Iran: Mousavi, The Regime, & "The Prerequisites of Escalation"

From The Newest Deal:

In his 17th statement, Mir-Hossein Mousavi made five specific points that he deemed necessary to start the political (and national) reconciliation process. The proposal lead to a noticeable uptick in the weeks leading up to 22 Bahman in talk of the need for national "unity" and also garnered much attention from Iranian intellectuals and dissidents. Ultimately, the regime's more radical elements reemerged and silenced the chatter before the security apparatus prevented a strong opposition showing on the revolution's 31st anniversary. But Mousavi's "five points," as they have come to be called, still carry much weight. Generally, they are:

1. Government accountability for post-election violations


2. Legislation of new election laws that would safeguard reform-minded candidates from regime's current vetting process


3. Release of all political prisoners


4. Freedom of the press and political-neutrality on state-run IRIB television


5. Freedom to assemble, as guaranteed by the Islamic Republic's constitution

Were these five conditions to be met, the Green movement would arguably have the breathing space it needs to mobilize and begin the long process of transforming Iranian society. For if anything became apparent in the weeks leading up to and after the June election, it was that Iran has undergone an awakening. It has simply been the repression that the above five grievances capture that has prevented the social movement's aspirations from coming to fruition.


Therefore, perhaps an alternative frame can be adopted to view Mousavi's five points. As a recent Tehran Bureau profile wonderfully captured, the reluctant leader of Iran's opposition has matured into a rather shrewd, cautious, and patient figure. While circumstances prevent him from voicing such a sentiment in public, the leader of the Green movement likely recognizes that the regime has reached a point of no return. The tyranny, the executions, the outright fascism -- all of it is, to quote his Mousavi from an interview on the eve of 22 Bahman, an outgrowth of the "revolution's failures" and the "roots of tyranny and dictatorship" that persist in society from the reign of the Shah. These are damning (and yet still very measured) words from one of the Islamic Republic's own founding fathers.

Thus, seeing the regime in this light gives Mousavi's five points new significance. The demands would no longer be five steps the regime must take in order to rescue the country from its current crisis, but rather, five blatant and particularly egregious shortcomings that the regime will inevitably be unwilling to address, and that will thus escalate the conflict between the Greens and the regime. For in the wake of the June coup d'etat, if one thing has become clear it is that those currently in control will never meet any such conditions, even if moderate voices within their camp plead otherwise. Political calculus has been replaced by megalomania, with the possibility of reconciliation falling victim.

And so if these five points are instead five tests that the regime must fail before confrontation with the regime escalates to the next phase, the news emerging this week from the Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts -- both bodies chaired by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- is indeed very telling. First, the Council began considering aproposal being pushed by Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rezaei that would take away the Guardian Council's vetting role and instead give it to a new "National Election Committee" of sorts, which would conveniently be under Rafsanjani's supervision in the Expediency Council. (Ironically, the proposal to revise the country's election laws was made to Supreme Leader two years ago, after which he ordered for a new plan to be drawn up).

Make no mistake: this would essentially be a first step in meeting the second condition laid of Mousavi's 17th statement. Were the change to the vetting process be enacted, the Guardian Council would no longer be able to disqualify candidates from running for president or parliament, as it did when it disqualified all but four candidates from running in the 2009 presidential election.

The chances of the plan coming to fruition, however, appear slim. With the regime still reeling from the aftermath of the June elections and still off-balance going forward, it would have no reason to suddenly invite more political opposition in Majlis through freer elections in 2012. Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the ultra-conservative Kayhandaily and someone who is regarded as being close to Khamenei, has already come out on the attack, stating that any propsoal to create such an electoral commission would be "against the Islamic Republic's constitution."

