US Foreign Policy Video & Analysis: CIA Director Panetta from Afghanistan to Iran (27 June)

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta, was interviewed by Jake Panetta of ABC's This Week this morning. The 24 minutes proved a depressing illustration both of the illusions and self-constructed evasions of US foreign policy and the failure of a mainstream media to offer any meaningful interrogation. Tapper would put up a headline question on a topic. After Panetta offered his set-piece answer --- which was usually a deflection or even a half-truth rather than a response to the enquiry --- there would be no follow-up or further consideration.

Three examples....

1. AFGHANISTAN: Tapper's simplistic questions are "Are we winning?" and "Are the Taliban getting stronger?". Panetta's answer is an extraordinary shift: "We are disrupting Al Qaida's operations in the tribal areas of the Pakistan,", which of course says nothing about the Afghan conflict.

Tapper misses/ignores this and puts a set-piece follow-up, "What does winning look like?", allowing Panetta to go on about defeat of Al Qa'eda even though --- at another point in the interview --- the Director of the CIA has said there are no more than 100 members of the organisation in Afghanistan.

2. TARGETED KILLINGS: Asked about the US targeting of an American citizen, cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, Panetta offers the suspect claim, "We have no assassination list" and then makes the startling assertion, "He's a U.S. citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we're going to treat him like a terrorist." In effect, all questions of law and due process have been swept away by the CIA director in a single sentence.

And there's more. When Tapper tosses up the claim of a United Nations official that the CIA's target killings by drone aircraft in Pakistan may be suspect, Panetta simply declares, "There is no question that we are abiding by international law and the law of war" and then, rather than explaining what law the US is observing, invokes, "Look, the United States of America on 9/11 was attacked by Al Qaida."

Tapper does not follow up on either sweeping statement, despite the political and legal implications.

3. IRAN: Inevitably, Tapper's concern is whether Tehran has The Bomb. And Panetta feeds him with soundbites both vague to the point of irrelevance ("They continue to develop their nuclear capability") and specific to the point of being misleading ("We think they have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons.")

At the same time, Panetta sneaks in one of his few substantial points in the interview: "There is a continuing debate [inside Iran] right now as to whether or nor they ought to proceed with the bomb....We would estimate that if they made that decision, it would probably take a year to get there, probably another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable."

Tapper misses the key point --- that the CIA has no firm evidence on the intentions of the Iranian Government --- and thus offers no space to develop the point.

TRANSCRIPT

TAPPER: Good morning. When the President takes a look at the world, he's confronted with threats literally all over the map. In Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces struggle to make headway against the Taliban. Iran moves ahead with a nuclear program in defiance of international condemnation.

North Korea becomes even more unpredictable as it prepares for a new supreme leader. New terror threats from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia. No one knows these threats better than the president's director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta. He's been in the job for 16 months, and he's here with me this morning, his first network news interview. Mr. Panetta, welcome.

PANETTA: Nice to be with you, Jake.

TAPPER: Now, this was a momentous week, with President Obama relieving General [Stanley] McChrystal of his command. When this was all going down, you were with General [David] Petraeus at a joint CIA-CENTCOM conference. And I want to ask you about the war in Afghanistan, because this has been the deadliest month for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the second deadliest for U.S. troops, with 52 at least killed this month. Are we winning in Afghanistan, and is the Taliban stronger or weaker than when you started on the job?

PANETTA: I think the President said it best of all, that this is a very tough fight that we are engaged in. There are some serious problems here. We're dealing with a tribal society. We're dealing with a country that has problems with governance, problems with corruption, problems with narcotics trafficking, problems with a Taliban insurgency. And yet, the fundamental purpose, the mission that the president has laid out is that we have to go after Al Qaida. We've got to disrupt and dismantle Al Qaida and their militant allies so they never attack this country again.

Are we making progress? We are making progress. It's harder, it's slower than I think anyone anticipated. But at the same time, we are seeing increasing violence, particularly in Kandahar and in Helmand provinces. Is the strategy the right strategy? We think so, because we're looking at about 100,000 troops being added by the end of August. If you add 50,000 from NATO, you've got 150,000. That's a pretty significant force, combined with the Afghans.

But I think the fundamental key, the key to success or failure is whether the Afghans accept responsibility, are able to deploy an effective army and police force to maintain stability. If they can do that, then I think we're going to be able to achieve the kind of progress and the kind of stability that the president is after.

TAPPER: Have you seen any evidence that they're able to do that?

PANETTA: I think so. I think that what we're seeing even in a place like Marjah, where there's been a lot of attention -- the fact is that if you look at Marjah on the ground, agriculture, commerce is, you know, moving back to some degree of normality. The violence is down from a year ago. There is some progress there.

We're seeing some progress in the fact that there's less deterioration as far as the ability of the Taliban to maintain control. So we're seeing elements of progress, but this is going to be tough. This is not going to be easy, and it is going to demand not only the United States military trying to take on, you know, a difficult Taliban insurgency, but it is going to take the Afghan army and police to be able to accept the responsibility that we pass on to them. That's going to be the key.

TAPPER: It seems as though the Taliban is stronger now than when President Obama took office. Is that fair to say?

PANETTA: I think the Taliban obviously is engaged in greater violence right now. They're doing more on IED's. They're going after our troops. There's no question about that. In some ways, they are stronger, but in some ways, they are weaker as well.

I think the fact that we are disrupting Al Qaida's operations in the tribal areas of the Pakistan, I think the fact that we are targeting Taliban leadership -- you saw what happened yesterday with one of the leaders who was dressed as a woman being taken down -- we are engaged in operations with the military that is going after Taliban leadership. I think all of that has weakened them at the same time.

So in some areas, you know, with regards to some of the directed violence, they seem to be stronger, but the fact is, we are undermining their leadership, and that I think is moving in the right direction.

