The Latest from Iran (30 June): Assessing "Crisis"

2025 GMT: Revelations from Evin Prison. Norooz publishes an account from Hossein Nouraninejad, a senior member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, of a debate between political prisoners: "Many of us came to Evin with a strange illusion and a misguided sense of self confidence thinking our arrest was a misunderstanding that could be cleared thru debate with interrogators, only to realise later how wrong we were. [Journalist Emaduddin] Baghi used to tell us: 'Perhaps you did not expect to be treated this way because you did not know them, but I did."

NEW Iran Eyewitness: “Life Continues for People…With the Hope of Change” (Fatemeh)
NEW Iran Special: The Significance of the “Universities Crisis” (Verde)
Latest Iran Video: Harassment of Karroubi in Mosque (29 June)
Iran: Can the Green Movement Ally with Workers? (Maljoo)
Iran Snap Analysis: Waiting for the Crumbling?
The Latest from Iran (29 June): Grading the Supreme Leader

1745 GMT: Economy Watch. Iranian Labor News Agency, complementing witness accounts on EA, reports on concerns over rising food prices --- especially for chicken, other meat, and fruit --- as Iran approaches the holy month of Ramadan.

1545 GMT: Nuclear Discussions (cont.). EA contacts follow up on the item below, pointing us to a Wall Street Journal article, "Turkey Asks Iran to Return to Negotiating Table":

"If they do not sit down and talk, we will be in a worse situation this time next year," Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Burak Ozugergin told a press conference in Ankara, according to Turkish state news agency Anadolu Ajansi. "President Ahmadinejad mentioned August. We wish [the talks] would take place sooner."

Our contact gets to the point, "Seems someone's been talking to the Turks, getting them to put some pressure back on Iran."

1500 GMT: Resuming Nuclear Discussions? Two pieces of information pointing to a possible resumption of talks --- despite Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's declaration that he would "punish" the West with an embargo until late August --- on Iran's uranium enrichment.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said that Russia, France, and the US have proposed a UN-brokered meeting with experts from all three countries and Iran, provided Tehran stops enriching uranium to 20 percent.

Lavrov's declaration, made during a trip in Israel, follows indications that the Brazil, Turkish, and Iranian Foreign Ministers are meeting this week to consider their joint declaration on uranium enrichment.

1410 GMT: The Kahrizak Verdicts. Of 12 defendants in the closed-door trial over the post-election abuses and killings in Kahrizak Prison, two have been sentenced to death and nine have been given prison sentences.

1350 GMT: Message to Foreigners --- You May Be Bad, but Give Us Your Money (unless You're Israeli). A bit of posturing from the President, who has ordered the implementation of a bill mandating the identification of Israeli companies and institutions to impose a ban on Israeli products. The Iranian Foreign Ministry is required to put forward a proposal for the boycott of Israeli commodities at international meetings, including the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement.

More substantive is today's announcement, in Fars News, that the Government has eased restrictions on foreign banks seeking to do business in Iran.

1340 GMT: Satire of Day. Ebrahim Nabavi considers "Ten Paradoxes of a Revolution". An example?  "Our people, who wished no foreign intervention during the Shah's time; now, after 30 years without foreigners, they urge all foreign institutions, the European Union, US, and UN to help them to get rid of this regime."

1250 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alerts (cont.). Hamid Hosseini of Iran's Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Mines has insisted that the Iranian bank accounts frozen by the United Arab Emirates do not belong to key traders.

The UAE's central bank has ordered that transactions of 41 bank accounts and the holdings of those individuals targeted by the new UN sanctions against Iran be suspended.

1245 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (Revolving Door Edition). One leading teachers' union activist, Ali Akbar Baghani, has been released from jail; another two, Mokhtar Asadi and Mahmoud Bagheri, have been detained.

1142 GMT: The War Within. Rooz Online claims that the move to exclude Motalefeh, a key party in the Islamic Republic since 1979, has started because of its lack of support for the Government. The website also asserts that internal Revolutionary Guard bulletins are warning of the "menace of war".

1139 GMT: Make of This What You Will. According to Peyke Iran, 30% of those living in Tehran are depressed.

1135 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Interrogations of Mohsen Armin, former Deputy Speaker of Parliament and leading member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, continue after 41 days in detention.

