The Latest from Iran (28 February): What Do The Statements Mean?

2045 GMT: Sunday Absurdity. A slow day, which leading to a perusing of opinion in the newspapers. Unfortunately, that turns up a piece of anti-Muslim diatribe posing as analysis by Ephraim Karsh in The New York Times: "Muslims Won't Play Together". The slurs have to be read to be believed, but here is the policy recommendation: "A military strike must remain a serious option: there is no peaceful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stemming as they do from its imperialist brand of national-Islamism."

NEW Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview

1700 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has been at a conference in Tehran attended by Palestinian leaders such as Hamas' Khaled Meshaal, Islamic Jihad's Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Ahmed Jibril. Ahmadinejad offered this commentary:

With God's grace and thanks to the Palestinian resistance the occupying Zionist regime has lost its raison d'être. [Israel's] presence even in one inch of the region's soil causes threat, crisis and war. The only way to confront them (Israelis) is through the Palestinian youths' resistance, and that of the regional nations.

1435 GMT: US-Israel Front (cont.). Haaretz has more on Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak's Iran manoeuvres after his US trip (see 0955 GMT). Barak had indicated earlier that Israel would not pursue military action but would look for tougher sanction; however, in a talk in Washington, he returned to the formula that "everything is on the table":

It's clear to me that the clock toward the collapse of this regime works much slower than the clock which ticks toward Iran becoming a nuclear military power. And this is the reason why simultaneously with diplomacy and effective sanctions, we recommend to all players not to remove any option from the table and we adopt this attitude for ourselves as well.

1400 GMT: Political Prisoner News. Journalist Ali Hekmat, editor-in-chief of the banned newsaper Khordaad, has been released after two months in detention. Civil rights activist Jamshid Zarei has also been freed.

1325 GMT: That Larijani Fellow. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing to grab headlines after his trip to Japan, has spoken to the Majlis about the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, "Fortunately, his confessions confirmed our previous information on the close cooperation between the US and NATO and the terrorist grouplet."

1300 GMT: No Protests. A day after Mir Hossein Mousavi called for the regime to allow rallies, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has given a sharp rejection:

Even though some go on trying to agitate the atmosphere in society with statements... they've been given the answer by the people. We will not witness street demonstrations and we will not allow anyone to come to the streets to disrupt public security without proper permits....

Even though threats against the revolution will not come to an end, we will not succumb and certainly one day in the not so distant future despair will take them and they will surrender. The file on the election has been closed and law enforcement agencies have been asked to preserve security.

Having wielded a large stick, Doulatabadi offered a small carrot with the promise that some post-election detainees would be released before the Iranian New Year.

1220 GMT: O" the Economic Front. Kalemeh denounces President Ahmadinejad's slogan of bringing oil income to people's tables, comparing it with "vanished billions" in revenues.

Rah-e-Sabz reports on a protest at an Isfahan steel plant over seven months of unpaid wages.

1215 GMT: Bluster of Day. Deputy Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami warns, "Iran is standing on 50% of world's energy resources. If it decides to do so, Europe will spend the winter in the cold."

1205 GMT: Maintaining His Silence. The Supreme Leader used a meeting with Tehran's ambassador to take a nationally-televised swipe at the International Atomic Energy Agency, "Measures and reports of the agency show its lack of independence.... Unilateral acts erode trust in this institution and the United Nations and it is very bad for the reputation of these international assemblies."

No news there, as it is a restatement of Iran's public line on the IAEA, a day before the Agency's four-day discussion of a draft report on Tehran's nuclear programme. What is more intriguing is the Supreme Leader's lack of reference to Ali Larijani's manoeuvres in Japan for "third-party enrichment" (see 0935 GMT).

1155 GMT: MediaWatch. Leading US newspapers have noted and evaluated the Mousavi interview. Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times leads with Mousavi's accusation of the regime's "wasteful exercise" of 22 Bahman (11 February) but then puts his key point, "Mousavi offered few specifics on what the so-called green movement should do next."

