Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting....

URGENT UPDATE 1000 GMT: We've posted extracts from the interview in our latest updates.

0830 GMT: The Mousavi interview on Kalemeh has just come out. The takeaway line is "Spreading Awareness is the Goal of the Green Movement", but there is far more here to be read and analysed.

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Whisper it softly, because the "Western" media are still sleeping, but politics is on the move again in Iran.

Kalemeh, the website of Mir Hossein Mousavi, has put out advance notice this morning that an interview with Mousavi will be coming out later today. No word on content, but this follows last weekend's assurance from a Mousavi-Mehdi Karroubi meeting that they would soon be letting the Iranian people know of their plans and Karroubi's mid-week interviews with his website and with an Italian newspaper.

Meanwhile, in Japan, Ali Larijani is making a big push from within the establishment. The signal of a deal for Japan to carry out "3rd party enrichment" on Iran's uranium is a major international development, but its internal implications are just as significant. If Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has been in Syria, is on-board with the Larijani (and probably Larijani-Khamenei) manoeuvre, that points to a coordinated push to move n the nuclear issue and Iran's regional position. However, if the President is out of the loop on the initiative, then Larijani is establishing his credential as the major "secular" player in Iranian politics.


Incredibly, given the attention to the nuclear issue, not many "Western" journalists have noticed the Japan development. Instead, our favourite New York Times reporter, David Sanger, takes the award for If You Don't Know, Just Make Up Some Crazy Stuff. Sanger takes on the question of why Iran moved most of its low-enriched uranium to an above-ground facility two weeks ago (simple answer: Ahmadinejad and Co. wanted a very public demonstration that they could make at least a tiny bit of 20% uranium from 3.5% stock). Since he has no information other than Washington chit-chat (whether it is based on actual intelligence, rumour, or propaganda), this is where the piece winds up:

The strangest of the speculations — but the one that is being talked about most — is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is inviting an attack to unify the country after eight months of street demonstrations that have pitted millions of Iranians against their government.

A somewhat most significant story, albeit based on more over-statement comes from the address of Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defense Minister, to the Wasihngton Institute for Near East Policy:

Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak raised doubts Friday on the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear strike on his country.

I don't think the Iranians, even if they got the bomb, (will) drop it in the neighborhood. They fully understand what might follow. They are radical but not totally crazy.

Barak's signal came after meetings with US officials like Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In contrast to Sanger, the Israeli minister --- and the State Department --- are taking the rationale for an Israeli military attack on Iran off the table. The push will be for stricter economic sanctions.

Not that those sanctions are assured of an easy passage. Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov put out his own signal, eagerly received by Iran's state media:

There is no evidence that Iran has made a decision to produce nuclear weapons. If we go with the sanctions, we'll not go beyond the goal of our purpose of defending the nonproliferation regime.

We don't want the nonproliferation regime to be used for ... strangling Iran, or taking some steps to deteriorate the situation [and] the living standards of people in Iran.

That's not a total rejection of more sanctions but a carefully-worded statement that any new steps will have to be measured and only pursued after much discussion.

Which brings us back to the really interesting news. While the international show goes on, it is the Iranians themselves --- be it a Mousavi or a Larijani --- who deserve watching right now.

The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2110 GMT: Khamenei v. Khomeini. Radio Zamaneh has more on the criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hasan Khomeini, by the Supreme Leader's representative in the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Saidi.

The conflict was sparked when the head of the Institute of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Publications, Mohammad Ali Ansari, wrote to Saidi to remind him of the Khomeini's insistence on no military intervention in politics, Ali Saidi then criticized Hassan Khomeini’s decision not to attend the August inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He alleged that the Ayatollah's grandson was standing against "the system and the Leader".

NEW Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mehrdad Bal Afkan, a senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party and Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, was arrested in Isfahan on Thursday.


2050 GMT: That "Path to Atonement" Thing (see 1915 GMT). Could the regime be setting up an offer of amnesty or reduced punishment for those who will give up their opposition? Alongside Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayer are the words of Iran's Attorney General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie: "If those who have been arrested in recent riots truly repent and compensate for the damages they have caused and correct their past conduct, they will be helped in the Appeals Court."

2005 GMT: Back to the Friday Prayer (see 1915 GMT). Ayatollah Jannati might have been a bit less hard-line than usual with the invocation that all the naughty protesters "to wake up and come to their senses", but I think he may have a message for a Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: “If the elite are not in accordance with the movement of these rioters, why don’t they protest against them and advise them?”

