The Latest from Iran (25 February): Misleading Statements?

2110 GMT: Not-Over-The-Top Statement of Today. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, testifying to a Congressional committee, reveals that the current manoeuvres over Iran's uranium enrichment are just like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis:

My reading of what happened with President Kennedy is that it's exactly what he did. It was high-stakes diplomacy. It was pushing hard to get the world community to understand, going to the UN, making a presentation, getting international opinion against the placement of Russian weapons in Cuba, making a deal eventually with the Russians that led to the removal of the weapons.

That is the kind of high-stakes diplomacy that I'm engaged in, that other members of this administration are, because we take very seriously the potential threat from Iran.

2100 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. After all the political positions (take your pick) he adopted at the Assembly of Experts, Hashemi Rafsanjani used a ceremony at the tomb of the late Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a warning about "uninformed individuals" (who are they?): "These individuals shirk from their responsibilities and make irrelevant declarations, thus causing the leadership to bear the responsibility of all the actions that the people reject."

1935 GMT: Diplomatic Poses (cont.). Well, I guess Washington had to strike its own posture given the statements of President Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart Bashir al-Assad in Damascus today (1335 GMT). Here's State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley:

As the secretary [Hillary Clinton] reiterated yesterday, we have expressed our concern directly to President (Bashar) Assad about Syria's relationship with Iran. This is ultimately a decision that Syria has to make, but as President Assad assesses Syria's long-term interests, he need only look around the region and recognize that Syria is increasingly an outlier.

We want to see Syria play a more constructive role in the region. One step would be to make clear what Iran's need to do differently and unfortunately there was no evidence of that today.

The key here is that it is a spokesman making the statement, not the President, not the Secretary of State. Yes, of course, the US would prefer that Damascus put Iran into isolation. But they know that, given the regional dynamics, Syria will not publicly cut off Tehran. So the real diplomacy will take place away from these statements.

1925 GMT: Back from a lengthy academic break --- the US Ambassador to Britain was in Birmingham today --- to catch up on the full force of Iranian propaganda. Here is the "confession" of Jundullah leader Abdolmalek Rigi, tailor-made to put the US as the main sponsor of his terrorism:

After Obama was elected, the Americans contacted us and they met me in Pakistan.They met us after clashes with my group around March 17 in (the southeastern city of) Zahedan, and he (the US operative) said that Americans had requested a meeting.

I said we didn't have any time for a meeting and if we do help them they should promise to give us aid. They said they would cooperate with us and will give me military equipment, arms and machine guns. They also promised to give us a base along the border with Afghanistan next to Iran.

They asked to meet me and we said where should we meet you and he said in Dubai. We sent someone to Dubai and we told a person to ask a place for myself in Afghanistan from the area near the operations and they complied that they would sort out the problem for us and they will find Mr. Rigi a base and guarantee his own security in Afghanistan or in any of the countries adjacent to Iran so that he can carry on his operations.

They told me that in Kyrgyzstan they have a base called Manas near Bishkek, and that a high-ranking person was coming to meet me and that if such high-ranking people come to the United Arab Emirates, they may be observed by intelligence people but in a place like Bishkek this high-ranking American person could come and we could reach an agreement on making personal contacts. But after the last major operation we took part in, they said that they wanted to meet with us.

The Americans said Iran was going its own way and they said our problem at the present is Iran…not al-Qaeda and not the Taliban, but the main problem is Iran. We don't have a military plan against Iran. Attacking Iran is very difficult for us (the US). The CIA is very particular about you and is prepared to do anything for you because our government has reached the conclusion that there was nothing Americans could do about Iran and only I could take care of the operations for them.

One of the CIA officers said that it was too difficult for us to attack Iran militarily, but we plan to give aid and support to all anti-Iran groups that have the capability to wage war and create difficulty for the Iranian (Islamic) system. They reached the conclusion that your organization has the power to create difficulties for the Islamic Republic and they are prepared to give you training and/or any assistance that you would require, in terms of telecommunications security and procedures as well as other support, the Americans said they would be willing to provide it at an extensive level.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Assembly of Experts Mystery
Latest Iran Video: Rafsanjani’s Daughter is Confronted
Iran Special: Interpreting the Videos of the Tehran Dorm Attacks
The Latest from Iran (24 February): Shocks and Erosions

1350 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Hengameh Shahidi has been arrested again.

Ebrahim Yazdi, former Foreign Minister and head of the Freedom of Movement Iran, underwent open heart surgery soon after his 10-day release yesterday. His family said that the surgery was a success.