In The Washington Post, Thomas Erdbrink  takes a similar line with Mousavi's denuncation of the Government as a "gang with no respect for Iran's interests" and the note that "he did not, however, propose new strategies". Nazila Fathi has a shorter piece in The New York Times, following the Associated Press, with the criticism of the Iranian leadership as a dictatorial "cult" but with no comment on Mousavi's goals.

0955 GMT: On the US-Israel Front. Laura Rozen has an intriguing reading of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's appearance at the Washington Institute of Near Policy, after his meetings with senior Obama Administration officials:

It became quite clear that [Barak] did not want to answer [a] question about the state of U.S.-Israel relations on Iran....It was his impression that Washington believes that, while it’s highly undesirable, at the end of the day the U.S. could live with a nuclear Iran; [however] for Israel, Barak said, it would be a “tipping point” in the strategic equation in the region.

0945 GMT: Today's Propaganda Special. Iranian state media pronounces, "Rigi planned to meet Holbrooke in Kyrgyzstan", which paints the picture of the Jundullah leader sitting down with President Obama's special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke.

The source? "Famous Washington, D.C. based investigative journalist and reporter Wayne Madsen". Funny, but I don't actually see that on the website of "famous reporter" Madsen.

Safer, I think, for Iran's loudspeakers to rely on "Iranian forces bust terrorist cell in Azarbaijan".

Meanwhile, Jundullah has chosen a new leader to succeed Rigi.

0940 GMT: Speaking of Larijani. Ali Larijani has avoided the nuclear issue on his return to Iran from Japan, issuing instead an un-controversial condemnation of US policy in Afghanistan and an announcement that Japanese officials are willing to cooperate with Iran on the reconstruction of the Afghan infrastructure.

0935 GMT: The Larijani Debate. Elsewhere, there is a spirited discussion going on, as Ali Larijani returns to Iran from a five-day trip, over the significance of his manoeuvres in Japan, especially on the nuclear programme.

I stand by the reading that Larijani's sudden embrace of "3rd-party enrichment" (no doubt backed by the Supreme Leader) is a political move meant not only to keep open links with the international community but to out-manoeuvre and even push aside President Ahmadinejad. Mr Verde is more cautious:

I think Larijani’s talk of enrichment by Japan is an attempt by the Islamic Republic to break or slow down the anti-Iran posturing. Larijani may be chipping away at Ahmadinejad, but it is all with Supreme Leader's permission.

The post-elections protest shocked the regime and Khamenei. And the Larijani/[Ahmad] Tavakoli spat with Ahmadinejad is possibly an attempt to show that the Republic is not just one voice (that of the Supreme Leader) but it actually tolerates dissent.

A well-placed EA contact, however, is dismissive that there is any significance, writing of "incremental
developments that oftentimes go nowhere".

0930 GMT: We have published a Sunday special: there is a summary of the official statement of the Assembly of Experts, and a detailed analysis by Mr Verde: "The institutions of the Islamic Republic are unable to pull it out of the current crisis. All that have any power (at least on paper) are under the direct, and at times illegal, control of Khamenei."

0745 GMT: It will be a slightly later start this morning, as we wrap up our coverage of the Chile earthquake and tsunami watch and also pick up on the important statements out of Iran.

We have posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Saturday interview with Kalemeh. Initial reading is both of a Mousavi trying to maintain the momentum of opposition but also carefully defining how far the challenge goes --- is it enough to call for the "spread of awareness", "free rallies", and "adherence to the Constitution" if the regime stands firm against even those measured demands? We'll think about that today, looking forward to an analysis on Monday.

Later today, however, we may have an equally important reading. The official statement of the Assembly of Experts, which did not appear for several days after last week's meeting, is now posted. Beyond its loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the references to the opposition are not clear. Was this really the declaration that "sedition" would be put down and opposition would longer be acceptable in the Iranian system?

The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2110 GMT: Khamenei v. Khomeini. Radio Zamaneh has more on the criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hasan Khomeini, by the Supreme Leader's representative in the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Saidi.

