Afghanistan Latest: Anger at US over Civilian Deaths; Karzai's Power Move; Drug Users Training Afghan Police?

Juan Cole offers a full round-up of developments:

Pajhwok News Agency reports that on Tuesday, the Afghanistan senate deplored the foreign airstrikes that killed 21 innocent civilians in the province of Daikundi on Sunday, and demanded that NATO avoid any repetition of this sort of error.

But some senators went farther, demanding that NATO or US military men responsible for the deaths be executed. Senator Hamidullah Tokhi of Uruzgan complained to Pajhwok that the foreign forces had killed civilians in such incidents time and again, and kept apologizing but then repeating the fatal mistake: "Anyone killing an ordinary Afghan should be executed in public."

Afghanistan Analysis: Dutch Government Falls Over Troop Withdrawal

Lawmaker Fatima Aziz of Qunduz concurred, observing, "We saw foreign troops time and again that they killed innocent people, something unbearable for the already war-weary Afghans."


Maulvi Abdul Wali Raji, a senator from Baghlan Province, called for the Muslim law of an "eye for an eye" to be applied to foreign troops for civilian deaths. Pajhwok concludes, "Mohammad Alam Izdiyar said civilian deaths were the major reason behind the widening gap between the people and Afghan government."

Note that those speaking this way are not Taliban, but rather elected members of the Afghanistan National Parliament, whose government is supposedly a close US ally.

Sarah Chayes, a former National Public Radio correspondent who lived for years in Qandahar but has been on Gen. Stanley McChrystal's staff for the past year, told CNN that she sees increasing frustration in the Afghan public over the killing of civilians by NATO and US strikes. She implies that how the government of President Hamid Karzai deals with this issue could determine its fate, given that it is acting like, and perceived as acting like a criminal syndicate.

In the meantime, Karzai is taking no chances. Radio Azadi reports in Dari Persian that Karzai took control of the supposedly independent Electoral Complaints Commission, and will appoint all 5 of its members. The system had been that 3 members were appointed by the United Nations, and the other two chosen by the supreme courty chief justice and the independent high electoral commission.

The ECC threw out about 1 million fraudulent ballots in last summer's presidential election, a move that could have forced Karzai into a run-off election against rival Abdullah Abdullah. But the latter withdrew from the race on the grounds that Karzai controlled the in-country electoral commission and refused to relinquish control of it. Many observers believe that Karzai stole the election. In short, Karzai is increasingly acting like a Middle Eastern dictator, manipulating state institutions to ensure that he cannot be unseated in an election.

Whatever US troops are fighting for in Afghanistan, it is not democracy.

As for those nearly 100,000 trained Afghan troops that Washington keeps boasting about, it turns out that the Pentagon sub-sub-contracted the troop training and "a Blackwater subsidiary hired violent drug users to help train the Afghan army." Many journalists doubt that there are actually so many troops in the Afghanistan National Army, citing high turnover and desertion rates, while others suggest that two weeks of 'show and tell' training for illiterate recruits is not exactly a rigorous 'training'-- even if it were done properly, which it seems not always to have been.

Canadian Brig. Gen. Daniel Ménard said that some estimates of the number of Taliban roadside bombs planted in Marjah were too low, putting them at 400 to 500. He said that despite what happened in Marjah, where Taliban took advantage of the ample warning NATO gave that it was coming, the same procedure will be followed this May when the Kandahar campaign begins. It is aimed at blunting the summer campaign of Taliban coming over the border from Pakistan.

Former Pakistan chief of staff, Mirza Aslam Beg, wrote in Nava-e Waqt for February 23, 2010, explaining Taliban strategy in Marjah. These passages were translated from Urdu by the USG Open Source Center:

Marjah is located some 15 km from Lashkargah City, which is the provincial capital of Helmand Province. It is a flat desert area. It has a few scattered mud houses. There is a green belt to its north and west, which is irrigated by the Helmand River. This green belt has large agricultural farms and orchards, with a population of about 6,000 to 7,000 people. The entire terrain is flat and totally unsuitable for guerilla war, which is the preferred style of the Taliban. It will be very easy for the allied air forces and ground war machine to control the movement of the Taliban in this area. Now, the question arises is why are the allied forces preparing for a similar kind of heavy attack in an area where there is hardly any resistance?