TAPPER: How many Al Qaida do you think are in Afghanistan?

PANETTA: I think the estimate on the number of Al Qaida is actually relatively small. I think at most, we're looking at maybe 60 to 100, maybe less. It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of Al Qaida is in tribal areas of Pakistan.

TAPPER: Largely lost in the trash talking in the Rolling Stone magazine were some concerns about the war. The chief of operations for General McChrystal told the magazine that the end game in Afghanistan is, quote, "not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win. This is going to end in an argument."

What does winning in Afghanistan look like?

PANETTA: Winning in Afghanistan is having a country that is stable enough to ensure that there is no safe haven for Al Qaida or for a militant Taliban that welcomes Al Qaida. That's really the measure of success for the United States. Our purpose, our whole mission there is to make sure that Al Qaida never finds another safe haven from which to attack this country. That's the fundamental goal of why the United States is there. And the measure of success for us is do you have an Afghanistan that is stable enough to make sure that never happens.

TAPPER: What's the latest thinking on where Osama bin Laden is, what kind of health he's in and how much control or contact he has with Al Qaida?

PANETTA: He is, as is obvious, in very deep hiding. He's in an area of the -- the tribal areas in Pakistan that is very difficult. The terrain is probably the most difficult in the world.

TAPPER: Can you be more specific? Is it in Waziristan or--

PANETTA: All i can tell you is that it's in the tribal areas. That's all we know, that he's located in that vicinity. The terrain is very difficult. He obviously has tremendous security around him.

But having said that, the more we continue to disrupt Al Qaida's operations, and we are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership. We've taken down more than half of their Taliban leadership, of their Al Qaida leadership. We just took down number three in their leadership a few weeks ago. We continue to disrupt them. We continue to impact on their command-and-control. We continue to impact on their ability to plan attacks in this country. If we keep that pressure on, we think ultimately we can flush out [Osama] bin Laden and Zawahiri and get after them.

TAPPER: When was the last time we had good intelligence on bin Laden's location?

PANETTA: It's been a while. I think it almost goes back, you know, to the early 2000s, that, you know, in terms of actually when he was moving from Afghanistan to Pakistan, that we had the last precise information about where he might be located. Since then, it's been very difficult to get any intelligence on his exact location.

TAPPER: We're in a new phase now of the war, in which the threat can come from within, the so-called homegrown terrorists or the lone wolf terrorists. I'm talking about Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed Christmas Day bomber; Lieutenant (sic) Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter. What do these incidents and the apparent increased occurrences of these types of attacks say about the nature of the threat we face?

PANETTA: I think what's happened is that the more we put pressure on the Al Qaida leadership in the tribal areas in Pakistan -- and I would say that as a result of our operations, that the Taliban leadership is probably at its weakest point since 9/11 and their escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Having said that, they clearly are continuing to plan, continuing to try to attack this country, and they are using other ways to do it.

TAPPER: Al Qaida you're talking about.

PANETTA: That's correct. They are continuing to do that, and they're using other ways to do it, which are in some ways more difficult to try to track. One is the individual who has no record of terrorism. That was true for the Detroit bomber in some ways. It was true for others.

They're using somebody who doesn't have a record in terrorism, it's tougher to track them. If they're using people who are already here, who are in hiding and suddenly decide to come out and do an attack, that's another potential threat that they're engaged in. The third is the individual who decides to self-radicalize. Hasan did that in the Fort Hood shootings. Those are the kinds of threats that we see and we're getting intelligence that shows that's the kind of stream of threats that we face, much more difficult to track. At the same time, I think we're doing a good job of moving against those threats. We've stopped some attacks, we continue to work the intelligence in all of these areas. But that area, those kinds of threats represent I think the most serious threat to the United States right now.

TAPPER: All three of those individuals were tied in some way to an American cleric who is now supposedly in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki. He has said to be on an assassination list by President Obama. Is that true and does being an American afford him any protection that any other terrorist might not enjoy?

PANETTA: Awlaki is a terrorist who has declared war on the United States. Everything he's doing now is to try to encourage others to attack this country, there's a whole stream of intelligence that goes back to Awlaki and his continuous urging of others to attack this country in some way. You can track Awlaki to the Detroit bomber. We can track him to other attacks in this country that have been urged by Awlaki or that have been influenced by Awlaki. Awlaki is a terrorist and yes, he's a U.S. citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we're going to treat him like a terrorist. We don't have an assassination list, but I can tell you this. We have a terrorist list and he's on it.

TAPPER: "The New York Times" reported this week that Pakistani officials say they can deliver the network of Sirajuddin Haqqani, an ally of Al Qaida, who runs a major part of the insurgency into Afghanistan into a power sharing arrangement. In addition, Afghan officials say the Pakistanis are pushing various other proxies with Pakistani General Kayani personally offering to broker a deal with the Taliban leadership. Do you believe Pakistan will be able to push the Haqqani network into peace negotiations?

PANETTA: You know, I read all the same stories, we get intelligence along those lines, but the bottom line is that we really have not seen any firm intelligence that there's a real interest among the Taliban, the militant allies of Al Qaida, Al Qaida itself, the Haqqanis, TTP, other militant groups. We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaida, where they would really try to become part of that society. We've seen no evidence of that and very frankly, my view is that with regards to reconciliation, unless they're convinced that the United States is going to win and that they're going to be defeated, I think it's very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that's going to be meaningful.

TAPPER: I know you can't discuss certain classified operations or even acknowledge them, but even since you've been here today, we've heard about another drone strike in Pakistan and there's been much criticism of the predator drone program, of the CIA. The United Nations official Phil Alston earlier this month said quote, "In a situation in which there is no disclosure of who has been killed for what reason and whether innocent civilians have died, the legal principle of international accountability is by definition comprehensibly violated." Will you give us your personal assurance that everything the CIA is doing in Pakistan is compliant with U.S. and international law?