The conflict was sparked when the head of the Institute of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Publications, Mohammad Ali Ansari, wrote to Saidi to remind him of the Khomeini's insistence on no military intervention in politics, Ali Saidi then criticized Hassan Khomeini’s decision not to attend the August inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He alleged that the Ayatollah's grandson was standing against "the system and the Leader".

NEW Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mehrdad Bal Afkan, a senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party and Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, was arrested in Isfahan on Thursday.


2050 GMT: That "Path to Atonement" Thing (see 1915 GMT). Could the regime be setting up an offer of amnesty or reduced punishment for those who will give up their opposition? Alongside Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayer are the words of Iran's Attorney General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie: "If those who have been arrested in recent riots truly repent and compensate for the damages they have caused and correct their past conduct, they will be helped in the Appeals Court."

2005 GMT: Back to the Friday Prayer (see 1915 GMT). Ayatollah Jannati might have been a bit less hard-line than usual with the invocation that all the naughty protesters "to wake up and come to their senses", but I think he may have a message for a Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: “If the elite are not in accordance with the movement of these rioters, why don’t they protest against them and advise them?”

1945 GMT: Larijani Watch. Blink and you might miss the story....

Agence France Presse headlines a ritual denunciation by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking in Tokyo, of the International Atomic Energy Association and the "West":

One of the defects in the IAEA is that it changes positions and attitudes if it is put under certain political pressure. I think the IAEA should be an organisation that states its views based on concrete facts, but should not comment on something such as 'there is a possibility.

Yawn. It's only in the 8th paragraph that AFP gets to the real story, with Larijani repeating his Thursday welcome to "third-party enrichment" by Japan: "I don't know if you read the Japanese offer, but various proposals are made in it. We welcome this kind of subsurface-level initiative."

1915 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati taking the podium in Tehran, and a bit of a surprise. After all the talk this week of the "sedition" of the opposition, the hard-line head of the Guardian Council appears to have been a bit of a softie, declaring, "the path to atonement is still open". Of course, those who atone need to recognise that, on 22 Bahman, the Iranian people "showed that [they] do not fear enemies, threats or sanctions, are committed to [their] stances and are loyal to and believe in 'velayat-e-faqih' (clerical authority)."

1910 GMT: An EA Special. We've posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's latest interview, with his forthright defiance and the lament, "The Shah didn't behave like this."

1500 GMT: Nuclear Power Play. What a way to come back from an academic break. I find that Press TV is pushing the statement of the head of the Parliament's National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, declaring in Tokyo:

Japan's participation and involvement in the construction of Iran's power plants will serve the interests of Japanese state and private companies. Iran's suggests that Japan start its job from a particular point, by building a nuclear power plant inside the country.

How big? Boroujerdi is in Japan with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who announced yesterday that "third-party enrichment" is back on the table, with Japan enriching Iran's uranium stock. So the deal is laid out: the international community gets its oversight of Iran's nuclear fuel, Tehran gets a nuclear power programme with the assistance of Tokyo, and Larijani and his allies --- no doubt representing the wishes of the Supreme Leader --- also outflank President Ahmadinejad.

1130 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (cont.). Activist websites reported that the women's ward in Section 209 of Evin Prison is overcrowded, with cells holding seven detainees rather than the recommeded two or three. Most in Section 209 are academics.

The news follows the revelation of imprisoned journalist Bahman Ahmadi-Amoui that 40 prisoners are being held in a 20- meter cell in Evin.

1105 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A series of reformist members of Parliament and parties have asked the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. to release journalists and political activists for Iranian New Year, Nowruz. Pro-Ahmadinejad MPs replied that it is up to the judge to decide the status of detainees, and this has nothing to do with Nowruz.

1100 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad Watch. Even when he's in Japan, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is slapping at the President: he has declared that 34 of 39 proposals presented by the Government do not conform to the law.

1055 GMT: Khamenei, Khomeini, and the Revolutionary Guard. The Supreme Leader's representative in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi, has sharply answered the criticism of those who accuse the Revolutionary Guard of interference in political matters: when civilians attack the holy republic, how can the IRGC stand aside?

