Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

The head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, appeared on NBC Television's Meet the Press, first to walk viewers through the US interventions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and then to take a tour around other issues from Iran to Guantanamo Bay to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.



In contrast to previous appearances, when Petraeus was fighting his own President to get his version of US foreign and military policy, this was a stay-the-course interview behind agreed approaches. The message on Afghanistan was long-haul effort to win. On Pakistan, it was supporting Pakistani forces to vanquish the Taliban. He spoke in generalities about maintaining pressure on Iran, and beyond his main agenda, on the tricky issues like Guantanamo Bay and "enhanced interrogation" (torture), he evaded any definitive statements.

MR. DAVID GREGORY: General David Petraeus joins us live from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

General, welcome to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thanks, David. Good to be with you.


MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. This NATO-U.S. offensive in southern Afghanistan is entering its second week with reports of resistance from the Taliban that our forces are facing. How formidable are the Taliban forces that we're confronting now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, they're formidable. They're a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them. But there's tough fighting going on, without question.

If I could, David, in fact, I'd like to put this into context, because this is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign, as General McChrystal and his team have mapped it out. We've spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structures and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those, helping with the development of the concepts, the counterinsurgency guidance General McChrystal has issued and so forth. And then now, with President Obama's policy announcement in December at West Point, the resourcing of that effort with the additional 30,000 forces that have now begun flowing, about 5,400 on the ground already, the additional civilians, the additional money, the additional authorization of Afghan security forces. So the inputs, we think, now are about right, and now we're starting to see the first of the output. And the Marja operation is the initial salvo, the initial operation in that overall campaign.

MR. GREGORY: The fight is going to be tough. As you have said, there are questions about how long the U.S. will be there in the fight, whether the Afghan army is capable enough to take over that fight. What should Americans expect as there's more engagement, as there's more fighting, in terms of U.S. losses?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, the same as in the surge in Iraq. When we go on the offensive, when we take away sanctuaries and safe havens from the Taliban and the other extremist elements that we and our Afghan and coalition partners are fighting in that country, they're going to fight back. And we're seeing that in Marja. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum. We have more of our special, special operations forces going in on the ground, and you've seen the results, you've heard some of the initial results of that with more Afghan shadow governors, the Taliban shadow governors being captured, more of the high value targets being taken down. Then, through the spectrum of providing additional security for the people, supporting additional training of Afghan security forces, as I mentioned, 100,000 more of those over the course of the next year and a half or so. And then also, out on the local defense and even the reintegration of reconcilables effort that will be pursued and is being pursued with the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY: But U.S. losses, significant?

GEN. PETRAEUS: They'll be tough. They were tough in Iraq. Look, I am--I have repeatedly said that these types of efforts are hard, and they're hard all the time. I don't use words like "optimist" or "pessimist," I use realist. And the reality is that it's hard. But we're there for a very, very important reason, and we can't forget that, David. We're in Afghanistan to ensure that it cannot once again be a sanctuary for the kind of attacks that were carried out on 9/11, which were planned initially in Kandahar, first training done in eastern Afghanistan before the attackers moved to Hamburg and then onto U.S. flight schools.

MR. GREGORY: As the offensive is taking place in southern Afghanistan, a major development in Pakistan, in neighboring Pakistan, as U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured a major Taliban figure, Abdul Baradar. What are you learning from him now that he's in custody?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, if I could, what we've learned, actually, in working with our Pakistani partners, who have done some very impressive work over the course of the last 10 months in particular, is that it's sometimes not best to talk a great deal about intelligence operations. And that's what I'll do here this morning.

What I will say is, again, I'd like to put this into context as well. Some 10 months or so ago, the Pakistani people, their political leaders, including major opposition figures and even the clerics, all recognized the threat posed to the very writ of governance of Pakistan. They saw this as the most pressing existential threat to their country, and they supported the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps as it went into Swat and the Malakand division of the northwest frontier province and then expanded its operations into the federally administered tribal areas. They've made some significant gains. They know they can't just clear and leave. They have to clear, hold, build and, over time, transition to local security forces. That's indeed what they're endeavoring to do. They are carrying out this fight. This is their fight against extremists internal to their country, threatening Pakistan, not them fighting our war on terror.