PANETTA: There is no question that we are abiding by international law and the law of war. Look, the United States of America on 9/11 was attacked by Al Qaida. They killed 3,000 innocent men and women in this country. We have a duty, we have a responsibility, to defend this country so that Al Qaida never conducts that kind of attack again. Does that make some of the Al Qaida and their supporters uncomfortable? Does it make them angry? Yes, it probably does. But that means that we're doing our job. We have a responsibility to defend this country and that's what we're doing. And anyone who suggests that somehow we're employing other tactics here that somehow violate international law are dead wrong. What we're doing is defending this country. That's what our operations are all about.

TAPPER: I'd like to move on to Iran, just because that consumes a lot of your time as director of the CIA. Do you think these latest sanctions will dissuade the Iranians from trying to enrich uranium?

PANETTA: I think the sanctions will have some impact. You know, the fact that we had Russia and China agree to that, that there is at least strong international opinion that Iran is on the wrong track, that's important. Those sanctions will have some impact. The sanctions that were passed by the Congress this last week will have some additional impact. It could help weaken the regime. It could create some serious economic problems. Will it deter them from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not.

TAPPER: The 2007 national intelligence estimate said all of Iran's work on nuclear weapons ended in 2003. You don't still believe that, do you?

PANETTA: I think they continue to develop their know-how. They continue to develop their nuclear capability.

TAPPER: Including weaponization?

PANETTA: I think they continue to work on designs in that area. There is a continuing debate right now as to whether or nor they ought to proceed with the bomb. But they clearly are developing their nuclear capability, and that raises concerns. It raises concerns about, you know, just exactly what are their intentions, and where they intend to go. I mean, we think they have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons. They do have to enrich it, fully, in order to get there. And we would estimate that if they made that decision, it would probably take a year to get there, probably another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable.

But having said that, you know, the president and the international community has said to Iran, you've got to wake up, you've got to join the family of nations, you've got to abide by international law. That's in the best interests of Iran. It's in the best interests of the Iranian people.

TAPPER: The administration has continually said that Iran has run into technical troubles in their nuclear program. Is that because the Iranians are bad at what they do, or because the U.S. and other countries are helping them be bad at what they do, by sabotaging in some instances their program?

PANETTA: Well, I can't speak to obviously intelligence operations, and I won't. It's enough to say that clearly, they have had problems. There are problems with regards to their ability to develop enrichment, and I think we continue to urge them to engage in peaceful use of nuclear power. If they did that, they wouldn't have these concerns, they wouldn't have these problems. The international community would be working with them rather than having them work on their own.

TAPPER: How likely do you think it is that Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities within the next two years?

PANETTA: I think, you know, Israel obviously is very concerned, as is the entire world, about what's happening in Iran. And they in particular because they're in that region in the world, have a particular concern about their security. At the same time, I think, you know, on an intelligence basis, we continue to share intelligence as to what exactly is Iran's capacity. I think they feel more strongly that Iran has already made the decision to proceed with the bomb. But at the same time, I think they know that sanctions will have an impact, they know that if we continue to push Iran from a diplomatic point of view, that we can have some impact, and I think they're willing to give us the room to be able to try to change Iran diplomatically and culturally and politically as opposed to changing them militarily.

TAPPER: There was a big announcement over the weekend. South Korea and the U.S. agreed to delay the transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul for three years because of the belligerence of North Korea. Kim Jong-il appears to be setting the stage for succession, including what many experts believe that torpedo attack in March on a South Korean warship. They believe that this is all setting the stage for the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un. Is that how you read all this and the sinking of the warship?

PANETTA: There is a lot to be said for that. I think our intelligence shows that at the present time, there is a process of succession going on. As a matter of fact, I think the....

TAPPER: Was the warship attack part of that?

PANETTA: I think that could have been part of it, in order to establish credibility for his son. That's what went on when he took power. His son is very young. His son is very untested. His son is loyal to his father and to North Korea, but his son does not have the kind of credibility with the military, because nobody really knows what he's going to be like.

So I think, you know, part of the provocations that are going on, part of the skirmishes that are going on are in part related to trying to establish credibility for the son. And that makes it a dangerous period.

Will it result in military confrontation? I don't think so. For 40 years, we've been going through these kinds of provocations and skirmishes with a rogue regime. In the end, they always back away from the brink and I think they'll do that now.

TAPPER: The CIA recently entered into a new $100 million contract with Blackwater, now called Xe Services for Security in Afghanistan. Blackwater guards allegedly opened fire in a city square in Baghdad in 2007, killing 17 unarmed civilians and since then, the firm has been fighting off prosecution and civil suits. Earlier this year, a federal grant jury indicted five Blackwater officials on 15 counts of conspiracy weapons and obstruction of justice charges. Here's Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, a Democrat from Illinois, who's a member of the House Intelligence Committee.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

REP. JAN SCHAKOWSKY (D), ILLINOIS: I'm just mystified why any branch of the government would decide to hire Blackwater, such a repeat offender. We're talking about murder, a company with a horrible reputation, that really jeopardizes our mission in so many different ways.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

TAPPER: What's your response?

PANETTA: Since I've become director, I've asked us to -- asked our agency to review every contract we have had with Blackwater and whatever their new name is, Xe now. And to ensure that first and foremost, that we have no contract in which they are engaged in any CIA operations. We're doing our own operations. That's important, that we not contract that out to anybody. But at the same time, I have to tell you that in the war zone, we continue to have needs for security. You've got a lot of forward bases. We've got a lot of attacks on some of these bases. We've got to have security. Unfortunately, there are a few companies that provide that kind of security. The State Department relies on them, we rely on them to a certain extent.

So we bid out some of those contracts. They provided a bid that was underbid everyone else by about $26 million. And a panel that we had said that they can do the job, that they have shaped up their act. So there really was not much choice but to accept that contract. But having said that, I will tell you that I continue to be very conscious about any of those contracts and we're reviewing all of the bids that we have with that company.