No sooner than the proposal was being discussed, more divisive conservative rhetoric emerged from the other body Rafsanjani chairs, the Assembly of Experts. In a statement reported by Fars News, the Assembly allegedly declared that the regime's patience with the opposition "ended in December after sedition leaders missed numerous chances to repent and return into the gown of the revolution." (Enduring America notes, however, that the statement is missing on the Assembly of Experts' official website and that several prominent members were absent from the Assembly's two-day meeting). Khamenei, for his part, has reiterated the statement's pronouncement in his own statement, saying that those who still do not accept the June presidential election result "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system."

The obstacles in revising the regime's election laws aside, the other four points from Mousavi's 17th statement have gone unheeded as well. Saeed Mortazavi, though implicated by Majlis [Iran's Parliament] in the Kahrizak torture-murders, remains a free man. Rather than having political prisoners freed, the country recently saw the greatest wave of arrests sweep dissidents since late June and early July. Meanwhile, state-controlled media remains entirely propagandized while any questions regarding citizens' right to freely assemble were surly answered by the enormous security presence deployed on 22 Bahman.

Not even appearing to consider the proposals, the regime seems bent on acting counter to each of Mousavi's five points. Despite the intentions of some del-soozan, (or "heartbroken" moderate conservatives), any promise for political reconciliation also appears dead. Rather, the crisis seems destined to continue indefinitely, and with neither side refusing to back down, Mousavi's five grievances may come to be prerequisites for the regime to unconditionally reject before the opposition begins to decide on how to take the uprising to the next level.

Iran Analysis: Re-alignment v. Crackdown --- Which "Wins"?

Forget all the talk and newspaper articles, which EA correspondents like Josh Shahryar took apart on Saturday, about this conflict being settled in favour of a heavy-fisted Government. While the opposition is still considering its next moves, there was more than enough to show that 1) this is far more than a simple narrative of Government putting down the Green Movement and 2) that Government is far from secure in its supposed victory.

NEW Iran: A Tale of Cricket, Andre the Giant, and Protests
Iran: “It’s All Over” for the Green Movement?

First, the less dramatic --- frankly, quite mundane --- but significant political move. The "ambiguous" Hashemi Rafsanjani is no longer ambiguous. His statement at the Council reaffirmed his basic position of siding with the Supreme Leader, but equally important were his call for unity and the need to make changes to ensure the security of the Iranian system.



Still a bit vague? Well, you have to join the statement to that of Mohsen Rezaei: Secretary of the Council, Presidential candidate, and Rafsanjani ally. Yep, ally. Rezaei's own declaration to the Council was for alterations to the electoral law that governed last year's unresolved campaign.

That might seems a bit too bureaucratic for much attention, but the significance of "alterations" is that they would take away power from bodies such as the Guardian Council, the group that tightly oversees and restricts Iran's political process. And that in turn means an opening up of space in the system for factions, parties, and individuals --- even critical parties and individuals if they stay within the legal framework of the system.

A Rafsanjani-Rezaei alignment is not new --- think "National Unity Plan" and the possible January initiative to clip the authority of President Ahmadinejad. In this case, however, it is narrower but more focused. Take away some of the political  power wielded by the executive and hand it to an ostensibly "neutral" body.

So how will the Government respond? Well, not directly. Saturday was another day where it was defending against attacks on the economy and trying to show its authority with more threats against the supposedly vanquished opposition and, perhaps, even "conservative" elements who are not on-board.

Iran police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam declared that media are the collaborators of intelligence services, assuring anyone listening that Iran's security services will take care of the foreign media in time to prevent any regime change.

Justice Minister Morteza Bakhtiari pronounced that you can forget the "official" figure of 300 detained on Ashura (27 December); it was actually 700. So let there be no doubt that the regime would also "get" Karroubi and Mousavi to prevent any significant challenge.

Ahmadinejad's media advisor Mehdi Kalhor chipped in with the news that the first "velvet revolution" in Iran was on 2 Khordaad 1376 (23 May 1997), the day that Mohammad Khatami was elected President. Neat twist, this. It is not the Ahmadinejad 2009 victory that is fraudulent but that of Khatami, who just happens to be one of the leading opposition figures, and the "reformists".