It appears there is a historical and psychological factor behind this decision. History says that every army that went to this area did not return safely. The allied forces believe that if they succeed in taking control of Marjah and the Taliban are compelled to back off, the allied forces will gain a psychological upper hand, making it easy for them to carry out operation against the Taliban in other provinces in Afghanistan as well.

The Taliban have become experts in fighting a war in the difficult desert terrain of the northern regions for the past 30 years. They are brave mujahids [holy warriors] who have full confidence in themselves and in their quest for success against their enemies. Time and circumstance are totally on their side. Thus, it is easy to understand their strategy in the battle of Marjah.

One of their strategies is to send 1,000 to 2,000 fighters under the command of Commander Mullah Abdul Razzaq. These fighters are committed to fight until their last breath and will bleed the allied forces to the end. They will defend the region with their scattered fighters spread all over the area. They will also defend the area against the attacking forces through the use of improvised engineering devices (IEDs), including the Omar bomb and booby traps. Their ground defense system, which was used by the Hezbollah against Israel in 2006, can also be used as a defense weapon. This strategy has been used by the Taliban during the last four days of this war.

The number of Taliban present in the adjacent areas of Helmand is around 10,000 to 12,000. These troops have the ability to attack the allied forces from the nearby areas of the main battleground and keep them engaged by attacking them regularly. Moreover, they will cut off the supply line of the allied forces. Under this strategy, on one side, the Taliban will continue the battle in Marjah, and on the other side, they will create problems for the allied forces by increasing attacks on them in provinces under their control.

Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

The head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, appeared on NBC Television's Meet the Press, first to walk viewers through the US interventions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and then to take a tour around other issues from Iran to Guantanamo Bay to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.



In contrast to previous appearances, when Petraeus was fighting his own President to get his version of US foreign and military policy, this was a stay-the-course interview behind agreed approaches. The message on Afghanistan was long-haul effort to win. On Pakistan, it was supporting Pakistani forces to vanquish the Taliban. He spoke in generalities about maintaining pressure on Iran, and beyond his main agenda, on the tricky issues like Guantanamo Bay and "enhanced interrogation" (torture), he evaded any definitive statements.

MR. DAVID GREGORY: General David Petraeus joins us live from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

General, welcome to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thanks, David. Good to be with you.


MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. This NATO-U.S. offensive in southern Afghanistan is entering its second week with reports of resistance from the Taliban that our forces are facing. How formidable are the Taliban forces that we're confronting now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, they're formidable. They're a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them. But there's tough fighting going on, without question.

If I could, David, in fact, I'd like to put this into context, because this is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign, as General McChrystal and his team have mapped it out. We've spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structures and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those, helping with the development of the concepts, the counterinsurgency guidance General McChrystal has issued and so forth. And then now, with President Obama's policy announcement in December at West Point, the resourcing of that effort with the additional 30,000 forces that have now begun flowing, about 5,400 on the ground already, the additional civilians, the additional money, the additional authorization of Afghan security forces. So the inputs, we think, now are about right, and now we're starting to see the first of the output. And the Marja operation is the initial salvo, the initial operation in that overall campaign.

MR. GREGORY: The fight is going to be tough. As you have said, there are questions about how long the U.S. will be there in the fight, whether the Afghan army is capable enough to take over that fight. What should Americans expect as there's more engagement, as there's more fighting, in terms of U.S. losses?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, the same as in the surge in Iraq. When we go on the offensive, when we take away sanctuaries and safe havens from the Taliban and the other extremist elements that we and our Afghan and coalition partners are fighting in that country, they're going to fight back. And we're seeing that in Marja. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum. We have more of our special, special operations forces going in on the ground, and you've seen the results, you've heard some of the initial results of that with more Afghan shadow governors, the Taliban shadow governors being captured, more of the high value targets being taken down. Then, through the spectrum of providing additional security for the people, supporting additional training of Afghan security forces, as I mentioned, 100,000 more of those over the course of the next year and a half or so. And then also, out on the local defense and even the reintegration of reconcilables effort that will be pursued and is being pursued with the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY: But U.S. losses, significant?