TAPPER: This month, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Assistant United States Attorney John Durham is close to completing a preliminary review of whether or not there's evidence that CIA agents or contractors violated the law when they used brutal methods, some call it torture, to interrogate terrorist detainees. Do you oppose this investigation? Are your officers -- your current officers, concerned about their legal jeopardy in the future under a future administration and what kind of guarantees can you give them?

PANETTA: Well look, CIA is an agency that has to collect intelligence, do operations. We have to take risks and it's important that we take risks and that we know that we have the support of the government and we have the support of the American people in what we're doing. With regards to this investigation, I know the reasons the attorney general decided to proceed. I didn't agree with them, but he decided to proceed. We're cooperating with him in that investigation. I've had discussions with the attorney general. He assures me that this investigation will be expedited and I think in the end, it will turn out to be OK. What I've told my people is please focus on the mission we have. Let me worry about Washington and those issues. And I think that's -- they have and I think frankly the morale at the CIA is higher than it's ever been.

TAPPER: We only have a few minutes left, but I want to ask, you're now privy to information about some of the ugliest, toughest tactics carried out by intelligence agencies with the purpose of defending our nation, stuff that probably as a member of Congress or OMB director of White House chief of staff, you suspected, but didn't actually know for a fact. How rough is it, and does any of it ever make it difficult for you to sleep at night or run to do an extra confession?

PANETTA: Well, I didn't realize that I would be making decisions, many decisions about life and death as I do now. And I don't take those decisions lightly. Those are difficult decisions. But at the same time, I have to tell you that the most rewarding part of this job -- I mean, we had a tragedy where we lost seven of our officers and it was tragic. But at the same time, it also provided a great deal of inspiration because the quality of people that work at the CIA are very dedicated and very committed to trying to help save this country and protect this country. They're not Republicans, they're not Democrats, they're just good Americans trying to do their job and that, I think, is the most rewarding part of being director of the CIA.

TAPPER: What's the flip side? Sleepless nights?

PANETTA: The flip side is you have to spend an awful lot of time worried about what the hell is going to go on our there and that keeps me up at night.

TAPPER: What -- this is my last question for you because we only have about a minute left -- what terrorist threat are we as a nation not paying enough attention to?

Or forget terrorist threat, what threat are we not paying enough attention to?

PANETTA: I think the one I worry about is, again, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the fact that one of those weapons could fall into the hands of a terrorist. I think that's one concern. And there is a lot of the stuff out there, and you worry about just exactly where it's located and who's getting their hands on it.

The other is the whole area of cyber security. We are now in a world in which cyber warfare is very real. It could threaten our grid system. It could threaten our financial system. It could paralyze this country, and I think that's an area we have to pay a lot more attention to.

TAPPER: All right, Director Leon Panetta, thank you so much for coming here today. Really appreciate it.

Petraeus, Afghanistan, and the Lessons of Iraq (Cole)

The last 72 hours, following the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan, have been filled by the US media with the glorification of McChrystal's successor, General David Petraeus. The New York Times set down the truth:

General Petraeus, 57, brings an extraordinary set of skills to his new job: a Boy Scout’s charm, penetrating intelligence and a ferocious will to succeed. At ease with the press and the public, and an adept negotiator, General Petraeus will probably distinguish himself from his predecessor with the political skills that carried him through the most difficult months of the counteroffensive in Iraq known as the surge.

Juan Cole offers a different perspective on Petraeus and, more importantly, on Iraq and Afghanistan:

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

President Obama’s appointment of Gen. David Petraeus to succeed Gen. Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan signaled a continued commitment by the White House to a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign involving taking large swathes of territory, clearing it of insurgents, holding it in the medium term, and building up local government and social services.

It is frequently asserted that Gen. Petraeus “succeeded” in Iraq via a troop escalation or “surge” of 30,000 extra US troops that he dedicated to counter-insurgency purposes in al-Anbar and Baghdad Provinces.

But it would be a huge mistake to see Iraq either as a success story or as stable. It is the scene of an ongoing civil war between Sunnis and Shiites that is killing roughly 300 civilians a month. It can’t form a government months after the March 7 elections, even though the outcomes are known, having a permanently hung parliament, wherein the four major parties find it difficult to agree on a prime minister. The political vacuum has proved an opening for Sunni Arab insurgents, who have mounted effective bombing campaigns and more recently are targeting the banks. And now the caretaker government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is being shaken by a wave of violent mass protests even in Shiite cities that voted for him, against his government’s failure to provide key services, especially electricity in the midst of a sweltering summer heat wave.

On [19 June], a big protest rally denouncing the lack of electricity turned violent, and police shot dead two protesters. In some parts of Iraq temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and few places have electricity more than 6 or 7 hours a day. The minister of electricity has been forced to resign. On Thursday, the headline in al-Zaman, the Times of Baghdad, read “Electricity Uprisings Break out in Hilla and Diyala under the Banner of Ousting al-Maliki.” If the caretaker government falls in the face of this popular pressure before parliament can agree on a new prime minister, there would be a dreadful security vacuum and a constitutional crisis.

Going back 3 1/2 years, Gen. Petraeus did what he could to end the Sunni-Shiite Civil War of 2006-2007, which helped produce the nearly 4 million Iraqi displaced (most of whom are still homeless) and likely killed tens of thousands. He put blast walls up to separate Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods; he put in checkpoints to keep out car and truck bombs; he made some markets pedestrian-only to stop them being blown up; he established Sunni Arab pro-American militias, the “Sons of Iraq,” to fight the fundamentalist vigilantes, both Sunni and Shiite; and he systematically tracked down and had killed the leadership of the insurgent cells.