In Qom, Ahmadinejad's clerical backer, Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, analysed that "the devil" played a role in the recent "riots" in Iran. Satan's companions includes "jinnis" and devious people, and democracy is another example of his ferocity and tyranny.

Not exactly the statements of a regime secure in its skin. Hmm....

Well, one easy read is that Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi haven't exactly gone away. They met for the second time this week on Saturday, this in Karroubi's home. No details given by Karroubi's website Saham News, but the point is that they met. The Government watches and frets that 22 Bahman did not settle matters.

But it should not only be watch the devil's foreign and domestic minions. The situation is such that any shift, even with "the system", of power and oversight is a slap-down to a President and his advisors who have escalated this crisis to the point of no compromise.

So expect more threats against Hashemi Rafsanjani in the near-future. Look for more counter-attacks from members of Parliament who no longer have any respect for Ahmadinejad. And bring back the recurrent question.

What say you now, Supreme Leader?

Iran: The IHRDC Report on Violence and Suppression of Dissent

Yesterday, three days after a Human Rights Watch report on the same topic (see separate entry), the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center released its initial findings, "Violent Aftermath: The 2009 Election and Suppression of Dissent in Iran":

INTRODUCTION

On June 13, 2009, the day after the tenth presidential election in the Islamic Republic of Iran, demonstrations erupted in cities across the country. Demonstrators protested what they viewed as widespread fraud—calls of “Where is my vote?” predominated. The Guardian Council had permitted only four men to campaign: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the incumbent; Mohsen Rezaei, a former head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Sepah), considered a conservative; Mir-Hossein Mousavi, a former prime minister of Iran during the war with Iraq, considered a reformist; and Mehdi Karroubi, a former speaker of the Majlis, also a reformist.

Iran: Human Rights Watch Report on Post-Election Abuses (11 February)
The Latest from Iran (15 February): Withstanding Abuse

Mousavi had declared himself the winner late on Election Day. The government immediately announced that Ahmadinejad had won by 62 percent of the vote. The regime also responded by cutting off electronic communication avenues within Iran and with the outside world. As the week progressed, cell phone and internet services were regularly shut down and slowed. On June 16, the authorities announced that foreign journalists were forbidden from reporting from the streets, and that their visas would not be renewed. Hundreds of domestic journalists and members of the press were arrested and intimidated.



Despite these efforts, demonstrations continued throughout the country on an almost daily basis through the month of June. On at least one occasion, the crowd numbered in the millions. In response, the government confirmed that Ahmadinejad had won and unleashed the Sepah (commanded by Mohammad-Ali Jafari) and the Basij (headed by Hossein Taeb) upon the crowds. As the crowds became larger and persisted in exercising their rights to peaceful assembly, the security forces became increasingly violent.

Demonstrators were attacked, beaten and shot in the streets. Many demonstrators were killed in the street. Thousands were arbitrarily arrested—the Judiciary reported that 4,000 people were arrested in the initial weeks. Daily demonstrations finally slowed after a particularly harsh crackdown on June 20 during which at least thirty people were killed.

However, throughout the summer and continuing into the winter, demonstrators flooded the streets on remembrance days, and the security forces continued to brutally suppress all expressions of dissent. Objection to alleged fraudulent elections gradually developed into broader expressions of dissatisfaction with the government. Over the course of a few months, the protests became less focused on the election and more on the general repressive nature of the regime. On December 27, Ashura, reportedly hundreds of demonstrators were arrested.

The Iranian regime also arrested people who were not demonstrating but whom the government charged with fomenting a “velvet revolution.” The exact number of arrests remains unknown, but circumstantial evidence indicates that hundreds were arrested and detained merely for exercising their rights of association. The arrests captured broad segments of civil society, including leaders and members of political opposition and minority groups, members of the political establishment, lawyers, students, and academics. The arrests continued through the winter.