1120 GMT: Today's All is Well Alerts. Press TV recycles the assurance, which we reported yesterday, by the head of the National Iranian Oil Distribution Company (NIODC), Farid Ameri, that "Iran is capable of meeting its gasoline needs under any circumstances without facing any difficulty".

The insistence comes amid news of more cut-offs of supplies by foreign oil companies.
And the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, says the country's first nuclear power plant will be inaugurated in the southern Iranian port city of Bushehr by late September: "Issuing resolutions against Iran will not have any effect as we are determined to continue with our plans," Salehi said.

Salehi said that a total of 3,000 Russian nuclear experts were working on the power plant and that the final tests for the inauguration of the facility were being conducted with only a two-week delay.

1115 GMT: The Hijab Pretext? RAHANA runs an analysis claiming that the increased enforcement of "proper" clothing is merely a pretext to put more security forces on the streets.

0855 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Yesterday we noted that the trial of Mahboubeh Karimi of the One Million Signatures Campaign had been scheduled for 29 June. It has now been put back to 9 July because of the absence of the judge.

Karimi's request for bail  continues to be denied.

RAHANA reports increasing concern over the health of detained student leader Majid Tavakoli, who is "suffering from abdominal bleeding".
0850 GMT: Transmitting. The new "Green TV" has posted its provisional schedule.

0840 GMT: The Universities Crisis. Complementing the analysis of EA's Mr Verde, Deutsche Welle posts an article claiming that President Ahmadinejad is seeking to organise a "board meeting" of Islamic Azad University with his own representatives.

Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejei is continuing to press the case for Presidential control, declaring that a judge's rulling supporting Parliament authority is invalid.

0835 GMT: Karroubi Follow-Up. Yesterday we posted the video of the Basiji harassment of Mehdi Karroubi in the mosque of Sharif University in Tehran.

Karroubi has issued a statement on his website, Saham News, concluding with the regret: "If we had one Shaaban Bimokh [a reference to Shaban Jafari, a particularly despised "enforcer" for the regime] during the Shah's times, this regime has brought up hundreds."

0825 GMT: Cyber-Warfare. Roshannews, a site for Iranian intellectuals, has been hacked shortly after its relaunch.

0820 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ali Bikas, a member of the Student Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, has been released from prison.

Bikas, detained since 14 June 2009, had been given a seven-year prison sentence by the Revolutionary Court.

0803 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The Revolutionary Court of Mashhad has sentenced student Yasser Ghanei to five years' suspended imprisonment for "propaganda against the regime". One of the charges against Ghanei, who spent more than two weeks in solitary confinement, is that he recorded the results of the 2009 Presidential election and made them available online.

Ghanei still faces charges of insulting President Ahmadinejad.

Human rights activist Saied Kalanaki has also been sentenced to one year of imprisonment for propaganda against the regime and two years in prison for insulting the Supreme Leader.

0800 GMT: Rumour of Day. Aftab claims that Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai said in a private meeting that he would accept the presidency of the Islamic Azad Universities.

0750 GMT: Corruption Watch. Member of Parliament Elyas Naderan, pressing his charges of corruption amongst President Ahmadinejad's advisors, has said that 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi --- accused of involvement in an insurance fraud -- should be "sentenced like a common citizen".

0715 GMT: We begin this morning with two features. Mr Verde analyses the wider significance --- for the President, Parliament, and the Supreme Leader --- of the current battle over control of Islamic Azad University. A new correspondent, Ms Fatemeh, writes for EA about her recent, extended visit to Iran.

Meanwhile....

Execution Watch

Writing in The New York Times, Nazila Fathi features the growing campaign against the possible execution of a female Kurdish activist, Zeinab Jalalian, who is accused of membership in the separatist PKK>. Fathi includes the recent statement of Zahra Rahnavard and the activity of Jalalian's lawyer, Khalil Bahramian, who has never been allowed to meet with his client.

Political Prisoner Watch

Azeri student activist Yunis Sulaimani has been seized and taken to Tabriz, where a two-month detention order has been issued.

