Afghanistan Analysis: Dutch Government Falls Over Troop Withdrawal

UPDATE 0810 GMT: Afghanistan government officials say at least 33 civilians have been killed by a NATO air attack on a convoy of vehicles in Uruzgan. Nato confirmed that it fired on Sunday on a group of vehicles that it believed contained fighters, only to discover later that women and children were in the cars.

On Friday, our colleagues at The Holland Bureau --- one of the up-and-coming blogs on political issues in and beyond The Netherlands --- wrote:

We still have a government, for the moment. Opinion polls taken today indicate 45% in favour of Uruzgan [Dutch troops in Afghanistan] being worth a crisis, 35% against. Supporters of [Geert] Wilders’ PVV and the Socialists are above 60% in their hope that the Cabinet falls, as are – significantly – 55% of Labour. Yet overall 54% still come out hoping the Cabinet stays together, economic concerns being the main reason. It's rare that a foreign policy issue can be so divisive, and potentially so decisive.

Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

Indeed. Less than 72 hours later, and the Government of Jan Peter Balkenende is no more. Balkenende, of the centre-right Christian Democrat CDA, wanted to extend the August deadline for withdrawal of Dutch troops from Afghanistan by a year. He miscalculated, possibly because of misleading signals, that he would the support of his coalition partner, the Labour Party; Labour leader and Deputy Prime Minister Wouter Bos announced:

A plan was agreed to when our soldiers went to Afghanistan. Our partners in the government didn't want to stick to that plan, and on the basis of their refusal we have decided to resign from this government.

With elections likely in May, the immediate issue is whether all 1,600 Dutch soldiers leave Uruzgan, southwest of Kabul and north of Kandahar. NATO's Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, filed an official request for the extension of the Dutch mission earlier this month.

The crisis exposes the too-common perception, at least in the US and UK press, of a military intervention in Afghanistan led by American forces, supported by a British junior partner. While 1600 Dutch troops may not seem much, compared to the 100,000+ that the US intends to have in place after its current escalation, any loss of soldiers --- especially in central Afghanistan --- is a blow to military plans.

Even more important, however, is the symbolic impact of this news. It comes in the middle of the vaunted US-led offensive, Operation Moshtarak, to clear the Taliban from Afghanistan's center and put in Afghan forces to hold the area. The vital support, beyond the word "coalition", of non-American troops is not just that they share the fighting; perhaps more importantly, they offer the image of peacekeeping and rebuilding after the Taliban are vanquished. The political message from Holland is that some politicians, supported by a large section of their public, don't buy the rhetoric that this will be the long but decisive resolution of Afghanistan's political, economic, and social issues.

There will be a lot of damage limitation this week from US and NATO press offices, and within America, there is the bonus of simply ignoring the story. (In his interview on US television yesterday, General David Petraeus, the overall American commander for the region, was never asked about the Holland situation, and he certainly did not volunteer a reaction.) But beyond US shores and en route to Afghanistan, others will see this as a wobble in the narrative of "this time, we win Afghanistan".

Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

The head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, appeared on NBC Television's Meet the Press, first to walk viewers through the US interventions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and then to take a tour around other issues from Iran to Guantanamo Bay to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.



In contrast to previous appearances, when Petraeus was fighting his own President to get his version of US foreign and military policy, this was a stay-the-course interview behind agreed approaches. The message on Afghanistan was long-haul effort to win. On Pakistan, it was supporting Pakistani forces to vanquish the Taliban. He spoke in generalities about maintaining pressure on Iran, and beyond his main agenda, on the tricky issues like Guantanamo Bay and "enhanced interrogation" (torture), he evaded any definitive statements.

MR. DAVID GREGORY: General David Petraeus joins us live from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

General, welcome to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thanks, David. Good to be with you.


MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. This NATO-U.S. offensive in southern Afghanistan is entering its second week with reports of resistance from the Taliban that our forces are facing. How formidable are the Taliban forces that we're confronting now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, they're formidable. They're a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them. But there's tough fighting going on, without question.