There were also pointed words for the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, Seyed Hassan Khomeini: how could he oppose the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system (nezam)?

1050 GMT: A slow political day, but that gives us the chance to feature a provocative analysis, from The Newest Deal, that the momentum for the Green Movement will come from the regime's rejection of Mir Hossein Mousavi's five proposals for justice and reform.

0810 GMT: The Committee for Human Rights Reporters posts that women’s rights activist Somayeh Rashidi has been released from Evin Prison after more than two months in detention.

0800 GMT: The big manoeuvres yesterday were within the regime, as key participants either tried to close the door on any challenge or to keep it slightly open for further manoeuvres. We've got two special analyses: Mr Verde takes a long look at this week's inconclusive, somewhat confusing Assembly of Experts meeting, featuring Hashemi Rafsanjani, and we assess the Supreme Leader's "not-so-big push" to secure his position.

Meanwhile, you could take your pick of sideshows. There was Iran's unsubtle propaganda push on captured Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi with his confession (see separate entry) as proof of US sponsorship. Bashir al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck their poses in Damascus, and US and Israeli officials met in Israel in a "strategic dialogue" which featured Iran's nuclear programme.

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts "The Certainty of the Uncertain"

Mr Verde follows up our analysis of the "mystery" of the Assembly of Experts statement/non-statement supporting the Supreme Leader and declaring that time has run out for a seditious opposition.



For the latest on the continuing politics, see our analysis of the Supreme Leader's "big push" and our latest updates:

The Assembly of Experts has been holding twice a yearly for many years. Most of its meetings are behind closed doors. The official reports of the meetings usually included a few set-piece and rather predictable speeches. And they were ignored by most people.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

The only notable “news” about the Assembly meetings in recent years was the 2007 election to replace the deceased Ali Meshkini as chair. Until then only one candidate stood in the election and was elected unanimously to show unity. This time, however, there were two candidates: Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.


Most people expected Jannati to win because Jannati heads the Guardian Council, which has to approve members of the Assembly. Rafsanjani had lost the second round of the 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad. Yet Rafsanjani beat Jannati. And then people again forgot about the Assembly and its sessions.

This was until the June 2009 presidential elections.

Soon after the disputed elections, a statement was released by the secretariat of the Assembly declaring that the members not only supported the Supreme Leader but they also supported the results. It later transpired that the statement was signed only by Mohammad Yazdi, a strong Ahmadinejad backer, a Guardian Council member close to Jannati, and the secretary of the Assembly. It was in effect Mohammad Yazdi’s opinion printed on Assembly letterhead.

Some of those hoping that the Islamic Republic would find a way out of the post-election crisis looked to the autumn session of the Assembly for a solution. They were disappointed, but this time they took note of the limited news of the Assembly’s proceedings. Mohammad Yazdi did not attend the meetings of that session, and citing his illness, he resigned as secretary of the Assembly. His resignation was rejected by Rafsanjani, who wished him a speedy recovery and return to his duties (a few days later Yazdi was pictured attending another event, which may point to illness being used as an excuse).

During the session some members criticised the actions of the regime and, by implication, the Supreme Leader. They were and still are attacked by the radical right for their stance.

Then during the final meeting, a strongly worded statement was read out on behalf of the Assembly by Ahmad Khatami, a hardline cleric and fervent supporter of Ahmadinejad. It was reported that Rafsanjani was not present during that part of the meeting and, later, that he had received a call from Khamenei asking him to attend a meeting with the Supreme Leader immediately. No news was ever published about the subject of this meeting was about and why it was it so urgent that Rafsanjani had to leave in the middle of the Assembly.

The struggle between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad supporters continued after the autumn session. At one point Rafsanjani was criticised, indeed threatened, by Yazdi. For the first time in the post-election crisis, Rafsanjani responded directly to an attack and said that he would reveal facts about Yazdi’s past actions. This lead to Yazdi calling a truce.

This week, Ahmadinejad supporters were hoping to create an atmosphere in which they could force Rafsanjani out as the head of the Assembly. The Yazdi attacks were accompanied by castigations of Rafsanjani’s family and political associates.