MR. GREGORY: Can I ask it a slightly different way, if you don't want to talk about what specifically is being learned? Presuming that both U.S. forces and Pakistani officials are doing the interrogation, do you wish you had the interrogation methods that were available to you during the Bush administration to get intelligence from a figure like this?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have always been on the record, in fact, since 2003, with the concept of living our values. And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. We decided early on in the 101st Airborne Division we're just going to--look, we just said we'd decide to obey the Geneva Convention, to, to move forward with that. That has, I think, stood elements in good stead. We have worked very hard over the years, indeed, to ensure that elements like the International Committee of the Red Cross and others who see the conduct of our detainee operations and so forth approve of them. Because in the cases where that is not true, we end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick in the Central Command area of responsibility. Beyond that, frankly, we have found that the use of the interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual that was given, the force of law by Congress, that that works. And...

MR. GREGORY: Well...

GEN. PETRAEUS: And that is our experience...

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in, in the years that we have implemented it.

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats, do you consider the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the same way? Do you consider it to be related, or do you think, in other words, should it be closed, or do you believe it was short-sighted to set a deadline certain for its closure?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it should be closed. But it should be done in a responsible manner. So I'm not seized with the issue that it won't be done by a certain date. In fact, I think it is--it's very prudent to ensure that, as we move forward with that, wherever the remaining detainees are relocated and so forth, whatever jurisdiction is used in legal cases and so forth, is really thought through and done in a very pragmatic and sensible manner.

MR. GREGORY: One more question about--on the subject of terrorism. You often say when it comes to politics, you like to go around the minefield rather than go through it. But this is a question, really, related to your experience and your expertise. In the past couple of weeks, there's been a big debate about what kind of threat al-Qaeda poses directly to the United States. Vice President Biden considers another 9/11 type attack unlikely. Former Vice President Cheney, who you served under as well, said that he disagrees with that, that 9/11 is indeed possible again, this time using a nuclear or biological weapon. Again, appealing to your expertise, where do you come down on that question? What is the specific threat that al-Qaeda poses now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, let me just express how we assess al-Qaeda in the Central Command area of responsibility, which happens to be where the bulk of al-Qaeda is located; although, certainly, the network extends beyond our area. And our assessment is that over the course of the last year or so, al-Qaeda has been diminished in that area, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the exception, obvious exception of Yemen--we can talk more about that if you want--that the, the progress has continued against al-Qaeda in Iraq, although, again, there are certainly remaining threats there. And we see those periodically shown in the form of horrific, barbaric attacks. There's been progress against al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas as well. So, as a general assessment, again, diminished. But, having said that, al-Qaeda is a flexible, adaptable--it may be barbaric, it may believe in extremist ideology, as it does, but this is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and we must maintain pressure on it everywhere.

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: It is a network, and it takes a network to keep the pressure on a network. And that is, indeed, what we're endeavoring to do.

MR. GREGORY: But, general, my question is do you think they want to pull off another 9/11 or smaller bore attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well I think al-Qaeda is assessing to pull off any kind of attack. I mean, you saw the Abdulmutallab attempt on--the, the would-be Detroit bomber. Again, this is an enemy that is looking for any opportunity to attack our partners and, indeed, our homeland, and we have to keep that in mind. There's no question about its desire to continue to attack our country and our allies.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Iran. International inspectors think that, in fact, that country is moving toward production of an actual nuclear warhead. How close is that regime to going nuclear?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well it's--it is certainly a ways off, and we'll probably hear more on that from the International Atomic Energy Agency when it meets here in the, in the next week or so. It has clearly--its new director has expressed his concern about the activities. There's no question that some of those activities have advanced during that time. There's also a new National Intelligence Estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States. We have over the course of the last year, of course, pursued the engagement track. I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world has--have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically. That puts us on a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the "pressure track." And that's the course in which we're embarked now. The U.N. Security Council countries, of course, expressing their concern. Russia now even piling on with that. We'll have to see where that goes and whether that can, indeed, send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have about Iran's activities in the nuclear program and in its continued arming, funding, training, equipping and directing of proxy extremist elements that still carry out attacks...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in Iraq, albeit on a much limited basis, but still do that there, and also pose security challenges in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere.