If I could, David, in fact, I'd like to put this into context, because this is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign, as General McChrystal and his team have mapped it out. We've spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structures and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those, helping with the development of the concepts, the counterinsurgency guidance General McChrystal has issued and so forth. And then now, with President Obama's policy announcement in December at West Point, the resourcing of that effort with the additional 30,000 forces that have now begun flowing, about 5,400 on the ground already, the additional civilians, the additional money, the additional authorization of Afghan security forces. So the inputs, we think, now are about right, and now we're starting to see the first of the output. And the Marja operation is the initial salvo, the initial operation in that overall campaign.

MR. GREGORY: The fight is going to be tough. As you have said, there are questions about how long the U.S. will be there in the fight, whether the Afghan army is capable enough to take over that fight. What should Americans expect as there's more engagement, as there's more fighting, in terms of U.S. losses?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, the same as in the surge in Iraq. When we go on the offensive, when we take away sanctuaries and safe havens from the Taliban and the other extremist elements that we and our Afghan and coalition partners are fighting in that country, they're going to fight back. And we're seeing that in Marja. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum. We have more of our special, special operations forces going in on the ground, and you've seen the results, you've heard some of the initial results of that with more Afghan shadow governors, the Taliban shadow governors being captured, more of the high value targets being taken down. Then, through the spectrum of providing additional security for the people, supporting additional training of Afghan security forces, as I mentioned, 100,000 more of those over the course of the next year and a half or so. And then also, out on the local defense and even the reintegration of reconcilables effort that will be pursued and is being pursued with the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY: But U.S. losses, significant?

GEN. PETRAEUS: They'll be tough. They were tough in Iraq. Look, I am--I have repeatedly said that these types of efforts are hard, and they're hard all the time. I don't use words like "optimist" or "pessimist," I use realist. And the reality is that it's hard. But we're there for a very, very important reason, and we can't forget that, David. We're in Afghanistan to ensure that it cannot once again be a sanctuary for the kind of attacks that were carried out on 9/11, which were planned initially in Kandahar, first training done in eastern Afghanistan before the attackers moved to Hamburg and then onto U.S. flight schools.

MR. GREGORY: As the offensive is taking place in southern Afghanistan, a major development in Pakistan, in neighboring Pakistan, as U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured a major Taliban figure, Abdul Baradar. What are you learning from him now that he's in custody?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, if I could, what we've learned, actually, in working with our Pakistani partners, who have done some very impressive work over the course of the last 10 months in particular, is that it's sometimes not best to talk a great deal about intelligence operations. And that's what I'll do here this morning.

What I will say is, again, I'd like to put this into context as well. Some 10 months or so ago, the Pakistani people, their political leaders, including major opposition figures and even the clerics, all recognized the threat posed to the very writ of governance of Pakistan. They saw this as the most pressing existential threat to their country, and they supported the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps as it went into Swat and the Malakand division of the northwest frontier province and then expanded its operations into the federally administered tribal areas. They've made some significant gains. They know they can't just clear and leave. They have to clear, hold, build and, over time, transition to local security forces. That's indeed what they're endeavoring to do. They are carrying out this fight. This is their fight against extremists internal to their country, threatening Pakistan, not them fighting our war on terror.

MR. GREGORY: Can I ask it a slightly different way, if you don't want to talk about what specifically is being learned? Presuming that both U.S. forces and Pakistani officials are doing the interrogation, do you wish you had the interrogation methods that were available to you during the Bush administration to get intelligence from a figure like this?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have always been on the record, in fact, since 2003, with the concept of living our values. And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. We decided early on in the 101st Airborne Division we're just going to--look, we just said we'd decide to obey the Geneva Convention, to, to move forward with that. That has, I think, stood elements in good stead. We have worked very hard over the years, indeed, to ensure that elements like the International Committee of the Red Cross and others who see the conduct of our detainee operations and so forth approve of them. Because in the cases where that is not true, we end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick in the Central Command area of responsibility. Beyond that, frankly, we have found that the use of the interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual that was given, the force of law by Congress, that that works. And...

MR. GREGORY: Well...

GEN. PETRAEUS: And that is our experience...

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in, in the years that we have implemented it.

