The Latest from Iran (28 February): What Do The Statements Mean?

2045 GMT: Sunday Absurdity. A slow day, which leading to a perusing of opinion in the newspapers. Unfortunately, that turns up a piece of anti-Muslim diatribe posing as analysis by Ephraim Karsh in The New York Times: "Muslims Won't Play Together". The slurs have to be read to be believed, but here is the policy recommendation: "A military strike must remain a serious option: there is no peaceful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, stemming as they do from its imperialist brand of national-Islamism."

NEW Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement “Crisis Continues”
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s Interview “Reform Within the Current Framework” (27 February)
Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview

1700 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has been at a conference in Tehran attended by Palestinian leaders such as Hamas' Khaled Meshaal, Islamic Jihad's Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, and the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command), Ahmed Jibril. Ahmadinejad offered this commentary:

With God's grace and thanks to the Palestinian resistance the occupying Zionist regime has lost its raison d'être. [Israel's] presence even in one inch of the region's soil causes threat, crisis and war. The only way to confront them (Israelis) is through the Palestinian youths' resistance, and that of the regional nations.

1435 GMT: US-Israel Front (cont.). Haaretz has more on Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barak's Iran manoeuvres after his US trip (see 0955 GMT). Barak had indicated earlier that Israel would not pursue military action but would look for tougher sanction; however, in a talk in Washington, he returned to the formula that "everything is on the table":

It's clear to me that the clock toward the collapse of this regime works much slower than the clock which ticks toward Iran becoming a nuclear military power. And this is the reason why simultaneously with diplomacy and effective sanctions, we recommend to all players not to remove any option from the table and we adopt this attitude for ourselves as well.

1400 GMT: Political Prisoner News. Journalist Ali Hekmat, editor-in-chief of the banned newsaper Khordaad, has been released after two months in detention. Civil rights activist Jamshid Zarei has also been freed.

1325 GMT: That Larijani Fellow. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing to grab headlines after his trip to Japan, has spoken to the Majlis about the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, "Fortunately, his confessions confirmed our previous information on the close cooperation between the US and NATO and the terrorist grouplet."

1300 GMT: No Protests. A day after Mir Hossein Mousavi called for the regime to allow rallies, Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has given a sharp rejection:

Even though some go on trying to agitate the atmosphere in society with statements... they've been given the answer by the people. We will not witness street demonstrations and we will not allow anyone to come to the streets to disrupt public security without proper permits....

Even though threats against the revolution will not come to an end, we will not succumb and certainly one day in the not so distant future despair will take them and they will surrender. The file on the election has been closed and law enforcement agencies have been asked to preserve security.

Having wielded a large stick, Doulatabadi offered a small carrot with the promise that some post-election detainees would be released before the Iranian New Year.

1220 GMT: O" the Economic Front. Kalemeh denounces President Ahmadinejad's slogan of bringing oil income to people's tables, comparing it with "vanished billions" in revenues.

Rah-e-Sabz reports on a protest at an Isfahan steel plant over seven months of unpaid wages.

1215 GMT: Bluster of Day. Deputy Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Salami warns, "Iran is standing on 50% of world's energy resources. If it decides to do so, Europe will spend the winter in the cold."

1205 GMT: Maintaining His Silence. The Supreme Leader used a meeting with Tehran's ambassador to take a nationally-televised swipe at the International Atomic Energy Agency, "Measures and reports of the agency show its lack of independence.... Unilateral acts erode trust in this institution and the United Nations and it is very bad for the reputation of these international assemblies."

No news there, as it is a restatement of Iran's public line on the IAEA, a day before the Agency's four-day discussion of a draft report on Tehran's nuclear programme. What is more intriguing is the Supreme Leader's lack of reference to Ali Larijani's manoeuvres in Japan for "third-party enrichment" (see 0935 GMT).

1155 GMT: MediaWatch. Leading US newspapers have noted and evaluated the Mousavi interview. Borzou Daragahi of the Los Angeles Times leads with Mousavi's accusation of the regime's "wasteful exercise" of 22 Bahman (11 February) but then puts his key point, "Mousavi offered few specifics on what the so-called green movement should do next."

In The Washington Post, Thomas Erdbrink  takes a similar line with Mousavi's denuncation of the Government as a "gang with no respect for Iran's interests" and the note that "he did not, however, propose new strategies". Nazila Fathi has a shorter piece in The New York Times, following the Associated Press, with the criticism of the Iranian leadership as a dictatorial "cult" but with no comment on Mousavi's goals.

