Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

I should point out that the question mark in the title is mine. For Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, writing in The Weekly Standard, there is no doubt that the US can triumph in Afghanistan.

That makes the ratio of assertion v. information in their article even more striking. Apart from two paragraphs on the "Marjah offensive", there is nothing of substance on Afghan politics and society. And even the passage on Marjah sweeps away the significance of "the incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people". (Indeed, it's notable that when the Kagans try to prop up the notion of likely American success, they talk about the internal dimension in Iraq rather than Afghanistan.)

Beyond Afghanistan: The US and the Poison of the “Long War” (Bacevich)

Success in Afghanistan is possible. The policy that President Obama announced in December and firmly reiterated last week is sound. So is the strategy that General Stanley McChrystal devised last summer and has been implementing this year.

There have been setbacks and disappointments during this campaign, and adjustments will likely be necessary. These are inescapable in war. Success is not by any means inevitable. Enemies adapt and spoilers spoil. But both panic and despair are premature. The coalition has made significant military progress against the Taliban, and will make more progress as the last surge forces arrive in August. Although military progress is insufficient by itself to resolve the conflict, it is a vital precondition. As The New York Times editors recently noted, “Until the insurgents are genuinely bloodied, they will keep insisting on a full restoration of their repressive power.” General David Petraeus knows how to bloody insurgents—and he also knows how to support and encourage political development and conflict resolution. He takes over the mission with the renewed support of the White House.

Neither the recent setbacks nor the manner of McChrystal’s departure should be allowed to obscure the enormous progress he has made in setting conditions for successful campaigns over the next two years. The internal, structural changes he made have revolutionized the ability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He oversaw the establishment of a three-star NATO training command that has accelerated both the expansion and the qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces in less than a year. He introduced a program of partnering ISAF units and headquarters with Afghan forces that had worked wonders in Iraq—and he improved on it. He oversaw the introduction of a three-star operational headquarters to develop and coordinate countrywide campaign plans. He has managed the massive planning and logistical burden of receiving the influx of surge forces and putting them immediately to use in a country with little infrastructure.

While undertaking these enormous tasks of internal reorganization, he has also taken the fight to the enemy. The controversies about his restrictions on the operations of Special Forces and rules of engagement that limit the use of destructive force in inhabited areas have obscured the fact that both Special Forces and conventional forces have been fighting harder than ever before and disrupting and seriously damaging enemy networks and strongholds. Targeted operations against Taliban networks have increased significantly during McChrystal’s tenure, and the Taliban’s ability to operate comfortably in Afghanistan has been greatly reduced. ISAF forces have killed, captured, or driven off numerous Taliban shadow governors and military commanders. They have pushed into areas the Taliban had controlled and eliminated safe-havens.

The story of Marjah is particularly illustrative. Before this year, Marjah was a Taliban sanctuary, command-and-control node, and staging area. Taliban fighters based there had been able to support operations against ISAF and coalition forces throughout Helmand Province. Lasting progress in Helmand was simply not possible without clearing Marjah. McChrystal cleared it. The Taliban naturally are trying to regain control of it. ISAF and the ANSF are trying to prevent them.

The attempt to import “governance” rapidly into the area is faltering, which is not surprising considering the haste with which the operation was conducted (driven at least partly by the perceived pressure of the president’s July 2011 timeline). The attempt was also ill-conceived. Governance plans for Marjah emphasized extending the influence of the central government to an area that supported insurgents precisely because it saw the central government as threatening and predatory. Although ISAF persuaded President Hamid Karzai to remove the most notorious malign actor in the area from power, Karzai allowed him to remain in the background, stoking fears among the people that he would inevitably return. The incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people naturally led to disappointment as well, partly because ISAF’s own rhetoric had raised expectations to unrealistic levels.