1945 GMT: Larijani Watch. Blink and you might miss the story....

Agence France Presse headlines a ritual denunciation by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking in Tokyo, of the International Atomic Energy Association and the "West":

One of the defects in the IAEA is that it changes positions and attitudes if it is put under certain political pressure. I think the IAEA should be an organisation that states its views based on concrete facts, but should not comment on something such as 'there is a possibility.

Yawn. It's only in the 8th paragraph that AFP gets to the real story, with Larijani repeating his Thursday welcome to "third-party enrichment" by Japan: "I don't know if you read the Japanese offer, but various proposals are made in it. We welcome this kind of subsurface-level initiative."

1915 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati taking the podium in Tehran, and a bit of a surprise. After all the talk this week of the "sedition" of the opposition, the hard-line head of the Guardian Council appears to have been a bit of a softie, declaring, "the path to atonement is still open". Of course, those who atone need to recognise that, on 22 Bahman, the Iranian people "showed that [they] do not fear enemies, threats or sanctions, are committed to [their] stances and are loyal to and believe in 'velayat-e-faqih' (clerical authority)."

1910 GMT: An EA Special. We've posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's latest interview, with his forthright defiance and the lament, "The Shah didn't behave like this."

1500 GMT: Nuclear Power Play. What a way to come back from an academic break. I find that Press TV is pushing the statement of the head of the Parliament's National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, declaring in Tokyo:

Japan's participation and involvement in the construction of Iran's power plants will serve the interests of Japanese state and private companies. Iran's suggests that Japan start its job from a particular point, by building a nuclear power plant inside the country.

How big? Boroujerdi is in Japan with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who announced yesterday that "third-party enrichment" is back on the table, with Japan enriching Iran's uranium stock. So the deal is laid out: the international community gets its oversight of Iran's nuclear fuel, Tehran gets a nuclear power programme with the assistance of Tokyo, and Larijani and his allies --- no doubt representing the wishes of the Supreme Leader --- also outflank President Ahmadinejad.

1130 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (cont.). Activist websites reported that the women's ward in Section 209 of Evin Prison is overcrowded, with cells holding seven detainees rather than the recommeded two or three. Most in Section 209 are academics.

The news follows the revelation of imprisoned journalist Bahman Ahmadi-Amoui that 40 prisoners are being held in a 20- meter cell in Evin.

1105 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A series of reformist members of Parliament and parties have asked the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. to release journalists and political activists for Iranian New Year, Nowruz. Pro-Ahmadinejad MPs replied that it is up to the judge to decide the status of detainees, and this has nothing to do with Nowruz.

1100 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad Watch. Even when he's in Japan, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is slapping at the President: he has declared that 34 of 39 proposals presented by the Government do not conform to the law.

1055 GMT: Khamenei, Khomeini, and the Revolutionary Guard. The Supreme Leader's representative in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi, has sharply answered the criticism of those who accuse the Revolutionary Guard of interference in political matters: when civilians attack the holy republic, how can the IRGC stand aside?

There were also pointed words for the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, Seyed Hassan Khomeini: how could he oppose the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system (nezam)?

1050 GMT: A slow political day, but that gives us the chance to feature a provocative analysis, from The Newest Deal, that the momentum for the Green Movement will come from the regime's rejection of Mir Hossein Mousavi's five proposals for justice and reform.

0810 GMT: The Committee for Human Rights Reporters posts that women’s rights activist Somayeh Rashidi has been released from Evin Prison after more than two months in detention.

0800 GMT: The big manoeuvres yesterday were within the regime, as key participants either tried to close the door on any challenge or to keep it slightly open for further manoeuvres. We've got two special analyses: Mr Verde takes a long look at this week's inconclusive, somewhat confusing Assembly of Experts meeting, featuring Hashemi Rafsanjani, and we assess the Supreme Leader's "not-so-big push" to secure his position.

Meanwhile, you could take your pick of sideshows. There was Iran's unsubtle propaganda push on captured Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi with his confession (see separate entry) as proof of US sponsorship. Bashir al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck their poses in Damascus, and US and Israeli officials met in Israel in a "strategic dialogue" which featured Iran's nuclear programme.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push

No doubt this morning about the big news out of Iran. On Thursday, the Supreme Leader tried to lock down the security of his position once and for all, declaring that opposition leaders “have lost their credibility by denying the results of the elections. They did not surrender to the law and committed a great sin....[They] have stepped down from the rescue ship and have lost their credibility to remain within the framework of the Islamic establishment.”