I mean to take nothing away from the significant and important efforts of the US military in 2007 when I say that they did not all by themselves end the Sunni-Shiite civil war. [But]in some ways, they inadvertently hastened a Shiite victory. Gen. Casey had been convinced to begin his plan of disarming the Iraqis in Baghdad with the Sunni Arabs by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The US military stuck to this bargain. But it turns out that if you disarmed the Sunni Arabs, then the Shiite militias came at night to chase them away. As I argued a couple of summers ago, working in part from the intrepid journalism of Karen DeYoung at the Washington Post, the main reason for decrease in the virulence of the Civil War (it is not over) was that the Shiites succeeded in ethnically cleansing the Sunnis from Baghdad. Based on US military and NGO statistics, on patterns of ambient light from West Baghdad visible by satellite, on the on-the-ground investigations of journalists like AP’s Hamza Hendawi, and on subsequent voting patterns, I don’t think Baghdad is now more than 10-15% Sunni, whereas it was probably about half and half Sunni and Shiite at the time of Bush’s invasion in 2003.

Obviously, when formerly mixed neighborhoods gradually no longer had Sunnis living in them, the ethnic violence declined (militant Shiites would have had to drive for an hour to find a Sunni to ethnically cleanse). My own field research among Iraqi refugees in Jordan in August of 2008 revealed to me the mechanisms by which the Sunnis were chased out. Many had been explicitly threatened by name, receiving death threats in their mail boxes. In addition, one fourth of Iraqi families who formally registered as refugees in Jordan had had a child kidnapped. Many had seen family members or close friends killed before their eyes. Some continued to receive threats in East Amman apartments, as the militias tracked them down to their new, squalid residences.

It was in part this Shiite wave of militia power and the usurping of Sunni property (most displaced families in Iraq have lost possession of their homes) that convinced many Sunni clans to go over to the Americans and to fight the Sunni fundamentalists in their midst, since it was the latter whose constant bombings and attacks on Shiite neighborhoods that had provoked the Civil War. Sunni Arabs in Iraq were initially absolutely convinced that they were a majority and that the Sunni Arab world would help them get back their country from the Americans, the Shiites and the Kurds. By early 2007 it had become clear that the Shiites were overwhelming them and that, indeed, their only plausible savior was the Americans, who might be persuaded to act as a moderating influence on the Shiites.

The Shiite victory in the Civil War was thus absolutely crucial as an Iraqi social-history background for what success Petraeus’s policies had.

No such major social-historical change has occurred in Afghanistan or is likely to. The Taliban and other insurgents primarily spring from the Pashtun ethnic group that predominates in the east and southwest of the country. Pashtuns probably make up about 42 percent of Afghanistan’s some 34 million people. Pashtun clans provided the top political leadership to Afghanistan from the 18th century, through the Durrani monarchy, and they look down on the northern Tajik and Hazarah ethnic groups (who speak dialects of Persian). Although probably only 20-30 percent of Afghan Pashtuns view the Taliban favorably, more may admire the Taliban as a group that stands up for Afghanistan’s independence from the Western nations now occupying it.

The Pashtuns do not believe that they have been conquered by anyone, and the vast majority of them wants US and NATO troops out of their country. They would fall down laughing at the idea of being afraid of the Tajiks and Hazarahs. So they will not be as easy to turn as the terrified and traumatized Sunnis of Iraq were in 2007.

What governmental and military framework the government of Nuri al-Maliki has been able to provide depends deeply on Iraq’s human capital. It was an industrializing society with an educated work force, a majority urban sector, and a respectable literacy rate, and its army could be rebuilt in part because literate soldiers are easier to train (not to mention that a stock of experienced soldiers and officers familiar with conventional military tactics could be drawn on). Iraq is an oil state with an income of $60 billion a year from petroleum alone. Afghanistan’s entire nominal GDP is $12 bn. a year. Afghanistan is 28% literate and its army is 10% literate. It is largely rural, poorly educated, and decades of civil war have destroyed or chased abroad its small managerial classes. Afghanistan is far more dependent on kinship ties (clans and tribes) in politics than Iraq (only 1/3 of Iraqis in polling say that tribal identity is important to them). Clan politics is notoriously insular and difficult for foreigners to enter into.

Moreover, Gen. Petreaus’s policies in 2007 in Iraq had many drawbacks. As noted, starting with the disarming of one ethno-religious group, the Sunni Arabs, left them vulnerable to ethnic cleansing by the still-armed Shiite militias. The creation of 100,000 Sons of Iraq fighters among the Sunni Arabs was viewed as a security problem by the Shiite government of al-Maliki, which brought only 17,000 of them into the police or other security forces. Many of the others were gradually dropped from the payroll by the Iraqi government, and, deprived of support by the withdrawing American troops, began being targeted by vengeful fundamentalists as traitors. The blast walls erected around neighborhoods cut them off economically from the city and produced 80% unemployment within, and so that tactic was not sustainable. There were also joint Sunni-Shiite demonstrations against Gen. Petraeus on the grounds that he was imposing and artificial sectarian separation on Iraqis. (I know.) The heavy US dependence on Blackwater and other private security contractors went badly awry when they kept going cowboy and committed a massacre at Nissour Square in 2007. (The same firm, now renamed, is being brought into Afghanistan.)

Above all, Gen Petreaus was unable to attain in Iraq that pot of gold at the bottom of the counter-insurgency rainbow, increased government capacity and political reconciliation. Even his ultimate crackdown on the Mahdi Army and attempt to marginalize the Sadrists who follow Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr largely failed. The Sadrists did well in the March elections and may well end up being king-makers in the negotiations over a new prime minister and the speed of the American withdrawal. Nor has the Arab-Kurdish conflict been resolved (and that one is a tinderbox).