The biggest problem with the Marjah operation, however, is that it was justified and explained on the wrong basis. Marjah is not a vitally important area in principle, even in Helmand. It is important because of its role as a Taliban base camp. It was so thoroughly controlled by the insurgents that the prospects for the rapid reestablishment of governance were always dim. It was fundamentally a military objective rather than a political one, and McChrystal made a mistake by offering Marjah as a test case of ISAF’s ability to improve Afghan governance. What matters about Marjah is that the enemy can no longer use it as a sanctuary and headquarters. ISAF’s military success there has allowed the coalition to launch subsequent operations in the Upper Helmand River Valley, particularly the more strategically important contested area around Sangin. The Marjah operation has so far succeeded in what it should have been intended to do. The aspects that are faltering should not have been priorities in that location.

Kandahar differs from Marjah in almost all respects. Kandahar City is not now a Taliban stronghold, although the Taliban are present in some force in its western districts and can stage attacks throughout the city. The Taliban had controlled the vital neighboring district of Arghandab until newly arrived American forces began contesting it in September 2009. The insurgents remain very strong in Zhari, Panjwayi, and Maiwand Districts to the west and south of Kandahar City, but they do not control any of those areas as completely as they controlled Marjah.

Read rest of article....

US Foreign Policy Video & Analysis: CIA Director Panetta from Afghanistan to Iran (27 June)

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta, was interviewed by Jake Panetta of ABC's This Week this morning. The 24 minutes proved a depressing illustration both of the illusions and self-constructed evasions of US foreign policy and the failure of a mainstream media to offer any meaningful interrogation. Tapper would put up a headline question on a topic. After Panetta offered his set-piece answer --- which was usually a deflection or even a half-truth rather than a response to the enquiry --- there would be no follow-up or further consideration.

Three examples....

1. AFGHANISTAN: Tapper's simplistic questions are "Are we winning?" and "Are the Taliban getting stronger?". Panetta's answer is an extraordinary shift: "We are disrupting Al Qaida's operations in the tribal areas of the Pakistan,", which of course says nothing about the Afghan conflict.

Tapper misses/ignores this and puts a set-piece follow-up, "What does winning look like?", allowing Panetta to go on about defeat of Al Qa'eda even though --- at another point in the interview --- the Director of the CIA has said there are no more than 100 members of the organisation in Afghanistan.

2. TARGETED KILLINGS: Asked about the US targeting of an American citizen, cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, Panetta offers the suspect claim, "We have no assassination list" and then makes the startling assertion, "He's a U.S. citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we're going to treat him like a terrorist." In effect, all questions of law and due process have been swept away by the CIA director in a single sentence.

And there's more. When Tapper tosses up the claim of a United Nations official that the CIA's target killings by drone aircraft in Pakistan may be suspect, Panetta simply declares, "There is no question that we are abiding by international law and the law of war" and then, rather than explaining what law the US is observing, invokes, "Look, the United States of America on 9/11 was attacked by Al Qaida."

Tapper does not follow up on either sweeping statement, despite the political and legal implications.

3. IRAN: Inevitably, Tapper's concern is whether Tehran has The Bomb. And Panetta feeds him with soundbites both vague to the point of irrelevance ("They continue to develop their nuclear capability") and specific to the point of being misleading ("We think they have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons.")

At the same time, Panetta sneaks in one of his few substantial points in the interview: "There is a continuing debate [inside Iran] right now as to whether or nor they ought to proceed with the bomb....We would estimate that if they made that decision, it would probably take a year to get there, probably another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable."

Tapper misses the key point --- that the CIA has no firm evidence on the intentions of the Iranian Government --- and thus offers no space to develop the point.

TRANSCRIPT

TAPPER: Good morning. When the President takes a look at the world, he's confronted with threats literally all over the map. In Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces struggle to make headway against the Taliban. Iran moves ahead with a nuclear program in defiance of international condemnation.

North Korea becomes even more unpredictable as it prepares for a new supreme leader. New terror threats from Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia. No one knows these threats better than the president's director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon Panetta. He's been in the job for 16 months, and he's here with me this morning, his first network news interview. Mr. Panetta, welcome.