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats, do you consider the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the same way? Do you consider it to be related, or do you think, in other words, should it be closed, or do you believe it was short-sighted to set a deadline certain for its closure?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it should be closed. But it should be done in a responsible manner. So I'm not seized with the issue that it won't be done by a certain date. In fact, I think it is--it's very prudent to ensure that, as we move forward with that, wherever the remaining detainees are relocated and so forth, whatever jurisdiction is used in legal cases and so forth, is really thought through and done in a very pragmatic and sensible manner.

MR. GREGORY: One more question about--on the subject of terrorism. You often say when it comes to politics, you like to go around the minefield rather than go through it. But this is a question, really, related to your experience and your expertise. In the past couple of weeks, there's been a big debate about what kind of threat al-Qaeda poses directly to the United States. Vice President Biden considers another 9/11 type attack unlikely. Former Vice President Cheney, who you served under as well, said that he disagrees with that, that 9/11 is indeed possible again, this time using a nuclear or biological weapon. Again, appealing to your expertise, where do you come down on that question? What is the specific threat that al-Qaeda poses now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, let me just express how we assess al-Qaeda in the Central Command area of responsibility, which happens to be where the bulk of al-Qaeda is located; although, certainly, the network extends beyond our area. And our assessment is that over the course of the last year or so, al-Qaeda has been diminished in that area, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the exception, obvious exception of Yemen--we can talk more about that if you want--that the, the progress has continued against al-Qaeda in Iraq, although, again, there are certainly remaining threats there. And we see those periodically shown in the form of horrific, barbaric attacks. There's been progress against al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas as well. So, as a general assessment, again, diminished. But, having said that, al-Qaeda is a flexible, adaptable--it may be barbaric, it may believe in extremist ideology, as it does, but this is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and we must maintain pressure on it everywhere.

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: It is a network, and it takes a network to keep the pressure on a network. And that is, indeed, what we're endeavoring to do.

MR. GREGORY: But, general, my question is do you think they want to pull off another 9/11 or smaller bore attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well I think al-Qaeda is assessing to pull off any kind of attack. I mean, you saw the Abdulmutallab attempt on--the, the would-be Detroit bomber. Again, this is an enemy that is looking for any opportunity to attack our partners and, indeed, our homeland, and we have to keep that in mind. There's no question about its desire to continue to attack our country and our allies.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Iran. International inspectors think that, in fact, that country is moving toward production of an actual nuclear warhead. How close is that regime to going nuclear?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well it's--it is certainly a ways off, and we'll probably hear more on that from the International Atomic Energy Agency when it meets here in the, in the next week or so. It has clearly--its new director has expressed his concern about the activities. There's no question that some of those activities have advanced during that time. There's also a new National Intelligence Estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States. We have over the course of the last year, of course, pursued the engagement track. I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world has--have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically. That puts us on a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the "pressure track." And that's the course in which we're embarked now. The U.N. Security Council countries, of course, expressing their concern. Russia now even piling on with that. We'll have to see where that goes and whether that can, indeed, send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have about Iran's activities in the nuclear program and in its continued arming, funding, training, equipping and directing of proxy extremist elements that still carry out attacks...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in Iraq, albeit on a much limited basis, but still do that there, and also pose security challenges in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere.

MR. GREGORY: But over the span of now two administrations so much has not worked in terms of the pressure option on Iran. Can a single country, be it the United States or Israel, deter Iran from going nuclear without a military strike?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, I think we have to embark on the pressure track next, but certainly they're, needless to say--you know, I was asked a couple of Sundays ago on another show, "Well, tell me, General, about your plans to take down Iran's nuclear program." And the way I answered was to, to note that it is the job of combatant commanders to consider the what-ifs, to be prepared for contingency plans. I'm not saying this in a provocative way. I'm merely saying that we have responsibilities, the American people and our commander-in-chief and so forth expect us to think those through and to be prepared for the what-ifs. And we try not to be irresponsible in that regard.