0955 GMT: On the US-Israel Front. Laura Rozen has an intriguing reading of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak's appearance at the Washington Institute of Near Policy, after his meetings with senior Obama Administration officials:

It became quite clear that [Barak] did not want to answer [a] question about the state of U.S.-Israel relations on Iran....It was his impression that Washington believes that, while it’s highly undesirable, at the end of the day the U.S. could live with a nuclear Iran; [however] for Israel, Barak said, it would be a “tipping point” in the strategic equation in the region.

0945 GMT: Today's Propaganda Special. Iranian state media pronounces, "Rigi planned to meet Holbrooke in Kyrgyzstan", which paints the picture of the Jundullah leader sitting down with President Obama's special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke.

The source? "Famous Washington, D.C. based investigative journalist and reporter Wayne Madsen". Funny, but I don't actually see that on the website of "famous reporter" Madsen.

Safer, I think, for Iran's loudspeakers to rely on "Iranian forces bust terrorist cell in Azarbaijan".

Meanwhile, Jundullah has chosen a new leader to succeed Rigi.

0940 GMT: Speaking of Larijani. Ali Larijani has avoided the nuclear issue on his return to Iran from Japan, issuing instead an un-controversial condemnation of US policy in Afghanistan and an announcement that Japanese officials are willing to cooperate with Iran on the reconstruction of the Afghan infrastructure.

0935 GMT: The Larijani Debate. Elsewhere, there is a spirited discussion going on, as Ali Larijani returns to Iran from a five-day trip, over the significance of his manoeuvres in Japan, especially on the nuclear programme.

I stand by the reading that Larijani's sudden embrace of "3rd-party enrichment" (no doubt backed by the Supreme Leader) is a political move meant not only to keep open links with the international community but to out-manoeuvre and even push aside President Ahmadinejad. Mr Verde is more cautious:

I think Larijani’s talk of enrichment by Japan is an attempt by the Islamic Republic to break or slow down the anti-Iran posturing. Larijani may be chipping away at Ahmadinejad, but it is all with Supreme Leader's permission.

The post-elections protest shocked the regime and Khamenei. And the Larijani/[Ahmad] Tavakoli spat with Ahmadinejad is possibly an attempt to show that the Republic is not just one voice (that of the Supreme Leader) but it actually tolerates dissent.

A well-placed EA contact, however, is dismissive that there is any significance, writing of "incremental
developments that oftentimes go nowhere".

0930 GMT: We have published a Sunday special: there is a summary of the official statement of the Assembly of Experts, and a detailed analysis by Mr Verde: "The institutions of the Islamic Republic are unable to pull it out of the current crisis. All that have any power (at least on paper) are under the direct, and at times illegal, control of Khamenei."

0745 GMT: It will be a slightly later start this morning, as we wrap up our coverage of the Chile earthquake and tsunami watch and also pick up on the important statements out of Iran.

We have posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Saturday interview with Kalemeh. Initial reading is both of a Mousavi trying to maintain the momentum of opposition but also carefully defining how far the challenge goes --- is it enough to call for the "spread of awareness", "free rallies", and "adherence to the Constitution" if the regime stands firm against even those measured demands? We'll think about that today, looking forward to an analysis on Monday.

Later today, however, we may have an equally important reading. The official statement of the Assembly of Experts, which did not appear for several days after last week's meeting, is now posted. Beyond its loyalty to the Supreme Leader, the references to the opposition are not clear. Was this really the declaration that "sedition" would be put down and opposition would longer be acceptable in the Iranian system?

The Latest from Iran (27 February): The Mousavi Interview

2230 GMT: Sneaking Out the News. It appears that the official statement of the Assembly of Experts meeting has been quietly placed on its website. We are reviewing and will have an analysis in the morning.

First impression is that while the statement is effusive about the "leadership and guidance" of the Supreme Leader to get Iran through the post-election crisis, it is not as severe in condemning the "sedition" of the opposition as the alleged statement released by Fars News in mid-week.

2115 GMT: Larijani Watch. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, continuing his Japan tour with a visit to the Peace Memorial Museum in Nagasaki, declared both Tehran's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and the perfidy of the West:

Iran will host an international conference on nuclear disarmament within the next two months....After the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US made no change in its policies. Two nuclear bombs of the United States have now increased to tens of thousands.