Many arrestees were threatened but released after a few days. However, many others faced torture, rape and sometimes death while in custody. Detainees were, and continue to be, subject to solitary confinement, lengthy interrogations, beatings, rape and other forms of torture. Many were not permitted contact with their families or lawyers, and many were coerced into providing public confessions. Some demonstrators were sent to the Kahrizak detention facility, where they were treated so brutally that the government ordered its closure and transferred detainees to Evin and other prisons. Three Kahrizak detainees died, due to lack of medical care, on the way to or shortly after arrival at Evin Prison. The families of many murdered demonstrators and detainees were denied permission to hold proper burial rites for their loved ones.

On August 1, a series of mass show trials began in Tehran. The first two were broadcast on Iranian television and showed hundreds of disheveled detainees dressed in pajama-like prison garb, looking dazed and confused. Although a list of defendants has never been made public, many were recognizable by the public including former vice-president Mohammad-Ali Abtahi and Dr. Mohsen Mirdamadi, the secretary general of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. The mass show trials bore little resemblance to criminal trials, under Iranian or international law. At each, the prosecution read a political document accusing the detainees and others outside of Iran, including foreign governments, of fomenting a “velvet revolution.” The readings were followed by confessions by select defendants.

Since August, detainees have also appeared on television confessing to crimes involving national security, belonging to terrorist organizations and conspiring with foreign powers. On October 5, the government began announcing sentences. The first four were death sentences handed down to men who had been arrested before the elections. As of December 31, at least a hundred sentences of lengthy prison terms, flogging, or banishment have been announced. However, the identities of many of those detained and tried remain unknown.

This preliminary report that documents and analyzes the Iranian government’s brutal suppression of dissent following the June 12 election. To meet publication deadlines, it ends its coverage on December 31, 2009. However, the Islamic Republic’s suppression efforts continue to escalate, and Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) fully expects that in the coming weeks, months and years, further details will come to light.

This report begins with a brief description of the presidential election, which is followed by a catalogue of the regime’s brutal suppression of the demonstrations. The regime’s refusal to issue demonstration permits to opposition groups, its use of excessive force to suppress the demonstrations, and its murder of demonstrators violated the rights of the demonstrators to freedom of assembly, protection against the use of excessive force by law enforcement, and their right to life under Iranian and international law. The killing of demonstrators was simply murder.

The third section covers the arbitrary arrests of demonstrators and the brutal treatment they suffered while  imprisoned in violation of Iranian and international law. Demonstrators were imprisoned without charge, and once imprisoned, were not afforded fundamental due process, including contact with their lawyers and families. Detainees were mistreated, denied medical care, beaten, raped, tortured, and killed. The regime’s failure to inform families of the whereabouts of their loved ones also constituted forced disappearances in violation of international law.

This is followed by a section describing the arrest and imprisonment of large swaths of Iran’s political and civil society. The arrests, interrogations and torture of the non-demonstrators violated Iranian and international law for the same reasons these acts violated the rights of the demonstrators. Political detainees were held for extended periods of time, often in solitary confinement, with minimal access to family or their chosen counsel. Those who were assigned legal counsel were allowed little contact with their chosen lawyers. If it is found that the torture, killings or forced disappearances were widespread, systematic, and with the knowledge of the perpetrators, each also constitutes a crime against humanity.

The last section of this report describes the five mass show trials and the sentencing of both demonstrators and activists. The parading of detainees in mass show trials, and subsequent sentencing of election-related arrestees violated Iranian and international law, both of which require observance of basic due process, including presumption of innocence, and the right to an attorney of one’s choice, and prohibit reliance on forced confessions in criminal proceedings.

The responsibility for this brutal wave of suppression begins at the top of the Iranian regime with the Supreme Leader and flows down through Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the heads of the law enforcement organizations, including the Sepah [Islamic Revolution Guards Corps], the Basij and the police (NAJA), the heads of the Judiciary, and continues down through the ranks to the Basij on motorcycles running demonstrators down on the street, sadistic prison guards and other judicial employees. The perpetrators and their superiors are responsible under Iranian and international law.