GEN. PETRAEUS: They'll be tough. They were tough in Iraq. Look, I am--I have repeatedly said that these types of efforts are hard, and they're hard all the time. I don't use words like "optimist" or "pessimist," I use realist. And the reality is that it's hard. But we're there for a very, very important reason, and we can't forget that, David. We're in Afghanistan to ensure that it cannot once again be a sanctuary for the kind of attacks that were carried out on 9/11, which were planned initially in Kandahar, first training done in eastern Afghanistan before the attackers moved to Hamburg and then onto U.S. flight schools.

MR. GREGORY: As the offensive is taking place in southern Afghanistan, a major development in Pakistan, in neighboring Pakistan, as U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured a major Taliban figure, Abdul Baradar. What are you learning from him now that he's in custody?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, if I could, what we've learned, actually, in working with our Pakistani partners, who have done some very impressive work over the course of the last 10 months in particular, is that it's sometimes not best to talk a great deal about intelligence operations. And that's what I'll do here this morning.

What I will say is, again, I'd like to put this into context as well. Some 10 months or so ago, the Pakistani people, their political leaders, including major opposition figures and even the clerics, all recognized the threat posed to the very writ of governance of Pakistan. They saw this as the most pressing existential threat to their country, and they supported the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps as it went into Swat and the Malakand division of the northwest frontier province and then expanded its operations into the federally administered tribal areas. They've made some significant gains. They know they can't just clear and leave. They have to clear, hold, build and, over time, transition to local security forces. That's indeed what they're endeavoring to do. They are carrying out this fight. This is their fight against extremists internal to their country, threatening Pakistan, not them fighting our war on terror.

MR. GREGORY: Can I ask it a slightly different way, if you don't want to talk about what specifically is being learned? Presuming that both U.S. forces and Pakistani officials are doing the interrogation, do you wish you had the interrogation methods that were available to you during the Bush administration to get intelligence from a figure like this?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have always been on the record, in fact, since 2003, with the concept of living our values. And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. We decided early on in the 101st Airborne Division we're just going to--look, we just said we'd decide to obey the Geneva Convention, to, to move forward with that. That has, I think, stood elements in good stead. We have worked very hard over the years, indeed, to ensure that elements like the International Committee of the Red Cross and others who see the conduct of our detainee operations and so forth approve of them. Because in the cases where that is not true, we end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick in the Central Command area of responsibility. Beyond that, frankly, we have found that the use of the interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual that was given, the force of law by Congress, that that works. And...

MR. GREGORY: Well...

GEN. PETRAEUS: And that is our experience...

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in, in the years that we have implemented it.

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats, do you consider the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the same way? Do you consider it to be related, or do you think, in other words, should it be closed, or do you believe it was short-sighted to set a deadline certain for its closure?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it should be closed. But it should be done in a responsible manner. So I'm not seized with the issue that it won't be done by a certain date. In fact, I think it is--it's very prudent to ensure that, as we move forward with that, wherever the remaining detainees are relocated and so forth, whatever jurisdiction is used in legal cases and so forth, is really thought through and done in a very pragmatic and sensible manner.

MR. GREGORY: One more question about--on the subject of terrorism. You often say when it comes to politics, you like to go around the minefield rather than go through it. But this is a question, really, related to your experience and your expertise. In the past couple of weeks, there's been a big debate about what kind of threat al-Qaeda poses directly to the United States. Vice President Biden considers another 9/11 type attack unlikely. Former Vice President Cheney, who you served under as well, said that he disagrees with that, that 9/11 is indeed possible again, this time using a nuclear or biological weapon. Again, appealing to your expertise, where do you come down on that question? What is the specific threat that al-Qaeda poses now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, let me just express how we assess al-Qaeda in the Central Command area of responsibility, which happens to be where the bulk of al-Qaeda is located; although, certainly, the network extends beyond our area. And our assessment is that over the course of the last year or so, al-Qaeda has been diminished in that area, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the exception, obvious exception of Yemen--we can talk more about that if you want--that the, the progress has continued against al-Qaeda in Iraq, although, again, there are certainly remaining threats there. And we see those periodically shown in the form of horrific, barbaric attacks. There's been progress against al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas as well. So, as a general assessment, again, diminished. But, having said that, al-Qaeda is a flexible, adaptable--it may be barbaric, it may believe in extremist ideology, as it does, but this is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and we must maintain pressure on it everywhere.