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

So that's an unambiguous warning to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to shut up, for example, giving up on Karroubi's latest call for a referendum on the Guardian Council and for the regime's permission for mass protest. But Khamenei has made such statements before: he did so just after the June election, before the Qods Day marches in September, and before the Ashura demonstrations in December.


What is distinctive this time is that the Supreme Leader issued his declaration in a meeting with the Assembly of Experts, which had just finished its two-day meeting. The regime blueprint was for the Assembly to add its 86-member weight to a resolution of the crisis; the problem is that, for reasons which will take some time to establish, it did not so. The "statement" published on Fars News condemning the "sedition" of the opposition (was it a draft? a "leak" from a few pro-Khamenei or pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly?) was never officially confirmed.

So, in the absence of that resolution, here was the Supreme Leader's message. It was not the authorisation of the arrest of Mousavi and Karroubi (although, if either make a high-profile declaration with further demands and the prospect of a rally, this may change). Despite the insistence that the June election was settled, it was not support of President Ahmadinejad.

It was, to use the language of American football, "Protect Your Quarterback". Me.

Personal security, for the moment, equates to the security of the system of velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy). And, for the moment, that is accepted by all high-profile political figures. For all his ambiguities, Rafsanjani has done somersaults to be unambiguous on this point. Mousavi has never made a direct attack on Khamenei's position. And Karroubi, despite his "Mr Khamenei" statement last month, has ensured that his demands are narrowly focused on certain institutions --- the Iranian judiciary, the Guardian Council, the Presidency --- and not on velayat-e-faqih.

So, Supreme Leader/Quarterback, you're OK. And that is about all that can be settled....for the moment.

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts "The Certainty of the Uncertain"

Mr Verde follows up our analysis of the "mystery" of the Assembly of Experts statement/non-statement supporting the Supreme Leader and declaring that time has run out for a seditious opposition.



For the latest on the continuing politics, see our analysis of the Supreme Leader's "big push" and our latest updates:

The Assembly of Experts has been holding twice a yearly for many years. Most of its meetings are behind closed doors. The official reports of the meetings usually included a few set-piece and rather predictable speeches. And they were ignored by most people.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

The only notable “news” about the Assembly meetings in recent years was the 2007 election to replace the deceased Ali Meshkini as chair. Until then only one candidate stood in the election and was elected unanimously to show unity. This time, however, there were two candidates: Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.


Most people expected Jannati to win because Jannati heads the Guardian Council, which has to approve members of the Assembly. Rafsanjani had lost the second round of the 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad. Yet Rafsanjani beat Jannati. And then people again forgot about the Assembly and its sessions.

This was until the June 2009 presidential elections.

Soon after the disputed elections, a statement was released by the secretariat of the Assembly declaring that the members not only supported the Supreme Leader but they also supported the results. It later transpired that the statement was signed only by Mohammad Yazdi, a strong Ahmadinejad backer, a Guardian Council member close to Jannati, and the secretary of the Assembly. It was in effect Mohammad Yazdi’s opinion printed on Assembly letterhead.

Some of those hoping that the Islamic Republic would find a way out of the post-election crisis looked to the autumn session of the Assembly for a solution. They were disappointed, but this time they took note of the limited news of the Assembly’s proceedings. Mohammad Yazdi did not attend the meetings of that session, and citing his illness, he resigned as secretary of the Assembly. His resignation was rejected by Rafsanjani, who wished him a speedy recovery and return to his duties (a few days later Yazdi was pictured attending another event, which may point to illness being used as an excuse).

During the session some members criticised the actions of the regime and, by implication, the Supreme Leader. They were and still are attacked by the radical right for their stance.

Then during the final meeting, a strongly worded statement was read out on behalf of the Assembly by Ahmad Khatami, a hardline cleric and fervent supporter of Ahmadinejad. It was reported that Rafsanjani was not present during that part of the meeting and, later, that he had received a call from Khamenei asking him to attend a meeting with the Supreme Leader immediately. No news was ever published about the subject of this meeting was about and why it was it so urgent that Rafsanjani had to leave in the middle of the Assembly.

