, Amature footage taken of the crowd suggests that most who were there had little enthusiasm for supporting the government or the regime.



No matter how few the pro-government numbers were or how indifferent they seemed, the Greens were hoping for more of a show of presence on that day; in that sense, the regime may have achieved one of its goals. Yet that suppression also brought a "victory" for the opposition, who generated publicity for their cause because of the security forces’ brutal suppressions. By its actions before 22 Bahman and on that day, the regime has demonstrated how scared it is of the Green Movement. There have been trials, executions, arrest, threats, mass mobilization of security forces, and of crowds for rallies. There has been use of tear gas against a 72 year-old cleric who was a regime-approved Presidential candidate only eight months ago (Mehdi Karroubi).

But is this exposure of a regime's nervousness and fear enough to bring success?

The Green Movement is made up of a loose collection of widely varying groups, ranging from Islamic Republic reformists to exiled opposition organisations.  Originally the movement was calling for cancellation of the presidential elections, which it said was fraudulent, but the authorities' ignorance of that call and response with brute force brought the perception that the problem was the Islamic Republic’s entire system of governance.

The question is no longer just the legitimacy of the Ahmadinejad Government, but the legitimacy of the Republic and its core values like velayat-e-faqih (ultimate clerical supremacy). The slogans on the streets shifted from “where is my vote?” to “death to Khamenei”. At the same time there were signs of strain within the Green Movement. Some factions, mostly exiled groups allied to the movement, were calling for dismantlement of the Islamic Republic and a new Constitution. Others, mostly the leaders within Iran, were calling for reform of Islamic Republic, but within its Constitution.

As the protests continued, and especially after the events of Ashura (27 December), which did more damage to the Islamic credentials of the regime than any other single event, the Movement’s leaders within the establishment --- Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami and other senior clerics and politicians --- have started questioning the legal and religious legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Mousavi said that the 1979 Islamic Revolution had failed to achieve its original aim of eradicating tyranny and dictatorship in Iran, and Karroubi said that he does not believe in the form of the Republic that exists in Iran today. This was a dramatic shift in a short period of time. Significantly Mousavi, Karroubi and the other opposition leaders were basing their new assessments on the actions of the regime, not on a change of heart or political values.

So it seems that the regime by its own actions has managed to discredit itself to the point that even its own former high-ranking officials are now openly questioning its legitimacy. These pronouncements by the Movement’s leaders in Iran reduce the gap between their stance and that of the external opposition. They also re-confirm that the actual movement is based and operates in Iran, with the overseas based opposition acting in an important supporting role.

The Green Movement has demonstrated that it has widespread support and is adaptable. But this is not enough for its success. Part of the problem is that the Movement is facing a leadership in the Islamic Republic in the form of Ayatollah Khamenei, who seems to be intent on proving he was right when on 13 June he declared the election was over and there was no crisis. The regime seems to be backing itself into a corner with every action it takes, but the Green leadership is not able to bring about the reforms that it says (and promised during the presidential campaign) are needed to rescue the regime and the country. There is a dangerous stalemate as Khamenei declares, "You are either with me, or we all go down together."

The immediate Green re-assessment has been of tactics. The Green Movement has been using the regime’s own many public occasions to make its persistent presence known. Usually this has taken the form of taking to the routes that are announced for the official marches, but using Green signs and slogans. If the Greens were stopped from taking part in the announced routes, they would disperse across a wide area and continue with their protests. This would not allow the Greens to gather in large numbers, but it would stretch the resources of the security forces to breaking point (and as seen on Ashura to their humiliating retreat in some places).

For 22 Bahman, Mousavi called for Green supporters to take part in the official marches, but with their own markings (green signs).  Seeing the success of the protestors against the riot police on Ashura, some from within the movement called for a “Trojan Horse” approach. Protestors would dress like the government supporters with no visible signs of green, try to get in front of the podium, and then heckle Ahmadinejad. A few were even speculating whether they could pull a “Ceaucescu” on him, referring to the Romanian dictator who was overthrown and executed in 1989.

It seems the events of Ashura had got to some people’s heads. They had forgotten that this is primarily a movement for peaceful and gradual change and not for violent revolution or public executions.  While 22 Bahman may seem a disappointment to some, just try to imagine if the “Trojan Horse” tactic was actually carried out. It could have led to open street fights between well equipped security forces and the empty handed protestors. It could have been a bloodbath.

The lesson? In the run-up to 22 Bahman, there was much anticipation in the opposition camp, but no real sign of a proper action plan. Everyone was talking about “something” happening, but no one was able to say “what” or by “what means” or indeed “what next”.

And this is the weakness of the Green Movement. While the leadership is becoming more articulate in stating its views and aims, it is failing to define a tactical plan of action and passing it onto its supporters.  It is looking like a strong army with numerous and brave soldiers and clever generals but weak communications. This is partly due to the heavy government crackdown. Almost all of Mousavi’s and Karoubi’s advisors are in prison, there is no independent media, satellite TV channels are disrupted, and the Internet is heavily filters and at times disconnected.

There is another problem, however: the movement’s growth and success in a short period of time. On the morning of 13 June (the day after the elections) no one would have been able to predict that the regime would be forced to lock down Tehran as a military camp and bus in foreign journalists, like children being taken to an out-of-town attraction, for Ahmadinejad’s 22 Bahman speech.

The pressure of the public protests have put the regime on the back foot and caused it make numerous errors of judgement that would come back and haunt it in the future. But the leadership of the Green Movement has not been able to tap into the full potential of the protest. Although it has managed to clarify its aims, it has not yet produced a clear road map.

The events of the past eight months have proven that the regime is not able to quash it. But the Green Movement is no longer content with just existing and surviving; it has passed its phase of vulnerability and infancy and now feels mature enough to be looking for actual results from its own actions, rather than just surviving the regime onslaught. The expectations prior to 22 Bahman point to this. Here lies the challenge for its leadership.

With the regime has been reduced to a point where it is celebrating its own survival rather than success, healthy debate is starting within the movement about its future directions and tactics (for example, whether to just stick to the current practice of attending the government marches, or to starting looking towards public strikes, etc.). This discussion, however, cannot just circulate amongst the grassroots if regime weakness is to be converted into positive change.

Mir Hossein Mousavi has on several occasions called the people the true leaders of the Green Movement. He calls himself one of the Movement’s followers. This is all well when trying to credit the people for the movement’s resilience, but it is time for the movement’s leaders to put aside modesty and actually lead the movement with tactical direction.  If they are for any reason unwilling or unable to do so, they need to make it clear.