The Shiite prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, deeply dislikes the ex-Baathists (whom he sees as supported by neighboring Syria), and which he codes as predominantly Sunni Arabs. He has not reached out to them in any significant way, and some 80% of the Sunni Arabs are estimated to have voted for Maliki’s rival, Iyad Allawi (an ex-Baathist himself). Although the list they voted for, the Iraqiya, gained the largest single number of seats, it is not being recognized as the biggest bloc in parliament and will almost certainly not be allowed to form a government. Instead, the two big Shiite blocs made a post-election alliance and are insisting that they will form the government, and the courts have backed them.

The message to Sunnis? Even if you put down your arms and participate in the electoral process, you will likely be marginalized by the Shiite majority.

And now al-Maliki faces the Great Electricity Uprising of 2010. Iraq cannot be a model for victory in Afghanistan, and it isn’t even clear that there has been any meaningful ‘victory’ in Iraq. The best that could be said is that in summer of 2006, 2500 civilians were showing up dead every month, and now it is a tenth of that (still a lot).

The counter-insurgency push in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan could go either way. It could tamp down the Taliban and other insurgents and produce a population grateful for increased security, even at the cost of increased foreign control. Or it could involve Fallujah-like leveling of towns and large numbers of killed and displaced clansmen, pushing Pashtuns now favorable to Karzai into insurgency. I would give the former a 10% chance of happening.

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Supporter's of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency policy are heart-broken over his firing.  Very few COINdinistas took the position that McChrystal should be permitted to undermine civilian control of policy, as he did so plainly in the Rolling Stone piece; however, they put out the line, "He's our only hope", with warnings about ruining the war effort.

They also want revenge.

The target of this vengeance is quite clear: Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Take a look at these snippets from across the blogosphere:

Josh Shahryar:

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation.

Bouhammer:

So now I am waiting for that POS [piece of s***] Eikenberry to be fired along with that ineffective Holbrooke. The relationship between the military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan is a two-way street. If the Ambassador and Special Envoy don’t get along with [Afghan President] Karzai and cannot influence him or even get a meeting with him, then they need to be FIRED asap and some people need to be put into place that can be effective at their job and get along with the military leadership.

Anonymous at Danger Room:

In fact, one e-mails: “It would be a travesty if we fired McChrystal and kept Eikenberry.”

Not only is McChrystal the “only one with any sort of relationship with [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai,” says this civilian advisor to the McChrystal-led International Security Assistance Force. Eikenberry “has no plan, didn’t get COIN [counterinsurgency] when he was the commander and still doesn’t.” Plus, the advisor adds: “The Embassy hates Eik. That’s not necessarily an indictment (I’m no fan of the Embassy). But it contributes to the dysfunction and it means that half the Embassy is focused on keeping Eik in line.”

Streetwise Professor:

Eikenberry was a backstabber from day one.

See the narrative building? McChrystal was doing a good job (they've leaked red meat to give pro-McChrystal progressives some lefty cover), it was that "POS Eikenberry" and his "meddling" that are really at fault. He's a backstabber and dysfunctional. McChrystal's violation of the relationship between civilian government and the military is no longer at issue; it's practically ignored.

McChrystal and Eikenberry have been feuding for some time now, so it's no surprise he draws the most wrath from the general's dismissal. But if we actually look closer at the tension between Eikenberry and McChrystal, we see that the Eikenberry-haters are way off base. Their attacks are at best childish displays of sour grapes; at worst, they are a fundamental misunderstanding of their own strategy.

Ambassador Eikenberry is not at fault here. In fact, Eikenberry was right all along.

What is this feud between McChrystal and Eikenberry about? It's usually described very ambiguously, a disagreement over "implementation" of the strategy or something like that. But, in fact, it is a few specific actions which amount to the battle between general and ambassador over conduct of the war.

From the Washington Post:

At times their differences over strategy have been public, particularly after two of Eikenberry's cables to Washington last year were leaked to the news media. The cables warned that McChrystal's request for new troops might be counterproductive as Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner." McChrystal's staff members were particularly upset that they weren't made aware of Eikenberry's position before he sent the cables to Washington, they said in interviews.

Eikenberry has resisted some of McChrystal's wartime experiments. The ambassador refused to release funds to expand a military effort to turn villagers into armed guards. He opposed one Army brigade's plan to form an anti-Taliban alliance with a Pashtun tribe and funnel it development money. He criticized the military's proposal to buy generators and diesel fuel for the energy-starved city of Kandahar and supported a longer-term hydroelectric dam project.

In each of these cases, including the disagreement over the energy situation in Kandahar, it's clear that Eikenberry has had a better understanding of COIN strategy, the blending of civilian nation building with military combat. Eikenberry consistently prioritized governance, rule of law, and other long-term objectives over McChrystal's short-term concerns about winning battles and killing the enemy.

Stabilizing Afghanistan, not winning battles, is what counterinsurgency is supposedly all about. And yet Eikenberry is made out to be the bad guy.

Counterinsurgency requires the dual (dueling?) roles of military leader and diplomatic leader. As COINdinistas like to say, there has to be "unity of effort." Both sides have to work together. But now what we hear from them is that the McChrystal should have had free rein to do whatever he wanted while anything Eikenberry did was "meddling", some sort of illegitimate interference with the all-important war effort. Do the sellers of COIN even understand their own strategy? It's not clear that they do.

Why would Eikenberry dare question our military leaders? Why would he see Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner?" Possibly because Karzai is corrupt and sits atop an illegitimate government that functions only as an organized criminal enterprise?

Why would Eikenberry oppose arming and bribing local militias? Could it be because support from the military legitimizes these groups, even though they're outlaws that pillage Afghans just the same, if not worse, than the Taliban does, in addition to undermining the central government in Kabul?

Boy, that Eikenberry sure is a jerk for pointing all this stuff out.

When we add up all the leaked cables, the wartime experiments, the history of their involvement in the war, etc, we see the full picture of Eikenberry's trespasses against McChrystal.