Parliament v. President

The fight over the Ahmadinejad budget is not over, it appears. Yesterday, we noted the expected approval by a Parliament commssion of the President's 5th Plan. However, Rah-e-Sabz, quoting reformist MP Nasrullah Torabi, reports that Government officials suddenly left the meeting of the commission.

Reformist Backing of Mousavi

The Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution has issued a statement supporting the "Green Charter" of Mir Hossein Mousavi and declaring that the message of the Green Movement is an answer to the unfulfilled goals of the Islamic Revolution.

The Latest from Iran (29 June): Grading the Supreme Leader

2000 GMT: The Burning of Baha'i Houses. Radio Farda and BBC Persian Service report that the houses of dozens of Bahais were demolished and/or set ablaze in Mazandaran Province in northern Iran.

Radio Farda has an interview with an eyewitness, and the Baha'i spokeswoman in Geneva, Diane Allai, confirmed the story in a live interview with BBC Persian.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Harassment of Karroubi in Mosque (29 June)
NEW Iran: Can the Green Movement Ally with Workers? (Maljoo)
NEW Iran Snap Analysis: Waiting for the Crumbling?
Thinking Human Rights: Citizens, Technology, and the “Right to Protect” (Mazzucelli)
The Latest from Iran (28 June): Remembering 7 Tir?

1945 GMT: Threat of the Day. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says Britain has a “thick file of biased action” against Iran, so the Foreign Ministry is in agreement with complete severing of all cultural and educational relations with Britain.

Surprisingly, the news has not caused a mass outbreak of fainting and gnashing of teeth in the United Kingdom.

1930 GMT: Today's All is Well Alert. It comes from the head of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, Farid Ameri, who says Iran sees no risks to its gasoline imports.

Up to 10 foreign oil companies have cut shipments to Iran, but Ameri insisted, "Under any conditions we are able to supply the country's gasoline needs and there is no problem in producing or importing gasoline."

1900 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amir Kabir University student activist Behzad Heydari, detained on 22 Khordaad (12 June), has been freed after 15 days in solitary confinement.

Mahboubeh Karami, a member of the One Million Signatures Campaign, will appear in Revolutionary Court on 28 June , 120 days after her arrest. Association for Women's Rights in Development has further information.

1800 GMT: The Battle over "Neda". The Los Angeles Times picks up on last week's story, noted on EA, of the "official" Iranian state media documentary on the death of Neda Agha-Soltan. The Times summary of Tehran's approach is complemented by Green Correspondents' dissection, in Persian, of the claims (Neda killed by mystery woman, Neda killed by "terrorist" Mujahedin-e-Khalq, Neda killed as part of "Western" plot, and so on).

1730 GMT: We have posted claimed video of Basiji harassment of Mehdi Karroubi --- and Karroubi's reaction --- at a mosque in Tehran today.

1400 GMT: Ahmadinejad  to Rafsanjani "Go". Curious story of the day comes out of the President's latest news conference: he allegedly said, when asked his reaction to Hashemi Rafsanjani's declaration that he was ready to retire, Ahmadinejad replied, "Very grateful".

1210 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA reports that journalist Mahboubeh Khansari has been released on bail after four weeks in detention.

Mokhtar Asadi, a teacher’s union activist, was detained yesterday in Karaj.

1200 GMT: Labour Front. We've posted an assessment by Mohammad Maljoo of the relationship between the Green Movement and workers.

Rah-e-Sabz, via Peyke Iran, claims that about 10o oil refinery workers in Abadan held a protest; two were arrested.

0815 GMT: Watching the Diplomats. An important line buried in a Wall Street Journal article on former nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, who is now a visiting scholar at Princeton University....

"Javad Zarif, a pro-engagement former ambassador to the U.N., is under virtual house arrest in Tehran, said Western officials."

Zarif was the key Iranian diplomat in talks, broken off by the Bush Administration in spring 2003, between Tehran and Washington. At one point, he was supposed to join the staff of Tehran University's Institute of North American and European Studies --- now headed by Dr Seyed Mohammad Marandi --- but the post never materialised.

0805 GMT: Regime Spinning. Iranian state media has used comments of Iran's Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, to declare that the "terrorist" Mujahedin-e-Khalq "is at the end of its line".

But the better entertainment value comes out of the Revolutionary Guard's Javan, which warns, "3000 corrupt tourists from East Asian states heading for Iran".