The struggle between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad supporters continued after the autumn session. At one point Rafsanjani was criticised, indeed threatened, by Yazdi. For the first time in the post-election crisis, Rafsanjani responded directly to an attack and said that he would reveal facts about Yazdi’s past actions. This lead to Yazdi calling a truce.

This week, Ahmadinejad supporters were hoping to create an atmosphere in which they could force Rafsanjani out as the head of the Assembly. The Yazdi attacks were accompanied by castigations of Rafsanjani’s family and political associates.

It seems that the plan to remove Rafsanjani has not worked, but there were no reports of speeches by critics of the current situation either. Instead, there were anomalies putting a question mark over the legitimacy of the meeting. Again Yazdi was absent because of "illness"; instead his son, who has no legal right to attend, was present.

Rafsanjani made a point of announcing the attendance of the younger Yazdi, raising speculation. Was the head of the Assembly effectively declaring that the body's status had been compromised? Was this a personal response to Yazdi, implying that he is so used to illegal actions that he would dare send his son to represent him? Or was Rafsanjani trying to protect the legitimacy of the gathering by citing "special circumstances"?

Yet the meeting was further damaged, at least in its official standing, by the absence of key members. Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini was either too ill or staged a personal boycott. (Amini, although a "conservative", stepped down as Friday Prayer leader of Qom because of his dissatisfaction with post-election events.) Rafsanjani ally Hassan Rohani was missing, as was Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, who had reportedly worked with Rafsanjani and others last autumn to forge a National Unity Plan. Perhaps most surprisingly, Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric reported to be Ahmadinejad’s religious mentor, was also a no-show.

So instead of ending in resolution, this week's meeting merely adds more puzzles and complications. The regime was trying to demontration both its unity after the events of 22 Bahman and its power, amidst symbolic developments like the launching of the Jamaran warship and the arrest of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. It wanted to present the image to the Iranian people that all is back to normal. Meeting Assembly members yesterday, the Supreme Leader tried to drive home the impression, emphasising that those who continued to question the June election were no longer acceptable in the Iranian system.

Rafsanjani served the regime to an extent by warning all to be careful that the arrows of criticism are not turned towards the Supreme Leader. Yet he later said, in a statement he repeated yesterday at Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum, that some officials are not taking responsibility for their own actions and are instead trying to push the blame onto Khamenei. (At one stage he said that we need to be careful that the crisis does not escalate further, using the word “toghyan”, which can be translated into English as insurrection or insurgency or uprising.)

So, just as the Assembly was far from "normal" with the absences and the continuing political manoeuvres within its ranks, the Islamic Republic is far from settled. In one moment, the call is "all is well". In the next, it is that "all should be well" with the threats against the opposition. And then, finally, with a wink and a nod, Hashemi Rafsanjani says "all might not be well" because of "uninformed individuals" (who are they?).

This is the certainty of the uncertain.

The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2110 GMT: Not-Over-The-Top Statement of Today. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying to a Congressional committee, reveals that the current manoeuvres over Iran's uranium enrichment are just like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis:

My reading of what happened with President Kennedy is that it's exactly what he did. It was high-stakes diplomacy. It was pushing hard to get the world community to understand, going to the UN, making a presentation, getting international opinion against the placement of Russian weapons in Cuba, making a deal eventually with the Russians that led to the removal of the weapons.

That is the kind of high-stakes diplomacy that I'm engaged in, that other members of this administration are, because we take very seriously the potential threat from Iran.

2100 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. After all the political positions (take your pick) he adopted at the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani used a ceremony at the tomb of the late Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a warning about "uninformed individuals" (who are they?): "These individuals shirk from their responsibilities and make irrelevant declarations, thus causing the leadership to bear the responsibility of all the actions that the people reject."

1935 GMT: Diplomatic Poses (cont.). Well, I guess Washington had to strike its own posture given the statements of President Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart Bashir al-Assad in Damascus today (1335 GMT). Here's State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

As the secretary [Hillary Clinton] reiterated yesterday, we have expressed our concern directly to President (Bashar) Assad about Syria's relationship with Iran. This is ultimately a decision that Syria has to make, but as President Assad assesses Syria's long-term interests, he need only look around the region and recognize that Syria is increasingly an outlier.

We want to see Syria play a more constructive role in the region. One step would be to make clear what Iran's need to do differently and unfortunately there was no evidence of that today.