The High Crimes and Treason of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry:

• Failing to decisively win the war in Afghanistan when all attention and resources were focused on Iraq


• Leaking important information about the war to the press


• Resisting "short-sighted" military domination of reconstruction/nation building efforts


• Opposing the escalation of 30,000 more US troops


• Criticizing the corruption and illegitimacy of Hamid Karzai


• Opposing a US strategic security guarantee with Karzai's illegitimate administration


• Opposing Karzai's CIA-narco-lord brother having a role in the government


• Opposing formation of militias which undermine the government


• Opposing bribes of development money which corrupt and distort rule of law, nation building, etc


• Opposing short-term energy solutions which are too expensive and cripple an already broken central government

Is it clear why everyone hates Eikenberry so much? No? I don't understand it either.

Don't take any of this the wrong way. Eikenberry is not a saint, a war hero, or even particularly effective in his conflicts with McChrystal. The point here is that Eikenberry was right. He was right to be transparent about strategic deliberations. He was right to oppose the military's faulty tactics. He was right to oppose the escalation of more troops. He was right about all of these arguments with McChrystal, and with the Obama administration itself.

Obviously there is plenty of room left to criticize Eikenberry and the State Department as a whole. Their continued association with criminal organisations like Blackwater all but negates any positive outcomes they might reach, and certainly erases any honor or integrity the institution might have. Corruption is a thriving malignancy throughout our development operations, from the contractors at the bottom to the sleazy crooks at the top.

Then, of course, there's the State Dept's participation in the first place in COIN, which is a deviant, militarist perversion of traditionally civilian-controlled policies like foreign aid, development, and nation building.

General McChrystal's downfall was his own making. Eikenberry should not be thrown in with that, least of all as part of some pathetic blame game by McChrystal supporters. What's at stake here is the war in Afghanistan, and that is clearly hopeless and unwinnable. Firing McChrystal didn't change the fact that the US has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose by continuing its war in Afghanistan, and neither will the revenge-firing of Ambassador Eikenberry. To get to the root of any of these problems, to really see solutions for countering terrorism and developing a stable Afghanistan, America's longest war has to end.

Afghanistan: The Politics Behind McChrystal's Removal --- and Why It's Bad for the War (Shahryar)

UPDATE 1245 GMT: Full credit to Josh Shahryar for nailing this in his analysis. CNN says, from a "senior Pentagon official", that "Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed keeping Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the job because he was vital to the war effort in Afghanistan, but he was overruled". --- WSL

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal is in charge no more. After two days of intense talks about his departure, he tendered his resignation as the man in charge of NATO troops in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama –-- angered by remarks about the White House and the US ambassador in Kabul made by the general and his aides to Rolling Stone magazine--- graciously accepted the resignation. He immediately Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the US troop surge policy in Iraq in 2008 that likely salvaged the war there, in his stead.
Has a crisis been averted? Probably not.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over
Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)

Even though President Obama saved face and probably made small gains with the hawkish portion of the US electorate --- just in time for the November mid-term elections, I might add --– the decision will have dire consequences for Obama’s war plan in Afghanistan. The reason is quite simple; nothing was actually done in the past days to understand the reasons why Gen. McChrystal made his remarks or to address the issues.

The situation with McChrystal and the White House is a by-product of two distinct but interrelated issues. The first is Gen. McChrystal’s relationship with President Obama, the Commander-in-Chief. The second is his relationship with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ret. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was largely ignored in this fiasco by US media.

The first action that led to Wednesday's decision was the State Department's despatch of Eikenberry to Kabul in April of last year, two months before McChrystal’s appointment. Before his appointment, Eikenberry had served two terms in Afghanistan, commanding US and international troops. His last posting was as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command for 18 months before he stepped down in 2007.

McChrystal’s complaints about Eikenberry had some merit. During his tours in Afghanistan, Eikenberry’s role in the war was not appreciated, but in that time the Taliban got stronger and the insurgency spread further. And as a former commander of the same troops McChrystal was leading, it does not look like Eikenberry helped the new US commander very much. The clash was inevitable: McChrystal had an agenda, and Eikenberry’s presence in Kabul meant the general had to deal with someone with his own ideas and plans about Afghanistan.

McChrystal worked closely with the Afghan people. He took the war --- for the first time since the ouster of the Taliban –-- straight to the insurgency’s comfort zone. He carefully controlled the bombing of areas with high concentration of civilians. But most of all, he forged links with the Afghan government, which has had a sour relationship with President Obama since last year’s elections in Kabul. All of these strategies helped propel him in popularity within Afghanistan, as local actors looked set to help him accomplish his goals. It was not to be.

There’s an old saying in Urdu, “You cannot hang two swords in one scabbard.” Friction arose because Eikenberry was not as popular as McChrystal. Eikenberry was also a strong critic of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, with whom McChrystal was attempting to forge close ties to help fight the insurgency.

The second catalyst that brought McChrystal’s ouster was the President himself. Obama took an awful lot of time in deciding what to do in Afghanistan when he took office; the entire year of 2009 was wasted on crafting his war policy. By the time it was made public, winter had arrived and offensives against insurgents were impossible in snow-covered Afghan mountains.

Perhaps Obama wanted to study his options carefully. Maybe he had to focus on other issues. Whatever the reason, for a man of action like Gen. McChrystal, political considerations were not the main issue. He needed more troops to follow the US war plan. He only started getting them this spring. No general –-- especially not McChrystal, who’s known to resent civilian meddling in military matters –-- could escape frustration when faced with such a situation.

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation. McChrystal may have been the most popular US general that has been put in charge of troops in Afghanistan. He may have led the offensive deep into Taliban heartland, forged close ties with the Afghan government and the people, and reduced civilian casualties dramatically. But he proved himself to be incompetent when it came to giving interviews to the media.