1340 GMT: Trying to Shut the Door. The Supreme Leader has returned to his rhetoric of last June. In a statement reported by Iranian state media, he said those not accepting the results of the Presidential election "would be disqualified from participating in the Islamic system, and they have already lost their credibility". Certain individuals caused the post-election turmoil because they wanted to "deny the vote of the people."

1335 GMT: Damascus Poses. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have made their declarations during the Iranian President's visit.

Assad gave a lecture to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton over her comments that the US is "troubled" by Syrian ties with Tehran, "We hope that others don't give us lessons about our region and our history. We are the ones who decide how matters will go and we know our interests. We thank them for their advice."

Ahmadinejad was even bolder, "(The Americans) want to dominate the region but they feel Iran and Syria are preventing that. We tell them that instead of interfering in the region's affairs, to pack their things and leave."

No real surprises in either man's pose. What is more important is whether there is any substantial support from Damascus for Iran, and more specifically Ahmadinejad, beyond the rhetoric of increased cooperation and cancelling of visa restrictions.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his Syrian counterpart, Bashar Assad, vowed increased cooperation during a meeting in Damascus and canceled visa restrictions between the countries.
1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Update. An activist updates that Mousavi campaign aide Asghar Khandan has been sentenced to 2 years and 74 lashes. Another aide Jahanbakh Khanjani, a former senior official in the Ministry of Interior, has been released on bail after eight months in detention.

1038 GMT: Claim of Day. According to Kalemeh, Iran's Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mohammad Hosseini, has said that "there is no censorship" of the press.

1035 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is in Damascus for talks with Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. Let's see if he can trump Ali Larijani's political manoeuvre.

1000 GMT: Larijani's Nuclear Move. This looks like it may be big news. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, after talks with Japanese officials, has said Japan's offer to enrich Iran's uranium "has the substance to be worth discussing. We want to deepen the discussion on it."

That would be a major shift from Iran's line since November that uranium had to be enriched or swapped inside the country, and it is a dramatic change in Larijani's previous hostility to third-party enrichment. A likely assumption is that the Speaker is representing the views of the Supreme Leader.

So now the key political question: is Larijani also speaking for the President or is he making a move to claim personal credit, surpassing and pushing aside Ahmadinejad?

0950 GMT: The Rigi Mystery. It may be that Iranian state media, when it finally settled on the story that the leader of Jundullah, Abdolmalek Rigi, was detained on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, had it right (and that our reports of Rigi's detention last week were inaccurate). The deputy chief of Kyrgyzstan's national airline has confirmed that a plane was forced to land in Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on Tuesday (in fact, other information indicates that the interception occurred Monday night) and two passengers were taken away by Iranian authorities.

0905 GMT: The Wrong Lawyers. An unexpected but still stunning story from Rooz Online about the screening of "unsuitable" human rights lawyers:

Last week the administrative committee of Iran’s bar association has disqualified nearly half of the candidates seeking to serve on Iran’s bar association.

The official website of the Iranian Bar Association reported yesterday that 36 candidates running for management positions at the Association’s headquarters were disqualified. The Association’s President, Seyed Mohammad Jondoghi-Kermanipour...said, “Today we received a letter from the administrative judicial tribunal, which stated that, pursuant to their previous letter, only 43 candidates were qualified, the remaining candidates having been disqualified for failing to meet the specified criteria.”

[As well as] Jondoghi-Kermanipour, other prominent attorneys such as Abdolfatah Soltani, Naser Zarafshan, Abdolsamad Khorramshahi, Mohammad-Ali Dadkhah, Nemat Ahmadi, Farideh Gheirat, Goudarz Eftekhar-Jahromi (former head of the Association), Ali Najafi-Tavana, Reza Nourbaha, Mohammad-Hossein Aghasi, Jahangir Mostofi, Akbar Sardarizadeh, Ramezan Haji-Mashadi have been disqualified.

0855 GMT: Satire of Day. Ebrahim Nabavi sets a Philosophy Quiz for readers. A sample question:

[Government spokesman] Gholam-Hossein Elham said, "Cutting off AN's government is the insurgents' next project." What is the logical mistake in this sentence?

1 - There exists no government to be cut off.
2 -  The government will be cut off by itself. There is no need for the insurgents to do anything.
3 - Even if the insurgents killed themselves, they could not stop the downfall of the government.
4 - The Agha [Supreme Leader] himself has started this project a long time ago.

0840 GMT: The Forgetful Assembly. Amidst the confusion over the statement/non-statement from the two-day meeting of the Assembly of Experts (see separate analysis), the Green website Rah-e-Sabz offers an overview of the divisions within the body since the election and declares that it is suffering from "Continuous Alzheimer's".