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: It is a network, and it takes a network to keep the pressure on a network. And that is, indeed, what we're endeavoring to do.

MR. GREGORY: But, general, my question is do you think they want to pull off another 9/11 or smaller bore attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well I think al-Qaeda is assessing to pull off any kind of attack. I mean, you saw the Abdulmutallab attempt on--the, the would-be Detroit bomber. Again, this is an enemy that is looking for any opportunity to attack our partners and, indeed, our homeland, and we have to keep that in mind. There's no question about its desire to continue to attack our country and our allies.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Iran. International inspectors think that, in fact, that country is moving toward production of an actual nuclear warhead. How close is that regime to going nuclear?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well it's--it is certainly a ways off, and we'll probably hear more on that from the International Atomic Energy Agency when it meets here in the, in the next week or so. It has clearly--its new director has expressed his concern about the activities. There's no question that some of those activities have advanced during that time. There's also a new National Intelligence Estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States. We have over the course of the last year, of course, pursued the engagement track. I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world has--have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically. That puts us on a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the "pressure track." And that's the course in which we're embarked now. The U.N. Security Council countries, of course, expressing their concern. Russia now even piling on with that. We'll have to see where that goes and whether that can, indeed, send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have about Iran's activities in the nuclear program and in its continued arming, funding, training, equipping and directing of proxy extremist elements that still carry out attacks...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in Iraq, albeit on a much limited basis, but still do that there, and also pose security challenges in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere.

MR. GREGORY: But over the span of now two administrations so much has not worked in terms of the pressure option on Iran. Can a single country, be it the United States or Israel, deter Iran from going nuclear without a military strike?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, I think we have to embark on the pressure track next, but certainly they're, needless to say--you know, I was asked a couple of Sundays ago on another show, "Well, tell me, General, about your plans to take down Iran's nuclear program." And the way I answered was to, to note that it is the job of combatant commanders to consider the what-ifs, to be prepared for contingency plans. I'm not saying this in a provocative way. I'm merely saying that we have responsibilities, the American people and our commander-in-chief and so forth expect us to think those through and to be prepared for the what-ifs. And we try not to be irresponsible in that regard.

MR. GREGORY: In our remaining moments, I want to cover a couple of other areas. Iraq: Of all the countries within Central Command that you oversee, 20, would you consider Iraq to be the most democratic?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It's interesting. I've actually posed that question to think-tankers and others, and I think it actually may be. Now, we hope that that is sustained through the elections and beyond 7 March. Right now it--I don't think there's any question right now that the Iraqi government, however imperfect--and this is "Iraqracy" at work, not necessarily Western democracy. But this is a government that is representative of all of the people, it is responsive to the people, it, its leaders know they are facing the electorate on 7 March. There's a fierce campaign, there's high political drama that's gone on. Some of it is of concern in, in a substantial way to elements to the Iraqi population and leadership. But we hope that this will move through, that the elections will be, as were the provincial elections in January 2009, deemed free and fair by the United Nations, which is very much supportive of this effort, needless to say; and that, indeed, the process of selecting the next prime minister, the next government and the other leadership will be a smooth one. Although, frankly, we expect that it is going to take some time. And, again, we do expect that there's going to be considerable drama and emotion that accompanies it, and it will be a period of months, at the very least, before that second election, if you will, the election of 7 March, which selects the parliament, the council of representatives; and they then will do the wheeling and dealing and the maneuvering to select the next prime minister and the key ministers and president.