The key here is that it is a spokesman making the statement, not the President, not the Secretary of State. Yes, of course, the US would prefer that Damascus put Iran into isolation. But they know that, given the regional dynamics, Syria will not publicly cut off Tehran. So the real diplomacy will take place away from these statements.

1925 GMT: Back from a lengthy academic break --- the US Ambassador to Britain was in Birmingham today --- to catch up on the full force of Iranian propaganda. Here is the "confession" of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, tailor-made to put the US as the main sponsor of his terrorism:

After Obama was elected, the Americans contacted us and they met me in Pakistan.They met us after clashes with my group around March 17 in (the southeastern city of) Zahedan, and he (the US operative) said that Americans had requested a meeting.

I said we didn't have any time for a meeting and if we do help them they should promise to give us aid. They said they would cooperate with us and will give me military equipment, arms and machine guns. They also promised to give us a base along the border with Afghanistan next to Iran.

They asked to meet me and we said where should we meet you and he said in Dubai. We sent someone to Dubai and we told a person to ask a place for myself in Afghanistan from the area near the operations and they complied that they would sort out the problem for us and they will find Mr. Rigi a base and guarantee his own security in Afghanistan or in any of the countries adjacent to Iran so that he can carry on his operations.

They told me that in Kyrgyzstan they have a base called Manas near Bishkek, and that a high-ranking person was coming to meet me and that if such high-ranking people come to the United Arab Emirates, they may be observed by intelligence people but in a place like Bishkek this high-ranking American person could come and we could reach an agreement on making personal contacts. But after the last major operation we took part in, they said that they wanted to meet with us.

The Americans said Iran was going its own way and they said our problem at the present is Iran…not al-Qaeda and not the Taliban, but the main problem is Iran. We don't have a military plan against Iran. Attacking Iran is very difficult for us (the US). The CIA is very particular about you and is prepared to do anything for you because our government has reached the conclusion that there was nothing Americans could do about Iran and only I could take care of the operations for them.

One of the CIA officers said that it was too difficult for us to attack Iran militarily, but we plan to give aid and support to all anti-Iran groups that have the capability to wage war and create difficulty for the Iranian (Islamic) system. They reached the conclusion that your organization has the power to create difficulties for the Islamic Republic and they are prepared to give you training and/or any assistance that you would require, in terms of telecommunications security and procedures as well as other support, the Americans said they would be willing to provide it at an extensive level.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
The Latest from Iran (24 February): Shocks and Erosions

1350 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Hengameh Shahidi has been arrested again.

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Foreign Minister and head of the Freedom of Movement Iran, underwent open heart surgery soon after his 10-day release yesterday. His family said that the surgery was a success.


1340 GMT: Trying to Shut the Door. The Supreme Leader has returned to his rhetoric of last June. In a statement reported by Iranian state media, he said those not accepting the results of the Presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system, and they have already lost their credibility". Certain individuals caused the post-election turmoil because they wanted to "deny the vote of the people."

1335 GMT: Damascus Poses. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have made their declarations during the Iranian President's visit.

Assad gave a lecture to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over her comments that the US is "troubled" by Syrian ties with Tehran, "We hope that others don't give us lessons about our region and our history. We are the ones who decide how matters will go and we know our interests. We thank them for their advice."

Ahmadinejad was even bolder, "(The Americans) want to dominate the region but they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that. We tell them that instead of interfering in the region's affairs, to pack their things and leave."

No real surprises in either man's pose. What is more important is whether there is any substantial support from Damascus for Iran, and more specifically Ahmadinejad, beyond the rhetoric of increased cooperation and cancelling of visa restrictions.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, vowed increased cooperation during a meeting in Damascus and canceled visa restrictions between the countries.
1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Update. An activist updates that Mousavi campaign aide Asghar Khandan has been sentenced to 2 years and 74 lashes. Another aide Jahanbakh Khanjani, a former senior official in the Ministry of Interior, has been released on bail after eight months in detention.

1038 GMT: Claim of Day. According to Kalemeh, Iran's Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mohammad Hosseini, has said that "there is no censorship" of the press.

1035 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is in Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. Let's see if he can trump Ali Larijani's political manoeuvre.

1000 GMT: Larijani's Nuclear Move. This looks like it may be big news. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, after talks with Japanese officials, has said Japan's offer to enrich Iran's uranium "has the substance to be worth discussing. We want to deepen the discussion on it."