PANETTA: Nice to be with you, Jake.

TAPPER: Now, this was a momentous week, with President Obama relieving General [Stanley] McChrystal of his command. When this was all going down, you were with General [David] Petraeus at a joint CIA-CENTCOM conference. And I want to ask you about the war in Afghanistan, because this has been the deadliest month for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the second deadliest for U.S. troops, with 52 at least killed this month. Are we winning in Afghanistan, and is the Taliban stronger or weaker than when you started on the job?

PANETTA: I think the President said it best of all, that this is a very tough fight that we are engaged in. There are some serious problems here. We're dealing with a tribal society. We're dealing with a country that has problems with governance, problems with corruption, problems with narcotics trafficking, problems with a Taliban insurgency. And yet, the fundamental purpose, the mission that the president has laid out is that we have to go after Al Qaida. We've got to disrupt and dismantle Al Qaida and their militant allies so they never attack this country again.

Are we making progress? We are making progress. It's harder, it's slower than I think anyone anticipated. But at the same time, we are seeing increasing violence, particularly in Kandahar and in Helmand provinces. Is the strategy the right strategy? We think so, because we're looking at about 100,000 troops being added by the end of August. If you add 50,000 from NATO, you've got 150,000. That's a pretty significant force, combined with the Afghans.

But I think the fundamental key, the key to success or failure is whether the Afghans accept responsibility, are able to deploy an effective army and police force to maintain stability. If they can do that, then I think we're going to be able to achieve the kind of progress and the kind of stability that the president is after.

TAPPER: Have you seen any evidence that they're able to do that?

PANETTA: I think so. I think that what we're seeing even in a place like Marjah, where there's been a lot of attention -- the fact is that if you look at Marjah on the ground, agriculture, commerce is, you know, moving back to some degree of normality. The violence is down from a year ago. There is some progress there.

We're seeing some progress in the fact that there's less deterioration as far as the ability of the Taliban to maintain control. So we're seeing elements of progress, but this is going to be tough. This is not going to be easy, and it is going to demand not only the United States military trying to take on, you know, a difficult Taliban insurgency, but it is going to take the Afghan army and police to be able to accept the responsibility that we pass on to them. That's going to be the key.

TAPPER: It seems as though the Taliban is stronger now than when President Obama took office. Is that fair to say?

PANETTA: I think the Taliban obviously is engaged in greater violence right now. They're doing more on IED's. They're going after our troops. There's no question about that. In some ways, they are stronger, but in some ways, they are weaker as well.

I think the fact that we are disrupting Al Qaida's operations in the tribal areas of the Pakistan, I think the fact that we are targeting Taliban leadership -- you saw what happened yesterday with one of the leaders who was dressed as a woman being taken down -- we are engaged in operations with the military that is going after Taliban leadership. I think all of that has weakened them at the same time.

So in some areas, you know, with regards to some of the directed violence, they seem to be stronger, but the fact is, we are undermining their leadership, and that I think is moving in the right direction.

TAPPER: How many Al Qaida do you think are in Afghanistan?

PANETTA: I think the estimate on the number of Al Qaida is actually relatively small. I think at most, we're looking at maybe 60 to 100, maybe less. It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of Al Qaida is in tribal areas of Pakistan.

TAPPER: Largely lost in the trash talking in the Rolling Stone magazine were some concerns about the war. The chief of operations for General McChrystal told the magazine that the end game in Afghanistan is, quote, "not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win. This is going to end in an argument."

What does winning in Afghanistan look like?

PANETTA: Winning in Afghanistan is having a country that is stable enough to ensure that there is no safe haven for Al Qaida or for a militant Taliban that welcomes Al Qaida. That's really the measure of success for the United States. Our purpose, our whole mission there is to make sure that Al Qaida never finds another safe haven from which to attack this country. That's the fundamental goal of why the United States is there. And the measure of success for us is do you have an Afghanistan that is stable enough to make sure that never happens.