MR. GREGORY: In our remaining moments, I want to cover a couple of other areas. Iraq: Of all the countries within Central Command that you oversee, 20, would you consider Iraq to be the most democratic?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It's interesting. I've actually posed that question to think-tankers and others, and I think it actually may be. Now, we hope that that is sustained through the elections and beyond 7 March. Right now it--I don't think there's any question right now that the Iraqi government, however imperfect--and this is "Iraqracy" at work, not necessarily Western democracy. But this is a government that is representative of all of the people, it is responsive to the people, it, its leaders know they are facing the electorate on 7 March. There's a fierce campaign, there's high political drama that's gone on. Some of it is of concern in, in a substantial way to elements to the Iraqi population and leadership. But we hope that this will move through, that the elections will be, as were the provincial elections in January 2009, deemed free and fair by the United Nations, which is very much supportive of this effort, needless to say; and that, indeed, the process of selecting the next prime minister, the next government and the other leadership will be a smooth one. Although, frankly, we expect that it is going to take some time. And, again, we do expect that there's going to be considerable drama and emotion that accompanies it, and it will be a period of months, at the very least, before that second election, if you will, the election of 7 March, which selects the parliament, the council of representatives; and they then will do the wheeling and dealing and the maneuvering to select the next prime minister and the key ministers and president.

MR. GREGORY: General, with the, the military engaged in two wars, with a country fighting terrorism in other forms as well, is this an appropriate time for the military to revisit the "don't ask, don't tell" policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, there's a process at work here now, David, and I, and I think that it is a very sound and good process. The secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced, when they were testifying, the creation of a review be headed by General Carter Hamm, U.S. Army four-star, and DOD General Counsel Jay Johnson. I don't think this has gotten enough prominence frankly. It is very important to this overall process. It will provide a rigorous analysis of the views of the force on the possible change. It will suggest the policies that could be used to implement a change if it, if it does come to that, so that it could be as uneventful as it was, say, in the U.K. or the Israeli militaries or, indeed, in our own CIA and FBI. And then it will assess the effects, the possible effects on readiness, recruiting and retention.

MR. GREGORY: What do you say?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very important for that process to move forward. We'll hear from the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs on this I think, probably their personal assessments and personal views in the course of the next week or so...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...when they're on Capitol Hill. And then the geographic combatant commanders, the other combatant commanders and I, will have our turn on Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

MR. GREGORY: But what, but what, what do you say, General? Should gays and lesbians be able to serve openly in the military?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I'll provide that, again, on Capitol Hill if, if asked at that time. I, I know you'd like to make some news here this morning. I support what our secretary and, and chairman have embarked on here. I will--I'm fully participating in that process. And I think it's very important, again, that these issues be handled and discussed and addressed by this review that will be so important in informing decisions as we move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think soldiers on the ground in the field care one way or the other if their comrades in arms are gay or lesbian?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not sure that they do. We'll see. Again, that's why this review panel. You know, all we have are, are personal soundings to go on, and I've certainly done some of that myself. I mean, you've heard General Powell, who was the chairman when the policy was implemented, had a big hand in that, who said that, yes indeed, the earth has revolved around the sun a number of times since that period 15 months ago. And you've heard a variety of anecdotal input. We have experienced, certainly, in the CIA and the FBI, I know. I served in fact in combat with individuals who were gay and who were lesbian in combat situations and, frankly, you know, over time you said, "Hey, how's, how's this guy's shooting?" Or "How is her analysis," or what have you. So--but we'll see. Again, that's the importance of this review that will be conducted by General Hamm and also by the DOD general counsel. I think it is hugely important that we have the answers from the questions that they'll be asking in a very methodical way, something we've not done before because of the emotion and the sensitivity of this issue.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we'll leave it there. General Petraeus, thank you very much this morning.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Great to be with you, David. Thanks again.

Afghanistan: Did The Way Forward Come Out of London Conference?

Writing for Foreign Policy, Gilles Dorronsoro looks over the political and military strategy discussed at last week's London Conference between Afghan leaders and "Western" powers and comes away unimpressed:

Washington, Paris and Berlin made their best efforts to keep up appearances during last week's Afghanistan conference here, but the gap between official rhetoric and reality could not have been wider. Participants called for reintegrating members of the Taliban who accept the Afghan constitution, enacting measures against government corruption, and building more regional cooperation.