Much of the material presented in this report is from thirty-two interviews conducted by IHRDC with activists, experts and victims of the government’s suppression. Most have chosen to remain anonymous for security reasons. Given the Iranian government’s concerted efforts to hide and distort the record, this report also analyzes and compares witness testimony with reports in the official Iranian press and the international press.

Read rest of report....

Iran: Human Rights Watch Report on Post-Election Abuses (11 February)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nearly nine months since Iran's presidential election sparked widespread popular demonstrations against alleged vote-rigging have been among the most tumultuous in the history of the Islamic Republic, which marks the 31st anniversary of the revolution that paved the way for its establishment on February 11, 2010. This has been a period of repeated serious human rights abuses that include extra-judicial killings, violations of the rights to freedom of assembly and expression, and the prohibition of torture, not to mention arbitrary arrest and detention and countless due process violations.

Iran: The IHRDC Report on Violence and Suppression of Dissent
The Latest from Iran (15 February): Withstanding Abuse

In the two months immediately following the June 12 election, the government carried out a major campaign of repression that included mass detentions of protestors, political reform figures, and rights activists, culminating in public trials in August. November and December saw renewed attacks on protestors as large demonstrations commemorated significant dates in the history of the Islamic revolution and the Shia Muslim religious calendar.


This report brings together testimonies and information reflecting the continuing human rights crisis since the election and its sharply disputed results. Over the course of 5 months, Human Rights Watch conducted interviews with over two dozen individuals, including ordinary protestors, journalists, political figure and their families, and human rights defenders. The report's findings indicate a widespread governmental crackdown across various sectors of Iranian society. Although the government has acknowledged some abuses and even named responsible individuals, no one has been prosecuted for committing major human rights violations.

On June 12, 2009, Iran's incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stood for re-election against challengers Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohsen Rezaii. Although the one-month campaign period produced some notable transparency, such as live televised presidential debates for the first time, the government mobilized its institutions and media resources to promote President Ahmadinejad and harass his opponents. The authorities closed reformist publications, blocked opposition websites, and disrupted SMS services prior to the election. Rival candidates' accusations of official favoritism and electoral meddling by the government came to a head on election day. After the announcement of preliminary results on election day, the three opposition candidates quickly charged that the authorities had rigged the voting in favor of President Ahmadinejad and later filed complaints with the Guardian Council. (The Guardian Council is an unelected body of six clerics and six jurists whose range of powers includes supervisory authority over presidential elections).

On June 13, following the government's announcement the previous afternoon that preliminary election results showed Ahmadinejad to be the winner, large numbers of protestors took to the streets. They gathered throughout Tehran and other major cities for the next several days. The demonstrations were overwhelmingly peaceful. However, police and security forces confronted protestors, including those who played no part in the occasional acts of vandalism that occurred, with batons, clubs, and in some cases live ammunition. State violence extended beyond demonstrations, with plainclothes andBasij paramilitary forces attacking student dormitories and staging nighttime raids in residential areas. Security forces arrested thousands of protestors in the course of these governmental crackdowns during the first week following the election.

In addition to massive detentions of ordinary protestors and peaceful activists, as early as the day after the election, authorities rounded up scores of well-known writers and political figures affiliated with the reform movement.  (The reform movement is a term dating to the 1997 election of President Mohammad Khatami, who planned to bring about greater social and political freedoms. Since that time, the term is often broadly applied to include political figures and activists who advocate for change within the framework of the current governmental system.)