TAPPER: What's the latest thinking on where Osama bin Laden is, what kind of health he's in and how much control or contact he has with Al Qaida?

PANETTA: He is, as is obvious, in very deep hiding. He's in an area of the -- the tribal areas in Pakistan that is very difficult. The terrain is probably the most difficult in the world.

TAPPER: Can you be more specific? Is it in Waziristan or--

PANETTA: All i can tell you is that it's in the tribal areas. That's all we know, that he's located in that vicinity. The terrain is very difficult. He obviously has tremendous security around him.

But having said that, the more we continue to disrupt Al Qaida's operations, and we are engaged in the most aggressive operations in the history of the CIA in that part of the world, and the result is that we are disrupting their leadership. We've taken down more than half of their Taliban leadership, of their Al Qaida leadership. We just took down number three in their leadership a few weeks ago. We continue to disrupt them. We continue to impact on their command-and-control. We continue to impact on their ability to plan attacks in this country. If we keep that pressure on, we think ultimately we can flush out [Osama] bin Laden and Zawahiri and get after them.

TAPPER: When was the last time we had good intelligence on bin Laden's location?

PANETTA: It's been a while. I think it almost goes back, you know, to the early 2000s, that, you know, in terms of actually when he was moving from Afghanistan to Pakistan, that we had the last precise information about where he might be located. Since then, it's been very difficult to get any intelligence on his exact location.

TAPPER: We're in a new phase now of the war, in which the threat can come from within, the so-called homegrown terrorists or the lone wolf terrorists. I'm talking about Faisal Shahzad, the would-be Times Square bomber; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the failed Christmas Day bomber; Lieutenant (sic) Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter. What do these incidents and the apparent increased occurrences of these types of attacks say about the nature of the threat we face?

PANETTA: I think what's happened is that the more we put pressure on the Al Qaida leadership in the tribal areas in Pakistan -- and I would say that as a result of our operations, that the Taliban leadership is probably at its weakest point since 9/11 and their escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Having said that, they clearly are continuing to plan, continuing to try to attack this country, and they are using other ways to do it.

TAPPER: Al Qaida you're talking about.

PANETTA: That's correct. They are continuing to do that, and they're using other ways to do it, which are in some ways more difficult to try to track. One is the individual who has no record of terrorism. That was true for the Detroit bomber in some ways. It was true for others.

They're using somebody who doesn't have a record in terrorism, it's tougher to track them. If they're using people who are already here, who are in hiding and suddenly decide to come out and do an attack, that's another potential threat that they're engaged in. The third is the individual who decides to self-radicalize. Hasan did that in the Fort Hood shootings. Those are the kinds of threats that we see and we're getting intelligence that shows that's the kind of stream of threats that we face, much more difficult to track. At the same time, I think we're doing a good job of moving against those threats. We've stopped some attacks, we continue to work the intelligence in all of these areas. But that area, those kinds of threats represent I think the most serious threat to the United States right now.

TAPPER: All three of those individuals were tied in some way to an American cleric who is now supposedly in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki. He has said to be on an assassination list by President Obama. Is that true and does being an American afford him any protection that any other terrorist might not enjoy?

PANETTA: Awlaki is a terrorist who has declared war on the United States. Everything he's doing now is to try to encourage others to attack this country, there's a whole stream of intelligence that goes back to Awlaki and his continuous urging of others to attack this country in some way. You can track Awlaki to the Detroit bomber. We can track him to other attacks in this country that have been urged by Awlaki or that have been influenced by Awlaki. Awlaki is a terrorist and yes, he's a U.S. citizen, but he is first and foremost a terrorist and we're going to treat him like a terrorist. We don't have an assassination list, but I can tell you this. We have a terrorist list and he's on it.