NEW Iran Analysis: Now It Gets Interesting….
Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & “The Prerequisites of Escalation”
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2100 GMT: And the Jundullah Beat Goes On. More of the same from Iran's Foreign Ministry on Saturday, via spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast:

Ties between this terrorist group and security services of the so-called advocates of human rights including the US, Britain and certain other countries indicate that they are not honest about their claims of having respect for human rights.

The support of certain so-called human rights advocates for terrorist groups and criminals such as Abdolmalek Rigi has turned into a routine issue. We have always witnessed the support of these countries for terrorist groups to continue their moves in the region.

1720 GMT: Waiting for News on "Earthquake Weapons". Apart from the Mousavi interview, a quiet day inside Iran. Press TV's website has noted the Chilean earthquake and tsunami warning; so far, however, it has not blamed the disaster on US "secret weapons" (as Iran and Venezuela did with Haiti).

1505 GMT: Academic Newsflash. Fars News reports that more than 1000 "experts" have asked for an independent inquiry of the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The article is based on a press conference held by Architects and Engineers for 9-11 Truth on 19 February.

1455 GMT: Almost all major news outlets now have summaries of the Mousavi interview. A prominent Iranian activist, via Iran News Now, offers anotherabridged version in English that parallels our translation (see 0955 GMT).

1235 GMT: Discovering Mousavi. Agence France Presse and the Los Angeles Times have now noted Mir Hossein Mousavi's interview (see 0955 GMT). Both are picking up on Mousavi's condemnation of the 22 Bahman "engineered" rally by the regime and his call for a "free" march of the Iranian people.

1200 GMT: Big in the Countryside? Peyke Iran claims that the publications, Hemmat and Mowj-Andishe, banned earlier this year are still distributed in Iran's provinces. Both are allegedly linked to President Ahmadinejad's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

0955 GMT: Mousavi's Interview. Setareh Sabety provides a few important extracts: "Mr. Karroubi and I, in our meeting, decided that we will once again ask for a permit, according to Article 27 of the Constitution, for a march that will put an end to the rumors and accusations."

Referring to 22 Bahman (11 February) as an "engineered" rally, Mousavi says that he does not like "insulting those who do not agree with us" and continues, "We did not suppose that everyone shared our opinions or that those who were not like-minded were bad people. All are our compatriots with the exception of some sabre-wielding thugs and murderers."

Mousavi compares the amount of money and methods used to muster crowds and transport them to Tehran for 22 Bahman --- "these kinds of engineered and mandatory rallies remind us of those used prior to tne 1979 Revolution" --- with the protest of the opposition. "Our movement looks like a traditional bazaar with many kiosks, cafes and store fronts of opinion connected to one another," Mousavi asserts, and he ends with an optimistc question, "When millions of young students are part of this movement, which is unique in our history and perhaps in the history of the world, how can we not have hope for the future?"

0950 GMT: Economy Watch. Seyyed Hossein Hashemi, the head of the Mining Commission, has declared that if Iran continues its present level of imports, "grave problems will arise". He warned in particular of under-investment in the domestic metal and mining industries.

0945 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary (A Day Later). Rah-e-Sabz offers a biting commentary on the Friday Prayers of Tehran's Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati and other clerics: "Praise of the Assembly Experts and [Jundullah leader Abdolmalek] Rigi's arrest, that's all."

0940 GMT: So Much for Unity. Davoud Ahmadinejad, the brother of the President, pronounced in a speech before Friday Prayers in Isfahan that the National Unity Plan "equals the reconciliation of Yazid with Imam Hossein" (Yazid, in fact, killed Hossein)". He declared, "After all these insults, why should we sit at a table for the 'dialogue of civilizations'? We have nano-technology and we have a nano-quarrel."

0930 GMT: Economy Watch. Member of Parliament and Larijani ally Ahmad Tavakoli, writing in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online, declares that the Government's claims on implementation its subsidy reform plan are ridiculous: "In the current year the administration has not taken an actual step for executing subsidy reform bill. The Government should have requested the permission of the Majlis [Parliament] for amending the bill, but it didn't."

Rah-e-Sabz publishes a long anlaysis by Professor Mohsen Massarrat with "Answers to the Riddle of the Subsidies", especially in the energy sector.