It seems that the plan to remove Rafsanjani has not worked, but there were no reports of speeches by critics of the current situation either. Instead, there were anomalies putting a question mark over the legitimacy of the meeting. Again Yazdi was absent because of "illness"; instead his son, who has no legal right to attend, was present.

Rafsanjani made a point of announcing the attendance of the younger Yazdi, raising speculation. Was the head of the Assembly effectively declaring that the body's status had been compromised? Was this a personal response to Yazdi, implying that he is so used to illegal actions that he would dare send his son to represent him? Or was Rafsanjani trying to protect the legitimacy of the gathering by citing "special circumstances"?

Yet the meeting was further damaged, at least in its official standing, by the absence of key members. Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini was either too ill or staged a personal boycott. (Amini, although a "conservative", stepped down as Friday Prayer leader of Qom because of his dissatisfaction with post-election events.) Rafsanjani ally Hassan Rohani was missing, as was Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, who had reportedly worked with Rafsanjani and others last autumn to forge a National Unity Plan. Perhaps most surprisingly, Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric reported to be Ahmadinejad’s religious mentor, was also a no-show.

So instead of ending in resolution, this week's meeting merely adds more puzzles and complications. The regime was trying to demontration both its unity after the events of 22 Bahman and its power, amidst symbolic developments like the launching of the Jamaran warship and the arrest of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. It wanted to present the image to the Iranian people that all is back to normal. Meeting Assembly members yesterday, the Supreme Leader tried to drive home the impression, emphasising that those who continued to question the June election were no longer acceptable in the Iranian system.

Rafsanjani served the regime to an extent by warning all to be careful that the arrows of criticism are not turned towards the Supreme Leader. Yet he later said, in a statement he repeated yesterday at Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum, that some officials are not taking responsibility for their own actions and are instead trying to push the blame onto Khamenei. (At one stage he said that we need to be careful that the crisis does not escalate further, using the word “toghyan”, which can be translated into English as insurrection or insurgency or uprising.)

So, just as the Assembly was far from "normal" with the absences and the continuing political manoeuvres within its ranks, the Islamic Republic is far from settled. In one moment, the call is "all is well". In the next, it is that "all should be well" with the threats against the opposition. And then, finally, with a wink and a nod, Hashemi Rafsanjani says "all might not be well" because of "uninformed individuals" (who are they?).

This is the certainty of the uncertain.

The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2110 GMT: Not-Over-The-Top Statement of Today. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying to a Congressional committee, reveals that the current manoeuvres over Iran's uranium enrichment are just like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis:

My reading of what happened with President Kennedy is that it's exactly what he did. It was high-stakes diplomacy. It was pushing hard to get the world community to understand, going to the UN, making a presentation, getting international opinion against the placement of Russian weapons in Cuba, making a deal eventually with the Russians that led to the removal of the weapons.

That is the kind of high-stakes diplomacy that I'm engaged in, that other members of this administration are, because we take very seriously the potential threat from Iran.

2100 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. After all the political positions (take your pick) he adopted at the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani used a ceremony at the tomb of the late Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a warning about "uninformed individuals" (who are they?): "These individuals shirk from their responsibilities and make irrelevant declarations, thus causing the leadership to bear the responsibility of all the actions that the people reject."

1935 GMT: Diplomatic Poses (cont.). Well, I guess Washington had to strike its own posture given the statements of President Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart Bashir al-Assad in Damascus today (1335 GMT). Here's State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

As the secretary [Hillary Clinton] reiterated yesterday, we have expressed our concern directly to President (Bashar) Assad about Syria's relationship with Iran. This is ultimately a decision that Syria has to make, but as President Assad assesses Syria's long-term interests, he need only look around the region and recognize that Syria is increasingly an outlier.

We want to see Syria play a more constructive role in the region. One step would be to make clear what Iran's need to do differently and unfortunately there was no evidence of that today.