0745 GMT: The International Front. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, has again drawn Washington's lines on Iran and its nuclear programme.

Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum, Mullen said he believes Iran will continue to pursue nuclear weapons, despite sanctions, and that its achievement of that goal would be "incredibly dangerous". However, he asserted that a military strike against Iran would be "incredibly destabilizing" to the region.

0740 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ali Tabi, a member of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, has been released from detention.

0730 GMT: Labour Front. Rah-e-Sabz reports on a rally of dismissed and unpaid workers of Tehran's Pars Metal in front of the President's office.

0710 GMT: The Oil Squeeze. Khabar Online takes note of the 10 foreign companies who have halted gasoline exports to Iran.

0655 GMT: Execution Watch. Zahra Rahnavard has issued a statement expressing her hope that reports of the imminent execution of Zeinab Jalalian, a Kurdish woman sentenced to death for membership of the separatist PKK, are just rumours.

0645 GMT: Budget Front. Reports indicate that a Parliamentary commission will finally approve the details of the President's 5th Budget Plan.

So will that stop the sniping against Ahmadinejad by a number of high-profile MPs?

0530 GMT: We start this morning with a quick analysis of signs of stagnation and even crumbling in the Iranian regime.

Meanwhile, more signs....

Secularism and the Supreme Leader

Two articles to note from the opposition Rah-e-Sabz. The website ventures into new ground with a commentary from Arash Naraghi, on the question, "Is it possible to be a secular Muslim?" The reply: "Yes, secularism is an appropriate condition for a good Muslim in a civil society."

And, in a rare English article, Rah-e-Sabz turns from secularism to Iran's top religious figure. It reports that a poll of readers shows 82% marked the Supreme Leader's performance as "very bad" (77.56%) or "bad" (4.52%) while only 4% thought he had been "good".

Keyhan and the CIA v. The Green Movement

Rah-e-Sabz also features a notable and "cheeky", as the British would call it, intervention by Ataollah Mohajerani, a minister in the Khatami Government and ally of Mehdi Karroubi.

Turning the regime's standard argument of foreign support for regime change,Mohajerani links the "hard-line" Keyhan to none other than the Central Intelligence Agency. He notes a provocative editorial by former CIA operative Reuel Marc Gerecht in The New York Times and claims, "Gerecht and those like him [including former Presidential candidate John McCain] support the Green Movement in order to hurt it."

Parliament v. President

The fallout from the dispute over control of Islamic Azad University, complete with demonstrations in front of Parliament, continues. MP Akbar Aalami asserts that the retreat of the Majlis retreat in front of uproars "is a novelty".

The Government Warns Its Own Officials

An advisor in the President's office has declared that officials who are challenging the Government, by creating blogs and not working enough, will be identified.

Earlier this spring, Government outlets said a special unit would be established to monitor officials for inappropriate behaviour.

Khabar Online adds that the main sites for Ahmadinejad supporters are www.valatarin.net and www.nasrclub.com.

Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

I should point out that the question mark in the title is mine. For Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, writing in The Weekly Standard, there is no doubt that the US can triumph in Afghanistan.

That makes the ratio of assertion v. information in their article even more striking. Apart from two paragraphs on the "Marjah offensive", there is nothing of substance on Afghan politics and society. And even the passage on Marjah sweeps away the significance of "the incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people". (Indeed, it's notable that when the Kagans try to prop up the notion of likely American success, they talk about the internal dimension in Iraq rather than Afghanistan.)

Beyond Afghanistan: The US and the Poison of the “Long War” (Bacevich)

Success in Afghanistan is possible. The policy that President Obama announced in December and firmly reiterated last week is sound. So is the strategy that General Stanley McChrystal devised last summer and has been implementing this year.

There have been setbacks and disappointments during this campaign, and adjustments will likely be necessary. These are inescapable in war. Success is not by any means inevitable. Enemies adapt and spoilers spoil. But both panic and despair are premature. The coalition has made significant military progress against the Taliban, and will make more progress as the last surge forces arrive in August. Although military progress is insufficient by itself to resolve the conflict, it is a vital precondition. As The New York Times editors recently noted, “Until the insurgents are genuinely bloodied, they will keep insisting on a full restoration of their repressive power.” General David Petraeus knows how to bloody insurgents—and he also knows how to support and encourage political development and conflict resolution. He takes over the mission with the renewed support of the White House.