0825 GMT: Comparing the Numbers. Iran News Now, using video and photographs, compares the non-crowd at the President's speech in Birjand, Khorasan, yesterday with the masses who turned out for a Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign rally and concludes:

Let’s look at the crowd gathered in Birjand for Ahmadinejad...and let’s be realistic. This thing is FAR from over. The aspirations of the Iranian people will not go unheeded.

EA's Mr Verde adds, "The interesting fact about the turnout (if one can claim it is interesting at all) is that even in a place close to Ayatollah Khamenei’s hometown of Mashhad, people don’t really care about Ahmadinejad."

0820 GMT: Economy Watch. Mohammad Reza Khabbaz, a member of Parliament's Economy Committee, has denounced President Ahmadinejad's proposed budget as "unrealistic".

0815 GMT: This is a Secure Regime? Revolutionary Guard commander Hossein Hamedani, in his statement yesterday, announced that the number of Basiji bases in Tehran would be increased from 6 to 22.

0800 GMT: Wednesday was marked by loud proclamations from the Government. There were the attempts to limit the damage of the video of June's attack on Tehran University dormitories, the aggressive promotion of the "terrorist" threat from Jundullah to Kurdish groups to the Green Movement, and the President's sparsely-attended speech in eastern Iran (see  inset.

However, the most intriguing statement by far was the supposed proclamation of the Assembly of Experts supporting the Supreme Leader and warning against the "sedition" of opposition leaders. This morning, however, it looks this was a non-statement, an attempt by pro-Ahmadinejad members of the Assembly and media to create the image of a regime ready to crush Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami (and, probably, to back Hashemi Rafsanjani into a corner). We have a special analysis.

"American Takfiris": The US Proponents of Torture (and Why It Matters)

Adam Serwer writes in The Atlantic:

The theological justification for al Qaeda's wholesale slaughter of civilians was provided by Sayyid Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, one of the founding fathers of al Qaeda. Because the murder of innocents is forbidden in Islam and the murder of Muslims in particular, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden required some sort of theological framework for justifying terrorism. This was provided by al-Sharif, who essentially argued in his book, "The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge," that apostates could be murdered, and that approach, takfir (which has come to be known as takfirism) allowed al Qaeda to, for all intents and purposes, kill anyone they wanted without violating the laws of Islam by declaring them to be apostates. In other words, Dr. Fadl helped provided a theological justification for something that everyone involved knew was wrong.

War on Terror Flashback: Bush’s Lawyer Yoo “Civilians Can Be Massacred”

The legal memos justifying torture aren't very different in terms of reasoning--it's clear that John Yoo and his cohorts in the Office of Legal Counsel saw their job not as binding the president to the rule of law, but to declare legal any tactic that the executive branch believed necessary to fight terrorism. They worked backwards from this conclusion, and ethics officials at the Department of Justice, we now know, decided that they they had violated professional standards in doing so. Whereas al-Zawahiri and bin Laden turned to al-Sharif for a method to circumvent the plain language of the Koran, Bush and Cheney went to Yoo and Jay Bybee to circumvent the plain language of the law. Most Islamic scholars, just like most legal experts, reject their respective reasoning as unsound.



The torture memos--indeed, all of the pro-torture arguments rest on a similar intellectual themes to the takfiris. Suspected terrorists are "illegal enemy combatants", outside the framework of laws that would otherwise guide us. Just as the takfiris justify the killing of even self-identified Muslims by excommunicating them as "infidels", torture apologists argue that even American citizens like Jose Padilla who are accused of being terrorists become legal "apostates" without any rights the president is bound to respect. These are extraordinary circumstances, this is an extraordinary war--and so, the Bush administration turned to Yoo, a man who believes the president is bound by no laws during wartime: he can murder a village of innocent civilian non-combatants just as surely as he can crush the testicles of a child or deploy the military against residents of the United States. The architects of torture are the intellectual mirror image of their declared enemies, depending on the perceived inhumanity of their foes to justify monstrous actions. It's worth noting however, that the Bush administration did not take full advantage of the wrongs that the lawyers in their Office of Legal Counsel would have enabled. My point is not to equate the deeds of AQ with the deeds of the Bush administration--merely to point out justification for acts that are on their face unjustifiable take a similar intellectual path.