Afghanistan: America’s Secret Prisons

Yet the coalition is systematically undermining what's left of the Afghan state. The New York Times reports that the Shinwari tribes have agreed to fight the Taliban -- in exchange for about $1 million. What's lesser known and less understood is that Washington didn't even feel obligated to notify the Karzai government of this decision.


Since last summer, the United States has supported all manner of militias in Afghanistan, creating fragmentation and a dangerous degree of competition in the security sphere. Critics rightly observe that this is a formula for an even weaker government in Kabul. In a number of cases, the U.S. is dealing directly with armed groups that are beyond the control of the central government,including the group that was reportedly responsible for the killing of the Kandahar police chief in 2009.

In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?

Washington's gravest error, however, is its manifest lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central government. Whatever the official word about fighting corruption, the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favor of local strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the coalition.

The so-called "tribal policy" has been tried before in the eastern provinces, with no results, between 2006 and 2008, when the Taliban were much weaker than they are today. Even inside the Afghan legal system, the coalition is choosing its partners at a local level, skirting the political center. NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions.

The big problem the London conference failed to tackle is the Karzai government's lack of credibility with the Afghan people, especially since the flawed election of August 2009. Working with essentially the same networks, and more and more alienated from Washington -- which has repeatedly and unceremoniously criticized him in public -- Karzai will not deliver on his political reforms.

And the return of the old Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, whom the coalition opposes but who supported Karzai in the latest election, signals that Karzai will become even more independent from Washington. As Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal have said, the U.S. cannot shoot its way to victory in Afghanistan, so with no prospect of building Afghan institutions for the foreseeable future, the coalition has less of an exit strategy each day.

The real game now is negotiating with the Taliban leadership in Quetta. Karzai and the Afghan government are trying to open some negotiations with the head of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar, as is the U.N., through special representative Kai Eide. The U.S. should also pursue direct negotiations, as it has very direct interests in a larger agreement with the Taliban -- namely, a guarantee that al Qaeda does not return to Afghanistan. If the U.S. cannot reach such a resolution, who else will?

The London conference, sadly, gave little confidence that NATO is moving any closer to its objectives in Afghanistan. A few days before leaders met here, we learned that the Afghan National Army and Police forces will be substantially increased: from 97,000 to 171,000, and 94,000 to 160,000, respectively, by the end of 2011. The security of a growing number of provinces will also come under the responsibility of the Afghan army after 2011. It all sounds nice on paper, but these policies are not remotely realistic, and as Anand Gopal reported in the Christian Science Monitor in April 2009, they have all been tried and found wanting already.

The number of ANA troops who are capable of combat is about 60,000, and turnover is reported to be as high as 25 percent per year. Given the insufficient number of Western military trainers, NATO will almost certainly miss its target numbers for the ANA. The key problem is training officers, which requires a lot of time the coalition doesn't have. And it is extremely difficult to build an army when the structures of the state are crumbling around it on all sides.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has become almost bewilderingly self-destructive. The White House has constantly slapped Hamid Karzai in public, demanding that he make reforms that would be difficult at the best of times, while performing an end run around him that diminishes his standing even further.

At this rate, when it withdraws, Washington may leave nothing behind in Afghanistan but warring factions -- a mess not unlike the one that precipitated the Taliban's rise to power in the first place.

The Latest From Iran (3 February): Picking Up the Pace

2150 GMT: Pep Talks. It is not just Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi talking up 22 Bahman. Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has issued his second declaration in days, reiterating that "mohareb" (enemies of God) are those beating and injuring people bloodily, not peaceful protesters, and asserting that the military should not interfere in politics.

And Nasrullah Torabi, the prominent reformist member of Parliament, has reassured that 22 Bahman is a national holiday and people do not fear the warnings of hardliners.

2140 GMT: Rafsanjani's Children and the Regime. Rah-e-Sabz has an article considering the political and psychological battle around the threat of criminal charges against the children of Hashemi Rafsanjani.