Neither the recent setbacks nor the manner of McChrystal’s departure should be allowed to obscure the enormous progress he has made in setting conditions for successful campaigns over the next two years. The internal, structural changes he made have revolutionized the ability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He oversaw the establishment of a three-star NATO training command that has accelerated both the expansion and the qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces in less than a year. He introduced a program of partnering ISAF units and headquarters with Afghan forces that had worked wonders in Iraq—and he improved on it. He oversaw the introduction of a three-star operational headquarters to develop and coordinate countrywide campaign plans. He has managed the massive planning and logistical burden of receiving the influx of surge forces and putting them immediately to use in a country with little infrastructure.

While undertaking these enormous tasks of internal reorganization, he has also taken the fight to the enemy. The controversies about his restrictions on the operations of Special Forces and rules of engagement that limit the use of destructive force in inhabited areas have obscured the fact that both Special Forces and conventional forces have been fighting harder than ever before and disrupting and seriously damaging enemy networks and strongholds. Targeted operations against Taliban networks have increased significantly during McChrystal’s tenure, and the Taliban’s ability to operate comfortably in Afghanistan has been greatly reduced. ISAF forces have killed, captured, or driven off numerous Taliban shadow governors and military commanders. They have pushed into areas the Taliban had controlled and eliminated safe-havens.

The story of Marjah is particularly illustrative. Before this year, Marjah was a Taliban sanctuary, command-and-control node, and staging area. Taliban fighters based there had been able to support operations against ISAF and coalition forces throughout Helmand Province. Lasting progress in Helmand was simply not possible without clearing Marjah. McChrystal cleared it. The Taliban naturally are trying to regain control of it. ISAF and the ANSF are trying to prevent them.

The attempt to import “governance” rapidly into the area is faltering, which is not surprising considering the haste with which the operation was conducted (driven at least partly by the perceived pressure of the president’s July 2011 timeline). The attempt was also ill-conceived. Governance plans for Marjah emphasized extending the influence of the central government to an area that supported insurgents precisely because it saw the central government as threatening and predatory. Although ISAF persuaded President Hamid Karzai to remove the most notorious malign actor in the area from power, Karzai allowed him to remain in the background, stoking fears among the people that he would inevitably return. The incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people naturally led to disappointment as well, partly because ISAF’s own rhetoric had raised expectations to unrealistic levels.

The biggest problem with the Marjah operation, however, is that it was justified and explained on the wrong basis. Marjah is not a vitally important area in principle, even in Helmand. It is important because of its role as a Taliban base camp. It was so thoroughly controlled by the insurgents that the prospects for the rapid reestablishment of governance were always dim. It was fundamentally a military objective rather than a political one, and McChrystal made a mistake by offering Marjah as a test case of ISAF’s ability to improve Afghan governance. What matters about Marjah is that the enemy can no longer use it as a sanctuary and headquarters. ISAF’s military success there has allowed the coalition to launch subsequent operations in the Upper Helmand River Valley, particularly the more strategically important contested area around Sangin. The Marjah operation has so far succeeded in what it should have been intended to do. The aspects that are faltering should not have been priorities in that location.

Kandahar differs from Marjah in almost all respects. Kandahar City is not now a Taliban stronghold, although the Taliban are present in some force in its western districts and can stage attacks throughout the city. The Taliban had controlled the vital neighboring district of Arghandab until newly arrived American forces began contesting it in September 2009. The insurgents remain very strong in Zhari, Panjwayi, and Maiwand Districts to the west and south of Kandahar City, but they do not control any of those areas as completely as they controlled Marjah.

Read rest of article....

Obama's Broken Promise: Guantanamo Will Not Close (Savage)

The blessing of the news, in this article by Charlie Savage in The New York Times is far from surprising. EA argued as early as the first week of the Obama Administration that the President's declaration that he would close the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay would be challenged and undermined by his own officials. And, even without that subversion, the process was bound to be beset by legal and political complexities.