From his cell in an Egyptian prison, al-Sharif denounced his former colleagues in al Qaeda, declaring that the killing of innocents was wrong. He essentially renounced his earlier work providing the theological basis for politically motivated murder and destruction, declaring, "There is no such thing in Islam as ends justifying the means," now arguing that the murder of innocents, Muslim or otherwise, was sinful. Whatever theological cover al-Sharif's original arguments provided were meaningless against the body count of mostly Muslim innocents amassed by al-Qaeda in their war against the "West", which by the numbers has been a war against fellow Muslims. In combination with the furious efforts of moderate Muslims and even committed Islamists like al-Sharif, al Qaeda and its methods have been largely discredited, to the point where, as Fareed Zakaria writes, we don't fear "a broad political movement but a handful of fanatics scattered across the globe."

I confess to being bothered that we haven't seen a similarly backlash against the architects of torture here--part of the reason we haven't, is because even though innocents were tortured, we still see them as fundamentally alien. Few Americans directly suffered as a result of what Yoo and Bybee did--although I think we have yet to understand that damage that's been done to our society as a whole. Bolstered by ideological partisans and powerful figures looking to avoid accountability for their actions, men like John Yoo and Jay Bybee have yet to be held responsible for the crimes they enabled--and I'm not sure they ever will be--although I'm less concerned with their punishment than with the permanent American rejection of torture. The Justice Department's David Margolis overruled the original conclusions of the Department's ethics lawyers that Yoo and Bybee had, in ignoring legal precedents and sanctioning behavior that was likely illegal, had committed "professional misconduct". That would have triggered professional sanctions for Yoo, a tenured professor at Berkeley, and Bybee, a sitting federal judge, but Margolis' memo instead concludes that they had excercised "flawed legal reasoning" that could be forgiven in part because of the context in which the memos were written, months after the 9/11 attacks. Margolis though, does not endorse their reasoning, and as for Yoo, he writes that whether or not he deliberately gave bad legal advice is a "close question."  Al-Sharif will never be able to wash the blood from his hands, but while this founding father of al Qaeda has recoiled from the fruits of his labor, the American architects of torture continue to argue that their reasoning is legally sound.

The American conscience, when it decides to act, is mighty--but it is also sluggish and vain. Americans are crushed by the weight of not fulfilling their own high expectations--so the shameful acts of one generation are often rectified by a subsequent generation unencumbered by their own complicity in such acts. So the compromise the Founding Fathers reached on the issue of slavery, in defiance of the spirit of the documents they authored, was eventually righted by the Civil War. The slavery by another name of reconstruction was ignored by a nation weary of conflict after nearly being rent in two--but eventually gave birth to the civil rights movement. The suffragettes were forced to accept a compromise on the 14th Amendment that denied them the vote--but they would ultimately prevail. Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans, Reagan gave them reparations. The American conscience is often slow to action, but not because it cannot recognize evil--but because our view of ourselves as a people guided by justice is so important to who we are that when confronted with proof of our own shortcomings, we recoil in shame and precious vanity. Eventually, with the big stuff, we usually find our way--we see this with our slow, staggering, but inevitable march towards full personhood for gays and lesbians.  And while those who stained America's honor with war crimes have escaped accountability for now, these American takfiris will eventually be judged by history with a clarity we cannot muster today.

The arc of the universe is long...you know, all that stuff.

Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

The head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, appeared on NBC Television's Meet the Press, first to walk viewers through the US interventions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and then to take a tour around other issues from Iran to Guantanamo Bay to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.



In contrast to previous appearances, when Petraeus was fighting his own President to get his version of US foreign and military policy, this was a stay-the-course interview behind agreed approaches. The message on Afghanistan was long-haul effort to win. On Pakistan, it was supporting Pakistani forces to vanquish the Taliban. He spoke in generalities about maintaining pressure on Iran, and beyond his main agenda, on the tricky issues like Guantanamo Bay and "enhanced interrogation" (torture), he evaded any definitive statements.

MR. DAVID GREGORY: General David Petraeus joins us live from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

General, welcome to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thanks, David. Good to be with you.


MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. This NATO-U.S. offensive in southern Afghanistan is entering its second week with reports of resistance from the Taliban that our forces are facing. How formidable are the Taliban forces that we're confronting now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, they're formidable. They're a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them. But there's tough fighting going on, without question.

If I could, David, in fact, I'd like to put this into context, because this is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign, as General McChrystal and his team have mapped it out. We've spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structures and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those, helping with the development of the concepts, the counterinsurgency guidance General McChrystal has issued and so forth. And then now, with President Obama's policy announcement in December at West Point, the resourcing of that effort with the additional 30,000 forces that have now begun flowing, about 5,400 on the ground already, the additional civilians, the additional money, the additional authorization of Afghan security forces. So the inputs, we think, now are about right, and now we're starting to see the first of the output. And the Marja operation is the initial salvo, the initial operation in that overall campaign.

