Afghanistan: The Latest on the US Military-Covert Offensive

Brian Downing offers this overview for Asia Times Online:

In the past week, American, British and Afghan troops launched a major campaign around the southern Afghan city of Marjah in Helmand province - part of the counter-insurgency program begun in earnest last year. Shortly thereafter, far to the south in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, a major Taliban figure was taken into custody. The two events may help bring about a negotiated settlement.

All go in Marjah

Operations began near the central Helmand town with little prospect of a large-scale battle with Taliban bands that had operated freely there. The much-publicized buildup to the operation might have been throwing down the gauntlet and challenging the Taliban to a major battle, but the Taliban know such engagements go badly for them as their levies are no match or a Western unit's cohesion and firepower - a lesson learned repeatedly over the years.


Marjah is not a large city but it is a large town. The 80,000 inhabitants lived under Taliban rule - an embarrassment to Kabul and Washington alike. Further, it is a major center of the opium trade - a source of Taliban revenue, though one often exaggerated.The town will become a logistical and administrative center for counter-insurgency programs: school construction, well-digging, medical and veterinary services, agricultural support, and the like.

The operation seeks to demonstrate the combat efficacy of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The West has made great efforts to build the ANA but has been disappointed by its performance in the field, which unfortunately ranges from desultory skirmishes with local insurgents to negotiated truces with them.

Perhaps most importantly, the Marjah operation is designed to stop the momentum the Taliban has been building over the past several years, which leads many Afghans to believe that the Taliban will once again rule the country and that they must sooner or later settle with them. Taliban success has come less from craft in the field than from blunders in Kabul and distractions in Washington, which left the country open to Taliban parleys with various tribal leaders.

Success over the years has left parts of the Taliban leadership with confidence that they can conquer most of Afghanistan, as they did in the mid-1990s. The campaign into Marjah, in conjunction with counter-insurgency programs and tribal diplomacy elsewhere, will seek to break that confidence and force the Taliban to a negotiated settlement.

Thus far, fighting has been relatively light. Most Taliban fighters fled the town during the buildup; others are putting up sporadic resistance, setting up explosive devices, and preparing to melt into the population if need be. They will also seek to bringWestern firepower down upon civilians - a tactic in which the Taliban have developed expertise over the years - making counter-insurgency programs in coming months less likely to take hold in aggrieved people.

Action in Karachi

More significant news comes out of Karachi, the Pakistani port city that has filled with Pashtun refugees over the years and to which the Taliban's chief council, fearing drone strikes, has fled from Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, second to Mullah Omar in the Taliban leadership, was captured by Pakistani and American intelligence officials. Reports indicate that he is providing intelligence, though his colleagues would have changed locations on his disappearance.

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Afghanistan: Did The Way Forward Come Out of London Conference?

Writing for Foreign Policy, Gilles Dorronsoro looks over the political and military strategy discussed at last week's London Conference between Afghan leaders and "Western" powers and comes away unimpressed:

Washington, Paris and Berlin made their best efforts to keep up appearances during last week's Afghanistan conference here, but the gap between official rhetoric and reality could not have been wider. Participants called for reintegrating members of the Taliban who accept the Afghan constitution, enacting measures against government corruption, and building more regional cooperation.

Afghanistan: America’s Secret Prisons

Yet the coalition is systematically undermining what's left of the Afghan state. The New York Times reports that the Shinwari tribes have agreed to fight the Taliban -- in exchange for about $1 million. What's lesser known and less understood is that Washington didn't even feel obligated to notify the Karzai government of this decision.


Since last summer, the United States has supported all manner of militias in Afghanistan, creating fragmentation and a dangerous degree of competition in the security sphere. Critics rightly observe that this is a formula for an even weaker government in Kabul. In a number of cases, the U.S. is dealing directly with armed groups that are beyond the control of the central government,including the group that was reportedly responsible for the killing of the Kandahar police chief in 2009.

In restive provinces like Helmand and Kandahar, rallying the foot soldiers of the insurgency is simply never going to work, because they are fighting in defense of values -- such as Islam, and freedom from foreign occupation -- that they see under attack. Even if the coalition achieves limited tactical successes, the Taliban will quickly replace the fighters it loses, and it can easily target the "traitors." These coalition tactics are not new and have never worked before. Why does the White House think they'll work now, with the insurgency stronger than ever?

Washington's gravest error, however, is its manifest lack of interest in shoring up the Afghan central government. Whatever the official word about fighting corruption, the international coalition is bypassing Kabul in favor of local strong-men, on whom it is growing more and more dependent for protection and logistics, especially in the south. Worse, the population rejects the militias, which are often brutal toward civilians, and do little to increase support for Karzai or the coalition.

The so-called "tribal policy" has been tried before in the eastern provinces, with no results, between 2006 and 2008, when the Taliban were much weaker than they are today. Even inside the Afghan legal system, the coalition is choosing its partners at a local level, skirting the political center. NATO's Provincial Reconstruction Teams act with total independence from Kabul, which is often not even informed of their actions.

The big problem the London conference failed to tackle is the Karzai government's lack of credibility with the Afghan people, especially since the flawed election of August 2009. Working with essentially the same networks, and more and more alienated from Washington -- which has repeatedly and unceremoniously criticized him in public -- Karzai will not deliver on his political reforms.

And the return of the old Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, whom the coalition opposes but who supported Karzai in the latest election, signals that Karzai will become even more independent from Washington. As Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal have said, the U.S. cannot shoot its way to victory in Afghanistan, so with no prospect of building Afghan institutions for the foreseeable future, the coalition has less of an exit strategy each day.

The real game now is negotiating with the Taliban leadership in Quetta. Karzai and the Afghan government are trying to open some negotiations with the head of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar, as is the U.N., through special representative Kai Eide. The U.S. should also pursue direct negotiations, as it has very direct interests in a larger agreement with the Taliban -- namely, a guarantee that al Qaeda does not return to Afghanistan. If the U.S. cannot reach such a resolution, who else will?

The London conference, sadly, gave little confidence that NATO is moving any closer to its objectives in Afghanistan. A few days before leaders met here, we learned that the Afghan National Army and Police forces will be substantially increased: from 97,000 to 171,000, and 94,000 to 160,000, respectively, by the end of 2011. The security of a growing number of provinces will also come under the responsibility of the Afghan army after 2011. It all sounds nice on paper, but these policies are not remotely realistic, and as Anand Gopal reported in the Christian Science Monitor in April 2009, they have all been tried and found wanting already.

The number of ANA troops who are capable of combat is about 60,000, and turnover is reported to be as high as 25 percent per year. Given the insufficient number of Western military trainers, NATO will almost certainly miss its target numbers for the ANA. The key problem is training officers, which requires a lot of time the coalition doesn't have. And it is extremely difficult to build an army when the structures of the state are crumbling around it on all sides.

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has become almost bewilderingly self-destructive. The White House has constantly slapped Hamid Karzai in public, demanding that he make reforms that would be difficult at the best of times, while performing an end run around him that diminishes his standing even further.

At this rate, when it withdraws, Washington may leave nothing behind in Afghanistan but warring factions -- a mess not unlike the one that precipitated the Taliban's rise to power in the first place.