Still, to have this coldly set out --- it's not just that Guantanamo did not close by Obama's promised date of 31 January 2010; it will not close by 31 December or, indeed, in 2011 or 2012 --- is harsh confirmation. The bottom line, beyond the rationalisations, is that many people around the world have seen Guantanamo as a powerful symbol of the hypocrisy and danger of American power. Now they may see it as a symbol as a failure of Barack Obama to deliver on his promises to re-shape that power for co-operation rather than punishment.

Stymied by political opposition and focused on competing priorities, the Obama administration has sidelined efforts to close the Guantánamo prison, making it unlikely that President Obama will fulfill his promise to close it before his term ends in 2013.

When the White House acknowledged last year that it would miss Mr. Obama’s initial January 2010 deadline for shutting the prison, it also declared that the detainees would eventually be moved to one in Illinois. But impediments to that plan have mounted in Congress, and the administration is doing little to overcome them.

“There is a lot of inertia” against closing the prison, “and the administration is not putting a lot of energy behind their position that I can see,” said Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and supports the Illinois plan. He added that “the odds are that it will still be open” by the next presidential inauguration.

And Senator Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican who also supports shutting it, said the effort is “on life support and it’s unlikely to close any time soon.” He attributed the collapse to some fellow Republicans’ “demagoguery” and the administration’s poor planning and decision-making “paralysis.”

The White House insists it is still determined to shutter the prison. The administration argues that Guantánamo is a symbol in the Muslim world of past detainee abuses, citing military views that its continued operation helps terrorists.

“Our commanders have made clear that closing the detention facility at Guantánamo is a national security imperative, and the president remains committed to achieving that goal,” said a White House spokesman, Ben LaBolt.

Still, some senior officials say privately that the administration has done its part, including identifying the Illinois prison — an empty maximum-security center in Thomson, 150 miles west of Chicago — where the detainees could be held. They blame Congress for failing to execute that endgame.

“The president can’t just wave a magic wand to say that Gitmo will be closed,” said a senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss internal thinking on a sensitive issue.

The politics of closing the prison have clearly soured following the attempted bombings on a plane on Dec. 25 and in Times Square in May, as well as Republican criticism that imprisoning detainees in the United States would endanger Americans. When Mr. Obama took office a slight majority supported closing it. By a March 2010 poll, 60 percent wanted it to stay open.

One administration official argued that the White House was still trying. On May 26, Mr. Obama’s national security adviser, James Jones, sent a letter to the House Appropriations Committee reiterating the case.

But Mr. Levin portrayed the administration as unwilling to make a serious effort to exert its influence, contrasting its muted response to legislative hurdles to closing Guantánamo with “very vocal” threats to veto financing for a fighter jet engine it opposes.

Read rest of article....

Petraeus, Afghanistan, and the Lessons of Iraq (Cole)

The last 72 hours, following the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan, have been filled by the US media with the glorification of McChrystal's successor, General David Petraeus. The New York Times set down the truth:

General Petraeus, 57, brings an extraordinary set of skills to his new job: a Boy Scout’s charm, penetrating intelligence and a ferocious will to succeed. At ease with the press and the public, and an adept negotiator, General Petraeus will probably distinguish himself from his predecessor with the political skills that carried him through the most difficult months of the counteroffensive in Iraq known as the surge.

Juan Cole offers a different perspective on Petraeus and, more importantly, on Iraq and Afghanistan:

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

President Obama’s appointment of Gen. David Petraeus to succeed Gen. Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan signaled a continued commitment by the White House to a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign involving taking large swathes of territory, clearing it of insurgents, holding it in the medium term, and building up local government and social services.

It is frequently asserted that Gen. Petraeus “succeeded” in Iraq via a troop escalation or “surge” of 30,000 extra US troops that he dedicated to counter-insurgency purposes in al-Anbar and Baghdad Provinces.

But it would be a huge mistake to see Iraq either as a success story or as stable. It is the scene of an ongoing civil war between Sunnis and Shiites that is killing roughly 300 civilians a month. It can’t form a government months after the March 7 elections, even though the outcomes are known, having a permanently hung parliament, wherein the four major parties find it difficult to agree on a prime minister. The political vacuum has proved an opening for Sunni Arab insurgents, who have mounted effective bombing campaigns and more recently are targeting the banks. And now the caretaker government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is being shaken by a wave of violent mass protests even in Shiite cities that voted for him, against his government’s failure to provide key services, especially electricity in the midst of a sweltering summer heat wave.