MR. GREGORY: The fight is going to be tough. As you have said, there are questions about how long the U.S. will be there in the fight, whether the Afghan army is capable enough to take over that fight. What should Americans expect as there's more engagement, as there's more fighting, in terms of U.S. losses?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, the same as in the surge in Iraq. When we go on the offensive, when we take away sanctuaries and safe havens from the Taliban and the other extremist elements that we and our Afghan and coalition partners are fighting in that country, they're going to fight back. And we're seeing that in Marja. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum. We have more of our special, special operations forces going in on the ground, and you've seen the results, you've heard some of the initial results of that with more Afghan shadow governors, the Taliban shadow governors being captured, more of the high value targets being taken down. Then, through the spectrum of providing additional security for the people, supporting additional training of Afghan security forces, as I mentioned, 100,000 more of those over the course of the next year and a half or so. And then also, out on the local defense and even the reintegration of reconcilables effort that will be pursued and is being pursued with the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY: But U.S. losses, significant?

GEN. PETRAEUS: They'll be tough. They were tough in Iraq. Look, I am--I have repeatedly said that these types of efforts are hard, and they're hard all the time. I don't use words like "optimist" or "pessimist," I use realist. And the reality is that it's hard. But we're there for a very, very important reason, and we can't forget that, David. We're in Afghanistan to ensure that it cannot once again be a sanctuary for the kind of attacks that were carried out on 9/11, which were planned initially in Kandahar, first training done in eastern Afghanistan before the attackers moved to Hamburg and then onto U.S. flight schools.

MR. GREGORY: As the offensive is taking place in southern Afghanistan, a major development in Pakistan, in neighboring Pakistan, as U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured a major Taliban figure, Abdul Baradar. What are you learning from him now that he's in custody?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, if I could, what we've learned, actually, in working with our Pakistani partners, who have done some very impressive work over the course of the last 10 months in particular, is that it's sometimes not best to talk a great deal about intelligence operations. And that's what I'll do here this morning.

What I will say is, again, I'd like to put this into context as well. Some 10 months or so ago, the Pakistani people, their political leaders, including major opposition figures and even the clerics, all recognized the threat posed to the very writ of governance of Pakistan. They saw this as the most pressing existential threat to their country, and they supported the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps as it went into Swat and the Malakand division of the northwest frontier province and then expanded its operations into the federally administered tribal areas. They've made some significant gains. They know they can't just clear and leave. They have to clear, hold, build and, over time, transition to local security forces. That's indeed what they're endeavoring to do. They are carrying out this fight. This is their fight against extremists internal to their country, threatening Pakistan, not them fighting our war on terror.

MR. GREGORY: Can I ask it a slightly different way, if you don't want to talk about what specifically is being learned? Presuming that both U.S. forces and Pakistani officials are doing the interrogation, do you wish you had the interrogation methods that were available to you during the Bush administration to get intelligence from a figure like this?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have always been on the record, in fact, since 2003, with the concept of living our values. And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. We decided early on in the 101st Airborne Division we're just going to--look, we just said we'd decide to obey the Geneva Convention, to, to move forward with that. That has, I think, stood elements in good stead. We have worked very hard over the years, indeed, to ensure that elements like the International Committee of the Red Cross and others who see the conduct of our detainee operations and so forth approve of them. Because in the cases where that is not true, we end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick in the Central Command area of responsibility. Beyond that, frankly, we have found that the use of the interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual that was given, the force of law by Congress, that that works. And...

MR. GREGORY: Well...

GEN. PETRAEUS: And that is our experience...

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in, in the years that we have implemented it.

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats, do you consider the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the same way? Do you consider it to be related, or do you think, in other words, should it be closed, or do you believe it was short-sighted to set a deadline certain for its closure?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it should be closed. But it should be done in a responsible manner. So I'm not seized with the issue that it won't be done by a certain date. In fact, I think it is--it's very prudent to ensure that, as we move forward with that, wherever the remaining detainees are relocated and so forth, whatever jurisdiction is used in legal cases and so forth, is really thought through and done in a very pragmatic and sensible manner.