2130 GMT: The Relay of Opposition. Radio Zamaneh has added details of Mehdi Karroubi's denunciation of the Government and call to march on 22 Bahman (see 1100 GMT). Karroubi has called on fellow clerics to “come to the aid of the people...reach[ing out to the people before all these atrocities [of the Government] are attributed to Islam, Shiites and the clergy" and declared that Iranians on 11 February will try to “stop their promising achievements and goals from falling into oblivion, and demand them with fortitude and an aversion of physical and verbal violence”.

Karroubi asserted, "From one side petty flatterers and from another side worthless extremists have closed the arena onto our scholars, thinkers and learned.” In contrast, the common ground for groups in the Green Movement is their demand for “open elections, freedom of the press, unconditional release of all political prisoners, reform of governance and the judiciary as well as respecting citizens’ rights.”

Significantly, given that the "Western" media was distracted earlier today by the Iran rocket launch (see 1325 GMT), CNN's website is now featuring the Karroubi statement.

2125 GMT: Blowing Smoke or Playing for Time? Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has said that death sentences for nine political prisoners have not been "finalised". Doulatabadi's statement adds to the confusion surrounding conflicting statements between the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, who said he would not be pushed into speeding up executions, and his deputy, Ebrahim Raeesi, who gave assurances that the nine would be killed.

2035 GMT: And Another "Monarchist" Death Sentence. Mehdi Eslamian has been condemned to execution on charges of involvement in a bombing in Shiraz and ties to a monarchist group.

NEW Iran Special: Full Text of Mousavi Answers for 22 Bahman (2 February)
NEW Iran Snap Analysis: “Game-Changers” from Mousavi and Ahmadinejad
Iran Document: The Rallying Call of Mousavi’s 14 Points (2 February)
Iran Letter: Journalist Emadeddin Baghi in Prison
Iran Document: Khatami Statement on Rights and Protests (1 February)
The Latest from Iran (2 February): A Quiet Start to An Unquiet Day

2025 GMT: Another Arrest. Kaveh Ghasemi Kermanshahi, a leading human rights activist, member of the Central Council of the Human Rights Organization of Kurdistan, and journalist, has been detained.

2015 GMT: Let Me Tell You About Human Rights. Back from a break to find that the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is setting the world straight about violations of human rights (when they do it, it's a transgression against humanity; when we do it, it's the rule of law):

Larijani on Wednesday criticized advocates of human rights for mixing up the boundaries of law and order with human rights....

Prisons such as Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib along with invasion of Gaza are good examples of human rights violations, he said adding that all should do their best to reveal the anti-human rights nature of such brutal measures.

“We should spare no effort to present theoretical concepts of the Islamic human rights consistent with religious teachings,” he said.

1735 GMT: Well, That's a Relief. General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, has apparently declared that the US will not support a military operation against Iran with this "You Think?" assessment:

It's possible (a military strike) could be used to play to nationalist tendencies. There is certainly a history, in other countries, of fairly autocratic regimes almost creating incidents that inflame nationalist sentiment. So that could be among the many different, second, third, or even fourth order effects (of a strike).

1715 GMT: Teaser of the Day. So Ayande News, the website close to Hashemi Rafsanjani --- the same Rafsanjani whose family has been threatened with trials and jail sentences by Government officials --- runs a story based on a source who says that some want to blame the Revolutionary Guard for arrests. However, the source continues, the Guard aren't behind arrests, "certain Government officials" are.

So at whom is Ayande pointing? President Ahmadinejad? Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi? Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader?

Just asking....

1700 GMT: Law and Order Moment of the Day. Peyke Iran reports that amongst the charges against the two women in court today is this threat to national security: wearing "I am Neda" wristbands.

1415 GMT: The Ashura Trial. The Human Rights Activists News Agency has published an account in Persian of today's hearing of 16 defendants.

1400 GMT: Ahmadinejad Takes the Lead? A positive reaction from Iranian state media --- Press TV --- to the President's initiative in reviving "third-party enrichment" outside the country for Iran's uranium:

Russia and Britain said Wednesday that they would welcome Iran's readiness to accept a proposal aimed at ending the standoff over its nuclear program as a "positive sign."