The worst abuses against ordinary protestors have taken place at police stations and detention centers, most notoriously at the Kahrizak detention center outside of Tehran. At least three detainees have died due to injuries sustained in Kahrizak. In August, authorities dismissed the director of Kahrizak and said that three guards would be prosecuted for prisoner abuse. In January 2010, a parliamentary panel investigated the deaths and allegations of torture and named former Tehran Prosecutor-General Saeed Mortazavi as the person responsible. Although the panel dismissed allegations of sexual abuse, it found that widespread violations had taken place in the detention center. However, neither Mortazavi nor anyone else implicated in the abuse has yet been prosecuted.

Authorities also abused detainees in Evin, a large prison complex where Human Rights Watch has previously documented systematic abuses.  In Evin, authorities held prominent political figures and activists, who gave confessions that appeared to have been coerced incriminating themselves and others of vaguely-worded political offenses. In August, the government held the first mass trial for over 100 reformists, with defendants confessing to having colluded to promote a "velvet revolution." After the first day of the trial, state television showed two of the defendants, Mohammad Ali Abtahi and Mohammad Atrianfar, denying that their confessions were coerced and claiming to have "changed" their opinions since they were detained. Testimonies collected by Human Rights Watch indicate that authorities coerced the detainees into providing these confessions. Families of detainees told Human Rights Watch that their relatives were put under severe physical and psychological pressure to produce self-incriminating statements.

Despite widespread repression in the weeks following the election, peaceful demonstrations and expressions of opposition continued. Former candidates and their supporters, primarily depending on the internet, have spoken out against human rights violations and called on the government to hold abusers accountable. In response, the government harassed and intimidated activists, journalists, and human rights defenders, detaining many, subjecting some to trials that did not meet international fair trial standards, and convicting others solely for exercising their right to peaceful dissent.

During the fall and winter of 2009, government harassment of peaceful protestors in response to major demonstrations such as those held on November 4 (the anniversary of the takeover of the US embassy in 1979), December 7 (National Student Day), and in conjunction with the Shia religious holiday of Ashura on December 27 continued unabated. Attacks by security forces acting alongside the Basij injured many and killed at least 8. Authorities also arrested scores of additional activists and protestors, and threatened to try some on charges that carry the death penalty. As of February 10, the government had executed 2 persons who had in fact been detained prior to the elections on charges ofmoharebe (enmity with God). In January, the government sentenced 9 others to the death penalty on the same charges and put on trial 16 others on charges that carry the death penalty upon conviction.

Key Recommendations to the Government of Iran

• Establish an independent and impartial fact-finding commission to identify those who ordered the crackdown on post-election protesters and those responsible for serious human rights violations.


• Investigate promptly and impartially all allegations of torture or ill-treatment in detention.


• Ensure that victims of torture or ill-treatment receive appropriate compensation from the government.


• Release all detainees held for exercising their right to free expression, assembly, and association

Read rest of report....

The Latest from Iran (13 February): Re-assessment, Renewal

2125 GMT: Reports have emerged that two more journalists, Mohammad Ghaznavian and Hamid Mafi, have been detained. They join more than 60 others in Iran's prisons.

2120 GMT: We have posted a snap analysis of what appears to be a serious challenge by Khabar Online, the website linked to Ali Larijani, to President Ahmadinejad. If we are on the mark, then in light of this week's suppression of Ayande News, it will be intriguing to see the Government's response to another location of "conservative" criticism.

2025 GMT: We have posted the text of Mehdi Karroubi's first interview after 22 Bahman.

1955 GMT: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has written the academic colleagues of imprisoned Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, "The espionage charges leveled against Dr. Tajbakhsh are groundless. The State Department is using every available diplomatic tool to achieve Dr. Tajbakhsh's release."

Tajbakhsh was jailed for 15 years in October on charges of espionage. Clinton said in her letter that Kian Tajbakhsh has not been allowed to meet with Swiss diplomats, who serve as the United States' diplomatic representatives in Iran, because Iran considers Tajbakhsh an Iranian citizen.