MR. GREGORY: One more question about--on the subject of terrorism. You often say when it comes to politics, you like to go around the minefield rather than go through it. But this is a question, really, related to your experience and your expertise. In the past couple of weeks, there's been a big debate about what kind of threat al-Qaeda poses directly to the United States. Vice President Biden considers another 9/11 type attack unlikely. Former Vice President Cheney, who you served under as well, said that he disagrees with that, that 9/11 is indeed possible again, this time using a nuclear or biological weapon. Again, appealing to your expertise, where do you come down on that question? What is the specific threat that al-Qaeda poses now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, let me just express how we assess al-Qaeda in the Central Command area of responsibility, which happens to be where the bulk of al-Qaeda is located; although, certainly, the network extends beyond our area. And our assessment is that over the course of the last year or so, al-Qaeda has been diminished in that area, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the exception, obvious exception of Yemen--we can talk more about that if you want--that the, the progress has continued against al-Qaeda in Iraq, although, again, there are certainly remaining threats there. And we see those periodically shown in the form of horrific, barbaric attacks. There's been progress against al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas as well. So, as a general assessment, again, diminished. But, having said that, al-Qaeda is a flexible, adaptable--it may be barbaric, it may believe in extremist ideology, as it does, but this is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and we must maintain pressure on it everywhere.

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: It is a network, and it takes a network to keep the pressure on a network. And that is, indeed, what we're endeavoring to do.

MR. GREGORY: But, general, my question is do you think they want to pull off another 9/11 or smaller bore attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well I think al-Qaeda is assessing to pull off any kind of attack. I mean, you saw the Abdulmutallab attempt on--the, the would-be Detroit bomber. Again, this is an enemy that is looking for any opportunity to attack our partners and, indeed, our homeland, and we have to keep that in mind. There's no question about its desire to continue to attack our country and our allies.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Iran. International inspectors think that, in fact, that country is moving toward production of an actual nuclear warhead. How close is that regime to going nuclear?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well it's--it is certainly a ways off, and we'll probably hear more on that from the International Atomic Energy Agency when it meets here in the, in the next week or so. It has clearly--its new director has expressed his concern about the activities. There's no question that some of those activities have advanced during that time. There's also a new National Intelligence Estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States. We have over the course of the last year, of course, pursued the engagement track. I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world has--have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically. That puts us on a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the "pressure track." And that's the course in which we're embarked now. The U.N. Security Council countries, of course, expressing their concern. Russia now even piling on with that. We'll have to see where that goes and whether that can, indeed, send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have about Iran's activities in the nuclear program and in its continued arming, funding, training, equipping and directing of proxy extremist elements that still carry out attacks...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in Iraq, albeit on a much limited basis, but still do that there, and also pose security challenges in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere.

MR. GREGORY: But over the span of now two administrations so much has not worked in terms of the pressure option on Iran. Can a single country, be it the United States or Israel, deter Iran from going nuclear without a military strike?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, I think we have to embark on the pressure track next, but certainly they're, needless to say--you know, I was asked a couple of Sundays ago on another show, "Well, tell me, General, about your plans to take down Iran's nuclear program." And the way I answered was to, to note that it is the job of combatant commanders to consider the what-ifs, to be prepared for contingency plans. I'm not saying this in a provocative way. I'm merely saying that we have responsibilities, the American people and our commander-in-chief and so forth expect us to think those through and to be prepared for the what-ifs. And we try not to be irresponsible in that regard.

MR. GREGORY: In our remaining moments, I want to cover a couple of other areas. Iraq: Of all the countries within Central Command that you oversee, 20, would you consider Iraq to be the most democratic?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It's interesting. I've actually posed that question to think-tankers and others, and I think it actually may be. Now, we hope that that is sustained through the elections and beyond 7 March. Right now it--I don't think there's any question right now that the Iraqi government, however imperfect--and this is "Iraqracy" at work, not necessarily Western democracy. But this is a government that is representative of all of the people, it is responsive to the people, it, its leaders know they are facing the electorate on 7 March. There's a fierce campaign, there's high political drama that's gone on. Some of it is of concern in, in a substantial way to elements to the Iraqi population and leadership. But we hope that this will move through, that the elections will be, as were the provincial elections in January 2009, deemed free and fair by the United Nations, which is very much supportive of this effort, needless to say; and that, indeed, the process of selecting the next prime minister, the next government and the other leadership will be a smooth one. Although, frankly, we expect that it is going to take some time. And, again, we do expect that there's going to be considerable drama and emotion that accompanies it, and it will be a period of months, at the very least, before that second election, if you will, the election of 7 March, which selects the parliament, the council of representatives; and they then will do the wheeling and dealing and the maneuvering to select the next prime minister and the key ministers and president.

MR. GREGORY: General, with the, the military engaged in two wars, with a country fighting terrorism in other forms as well, is this an appropriate time for the military to revisit the "don't ask, don't tell" policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, there's a process at work here now, David, and I, and I think that it is a very sound and good process. The secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced, when they were testifying, the creation of a review be headed by General Carter Hamm, U.S. Army four-star, and DOD General Counsel Jay Johnson. I don't think this has gotten enough prominence frankly. It is very important to this overall process. It will provide a rigorous analysis of the views of the force on the possible change. It will suggest the policies that could be used to implement a change if it, if it does come to that, so that it could be as uneventful as it was, say, in the U.K. or the Israeli militaries or, indeed, in our own CIA and FBI. And then it will assess the effects, the possible effects on readiness, recruiting and retention.