That would be a major shift from Iran's line since November that uranium had to be enriched or swapped inside the country, and it is a dramatic change in Larijani's previous hostility to third-party enrichment. A likely assumption is that the Speaker is representing the views of the Supreme Leader.

So now the key political question: is Larijani also speaking for the President or is he making a move to claim personal credit, surpassing and pushing aside Ahmadinejad?

0950 GMT: The Rigi Mystery. It may be that Iranian state media, when it finally settled on the story that the leader of Jundullah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was detained on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, had it right (and that our reports of Rigi's detention last week were inaccurate). The deputy chief of Kyrgyzstan's national airline has confirmed that a plane was forced to land in Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on Tuesday (in fact, other information indicates that the interception occurred Monday night) and two passengers were taken away by Iranian authorities.

0905 GMT: The Wrong Lawyers. An unexpected but still stunning story from Rooz Online about the screening of "unsuitable" human rights lawyers:

Last week the administrative committee of Iran’s bar association has disqualified nearly half of the candidates seeking to serve on Iran’s bar association.

The official website of the Iranian Bar Association reported yesterday that 36 candidates running for management positions at the Association’s headquarters were disqualified. The Association’s President, Seyed Mohammad Jondoghi-Kermanipour...said, “Today we received a letter from the administrative judicial tribunal, which stated that, pursuant to their previous letter, only 43 candidates were qualified, the remaining candidates having been disqualified for failing to meet the specified criteria.”

[As well as] Jondoghi-Kermanipour, other prominent attorneys such as Abdolfatah Soltani, Naser Zarafshan, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, Mohammad-Ali Dadkhah, Nemat Ahmadi, Farideh Gheirat, Goudarz Eftekhar-Jahromi (former head of the Association), Ali Najafi-Tavana, Reza Nourbaha, Mohammad-Hossein Aghasi, Jahangir Mostofi, Akbar Sardarizadeh, Ramezan Haji-Mashadi have been disqualified.

0855 GMT: Satire of Day. Ebrahim Nabavi sets a Philosophy Quiz for readers. A sample question:

[Government spokesman] Gholam-Hossein Elham said, "Cutting off AN's government is the insurgents' next project." What is the logical mistake in this sentence?

1 - There exists no government to be cut off.
2 -  The government will be cut off by itself. There is no need for the insurgents to do anything.
3 - Even if the insurgents killed themselves, they could not stop the downfall of the government.
4 - The Agha [Supreme Leader] himself has started this project a long time ago.

0840 GMT: The Forgetful Assembly. Amidst the confusion over the statement/non-statement from the two-day meeting of the Assembly of Experts (see separate analysis), the Green website Rah-e-Sabz offers an overview of the divisions within the body since the election and declares that it is suffering from "Continuous Alzheimer's".

0825 GMT: Comparing the Numbers. Iran News Now, using video and photographs, compares the non-crowd at the President's speech in Birjand, Khorasan, yesterday with the masses who turned out for a Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign rally and concludes:

Let’s look at the crowd gathered in Birjand for Ahmadinejad...and let’s be realistic. This thing is FAR from over. The aspirations of the Iranian people will not go unheeded.

EA's Mr Verde adds, "The interesting fact about the turnout (if one can claim it is interesting at all) is that even in a place close to Ayatollah Khamenei’s hometown of Mashhad, people don’t really care about Ahmadinejad."

0820 GMT: Economy Watch. Mohammad Reza Khabbaz, a member of Parliament's Economy Committee, has denounced President Ahmadinejad's proposed budget as "unrealistic".

0815 GMT: This is a Secure Regime? Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Hamedani, in his statement yesterday, announced that the number of Basiji bases in Tehran would be increased from 6 to 22.

0800 GMT: Wednesday was marked by loud proclamations from the Government. There were the attempts to limit the damage of the video of June's attack on Tehran University dormitories, the aggressive promotion of the "terrorist" threat from Jundullah to Kurdish groups to the Green Movement, and the President's sparsely-attended speech in eastern Iran (see  inset.

However, the most intriguing statement by far was the supposed proclamation of the Assembly of Experts supporting the Supreme Leader and warning against the "sedition" of opposition leaders. This morning, however, it looks this was a non-statement, an attempt by pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly and media to create the image of a regime ready to crush Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami (and, probably, to back Hashemi Rafsanjani into a corner). We have a special analysis.