MR. GREGORY: But over the span of now two administrations so much has not worked in terms of the pressure option on Iran. Can a single country, be it the United States or Israel, deter Iran from going nuclear without a military strike?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, I think we have to embark on the pressure track next, but certainly they're, needless to say--you know, I was asked a couple of Sundays ago on another show, "Well, tell me, General, about your plans to take down Iran's nuclear program." And the way I answered was to, to note that it is the job of combatant commanders to consider the what-ifs, to be prepared for contingency plans. I'm not saying this in a provocative way. I'm merely saying that we have responsibilities, the American people and our commander-in-chief and so forth expect us to think those through and to be prepared for the what-ifs. And we try not to be irresponsible in that regard.

MR. GREGORY: In our remaining moments, I want to cover a couple of other areas. Iraq: Of all the countries within Central Command that you oversee, 20, would you consider Iraq to be the most democratic?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It's interesting. I've actually posed that question to think-tankers and others, and I think it actually may be. Now, we hope that that is sustained through the elections and beyond 7 March. Right now it--I don't think there's any question right now that the Iraqi government, however imperfect--and this is "Iraqracy" at work, not necessarily Western democracy. But this is a government that is representative of all of the people, it is responsive to the people, it, its leaders know they are facing the electorate on 7 March. There's a fierce campaign, there's high political drama that's gone on. Some of it is of concern in, in a substantial way to elements to the Iraqi population and leadership. But we hope that this will move through, that the elections will be, as were the provincial elections in January 2009, deemed free and fair by the United Nations, which is very much supportive of this effort, needless to say; and that, indeed, the process of selecting the next prime minister, the next government and the other leadership will be a smooth one. Although, frankly, we expect that it is going to take some time. And, again, we do expect that there's going to be considerable drama and emotion that accompanies it, and it will be a period of months, at the very least, before that second election, if you will, the election of 7 March, which selects the parliament, the council of representatives; and they then will do the wheeling and dealing and the maneuvering to select the next prime minister and the key ministers and president.

MR. GREGORY: General, with the, the military engaged in two wars, with a country fighting terrorism in other forms as well, is this an appropriate time for the military to revisit the "don't ask, don't tell" policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, there's a process at work here now, David, and I, and I think that it is a very sound and good process. The secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced, when they were testifying, the creation of a review be headed by General Carter Hamm, U.S. Army four-star, and DOD General Counsel Jay Johnson. I don't think this has gotten enough prominence frankly. It is very important to this overall process. It will provide a rigorous analysis of the views of the force on the possible change. It will suggest the policies that could be used to implement a change if it, if it does come to that, so that it could be as uneventful as it was, say, in the U.K. or the Israeli militaries or, indeed, in our own CIA and FBI. And then it will assess the effects, the possible effects on readiness, recruiting and retention.

MR. GREGORY: What do you say?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very important for that process to move forward. We'll hear from the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs on this I think, probably their personal assessments and personal views in the course of the next week or so...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...when they're on Capitol Hill. And then the geographic combatant commanders, the other combatant commanders and I, will have our turn on Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

MR. GREGORY: But what, but what, what do you say, General? Should gays and lesbians be able to serve openly in the military?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I'll provide that, again, on Capitol Hill if, if asked at that time. I, I know you'd like to make some news here this morning. I support what our secretary and, and chairman have embarked on here. I will--I'm fully participating in that process. And I think it's very important, again, that these issues be handled and discussed and addressed by this review that will be so important in informing decisions as we move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think soldiers on the ground in the field care one way or the other if their comrades in arms are gay or lesbian?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not sure that they do. We'll see. Again, that's why this review panel. You know, all we have are, are personal soundings to go on, and I've certainly done some of that myself. I mean, you've heard General Powell, who was the chairman when the policy was implemented, had a big hand in that, who said that, yes indeed, the earth has revolved around the sun a number of times since that period 15 months ago. And you've heard a variety of anecdotal input. We have experienced, certainly, in the CIA and the FBI, I know. I served in fact in combat with individuals who were gay and who were lesbian in combat situations and, frankly, you know, over time you said, "Hey, how's, how's this guy's shooting?" Or "How is her analysis," or what have you. So--but we'll see. Again, that's the importance of this review that will be conducted by General Hamm and also by the DOD general counsel. I think it is hugely important that we have the answers from the questions that they'll be asking in a very methodical way, something we've not done before because of the emotion and the sensitivity of this issue.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we'll leave it there. General Petraeus, thank you very much this morning.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Great to be with you, David. Thanks again.

