Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

I should point out that the question mark in the title is mine. For Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, writing in The Weekly Standard, there is no doubt that the US can triumph in Afghanistan.

That makes the ratio of assertion v. information in their article even more striking. Apart from two paragraphs on the "Marjah offensive", there is nothing of substance on Afghan politics and society. And even the passage on Marjah sweeps away the significance of "the incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people". (Indeed, it's notable that when the Kagans try to prop up the notion of likely American success, they talk about the internal dimension in Iraq rather than Afghanistan.)

Beyond Afghanistan: The US and the Poison of the “Long War” (Bacevich)

Success in Afghanistan is possible. The policy that President Obama announced in December and firmly reiterated last week is sound. So is the strategy that General Stanley McChrystal devised last summer and has been implementing this year.

There have been setbacks and disappointments during this campaign, and adjustments will likely be necessary. These are inescapable in war. Success is not by any means inevitable. Enemies adapt and spoilers spoil. But both panic and despair are premature. The coalition has made significant military progress against the Taliban, and will make more progress as the last surge forces arrive in August. Although military progress is insufficient by itself to resolve the conflict, it is a vital precondition. As The New York Times editors recently noted, “Until the insurgents are genuinely bloodied, they will keep insisting on a full restoration of their repressive power.” General David Petraeus knows how to bloody insurgents—and he also knows how to support and encourage political development and conflict resolution. He takes over the mission with the renewed support of the White House.

Neither the recent setbacks nor the manner of McChrystal’s departure should be allowed to obscure the enormous progress he has made in setting conditions for successful campaigns over the next two years. The internal, structural changes he made have revolutionized the ability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He oversaw the establishment of a three-star NATO training command that has accelerated both the expansion and the qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces in less than a year. He introduced a program of partnering ISAF units and headquarters with Afghan forces that had worked wonders in Iraq—and he improved on it. He oversaw the introduction of a three-star operational headquarters to develop and coordinate countrywide campaign plans. He has managed the massive planning and logistical burden of receiving the influx of surge forces and putting them immediately to use in a country with little infrastructure.

While undertaking these enormous tasks of internal reorganization, he has also taken the fight to the enemy. The controversies about his restrictions on the operations of Special Forces and rules of engagement that limit the use of destructive force in inhabited areas have obscured the fact that both Special Forces and conventional forces have been fighting harder than ever before and disrupting and seriously damaging enemy networks and strongholds. Targeted operations against Taliban networks have increased significantly during McChrystal’s tenure, and the Taliban’s ability to operate comfortably in Afghanistan has been greatly reduced. ISAF forces have killed, captured, or driven off numerous Taliban shadow governors and military commanders. They have pushed into areas the Taliban had controlled and eliminated safe-havens.

The story of Marjah is particularly illustrative. Before this year, Marjah was a Taliban sanctuary, command-and-control node, and staging area. Taliban fighters based there had been able to support operations against ISAF and coalition forces throughout Helmand Province. Lasting progress in Helmand was simply not possible without clearing Marjah. McChrystal cleared it. The Taliban naturally are trying to regain control of it. ISAF and the ANSF are trying to prevent them.

The attempt to import “governance” rapidly into the area is faltering, which is not surprising considering the haste with which the operation was conducted (driven at least partly by the perceived pressure of the president’s July 2011 timeline). The attempt was also ill-conceived. Governance plans for Marjah emphasized extending the influence of the central government to an area that supported insurgents precisely because it saw the central government as threatening and predatory. Although ISAF persuaded President Hamid Karzai to remove the most notorious malign actor in the area from power, Karzai allowed him to remain in the background, stoking fears among the people that he would inevitably return. The incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people naturally led to disappointment as well, partly because ISAF’s own rhetoric had raised expectations to unrealistic levels.

The biggest problem with the Marjah operation, however, is that it was justified and explained on the wrong basis. Marjah is not a vitally important area in principle, even in Helmand. It is important because of its role as a Taliban base camp. It was so thoroughly controlled by the insurgents that the prospects for the rapid reestablishment of governance were always dim. It was fundamentally a military objective rather than a political one, and McChrystal made a mistake by offering Marjah as a test case of ISAF’s ability to improve Afghan governance. What matters about Marjah is that the enemy can no longer use it as a sanctuary and headquarters. ISAF’s military success there has allowed the coalition to launch subsequent operations in the Upper Helmand River Valley, particularly the more strategically important contested area around Sangin. The Marjah operation has so far succeeded in what it should have been intended to do. The aspects that are faltering should not have been priorities in that location.

Kandahar differs from Marjah in almost all respects. Kandahar City is not now a Taliban stronghold, although the Taliban are present in some force in its western districts and can stage attacks throughout the city. The Taliban had controlled the vital neighboring district of Arghandab until newly arrived American forces began contesting it in September 2009. The insurgents remain very strong in Zhari, Panjwayi, and Maiwand Districts to the west and south of Kandahar City, but they do not control any of those areas as completely as they controlled Marjah.

Read rest of article....

Comments

[Catherine]

I think this exchange from the 20 June edition of State of the Union (CNN) says it all:

Host Candy Crowley: So, basically, we have 94,000 U.S. troops, with more coming, in Afghanistan on a mission that hasn't been clearly defined, with any number of problems, including the drug trade, neighboring Pakistan. ... And I wanted to read you something from Time magazine on that score.

"Nine out of 10 Afghan enlisted recruits can't read a rifle- instruction manual or drive a car, according to NATO trainers. The officer's corps is fractured by rivalries. Commanders routinely steal their enlisted men's salaries. Soldiers shake down civilians at road checkpoints and sell off their own American-supplied boots, blankets and guns at the bazaar, sometimes to the Taliban. Afghans, not surprisingly, run when they see the army coming. Recruits tend to go AWOL after their first leave, while one-quarter of those who stay in the service are blitzed on hashish or heroin, according to an internal survey carried out by the Afghan National Army."

Senator Dianne Feinstein** : Well, Candy, that's true. Now, that's the bad side of it. There also is a good side of it. I mean, I am told that they are on track to meet their training numbers.

** Senator Feinstein is chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence with oversight responsibility for the 16 civilian and military agencies and departments that make up the U.S. Intelligence Community; she also sites on the Defence Subcomittee of the Appropriations Committee.

[Catherine]

Afghan troops 'overrated' by US
An independent report has found that the US has often over-estimated the capability of local Afghan military and police units to provide security in the country.

The report by the Special Inspector-General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found big failings in the methods US and multinational forces have used since 2005 to assess the readiness of Afghan army and police who will be left behind.

So far $27bn has been spent training and equipping Afghan security forces, including the army and police. Widespread corruption and drug abuse among Afghan security forces as well as logistics nightmares plagued the effort to develop independent Afghan forces, the auditors said.
Full article: http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/06/201062971610181718.html" rel="nofollow">http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/06/...