0905 GMT: No doubt what the big story will be this morning. Kalemeh has just posted its interview with Mir Hossein Mousavi (see separate, earlier analysis). The tone is defiant, but the deeper issue will be the substance of Mousavi's call. Defending the opposition over 22 Bahman and calling for a "spread of awareness" is fair enough, but it is the substance of Mousavi's 5 points --- issued in his statement of 1 January --- that gave a boost to political demands. We'll be reading closely to see if and how Mousavi expands that platform.

Elsewhere, Robert Mackey of The New York Times has a thoughtful, in-depth consideration of the regime's propaganda over the capture of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. He raises the interesting point that the spin on Rigi's "confession" of his contacts with US officials is meant to discredit President Obama's "engagement" launched in his March 2009 Nowruz address to the Iranian people.

The Latest from Iran (26 February): Closing the Door?

2110 GMT: Khamenei v. Khomeini. Radio Zamaneh has more on the criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hasan Khomeini, by the Supreme Leader's representative in the Revolutionary Guards, Ali Saidi.

The conflict was sparked when the head of the Institute of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Publications, Mohammad Ali Ansari, wrote to Saidi to remind him of the Khomeini's insistence on no military intervention in politics, Ali Saidi then criticized Hassan Khomeini’s decision not to attend the August inauguration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He alleged that the Ayatollah's grandson was standing against "the system and the Leader".

NEW Iran Document: Latest Karroubi Interview “The Shah Didn’t Behave Like This”
Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"
Latest Iran Video: The Rigi “Confession” (25 February)
Iran Analysis: Khamenei’s Not-So-Big Push
Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts “The Certainty of the Uncertain”
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Mehrdad Bal Afkan, a senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party and Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, was arrested in Isfahan on Thursday.


2050 GMT: That "Path to Atonement" Thing (see 1915 GMT). Could the regime be setting up an offer of amnesty or reduced punishment for those who will give up their opposition? Alongside Ayatollah Jannati's Friday Prayer are the words of Iran's Attorney General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie: "If those who have been arrested in recent riots truly repent and compensate for the damages they have caused and correct their past conduct, they will be helped in the Appeals Court."

2005 GMT: Back to the Friday Prayer (see 1915 GMT). Ayatollah Jannati might have been a bit less hard-line than usual with the invocation that all the naughty protesters "to wake up and come to their senses", but I think he may have a message for a Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani: “If the elite are not in accordance with the movement of these rioters, why don’t they protest against them and advise them?”

1945 GMT: Larijani Watch. Blink and you might miss the story....

Agence France Presse headlines a ritual denunciation by Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking in Tokyo, of the International Atomic Energy Association and the "West":

One of the defects in the IAEA is that it changes positions and attitudes if it is put under certain political pressure. I think the IAEA should be an organisation that states its views based on concrete facts, but should not comment on something such as 'there is a possibility.

Yawn. It's only in the 8th paragraph that AFP gets to the real story, with Larijani repeating his Thursday welcome to "third-party enrichment" by Japan: "I don't know if you read the Japanese offer, but various proposals are made in it. We welcome this kind of subsurface-level initiative."

1915 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati taking the podium in Tehran, and a bit of a surprise. After all the talk this week of the "sedition" of the opposition, the hard-line head of the Guardian Council appears to have been a bit of a softie, declaring, "the path to atonement is still open". Of course, those who atone need to recognise that, on 22 Bahman, the Iranian people "showed that [they] do not fear enemies, threats or sanctions, are committed to [their] stances and are loyal to and believe in 'velayat-e-faqih' (clerical authority)."

1910 GMT: An EA Special. We've posted the English translation of Mehdi Karroubi's latest interview, with his forthright defiance and the lament, "The Shah didn't behave like this."

1500 GMT: Nuclear Power Play. What a way to come back from an academic break. I find that Press TV is pushing the statement of the head of the Parliament's National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, declaring in Tokyo:

Japan's participation and involvement in the construction of Iran's power plants will serve the interests of Japanese state and private companies. Iran's suggests that Japan start its job from a particular point, by building a nuclear power plant inside the country.

How big? Boroujerdi is in Japan with Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who announced yesterday that "third-party enrichment" is back on the table, with Japan enriching Iran's uranium stock. So the deal is laid out: the international community gets its oversight of Iran's nuclear fuel, Tehran gets a nuclear power programme with the assistance of Tokyo, and Larijani and his allies --- no doubt representing the wishes of the Supreme Leader --- also outflank President Ahmadinejad.