War on Terror Flashback: Bush's Lawyer Yoo "Civilians Can Be Massacred"

From Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball at Newsweek:

The chief author of the Bush administration's "torture memo" told Justice Department investigators that the president's war-making authority was so broad that he had the constitutional power to order a village to be "massacred," according to a report by released Friday night by the Office of Professional Responsibility.

The views of former Justice lawyer John Yoo were deemed to be so extreme and out of step with legal precedents that they prompted the Justice Department's internal watchdog office to conclude last year that he committed "intentional professional misconduct" when he advised the CIA it could proceed with waterboarding and other aggressive interrogation techniques against Al Qaeda suspects.


The report by OPR concludes that Yoo, now a Berkeley law professor, and his boss at the time, Jay Bybee, now a federal judge, should be referred to their state bar associations for possible disciplinary proceedings. But, as first reported by NEWSWEEK, another senior department lawyer, David Margolis, reviewed the report and last month overruled its findings on the grounds that there was no clear and "unambiguous" standard by which OPR was judging the lawyers. Instead, Margolis, who was the final decision-maker in the inquiry, found that they were guilty of only "poor judgment."

The report, more than four years in the making, is filled with new details into how a small group of lawyers at the Justice Department, the CIA, and the White House crafted the legal arguments that gave the green light to some of the most controversial tactics in the Bush administration's war on terror. They also describe how Bush administration officials were so worried about the prospect that CIA officers might be criminally prosecuted for torture that one senior official—Attorney General John Ashcroft—even suggested that President Bush issue "advance pardons" for those engaging in waterboarding, a proposal that he was quickly told was not possible.

At the core of the legal arguments were the views of Yoo, strongly backed by David Addington, Vice President Dick Cheney's legal counsel, that the president's wartime powers were essentially unlimited and included the authority to override laws passed by Congress, such as a statute banning the use of torture. Pressed on his views in an interview with OPR investigators, Yoo was asked:

"What about ordering a village of resistants to be massacred? ... Is that a power that the president could legally—"

"Yeah," Yoo replied, according to a partial transcript included in the report. "Although, let me say this: So, certainly, that would fall within the commander-in-chief's power over tactical decisions."

"To order a village of civilians to be [exterminated]?" the OPR investigator asked again.

"Sure," said Yoo.

Yoo is depicted as the driving force behind an Aug. 1, 2002, Justice Department memo that narrowly defined torture and then added sections concluding that, in the end, it essentially didn't matter what the fine print of the congressionally passed law said: The president's authority superseded the law and CIA officers who might later be accused of torture could also argue that were acting in "self defense" in order to save American lives.

The original torture memo was prompted by concerns by John Rizzo, the CIA's general counsel, that the agency's officers might be criminally prosecuted if they proceeded with waterboarding and other rough tactics in their interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, an allegedly high-level Al Qaeda-linked operative who had been captured in Pakistan and in the spring of 2002 was transferred to a CIA "black site" prison in Thailand. Rizzo wanted the Justice Department to provide a blanket letter declining criminal prosecution, essentially providing immunity for any action engaged in by CIA officers, a request that Michael Chertoff, then chief of the Justice Department's criminal division, refused to provide. It was at that point that Yoo began crafting his opinion, the contents of which he actively reviewed with senior officials at the White House. "Let's plan on going over [to the White House] at 3:30 to see some other folks about the bad things opinion," he wrote in a July 12, 2002, e-mail quoted in the OPR report.

The report describes two meetings at the White House with then-chief counsel Alberto Gonzales and "possibly Addington." (Addington refused to talk to the OPR investigators but testified before Congress that he did in fact have at least one meeting with Yoo in the summer of 2002 to discuss the contents of the torture opinion.) After the second meeting, on July 16, 2002, Yoo began writing new sections of his memo that included his controversial views on the president's powers as commander in chief. When one of his associates, Patrick Philbin, questioned the inclusion of that section and suggested it be removed, Yoo replied, "They want it in there," according to an account given by Philbin to OPR investigators. Philbin said he didn't know who the "they" was but assumed it was whoever it was that requested the opinion (technically, that was the CIA, although, as the report makes clear, the White House was also pressing for it).

Yoo provided extensive comments to OPR defending his views of the president's war-making authority and disputing OPR's take that he slanted them to accommodate the White House. He did not immediately respond to NEWSWEEK'S request for comment Friday night.