MR. GREGORY: What do you say?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very important for that process to move forward. We'll hear from the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs on this I think, probably their personal assessments and personal views in the course of the next week or so...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...when they're on Capitol Hill. And then the geographic combatant commanders, the other combatant commanders and I, will have our turn on Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

MR. GREGORY: But what, but what, what do you say, General? Should gays and lesbians be able to serve openly in the military?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I'll provide that, again, on Capitol Hill if, if asked at that time. I, I know you'd like to make some news here this morning. I support what our secretary and, and chairman have embarked on here. I will--I'm fully participating in that process. And I think it's very important, again, that these issues be handled and discussed and addressed by this review that will be so important in informing decisions as we move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think soldiers on the ground in the field care one way or the other if their comrades in arms are gay or lesbian?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not sure that they do. We'll see. Again, that's why this review panel. You know, all we have are, are personal soundings to go on, and I've certainly done some of that myself. I mean, you've heard General Powell, who was the chairman when the policy was implemented, had a big hand in that, who said that, yes indeed, the earth has revolved around the sun a number of times since that period 15 months ago. And you've heard a variety of anecdotal input. We have experienced, certainly, in the CIA and the FBI, I know. I served in fact in combat with individuals who were gay and who were lesbian in combat situations and, frankly, you know, over time you said, "Hey, how's, how's this guy's shooting?" Or "How is her analysis," or what have you. So--but we'll see. Again, that's the importance of this review that will be conducted by General Hamm and also by the DOD general counsel. I think it is hugely important that we have the answers from the questions that they'll be asking in a very methodical way, something we've not done before because of the emotion and the sensitivity of this issue.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we'll leave it there. General Petraeus, thank you very much this morning.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Great to be with you, David. Thanks again.

War on Terror Flashback: Bush's Lawyer Yoo "Civilians Can Be Massacred"

From Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball at Newsweek:

The chief author of the Bush administration's "torture memo" told Justice Department investigators that the president's war-making authority was so broad that he had the constitutional power to order a village to be "massacred," according to a report by released Friday night by the Office of Professional Responsibility.

The views of former Justice lawyer John Yoo were deemed to be so extreme and out of step with legal precedents that they prompted the Justice Department's internal watchdog office to conclude last year that he committed "intentional professional misconduct" when he advised the CIA it could proceed with waterboarding and other aggressive interrogation techniques against Al Qaeda suspects.


The report by OPR concludes that Yoo, now a Berkeley law professor, and his boss at the time, Jay Bybee, now a federal judge, should be referred to their state bar associations for possible disciplinary proceedings. But, as first reported by NEWSWEEK, another senior department lawyer, David Margolis, reviewed the report and last month overruled its findings on the grounds that there was no clear and "unambiguous" standard by which OPR was judging the lawyers. Instead, Margolis, who was the final decision-maker in the inquiry, found that they were guilty of only "poor judgment."

The report, more than four years in the making, is filled with new details into how a small group of lawyers at the Justice Department, the CIA, and the White House crafted the legal arguments that gave the green light to some of the most controversial tactics in the Bush administration's war on terror. They also describe how Bush administration officials were so worried about the prospect that CIA officers might be criminally prosecuted for torture that one senior official—Attorney General John Ashcroft—even suggested that President Bush issue "advance pardons" for those engaging in waterboarding, a proposal that he was quickly told was not possible.

At the core of the legal arguments were the views of Yoo, strongly backed by David Addington, Vice President Dick Cheney's legal counsel, that the president's wartime powers were essentially unlimited and included the authority to override laws passed by Congress, such as a statute banning the use of torture. Pressed on his views in an interview with OPR investigators, Yoo was asked:

"What about ordering a village of resistants to be massacred? ... Is that a power that the president could legally—"

"Yeah," Yoo replied, according to a partial transcript included in the report. "Although, let me say this: So, certainly, that would fall within the commander-in-chief's power over tactical decisions."

"To order a village of civilians to be [exterminated]?" the OPR investigator asked again.

"Sure," said Yoo.

Yoo is depicted as the driving force behind an Aug. 1, 2002, Justice Department memo that narrowly defined torture and then added sections concluding that, in the end, it essentially didn't matter what the fine print of the congressionally passed law said: The president's authority superseded the law and CIA officers who might later be accused of torture could also argue that were acting in "self defense" in order to save American lives.