On [19 June], a big protest rally denouncing the lack of electricity turned violent, and police shot dead two protesters. In some parts of Iraq temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and few places have electricity more than 6 or 7 hours a day. The minister of electricity has been forced to resign. On Thursday, the headline in al-Zaman, the Times of Baghdad, read “Electricity Uprisings Break out in Hilla and Diyala under the Banner of Ousting al-Maliki.” If the caretaker government falls in the face of this popular pressure before parliament can agree on a new prime minister, there would be a dreadful security vacuum and a constitutional crisis.

Going back 3 1/2 years, Gen. Petraeus did what he could to end the Sunni-Shiite Civil War of 2006-2007, which helped produce the nearly 4 million Iraqi displaced (most of whom are still homeless) and likely killed tens of thousands. He put blast walls up to separate Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods; he put in checkpoints to keep out car and truck bombs; he made some markets pedestrian-only to stop them being blown up; he established Sunni Arab pro-American militias, the “Sons of Iraq,” to fight the fundamentalist vigilantes, both Sunni and Shiite; and he systematically tracked down and had killed the leadership of the insurgent cells.

I mean to take nothing away from the significant and important efforts of the US military in 2007 when I say that they did not all by themselves end the Sunni-Shiite civil war. [But]in some ways, they inadvertently hastened a Shiite victory. Gen. Casey had been convinced to begin his plan of disarming the Iraqis in Baghdad with the Sunni Arabs by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The US military stuck to this bargain. But it turns out that if you disarmed the Sunni Arabs, then the Shiite militias came at night to chase them away. As I argued a couple of summers ago, working in part from the intrepid journalism of Karen DeYoung at the Washington Post, the main reason for decrease in the virulence of the Civil War (it is not over) was that the Shiites succeeded in ethnically cleansing the Sunnis from Baghdad. Based on US military and NGO statistics, on patterns of ambient light from West Baghdad visible by satellite, on the on-the-ground investigations of journalists like AP’s Hamza Hendawi, and on subsequent voting patterns, I don’t think Baghdad is now more than 10-15% Sunni, whereas it was probably about half and half Sunni and Shiite at the time of Bush’s invasion in 2003.

Obviously, when formerly mixed neighborhoods gradually no longer had Sunnis living in them, the ethnic violence declined (militant Shiites would have had to drive for an hour to find a Sunni to ethnically cleanse). My own field research among Iraqi refugees in Jordan in August of 2008 revealed to me the mechanisms by which the Sunnis were chased out. Many had been explicitly threatened by name, receiving death threats in their mail boxes. In addition, one fourth of Iraqi families who formally registered as refugees in Jordan had had a child kidnapped. Many had seen family members or close friends killed before their eyes. Some continued to receive threats in East Amman apartments, as the militias tracked them down to their new, squalid residences.

It was in part this Shiite wave of militia power and the usurping of Sunni property (most displaced families in Iraq have lost possession of their homes) that convinced many Sunni clans to go over to the Americans and to fight the Sunni fundamentalists in their midst, since it was the latter whose constant bombings and attacks on Shiite neighborhoods that had provoked the Civil War. Sunni Arabs in Iraq were initially absolutely convinced that they were a majority and that the Sunni Arab world would help them get back their country from the Americans, the Shiites and the Kurds. By early 2007 it had become clear that the Shiites were overwhelming them and that, indeed, their only plausible savior was the Americans, who might be persuaded to act as a moderating influence on the Shiites.

The Shiite victory in the Civil War was thus absolutely crucial as an Iraqi social-history background for what success Petraeus’s policies had.

No such major social-historical change has occurred in Afghanistan or is likely to. The Taliban and other insurgents primarily spring from the Pashtun ethnic group that predominates in the east and southwest of the country. Pashtuns probably make up about 42 percent of Afghanistan’s some 34 million people. Pashtun clans provided the top political leadership to Afghanistan from the 18th century, through the Durrani monarchy, and they look down on the northern Tajik and Hazarah ethnic groups (who speak dialects of Persian). Although probably only 20-30 percent of Afghan Pashtuns view the Taliban favorably, more may admire the Taliban as a group that stands up for Afghanistan’s independence from the Western nations now occupying it.