NEW Iran: Reading Khabar’s “Conservative” Attack on Ahmadinejad
NEW Iran: Mehdi Karroubi’s 1st Interview After 22 Bahman (13 February)
NEW Iran: Desperately Seeking Sensible US Comment about 22 Bahman
NEW Iran: “Allahu Akhbar from the Rooftops” — The 2009 Photo of the Year
Iran Video Special (2): Decoding the 22 Bahman Rally in Azadi Square
Iran Video Special (1): The 22 Bahman Attack on Karroubi?
Iran: 22 Bahman’s Reality “No Victory, No Defeat”
Iran Analysis: The Regime’s Pyrrhic Victory
Iran: The Events of 22 Bahman, Seen from Inside Tehran
Iran on 22 Bahman: Ahmadinejad “Wins Ugly” (This Time)
Iran: Greening YouTube — An Interview with Mehdi Saharkhiz
The Latest from Iran (12 February): The Day After 22 Bahman

1940 GMT: A Friday Prayer for All. Neday-e Sabz Azadi reports, via Radio Zamaneh, that the Friday Prayers leader of Zahedan, Molavi Abdolhamid, described the Islamic Republic as a system that gives equal freedom to both pro- and anti-Government groups and allows voices of opposition to be heard: “The people of Iran brought the Revolution to victory to achieve its goals and now they demand the reviewing and realization of those goals.”


1817 GMT: Re-Assessment (cont.). The Los Angeles Times has a wide-ranging, sometimes sprawling review of 22 Bahman. At its heart, however, is an interview with a female journalist in Tehran pondering the next steps for the Green Movement:

Our response was better than getting angry and violent and paying a lot of costs and not gaining anything. I think it was a wise choice to just show the government that we disagree, and not to pay too much of a cost, and not hurry to overthrow the system, and to just consider [the day] as a step in the path that we are on and will continue.

If the government believes that the green movement is finished, they are mistaken. Actually, I don't think that they are that stupid.

1810 GMT: Student activist Vahid Abedini has been released from detention.

1615 GMT: Re-assessing. Setareh Sabety's assessment of the way forward after 22 Bahman, which we featured on Thursday, has now been extended for The Huffington Post.

1610 GMT: More on the Karroubi Attack (see 1452 GMT). The account in Saham News claims that Ali Karroubi, son of Mehdi Karroubi, was taken to Amirolmomenin mosque after his arrest, beaten severely, and threatened with rape.

1600 GMT: Like Rah-e-Sabz, the Green website Tahavol-e-Sabz is on-line on a different address after it was taken down by a cyber-attack on Friday. And Mir Hossein Mousavi's Kalemeh is also now back in operation.

1452 GMT: The 22 Bahman Attack. Fatemeh Karroubi, the wife of Mehdi Karroubi, has written to the Supreme Leader to complain about the physical abuse of her son Ali when he was arrested on 22 Bahman  during an assault on the Karroubi entourage. A picture in Karroubi's Saham News shows a bruised Ali Karroubi.

1432 GMT: On the Labour Front. The Flying Carpet Institute passes on an English translation of a Radio Farda interview with the leader of a recently-formed labor organisation at the Isfahan Steel Factory.

1430 GMT: We've posted a separate entry considering US "expert" reaction to the events of 22 Bahman.

1300 GMT: The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front has issued a statement about the events of 22 Bahman.

1145 GMT: And More Clarification. An EA correspondent checks in:

Rah-e-Sabz reports that, contrary to popular perception, Ayande News is run by an ally of Mohsen Rezaei (Secretary of the Expediency Council and Presidential candidate) and not of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The entire editorial team was indeed arrested on 11 February, and the current notice regarding the arrest of the editor-in-chief, Fouad Sadeghi, was placed there because of pressure by the intelligence forces. Rah-e-Sabz speculates that Sadeghi is resolutely opposed to the transfer of Iranian uranium abroad, which is why the Government might have arrested him.

1125 GMT: Important Correction. Ayande News is not operating "as normal" after the reported detention of all of its staff, including editor-in-chief Fouad Sadeghi, just before 22 Bahman (see 0920 GMT). The site has not been updated since Wednesday, when it noted the detentions and suspension of operations.