The original torture memo was prompted by concerns by John Rizzo, the CIA's general counsel, that the agency's officers might be criminally prosecuted if they proceeded with waterboarding and other rough tactics in their interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, an allegedly high-level Al Qaeda-linked operative who had been captured in Pakistan and in the spring of 2002 was transferred to a CIA "black site" prison in Thailand. Rizzo wanted the Justice Department to provide a blanket letter declining criminal prosecution, essentially providing immunity for any action engaged in by CIA officers, a request that Michael Chertoff, then chief of the Justice Department's criminal division, refused to provide. It was at that point that Yoo began crafting his opinion, the contents of which he actively reviewed with senior officials at the White House. "Let's plan on going over [to the White House] at 3:30 to see some other folks about the bad things opinion," he wrote in a July 12, 2002, e-mail quoted in the OPR report.

The report describes two meetings at the White House with then-chief counsel Alberto Gonzales and "possibly Addington." (Addington refused to talk to the OPR investigators but testified before Congress that he did in fact have at least one meeting with Yoo in the summer of 2002 to discuss the contents of the torture opinion.) After the second meeting, on July 16, 2002, Yoo began writing new sections of his memo that included his controversial views on the president's powers as commander in chief. When one of his associates, Patrick Philbin, questioned the inclusion of that section and suggested it be removed, Yoo replied, "They want it in there," according to an account given by Philbin to OPR investigators. Philbin said he didn't know who the "they" was but assumed it was whoever it was that requested the opinion (technically, that was the CIA, although, as the report makes clear, the White House was also pressing for it).

Yoo provided extensive comments to OPR defending his views of the president's war-making authority and disputing OPR's take that he slanted them to accommodate the White House. He did not immediately respond to NEWSWEEK'S request for comment Friday night.

Afghanistan-Pakistan: Top Insurgent's Son Killed; Taliban Leaders Captured

Juan Cole looks over the breaking news from the US-led military-covert offensive in Afghanistan and Pakistan:

A US drone strike on N. Waziristan has allegedly killed Muhammad Haqqani, a son of guerrilla leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. The Haqqani network is considered particularly skilled insurgents, and is the faction closes to both the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence and to al-Qaeda. Jalaluddin's health is said to be poor and he may have already turned most decisions over to his other son, Siraj. The Telegraph hinted that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has ceased supporting the Haqqanis behind the scenes, and may even have helped the Americans target their drone strike.

Afghanistan Mystery: What’s Behind the US, Pakistan, and the Captured Mullah?

According to Dawn, the governor of the Afghan province of Qunduz is reporting that Pakistan has "arrested Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mir Mohammad, respectively the shadow governors of the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan" in Pakistani Baluchistan (presumably in Quetta). Islamabad has yet to confirm the report.


The New York Times revealed that Pakistan had captured the Old Taliban's no. 2 man, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, and it is not impossible that these two were picked up with intelligence gained from him. Pakistan and the US have still not decided whether to treat Mullah Baradar as an enemy combatant or to attempt to persuade him to back a reconciliation of the Taliban with the Karzai government in Islamabad. Gareth Porter believes that the reconciliation idea was put forward by Pakistan as a means of asserting Islambad's indispensability to any settlement between Hamid Karzai and Mullah Omar.

These actions are degrading the leadership abilities of the Taliban and the Haqqani network, and creating a sense of momentum against the Taliban.

As US special envoy to Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, arrived in Islambad Thursday for consultations with the government, a bomb was set off at a cattle market in the Khyber Agency. It killed 20 and wounded 80. One of those killed was militant leader Azam Khan, of the Lashkar-i Islam or army of Islam. The bombing may have been the work of Ansar-i Islam, a rival political grouping which has feuded for some time with the Lashkar.

Aljazeera English probes the possibility of reconciliation between the Taliban and the Kabul government, which it believes is very difficult.

Meanwhile, on the Afghan side of the border, guerrilla foes of the Karzai government and the foreign troop presence in Marjah killed 4 NATO troops with roadside bombs and sniping.

Richard Holbrooke claimed that some Taliban in the Marjah area are considering defecting to the side of President Hamid Karzai. (This assertion is not far-fetched. Some clan chieftains adopt a Taliban allegiance rather as a franchise, and they drop it just as easily.)

Al Jazeera English interviews the former governor of Helmand, now a cabinet member, about the progress of the Marjah campaign.

Brave New Films reports on the condition of Afghan women.

Nick Turse writes about US bases in Afghanistan at Tomdispatch.