"If Iran is ready to come back to the original agreement we can only welcome it," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told reporters at a Wednesday news conference.

The UK's Foreign Office said in a statement that "if Iran is willing to take up the IAEA's proposed offer, it would be a positive sign of their willingness to engage with the international community on nuclear issues."

1325 GMT: Mediawatch --- Rockets and Trials. As expected, the "Western" media has rushed after the Iranian "rocket launch", dropping entirely the Mousavi story and so far not even noticing the regime's PR effort with the Ashura trial.

There is one notable exception on the trial front: Reuters publishes information from the Fars News account. That leads to a bit of interesting interpretation ("Student Denies Charges", referring to one of the five accused as "enemy of God"/"mohareb") and information (one defendant is from Manchester in the UK and has British nationality).

1300 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Nuke Move. A short but important update from Associated Press:

Iran's foreign minister says Tehran's plan to send its uranium abroad for further enrichment as requested by the U.N. is aimed at building confidence in the country's nuclear program.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says swapping low-enriched uranium with uranium enriched by 20 percent is "a formula which could build confidence." He spoke Wednesday in Ankara.

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu says there is room for a diplomatic solution over neighboring Iran's nuclear program.

Mottaki says, "Any threat to the security of Iran amounts to a threat to the security of Turkey."

1. This is the "external" complement to the "internal" (though unacknowledged) reasons for President Ahmadinejad's declaration last night.

2. To follow the nuclear story, keep an eye on Turkey. Ankara is pursuing its regional "strategy in depth", as put forward as Davutoglu, and the moves with Tehran bring not only bilateral advantages but also an enhanced presence in the Middle East and, as a bonus, brownie points with Washington.

3. Now, watch for the reaction within Iran's regime. Will the conservative critics accept the Turkey-Iran manoeuvre or will it be condemned as a giveaway to "the West"?

1210 GMT: Headline of Day. The Independent of London summarises the media's current focus on Tehran: "Iran Fires Mouse,Turtle and Worms into Space".

1110 GMT: On the Economic Front. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting has posted a useful overview by "Mitra Farnik" (the pseudonym of an Iranian writer) of President Ahmadinejad's economic difficulties.

1100 GMT: The Next Leg of the Race. This is almost becoming an opposition relay: Mehdi Karroubi last week, Mohammad Khatami on Monday, Mir Hossein Mousavi yesterday, and now Mehdi Karroubi today. The Facebook page supporting Mousavi has the full text and summarises:

Mehdi Karroubi,...issuing a statement for the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, invited everyone to participate in the Feb 11th (22 Bahman) rallies peacefully and strongly and emphasised, "The constitution is an order that people give to the rulers, and if a ruler does not obey that, then he/she is oppressor and should be removed from power."

1050 GMT: Swallowing Nuclear Poison? An interesting analysis by Jahanshah Javid in Iranian.com of the motives and likely political repercussions of the Ahmadinejad statement on Iran's nuclear negotiations:

Now the Islamic Republic has again swallowed poison (a reference to the famous 1988 quote of Ayatollah Khomeini when he accepted a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War) in the face of enormous international pressure and domestic upheaval. Suddenly it is bowing to the U.N. after years of insisting that it would never ever ever compromise over its enrichment program.

1040 GMT: On the Economic Front. The head of Bank Melli, Mahmoud Reza Khavari, declares that it is not bankrupt.

1030 GMT: Ahmadinejad, His Allies, and Government Money. Radio Farda reports that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's draft budget increases funds for insitutes close to the President by 143 percent.

One beneficiary is the Ayandeh Rooshan Organization, led by Ahmadinejad's brother-in-law, chief of staff, and close ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. It will receive about $120 million if the budget is passed.

Increased funding will also go to the Imam Khomeini think tank, run by Ahmadinejad's "spiritual advisor" Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi.

1020 GMT: The Fight Within the Establishment. While the Mousavi statement holds the political spotlight, the "conservative" challenge to President Ahmadinejad continues.