As word of McChrystal's imminent departure emerged and gathered strength, Afghan policians reacted by heaping praise upon him and pleading how important it was for the commander to stay in the country. Gen. McChrystal might have been forgiven for his Rolling Stone mistake had he not committed it just months before the November --- Defense Secretary Robert Gates seemed to have been open to the possibility of keeping him. President Obama’s political advisers, however, sided with a decision that would improve Obama’s image as a strong Commander-in-Chief and win him more votes. has welcomed his appointment. But the task of forming close ties with the Afghan government people to win a war –-- all in a year before US troops start departing Afghanistan in July 2011 --- looks impossible.

Would Obama look good if he kept someone who disrespected him so publically? Probably not. The President had to make a choice between a successful implementation of his war plan in Afghanistan and votes for the Democrats in November. He chose the latter.

However, the decision is likely going to backfirein Afghanistan once Gen. Petraeus steps into Afghanistan. He is the architect of the troop surge in the country, and the Afghan Government

Gen. McChrystal is not done. He’s around. He’ll be giving out more interviews and throwing some more mud on Obama and his political advisers, as well as Ambassador Eikenberry. So if Obama thinks he’s dodged the bullet by making a tough decision, he’s very wrong. The show’s only began, folks.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over

1805 GMT: The official line, now reinforced by a McChrystal e-mail to press outlets, is that he resigned and was not fired.

1800 GMT: Two thoughts. 1) From the frying pan to the fire: David Petraeus is just as hostile as Stanley McChrystal to Obama's declared intention to withdraw troops by July 2011. 2) Who takes over Central Command and become Petraeus' military boss?

1751 GMT: Obama says, "It was a difficult decision I made today. Indeed it saddens me to lose the service of a soldier whom I have come to respect and admire." But this decision was necessary "for the strength of our military and our nation".

And with that Obama exits, taking no questions.

NEW Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
NEW Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)
Afghanistan Special: McChrystal and the Trashing of the President (US Military v. Obama, Chapter 472)
Afghanistan Document: The McChrystal Profile (Hastings — Rolling Stone)

1750 GMT: Obama is flanked during the statement by Vice President Biden --- one of the targets of the McChrystal teams in the Rolling Stone interview ("Vice President Bite Me") --- and General Petraeus.

Obama is now on the section of the statement on how super-fantastic Petraeus is.

1749 GMT: Obama now reinforcing his play for support by stressing decision was necessary because of responsibility to troops and demand to defeat Al Qa'eda: "Our nation is at war. We face a very tough fight in Afghanistan....We are going to break the Taliban's momentum. We are going to rebuild Afghanistan."

1743 GMT: Obama begins his statement. Have accepted McChrystal resignation with "regret" but "with certainty" that is right thing to do for US troops and war effort.

Obama stresses that decision not because of any difference on policy with McChrystal or "any sense of personal insult". He expresses "great admiration" for McChrystal and his service in Iraq and Afghanistan as "one of America's finest soldiers".

But "war is bigger than one man or woman", and "this is right decision to make". McChrystal's conduct in Rolling Stone interview "did not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general. It undermines the civilian control of the military, the core of our democratic system, and it erodes the trust that is necessary for our team to work together to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan."

1725 GMT: CNN and Associated Press are reporting from sources that General David Petraeus, currently the head of Central Command, will take over the Afghanistan command from General McChrystal. This follows earlier leaks to CNN and NBC that Obama would "fire" McChrystal, who met the President for 30 minutes this morning but left the White House and did not attend a strategy meeting on Afghanistan.

That is pretty stunning, not because McChrystal is out but because Petraeus is effectively demoting himself from moving from Central Command --- where he is currently McChrystal's boss --- to the Afghanistan role.

Obama is making a statement within the next few minutes.

1430 GMT: The meeting between President Obama and General McChrystal, which lasted about 30 minutes, has concluded. The Afghanistan strategy meeting at the White House is at 1535 GMT --- will the general return for the discussion?

1325 GMT: Getting to the Important Point. A prominent activist ponders, "If McChrystal f**** up public outreach to Americans this often, how is he going to win hearts and minds of Afghans?"

1320 GMT: The Hot Tip? A "senior a

dministration official" has told CNN that the White House has asked the Pentagon to make a list of possible replacements for McChrystal.

1305 GMT: Beyond the Drama. A couple of commentaries to note, alongside our analysis this morning, that usefully note the policy issues beyond the McChrystal "crisis". Matthew Yglesias, drawing from his colleague Max Bergmann, writes:

The military can easily continue to pursue a McChrystal-style strategy on both the Afghan and US media fronts under different leadership. The more important question facing the White House is how they feel about that. A determined president will always prevail over the opinions of generals, but the political costs of attempting to do so can be quite high since military officials have a lot of prestige in American society.

(My caveat is the question as to whether Obama has ever --- when the crunch came --- been "determined [enough to]...prevail over the opinions of generals.")

And Juan Cole puts the challenge --- that will remain long after the Rolling Stone gathers moss --- to the President:

Obama needs to define an attainable goal in Afghanistan and then execute it swiftly. As it is, when he is pressed about what in the world we are doing there, he retreats into Bushisms: “So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.”

Well that isn’t a good enough reason to be in Afghanistan. There is no al-Qaeda to speak of in Afghanistan. And although insurgents and Taliban probably control about 20 percent of the country, they have not let al-Qaeda set up shop in their territory.

1255 GMT: On Day 2 of the Great McChrystal Balls-Up (with the reminder that we've posted the important story --- the US military v. Obama --- beyond the media noise), here's the latest....

General Stanley McChrystal, after his recall to Washington over his profile in Rolling Stone magazine, is now in the Pentagon for discussions before his meeting at the White House with President Obama. On the way into the building, he denied rumours --- spread by Joe Klein of Time magazine and picked up by other outlets from CBS News to Britain's Daily Telegraph --- that he had offered his resignation.

McChrystal told reporters, ""Come on, you know better than that.  No!"