MR. GREGORY: General, with the, the military engaged in two wars, with a country fighting terrorism in other forms as well, is this an appropriate time for the military to revisit the "don't ask, don't tell" policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, there's a process at work here now, David, and I, and I think that it is a very sound and good process. The secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced, when they were testifying, the creation of a review be headed by General Carter Hamm, U.S. Army four-star, and DOD General Counsel Jay Johnson. I don't think this has gotten enough prominence frankly. It is very important to this overall process. It will provide a rigorous analysis of the views of the force on the possible change. It will suggest the policies that could be used to implement a change if it, if it does come to that, so that it could be as uneventful as it was, say, in the U.K. or the Israeli militaries or, indeed, in our own CIA and FBI. And then it will assess the effects, the possible effects on readiness, recruiting and retention.

MR. GREGORY: What do you say?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very important for that process to move forward. We'll hear from the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs on this I think, probably their personal assessments and personal views in the course of the next week or so...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...when they're on Capitol Hill. And then the geographic combatant commanders, the other combatant commanders and I, will have our turn on Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

MR. GREGORY: But what, but what, what do you say, General? Should gays and lesbians be able to serve openly in the military?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I'll provide that, again, on Capitol Hill if, if asked at that time. I, I know you'd like to make some news here this morning. I support what our secretary and, and chairman have embarked on here. I will--I'm fully participating in that process. And I think it's very important, again, that these issues be handled and discussed and addressed by this review that will be so important in informing decisions as we move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think soldiers on the ground in the field care one way or the other if their comrades in arms are gay or lesbian?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not sure that they do. We'll see. Again, that's why this review panel. You know, all we have are, are personal soundings to go on, and I've certainly done some of that myself. I mean, you've heard General Powell, who was the chairman when the policy was implemented, had a big hand in that, who said that, yes indeed, the earth has revolved around the sun a number of times since that period 15 months ago. And you've heard a variety of anecdotal input. We have experienced, certainly, in the CIA and the FBI, I know. I served in fact in combat with individuals who were gay and who were lesbian in combat situations and, frankly, you know, over time you said, "Hey, how's, how's this guy's shooting?" Or "How is her analysis," or what have you. So--but we'll see. Again, that's the importance of this review that will be conducted by General Hamm and also by the DOD general counsel. I think it is hugely important that we have the answers from the questions that they'll be asking in a very methodical way, something we've not done before because of the emotion and the sensitivity of this issue.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we'll leave it there. General Petraeus, thank you very much this morning.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Great to be with you, David. Thanks again.

The Latest from Iran (14 February): Step by Step

2140 GMT: The Evin Protests. Once again, families of detainees have protested outside Evin Prison. The demonstrations have been occurring almost every evening in recent weeks.

2030 GMT: US To Israel "No Attack"? A bit of a tangled message from Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his visit to Tel Aviv today. On the one hand, Mullen declared, "The outbreak of a conflict will be a big, big, big problem for all of us, and I worry a great deal about the unintended consequences of a strike." On the other, he still put out the escape clause for military action, "We haven't taken off any option from the table."

1735 GMT: Blogger and rights activist Ali Kalayi has been released from detention after posting $50,000 bail. Kalayi was arrested last Sunday for publishing a statement alleged to be from the Army in support of the Iranian people.

1710 GMT: Pardon This Interruption. To Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the US House of Representatives: you're a blowhard who should be remembered fo r what you did to your first wife rather than any "contribution" to US foreign policy. Especially when your approach to Iran is based on tired 1930s hyperbole rather than any approximation of knowledge.

NEW Iran Analysis: What Now for the Green Movement?
Iran: Reading Khabar’s “Conservative” Attack on Ahmadinejad
Iran: Mehdi Karroubi’s 1st Interview After 22 Bahman (13 February)
Iran: Desperately Seeking Sensible US Comment about 22 Bahman
Iran: “Allahu Akhbar from the Rooftops” — The 2009 Photo of the Year
Iran Video Special (2): Decoding the 22 Bahman Rally in Azadi Square
Iran Video Special (1): The 22 Bahman Attack on Karroubi?
The Latest from Iran (13 February): Re-assessment, Renewal

1700 GMT: Today's US Posture. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talks tough as she visits Qatar before going to Saudi Arabia:

Iran leaves the international community little choice but to impose greater costs for its provocative steps. Together, we are encouraging Iran to reconsider its dangerous policy decisions. We are now working actively with our regional and international partners, in the context of our dual track approach, to prepare and implement new measures to convince Iran to change its course

Back in Washington, National Security Council James Jones took the rhetoric to the point of "spontaneous" toppling of the Iranian Government:

We're drawing our conclusions based on non-action on the Iranian part and now moving towards a clear set of sanctions. I think we will get tough as quickly as possible. But you know, whether it happens this week or next week is not the issue.