The key here is that it is a spokesman making the statement, not the President, not the Secretary of State. Yes, of course, the US would prefer that Damascus put Iran into isolation. But they know that, given the regional dynamics, Syria will not publicly cut off Tehran. So the real diplomacy will take place away from these statements.

1925 GMT: Back from a lengthy academic break --- the US Ambassador to Britain was in Birmingham today --- to catch up on the full force of Iranian propaganda. Here is the "confession" of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, tailor-made to put the US as the main sponsor of his terrorism:

After Obama was elected, the Americans contacted us and they met me in Pakistan.They met us after clashes with my group around March 17 in (the southeastern city of) Zahedan, and he (the US operative) said that Americans had requested a meeting.

I said we didn't have any time for a meeting and if we do help them they should promise to give us aid. They said they would cooperate with us and will give me military equipment, arms and machine guns. They also promised to give us a base along the border with Afghanistan next to Iran.

They asked to meet me and we said where should we meet you and he said in Dubai. We sent someone to Dubai and we told a person to ask a place for myself in Afghanistan from the area near the operations and they complied that they would sort out the problem for us and they will find Mr. Rigi a base and guarantee his own security in Afghanistan or in any of the countries adjacent to Iran so that he can carry on his operations.

They told me that in Kyrgyzstan they have a base called Manas near Bishkek, and that a high-ranking person was coming to meet me and that if such high-ranking people come to the United Arab Emirates, they may be observed by intelligence people but in a place like Bishkek this high-ranking American person could come and we could reach an agreement on making personal contacts. But after the last major operation we took part in, they said that they wanted to meet with us.

The Americans said Iran was going its own way and they said our problem at the present is Iran…not al-Qaeda and not the Taliban, but the main problem is Iran. We don't have a military plan against Iran. Attacking Iran is very difficult for us (the US). The CIA is very particular about you and is prepared to do anything for you because our government has reached the conclusion that there was nothing Americans could do about Iran and only I could take care of the operations for them.

One of the CIA officers said that it was too difficult for us to attack Iran militarily, but we plan to give aid and support to all anti-Iran groups that have the capability to wage war and create difficulty for the Iranian (Islamic) system. They reached the conclusion that your organization has the power to create difficulties for the Islamic Republic and they are prepared to give you training and/or any assistance that you would require, in terms of telecommunications security and procedures as well as other support, the Americans said they would be willing to provide it at an extensive level.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
The Latest from Iran (24 February): Shocks and Erosions

1350 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Hengameh Shahidi has been arrested again.

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Foreign Minister and head of the Freedom of Movement Iran, underwent open heart surgery soon after his 10-day release yesterday. His family said that the surgery was a success.


1340 GMT: Trying to Shut the Door. The Supreme Leader has returned to his rhetoric of last June. In a statement reported by Iranian state media, he said those not accepting the results of the Presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system, and they have already lost their credibility". Certain individuals caused the post-election turmoil because they wanted to "deny the vote of the people."

1335 GMT: Damascus Poses. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have made their declarations during the Iranian President's visit.

Assad gave a lecture to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over her comments that the US is "troubled" by Syrian ties with Tehran, "We hope that others don't give us lessons about our region and our history. We are the ones who decide how matters will go and we know our interests. We thank them for their advice."

Ahmadinejad was even bolder, "(The Americans) want to dominate the region but they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that. We tell them that instead of interfering in the region's affairs, to pack their things and leave."

No real surprises in either man's pose. What is more important is whether there is any substantial support from Damascus for Iran, and more specifically Ahmadinejad, beyond the rhetoric of increased cooperation and cancelling of visa restrictions.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, vowed increased cooperation during a meeting in Damascus and canceled visa restrictions between the countries.
1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Update. An activist updates that Mousavi campaign aide Asghar Khandan has been sentenced to 2 years and 74 lashes. Another aide Jahanbakh Khanjani, a former senior official in the Ministry of Interior, has been released on bail after eight months in detention.

1038 GMT: Claim of Day. According to Kalemeh, Iran's Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mohammad Hosseini, has said that "there is no censorship" of the press.

1035 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is in Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. Let's see if he can trump Ali Larijani's political manoeuvre.