1025 GMT: Sure, Sure, Whatever. Political posturing all around this morning. Iranian state media bangs out the "self-sufficient" beat: "Iran's nuclear point man Ali Akhbar Salehi says that much to the West's surprise, Tehran will produce nuclear fuel plates within the next few months."

And American not-really-state-media (The New York Times) serves as Obama Administration "get tough" spokesperson:

With tensions over Iran’s nuclear ambitions hitting new levels, the United States is mounting a diplomatic full-court press in the Middle East, sending four top diplomats, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, to confer with Arab and Israeli leaders.

The envoys’ visits to Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were planned separately in recent weeks, but they now have a common purpose, administration officials said: to reassure Iran’s neighbors that the United States will stand firm against Tehran, and to enlist other countries in a global effort to put pressure on the Iranian authorities.

0925 GMT: Toeing the Line. Former Presidential candidate Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri has declared, "Even one foe in the Government is too much."

0920 GMT: Claim of Day. If this is true, it is a huge story. Iran Green Voice is asserting, from sources, that all staff of Ayande News were detained on the night of 22 Bahman. Ayande is not "reformist" but affiliated with Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Ayande is on-line as normal this morning. (see 1125 GMT)

0915 GMT: Free Them. A group of international organizations, journalists, writers, and publishers have written an open letter to the Supreme Leader demanding freedom for at least 60 imprisoned journalists and writers in Iran.

0910 GMT: More Numbers. Ebrahim Nabavi writes, "According to eye-witnesses, the government insists on the fact that four million loudspeakers participated in 22 Bahman."

0845 GMT: The Numbers on 22 Bahman. The Newest Deal, using Google's eye-in-the-sky imagery of Azadi Square on Thursday, offers a concise, effective repudiation to the official claims of "millions" supporting the regime on the day.

0755 GMT: On the International Front. Arms for Iran, sent by a Russian export company,have reportedly been confiscated at Frankfurt Airport in Germany.

Following the European Parliament resolution challenging Iran over internal abuses and its nuclear programme, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has sharply condemned human rights violations in Iran and demanded harsher sanctions.

And speculation continues as to why Saeed Jalili, Iran's Secretary of the National Security Council and key figure in nuclear talks, had trip to Moscow cancelled last week.

0740 GMT: We began yesterday by looking for reactions to Thursday's demonstrations, especially political re-alignments within the Iranian regime and political re-assessments within the opposition and Green movements.

We got both.

On the "conservative" side, the fightback against President Ahmadinejad's declared victory came late, but it was clear and strong in the statement of the member of Parliament and Larijani ally Ali Motahhari. His interview, published in the Larijani-allied Khabar Online, was a forthright challenge for "both sides" to acknowledge mistakes. That has been standard rhetoric for Motahhari for weeks; what was distinctive was his specific challenge to the Government to stop banning the press and to release all political prisoners.

Yet it was the re-assessment on the opposition side that was most striking on Friday. The let-down of Thursday slowly gave way to a more balanced reaction. That was supported in part by the emerging evidence --- which we had projected in our analyses late on Thursday and early on Friday --- that the support for the regime on 22 Bahman was not as large as first believed and certainly was not as enthusiastic.

Beyond that, however, was an even more important conclusion: hopes for 22 Bahman had been inflated and the opposition approach to the day had been very, very wrong, but this was a tactical failure, not the demise of the Green movement. Tehran Bureau, which had been striking in its pessimism late Thursday, now features an analysis by Muhammad Sahimi which swings back to long-term determination: "There is a new dawn in the struggle of the Iranian people for democracy and the rule of law. The Green Movement must develop the necessary organization and adjust its tactics dynamically in order to make further progress during this turbulent era."

More importantly than any statement from an organisation on "the outside", activists inside Iran have made that assessment. So to the next phase of this crisis.