While the Administration was not advocating regime change, in the context of Iran's internal issues, "very tough sanctions ... could well trigger regime change".

1500 GMT: Presenting 22 Bahman. The "conservative"  Combatant Clergy Association has issued a statement declaring "victory" in Thursday's rallies with the "unity" of the Iranian nation made clear. It asks reformists, even though they have been insulted by their opponents, to join them while maintaining a call to prosecute those who act against the people.

1455 GMT: Big in the USA. President Ahmadinejad's chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai may have his problems at home but he's consoling himself that he --- or at least his Government --- is wowing everyone abroad. He has declared that, with its successes in laser technology and stem-cell research, Iran's victory is being celebrated "even in the USA".

1445 GMT: On the International Front. Good to know that Iran and the US can still find common ground. Iranian state media has supportive words today for NATO's offensive against the Taliban in central Afghanistan, with the town of Marjah "a breeding ground for both insurgents and opium poppy cultivation for years".

1200 GMT: Reasons to Remember. Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim, writing for the Los Angeles Times, post an article based on the accounts of detainees at Iran's Kahrizak Prison:

They say the Kahrizak experience has only made them more determined. Few of the ex-inmates have given up their political activities. Hatef says he's trying to prepare for a long fight. When he sees the riot police approach at demonstrations, he draws comfort from a popular slogan that has become a signature of the protest movement.

"Don't be afraid, don't be afraid!" it goes. "We are all together."

1115 GMT: Reasons to Be Cheerful. Babak Dad posts that the Iranian opposition is "tired but praises hope".

And, at the Winter Olympics, Marjan Kalhor has become Iran's first female competitor. Kalhor, who will compete in the slalom and giant slalom, carries the flag for Iran's four-person team in the opening ceremony.

0920 GMT: News Accompanies Analysis. Mr Verde's evaluation of the next steps for the Green Movement is complemented this morning by the call by the Islamic Iran Participation Front to find ways out of the crisis based on the propositions of movement leaders.

0900 GMT: Follow-ups. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty summarises the story of the beating of Mehdi Karroubi's son Ali, while Jon Swain of the Sunday Times --- with a bit of input from EA --- considers the on-line battle between the regime and opposition.

0805 GMT: EA will be on limited service this morning to celebrate Valentine's Day (yes, we still hang on to a bit of romance here), but we have two analyses and an interview to get the day off to a flying start: Mehdi Karroubi offers his first thoughts after 22 Bahman, we take a look at the re-emerging challenge to the President from "conservatives", and Mr Verde has a searching, challenging consideration of "What Next for the Green Movement?"

Middle East-Afghanistan Inside Line: Ayalon on Peace; NATO Operation Against Taliban; US Relations with Syria & Israel

Israel's Ayalon on Peace: On Saturday, in an interview with the London-based Arabic daily Asharq al-Awsat, Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon talked about the conditions of the peace process with Palestinians. He pointed towards two demographically "pure" states with the swap to Palestine of Israeli Arab towns and villages in the north (except Nazareth) in exchange for Palestinians relinquishing the "right of return" to their former lands in Israel.

Ayalon denied that this was an attempt to rid Israel of the country's Arabs: "Israel's Arabs who are moved to Palestine will also help the Palestinian state economically".

Ayalon also said that Israel is willing to give up land for peace and that the claim that settlements affect peace is an exaggeration; however, he did not specify how many settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that Israel would relinquish.



US-UK-Afghan Offensive Against Taliban: Thousands of British, US and Afghan soldiers are engaged in the biggest military offensive since 2001 in central Afghanistan. The push, codenamed Mushtarak ("together"), is against the Taliban in Helmand province, especially the towns of Marjah and Nad Ali.

US Restores Ambassador in Syria: Philip J. Crowley,  Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, confirmed Saturday that Washington has "agreement from the Syrians on the candidate" to be the new ambassador in Damascus. He added, "The decision reflects our growing interest in working constructively with Syria and the leaders of that country." Crowley also said that Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns will travel to Syria next week.