1000 GMT: Larijani's Nuclear Move. This looks like it may be big news. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, after talks with Japanese officials, has said Japan's offer to enrich Iran's uranium "has the substance to be worth discussing. We want to deepen the discussion on it."

That would be a major shift from Iran's line since November that uranium had to be enriched or swapped inside the country, and it is a dramatic change in Larijani's previous hostility to third-party enrichment. A likely assumption is that the Speaker is representing the views of the Supreme Leader.

So now the key political question: is Larijani also speaking for the President or is he making a move to claim personal credit, surpassing and pushing aside Ahmadinejad?

0950 GMT: The Rigi Mystery. It may be that Iranian state media, when it finally settled on the story that the leader of Jundullah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was detained on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, had it right (and that our reports of Rigi's detention last week were inaccurate). The deputy chief of Kyrgyzstan's national airline has confirmed that a plane was forced to land in Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on Tuesday (in fact, other information indicates that the interception occurred Monday night) and two passengers were taken away by Iranian authorities.

0905 GMT: The Wrong Lawyers. An unexpected but still stunning story from Rooz Online about the screening of "unsuitable" human rights lawyers:

Last week the administrative committee of Iran’s bar association has disqualified nearly half of the candidates seeking to serve on Iran’s bar association.

The official website of the Iranian Bar Association reported yesterday that 36 candidates running for management positions at the Association’s headquarters were disqualified. The Association’s President, Seyed Mohammad Jondoghi-Kermanipour...said, “Today we received a letter from the administrative judicial tribunal, which stated that, pursuant to their previous letter, only 43 candidates were qualified, the remaining candidates having been disqualified for failing to meet the specified criteria.”

[As well as] Jondoghi-Kermanipour, other prominent attorneys such as Abdolfatah Soltani, Naser Zarafshan, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, Mohammad-Ali Dadkhah, Nemat Ahmadi, Farideh Gheirat, Goudarz Eftekhar-Jahromi (former head of the Association), Ali Najafi-Tavana, Reza Nourbaha, Mohammad-Hossein Aghasi, Jahangir Mostofi, Akbar Sardarizadeh, Ramezan Haji-Mashadi have been disqualified.

0855 GMT: Satire of Day. Ebrahim Nabavi sets a Philosophy Quiz for readers. A sample question:

[Government spokesman] Gholam-Hossein Elham said, "Cutting off AN's government is the insurgents' next project." What is the logical mistake in this sentence?

1 - There exists no government to be cut off.
2 -  The government will be cut off by itself. There is no need for the insurgents to do anything.
3 - Even if the insurgents killed themselves, they could not stop the downfall of the government.
4 - The Agha [Supreme Leader] himself has started this project a long time ago.

0840 GMT: The Forgetful Assembly. Amidst the confusion over the statement/non-statement from the two-day meeting of the Assembly of Experts (see separate analysis), the Green website Rah-e-Sabz offers an overview of the divisions within the body since the election and declares that it is suffering from "Continuous Alzheimer's".

0825 GMT: Comparing the Numbers. Iran News Now, using video and photographs, compares the non-crowd at the President's speech in Birjand, Khorasan, yesterday with the masses who turned out for a Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign rally and concludes:

Let’s look at the crowd gathered in Birjand for Ahmadinejad...and let’s be realistic. This thing is FAR from over. The aspirations of the Iranian people will not go unheeded.

EA's Mr Verde adds, "The interesting fact about the turnout (if one can claim it is interesting at all) is that even in a place close to Ayatollah Khamenei’s hometown of Mashhad, people don’t really care about Ahmadinejad."

0820 GMT: Economy Watch. Mohammad Reza Khabbaz, a member of Parliament's Economy Committee, has denounced President Ahmadinejad's proposed budget as "unrealistic".

0815 GMT: This is a Secure Regime? Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Hamedani, in his statement yesterday, announced that the number of Basiji bases in Tehran would be increased from 6 to 22.