A latest attack comes from Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online. While firmly defending the Supreme Leader, calling on opposition leaders to be accountable, and blaming the US for stirring unrest, Bahonar criticised the Government's response to protests:

Some forces fulfilled their responsibility on time, but some took hasty measures and others delayed. The sedition imposed heavy expenses on us which will be simply realized in future.

Many officials have neglected daily responsibilities and are engaged in a game designed by the enemy. If we are to put out the fire of sedition in the country, we should not add fuel to it.

Bahonar also attacked on the economic front, "We in the Parliament are still discussing the issue of budget bill. Perhaps the plans for the next year are not that much significant but outside the country the analyses are made that due to the chaos within the country, the government is so troubled that it cannot even complete a bill."

(It should also noted that Khabar Online has just featured a Monday speech by Davoud Ahmadinejad, brother of the President, attacking Presidential Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.)

0915 GMT: And For Our Next Showpiece. Today's latest hearing in the trial of 16 Ashura detainees is also being pushed by Iranian state media. The Islamic Republic News Agency is declaring the repentance of one of the defendants, who was misled by Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer address in July (Regime to Hashemi: Take note and stay in your box) and by those seeking trouble on Ashura (27 December).

0850 GMT: Quick, Look Over There!

Can you pronounce "diversion"? This morning Iranian state media have been splashing rivers of ink over the launch of a satellite-boosting rocket, the Kavoshgar-3, and President Ahmadinejad is now speaking about it on national television.

No difficulty reading this move: this is the bid for legitimacy at home, trying to draw attention away from conflict and protest just over a week before 22 Bahman. Any power-posturing in the ongoing manoeuvres with the "West" over the nuclear programme and regional influence is secondary to this.

0845 GMT: We have just posted the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration, in an interview with Kalemeh, yesterday.

Forgive me for dropping journalistic objectivity. Wow. "Game-changer" indeed.

Any media outlet that gets diverted today, by Iran's posturing with the launch of a satellite-boosting rocket or even by President Ahmadinejad's statement on a nuclear deal, and misses the significance of Mousavi's statement needs to get its credentials checked.

0735 GMT: The Call to March. More than 80 Iranian civil rights activists have issued a statement denouncing the "naked violence" of the regime and calling for mass demonstrations on 22 Bahman:

We, the signatories to this statement, invite the wise and courageous people of Iran to demonstrate to the world their demands for justice and liberty with their peaceful and calm presence on the anniversary of the 1979 revolution, once again showing to the dictators that the right-seeking movement of enlightened Iranians will never be decapitated with the blade of violence and terror, and the execution of innocent Iranian youth and the injustice and violence of the coup agents will not leave the slightest impact on the national determination of Iranians to realize the dreams of democracy, human rights, and respect for the human dignity of all Iranian citizens, regardless of their gender, ideology and ethnicity.

0730 GMT: So much for a quiet day yesterday. Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Kalemeh emerged as a big boost for the opposition just over a week before 22 Bahman and the marches on the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, and President Ahmadinejad had his own surprise last night with an apparent shift in Iran's position on its nuclear programme. We've got a special snap analysis.

Those important events, however, should not overshadow the steady patter of news as the regime sends out conflicting signals over its tough stance on protest. On the one hand, detainees are now being released each night to the crowd waiting and demonstrating in front of Evin Prison. On the other, there have been more arrests of activists, journalists, and key advisors. Norooz reported last night that Mohammad Davari, the editor-in-chief of Mehdi Karroubi's website Saham News, is still jailed after five months, ostensibly because he cannot post bail.

This morning, another act unfolds as the trial of 16 Ashura detainees, five of whom are charged with mohareb (war against God), resumes.

Best read? The Government is now caught up in some confusion over its approach to detentions, trials, and even executions --- witness the contradictory statements within 48 hours of Saeed Larijani, the head of Iran's judiciary, and his deputy, Ebrahim Raeesi --- which means that the harsh fist of We Will Arrest, We May Kill You is matched by the open hand of Maybe We Will Let You Have Bail. Overall, if there is a strategy before 22 Bahman, it appears to be letting "smaller fish" go while ensuring that those whom the regime sees as key organisers/mobilisers in the opposition are kept well out of sight.