The Pashtuns do not believe that they have been conquered by anyone, and the vast majority of them wants US and NATO troops out of their country. They would fall down laughing at the idea of being afraid of the Tajiks and Hazarahs. So they will not be as easy to turn as the terrified and traumatized Sunnis of Iraq were in 2007.

What governmental and military framework the government of Nuri al-Maliki has been able to provide depends deeply on Iraq’s human capital. It was an industrializing society with an educated work force, a majority urban sector, and a respectable literacy rate, and its army could be rebuilt in part because literate soldiers are easier to train (not to mention that a stock of experienced soldiers and officers familiar with conventional military tactics could be drawn on). Iraq is an oil state with an income of $60 billion a year from petroleum alone. Afghanistan’s entire nominal GDP is $12 bn. a year. Afghanistan is 28% literate and its army is 10% literate. It is largely rural, poorly educated, and decades of civil war have destroyed or chased abroad its small managerial classes. Afghanistan is far more dependent on kinship ties (clans and tribes) in politics than Iraq (only 1/3 of Iraqis in polling say that tribal identity is important to them). Clan politics is notoriously insular and difficult for foreigners to enter into.

Moreover, Gen. Petreaus’s policies in 2007 in Iraq had many drawbacks. As noted, starting with the disarming of one ethno-religious group, the Sunni Arabs, left them vulnerable to ethnic cleansing by the still-armed Shiite militias. The creation of 100,000 Sons of Iraq fighters among the Sunni Arabs was viewed as a security problem by the Shiite government of al-Maliki, which brought only 17,000 of them into the police or other security forces. Many of the others were gradually dropped from the payroll by the Iraqi government, and, deprived of support by the withdrawing American troops, began being targeted by vengeful fundamentalists as traitors. The blast walls erected around neighborhoods cut them off economically from the city and produced 80% unemployment within, and so that tactic was not sustainable. There were also joint Sunni-Shiite demonstrations against Gen. Petraeus on the grounds that he was imposing and artificial sectarian separation on Iraqis. (I know.) The heavy US dependence on Blackwater and other private security contractors went badly awry when they kept going cowboy and committed a massacre at Nissour Square in 2007. (The same firm, now renamed, is being brought into Afghanistan.)

Above all, Gen Petreaus was unable to attain in Iraq that pot of gold at the bottom of the counter-insurgency rainbow, increased government capacity and political reconciliation. Even his ultimate crackdown on the Mahdi Army and attempt to marginalize the Sadrists who follow Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr largely failed. The Sadrists did well in the March elections and may well end up being king-makers in the negotiations over a new prime minister and the speed of the American withdrawal. Nor has the Arab-Kurdish conflict been resolved (and that one is a tinderbox).

The Shiite prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, deeply dislikes the ex-Baathists (whom he sees as supported by neighboring Syria), and which he codes as predominantly Sunni Arabs. He has not reached out to them in any significant way, and some 80% of the Sunni Arabs are estimated to have voted for Maliki’s rival, Iyad Allawi (an ex-Baathist himself). Although the list they voted for, the Iraqiya, gained the largest single number of seats, it is not being recognized as the biggest bloc in parliament and will almost certainly not be allowed to form a government. Instead, the two big Shiite blocs made a post-election alliance and are insisting that they will form the government, and the courts have backed them.

The message to Sunnis? Even if you put down your arms and participate in the electoral process, you will likely be marginalized by the Shiite majority.

And now al-Maliki faces the Great Electricity Uprising of 2010. Iraq cannot be a model for victory in Afghanistan, and it isn’t even clear that there has been any meaningful ‘victory’ in Iraq. The best that could be said is that in summer of 2006, 2500 civilians were showing up dead every month, and now it is a tenth of that (still a lot).

The counter-insurgency push in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan could go either way. It could tamp down the Taliban and other insurgents and produce a population grateful for increased security, even at the cost of increased foreign control. Or it could involve Fallujah-like leveling of towns and large numbers of killed and displaced clansmen, pushing Pashtuns now favorable to Karzai into insurgency. I would give the former a 10% chance of happening.