US Military Mission to Israel: On Sunday, Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, will meet with Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi as well as Minister of Defense Ehud Barak and other senior IDF commanders. Discussions will include joint defense issues between Israel and the US and mutual security concerns.

Afghanistan: Did The Way Forward Come Out of London Conference?

Writing for Foreign Policy, Gilles Dorronsoro looks over the political and military strategy discussed at last week's London Conference between Afghan leaders and "Western" powers and comes away unimpressed:

Washington, Paris and Berlin made their best efforts to keep up appearances during last week's Afghanistan conference here, but the gap between official rhetoric and reality could not have been wider. Participants called for reintegrating members of the Taliban who accept the Afghan constitution, enacting measures against government corruption, and building more regional cooperation.

Afghanistan: America’s Secret Prisons

Yet the coalition is systematically undermining what's left of the Afghan state. The New York Times reports that the Shinwari tribes have agreed to fight the Taliban -- in exchange for about $1 million. What's lesser known and less understood is that Washington didn't even feel obligated to notify the Karzai government of this decision.


Since last summer, the United States has supported all manner of militias in Afghanistan, creating fragmentation and a dangerous degree of competition in the security sphere. Critics rightly observe that this is a formula for an even weaker government in Kabul. In a number of cases, the U.S. is dealing directly with armed groups that are beyond the control of the central government,including the group that was reportedly responsible for the killing of the Kandahar police chief in 2009.

In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?

Washington's gravest error, however, is its manifest lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central government. Whatever the official word about fighting corruption, the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favor of local strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the coalition.

The so-called "tribal policy" has been tried before in the eastern provinces, with no results, between 2006 and 2008, when the Taliban were much weaker than they are today. Even inside the Afghan legal system, the coalition is choosing its partners at a local level, skirting the political center. NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions.

The big problem the London conference failed to tackle is the Karzai government's lack of credibility with the Afghan people, especially since the flawed election of August 2009. Working with essentially the same networks, and more and more alienated from Washington -- which has repeatedly and unceremoniously criticized him in public -- Karzai will not deliver on his political reforms.

And the return of the old Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, whom the coalition opposes but who supported Karzai in the latest election, signals that Karzai will become even more independent from Washington. As Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal have said, the U.S. cannot shoot its way to victory in Afghanistan, so with no prospect of building Afghan institutions for the foreseeable future, the coalition has less of an exit strategy each day.

The real game now is negotiating with the Taliban leadership in Quetta. Karzai and the Afghan government are trying to open some negotiations with the head of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar, as is the U.N., through special representative Kai Eide. The U.S. should also pursue direct negotiations, as it has very direct interests in a larger agreement with the Taliban -- namely, a guarantee that al Qaeda does not return to Afghanistan. If the U.S. cannot reach such a resolution, who else will?

The London conference, sadly, gave little confidence that NATO is moving any closer to its objectives in Afghanistan. A few days before leaders met here, we learned that the Afghan National Army and Police forces will be substantially increased: from 97,000 to 171,000, and 94,000 to 160,000, respectively, by the end of 2011. The security of a growing number of provinces will also come under the responsibility of the Afghan army after 2011. It all sounds nice on paper, but these policies are not remotely realistic, and as Anand Gopal reported in the Christian Science Monitor in April 2009, they have all been tried and found wanting already.

The number of ANA troops who are capable of combat is about 60,000, and turnover is reported to be as high as 25 percent per year. Given the insufficient number of Western military trainers, NATO will almost certainly miss its target numbers for the ANA. The key problem is training officers, which requires a lot of time the coalition doesn't have. And it is extremely difficult to build an army when the structures of the state are crumbling around it on all sides.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has become almost bewilderingly self-destructive. The White House has constantly slapped Hamid Karzai in public, demanding that he make reforms that would be difficult at the best of times, while performing an end run around him that diminishes his standing even further.

At this rate, when it withdraws, Washington may leave nothing behind in Afghanistan but warring factions -- a mess not unlike the one that precipitated the Taliban's rise to power in the first place.