1130 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (cont.). Activist websites reported that the women's ward in Section 209 of Evin Prison is overcrowded, with cells holding seven detainees rather than the recommeded two or three. Most in Section 209 are academics.

The news follows the revelation of imprisoned journalist Bahman Ahmadi-Amoui that 40 prisoners are being held in a 20- meter cell in Evin.

1105 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A series of reformist members of Parliament and parties have asked the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. to release journalists and political activists for Iranian New Year, Nowruz. Pro-Ahmadinejad MPs replied that it is up to the judge to decide the status of detainees, and this has nothing to do with Nowruz.

1100 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad Watch. Even when he's in Japan, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is slapping at the President: he has declared that 34 of 39 proposals presented by the Government do not conform to the law.

1055 GMT: Khamenei, Khomeini, and the Revolutionary Guard. The Supreme Leader's representative in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Hojatoleslam Ali Saidi, has sharply answered the criticism of those who accuse the Revolutionary Guard of interference in political matters: when civilians attack the holy republic, how can the IRGC stand aside?

There were also pointed words for the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, Seyed Hassan Khomeini: how could he oppose the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system (nezam)?

1050 GMT: A slow political day, but that gives us the chance to feature a provocative analysis, from The Newest Deal, that the momentum for the Green Movement will come from the regime's rejection of Mir Hossein Mousavi's five proposals for justice and reform.

0810 GMT: The Committee for Human Rights Reporters posts that women’s rights activist Somayeh Rashidi has been released from Evin Prison after more than two months in detention.

0800 GMT: The big manoeuvres yesterday were within the regime, as key participants either tried to close the door on any challenge or to keep it slightly open for further manoeuvres. We've got two special analyses: Mr Verde takes a long look at this week's inconclusive, somewhat confusing Assembly of Experts meeting, featuring Hashemi Rafsanjani, and we assess the Supreme Leader's "not-so-big push" to secure his position.

Meanwhile, you could take your pick of sideshows. There was Iran's unsubtle propaganda push on captured Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi with his confession (see separate entry) as proof of US sponsorship. Bashir al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad struck their poses in Damascus, and US and Israeli officials met in Israel in a "strategic dialogue" which featured Iran's nuclear programme.

Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"

From The Newest Deal:

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national "unity" and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations


2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process


3. Release of all political prisoners


4. Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television


5. Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement's aspirations from coming to fruition.


Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captured, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure. While circumstances prevent him from voicing such a sentiment in public, the leader of the Green movement likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote his Mousavi from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist in society from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands would no longer be five steps the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but rather, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will inevitably be unwilling to address, and that will thus escalate the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before confrontation with the regime escalates to the next phase, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering aproposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role and instead give it to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for a new plan to be drawn up).

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid of Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the change to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan coming to fruition, however, appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhandaily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei, has already come out on the attack, stating that any propsoal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting). Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own statement, saying that those who still do not accept the June presidential election result "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."

The obstacles in revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis [Iran's Parliament] in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surly answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the proposals, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some del-soozan, (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any promise for political reconciliation also appears dead. Rather, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with neither side refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unconditionally reject before the opposition begins to decide on how to take the uprising to the next level.

Iran Follow-Up: Interpreting the Assembly of Experts "The Certainty of the Uncertain"

Mr Verde follows up our analysis of the "mystery" of the Assembly of Experts statement/non-statement supporting the Supreme Leader and declaring that time has run out for a seditious opposition.



For the latest on the continuing politics, see our analysis of the Supreme Leader's "big push" and our latest updates:

The Assembly of Experts has been holding twice a yearly for many years. Most of its meetings are behind closed doors. The official reports of the meetings usually included a few set-piece and rather predictable speeches. And they were ignored by most people.

Iran Analysis: Khamenei's Not-So-Big Push
Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery

The only notable “news” about the Assembly meetings in recent years was the 2007 election to replace the deceased Ali Meshkini as chair. Until then only one candidate stood in the election and was elected unanimously to show unity. This time, however, there were two candidates: Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati.


Most people expected Jannati to win because Jannati heads the Guardian Council, which has to approve members of the Assembly. Rafsanjani had lost the second round of the 2005 presidential election to Ahmadinejad. Yet Rafsanjani beat Jannati. And then people again forgot about the Assembly and its sessions.

This was until the June 2009 presidential elections.