0800 GMT: Wednesday was marked by loud proclamations from the Government. There were the attempts to limit the damage of the video of June's attack on Tehran University dormitories, the aggressive promotion of the "terrorist" threat from Jundullah to Kurdish groups to the Green Movement, and the President's sparsely-attended speech in eastern Iran (see  inset.

However, the most intriguing statement by far was the supposed proclamation of the Assembly of Experts supporting the Supreme Leader and warning against the "sedition" of opposition leaders. This morning, however, it looks this was a non-statement, an attempt by pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly and media to create the image of a regime ready to crush Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami (and, probably, to back Hashemi Rafsanjani into a corner). We have a special analysis.

Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks

Mr Verde writes for EA:

For eight months now, there has been a steady stream of footage showing security forces beating up protesters. What sets apart the footage from the night of 24-25 Khordad 88 (14-15 June 09), shown by BBC Persian and disseminated by YouTube, is the cameraman. Almost all other videos have been taken by ordinary people on their cameraphones. (A few clips were taken by professional camera crews in the first days of the post-election protests in June, before they were expelled by the authorities.) This footage was taken by one of the attackers using a professional camera.

Latest Iran Video: The Attack on Tehran University Dormitories (14/15 June 2009)
The Latest from Iran (23 February): Sideshows and Main Events

Much of the amateur footage of the protests has shown security and intelligence agents filming the protestors. For the first time in eight months we are actually seeing one of these videos. In that sense, this is the first “official” footage confirming the brutality of the Islamic Republic’s security forces.


This footage confirms the allegations of extreme brutality by the security forces against the students on that night. It confirms the allegations that the police and plainclothes enforcers (referred to by Islamic Republic officials as “lebas shakhis”) work side-by-side. The attack was pre-planned and well-organized and carried out by uniformed police and these plainsclothesmen.

No one in the Islamic Republic accepts responsibility for the actions of the non-uniformed forces. Their actions are usually denied by officials or are attributed to unknown people (and sometimes blamed on foreign intelligence agencies). In the summer the Supreme Leader referred to the attack on the student dorms as crimes, but he added that the attacks were carried out by assailants who had not been identified (see video).

This video proves that either Khamenei, despite being the Supreme Leader, was not given the complete facts about the events or he was lying.

A few days ago, the Tehran Police Commander, Azizollah Rajabzadeh, was replaced. In his departing speech, he said that the police had not killed anyone in Tehran and that, after the elections, the police’s responsibilities and authority had been passed to the Seyyed-o-Shohada Command of the Revolutionary Guards, who are now in charge of Tehran. He was in effect defending himself and saying that the Guards were responsible for the violence against protesters.

The following day the commander the Seyyed-o-Shohada Command of the Revolutionary Guards was also replaced. Now this video was leaked to the press and public. Either this is an unauthorized leak, in which case the Islamic Republics security and intelligence services have serious problems, or this was officially sanctioned. If the latter, there could be different explanations:

* It could be an attempt to discredit the outgoing Tehran Police Commander and prove that the attack on the student dormitories was ordered by him (at one stage the cameraman is heard saying this). This could even set him up for prosecution.

* It could be an attempt to shift the blame for the post-election violence from the Revolutionary Guards into the police (at some points the plainclothes personnel, who could be assumed to be Ministry of Intelligence, Basij militia, or Guards operatives are seen asking the uniformed police not to beat the students).

* It could be an attempt to show that the police actions were coordinated with the Basij and the Guards (the Basij is now part of the Revolutionary Guards) and jointly carried out.

* It could be that someone from within the regime who is unhappy with the brutality has leaked the video, or it may have been leaked by someone or some group to gain political leverage within the establishment.

Whatever the motives behind the leak, the leaking of this video, the removal of two very senior security commanders of Tehran and the statement by the Tehran Police Commander may be an indication of problems behind the scenes. The past eight months have shown that there are serious rifts within the political leadership of the Islamic Republic, and these events may point to divisions within the security, military, and intelligence communities too.

Whatever the intention was for leaking this video, it has the effect of exposing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic as either an uninformed figurehead or a liar. Neither of these two possibilities bode well for the regime.