Soon after the disputed elections, a statement was released by the secretariat of the Assembly declaring that the members not only supported the Supreme Leader but they also supported the results. It later transpired that the statement was signed only by Mohammad Yazdi, a strong Ahmadinejad backer, a Guardian Council member close to Jannati, and the secretary of the Assembly. It was in effect Mohammad Yazdi’s opinion printed on Assembly letterhead.

Some of those hoping that the Islamic Republic would find a way out of the post-election crisis looked to the autumn session of the Assembly for a solution. They were disappointed, but this time they took note of the limited news of the Assembly’s proceedings. Mohammad Yazdi did not attend the meetings of that session, and citing his illness, he resigned as secretary of the Assembly. His resignation was rejected by Rafsanjani, who wished him a speedy recovery and return to his duties (a few days later Yazdi was pictured attending another event, which may point to illness being used as an excuse).

During the session some members criticised the actions of the regime and, by implication, the Supreme Leader. They were and still are attacked by the radical right for their stance.

Then during the final meeting, a strongly worded statement was read out on behalf of the Assembly by Ahmad Khatami, a hardline cleric and fervent supporter of Ahmadinejad. It was reported that Rafsanjani was not present during that part of the meeting and, later, that he had received a call from Khamenei asking him to attend a meeting with the Supreme Leader immediately. No news was ever published about the subject of this meeting was about and why it was it so urgent that Rafsanjani had to leave in the middle of the Assembly.

The struggle between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad supporters continued after the autumn session. At one point Rafsanjani was criticised, indeed threatened, by Yazdi. For the first time in the post-election crisis, Rafsanjani responded directly to an attack and said that he would reveal facts about Yazdi’s past actions. This lead to Yazdi calling a truce.

This week, Ahmadinejad supporters were hoping to create an atmosphere in which they could force Rafsanjani out as the head of the Assembly. The Yazdi attacks were accompanied by castigations of Rafsanjani’s family and political associates.

It seems that the plan to remove Rafsanjani has not worked, but there were no reports of speeches by critics of the current situation either. Instead, there were anomalies putting a question mark over the legitimacy of the meeting. Again Yazdi was absent because of "illness"; instead his son, who has no legal right to attend, was present.

Rafsanjani made a point of announcing the attendance of the younger Yazdi, raising speculation. Was the head of the Assembly effectively declaring that the body's status had been compromised? Was this a personal response to Yazdi, implying that he is so used to illegal actions that he would dare send his son to represent him? Or was Rafsanjani trying to protect the legitimacy of the gathering by citing "special circumstances"?

Yet the meeting was further damaged, at least in its official standing, by the absence of key members. Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini was either too ill or staged a personal boycott. (Amini, although a "conservative", stepped down as Friday Prayer leader of Qom because of his dissatisfaction with post-election events.) Rafsanjani ally Hassan Rohani was missing, as was Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, who had reportedly worked with Rafsanjani and others last autumn to forge a National Unity Plan. Perhaps most surprisingly, Mesbah Yazdi, a hardline cleric reported to be Ahmadinejad’s religious mentor, was also a no-show.

So instead of ending in resolution, this week's meeting merely adds more puzzles and complications. The regime was trying to demontration both its unity after the events of 22 Bahman and its power, amidst symbolic developments like the launching of the Jamaran warship and the arrest of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi. It wanted to present the image to the Iranian people that all is back to normal. Meeting Assembly members yesterday, the Supreme Leader tried to drive home the impression, emphasising that those who continued to question the June election were no longer acceptable in the Iranian system.

Rafsanjani served the regime to an extent by warning all to be careful that the arrows of criticism are not turned towards the Supreme Leader. Yet he later said, in a statement he repeated yesterday at Ayatollah Khomeini's mausoleum, that some officials are not taking responsibility for their own actions and are instead trying to push the blame onto Khamenei. (At one stage he said that we need to be careful that the crisis does not escalate further, using the word “toghyan”, which can be translated into English as insurrection or insurgency or uprising.)

So, just as the Assembly was far from "normal" with the absences and the continuing political manoeuvres within its ranks, the Islamic Republic is far from settled. In one moment, the call is "all is well". In the next, it is that "all should be well" with the threats against the opposition. And then, finally, with a wink and a nod, Hashemi Rafsanjani says "all might not be well" because of "uninformed individuals" (who are they?).

This is the certainty of the uncertain.