TAPPER: "The New York Times" reported this week that Pakistani officials say they can deliver the network of Sirajuddin Haqqani, an ally of Al Qaida, who runs a major part of the insurgency into Afghanistan into a power sharing arrangement. In addition, Afghan officials say the Pakistanis are pushing various other proxies with Pakistani General Kayani personally offering to broker a deal with the Taliban leadership. Do you believe Pakistan will be able to push the Haqqani network into peace negotiations?

PANETTA: You know, I read all the same stories, we get intelligence along those lines, but the bottom line is that we really have not seen any firm intelligence that there's a real interest among the Taliban, the militant allies of Al Qaida, Al Qaida itself, the Haqqanis, TTP, other militant groups. We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation, where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaida, where they would really try to become part of that society. We've seen no evidence of that and very frankly, my view is that with regards to reconciliation, unless they're convinced that the United States is going to win and that they're going to be defeated, I think it's very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that's going to be meaningful.

TAPPER: I know you can't discuss certain classified operations or even acknowledge them, but even since you've been here today, we've heard about another drone strike in Pakistan and there's been much criticism of the predator drone program, of the CIA. The United Nations official Phil Alston earlier this month said quote, "In a situation in which there is no disclosure of who has been killed for what reason and whether innocent civilians have died, the legal principle of international accountability is by definition comprehensibly violated." Will you give us your personal assurance that everything the CIA is doing in Pakistan is compliant with U.S. and international law?

PANETTA: There is no question that we are abiding by international law and the law of war. Look, the United States of America on 9/11 was attacked by Al Qaida. They killed 3,000 innocent men and women in this country. We have a duty, we have a responsibility, to defend this country so that Al Qaida never conducts that kind of attack again. Does that make some of the Al Qaida and their supporters uncomfortable? Does it make them angry? Yes, it probably does. But that means that we're doing our job. We have a responsibility to defend this country and that's what we're doing. And anyone who suggests that somehow we're employing other tactics here that somehow violate international law are dead wrong. What we're doing is defending this country. That's what our operations are all about.

TAPPER: I'd like to move on to Iran, just because that consumes a lot of your time as director of the CIA. Do you think these latest sanctions will dissuade the Iranians from trying to enrich uranium?

PANETTA: I think the sanctions will have some impact. You know, the fact that we had Russia and China agree to that, that there is at least strong international opinion that Iran is on the wrong track, that's important. Those sanctions will have some impact. The sanctions that were passed by the Congress this last week will have some additional impact. It could help weaken the regime. It could create some serious economic problems. Will it deter them from their ambitions with regards to nuclear capability? Probably not.

TAPPER: The 2007 national intelligence estimate said all of Iran's work on nuclear weapons ended in 2003. You don't still believe that, do you?

PANETTA: I think they continue to develop their know-how. They continue to develop their nuclear capability.

TAPPER: Including weaponization?

PANETTA: I think they continue to work on designs in that area. There is a continuing debate right now as to whether or nor they ought to proceed with the bomb. But they clearly are developing their nuclear capability, and that raises concerns. It raises concerns about, you know, just exactly what are their intentions, and where they intend to go. I mean, we think they have enough low-enriched uranium right now for two weapons. They do have to enrich it, fully, in order to get there. And we would estimate that if they made that decision, it would probably take a year to get there, probably another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable.

But having said that, you know, the president and the international community has said to Iran, you've got to wake up, you've got to join the family of nations, you've got to abide by international law. That's in the best interests of Iran. It's in the best interests of the Iranian people.

TAPPER: The administration has continually said that Iran has run into technical troubles in their nuclear program. Is that because the Iranians are bad at what they do, or because the U.S. and other countries are helping them be bad at what they do, by sabotaging in some instances their program?

PANETTA: Well, I can't speak to obviously intelligence operations, and I won't. It's enough to say that clearly, they have had problems. There are problems with regards to their ability to develop enrichment, and I think we continue to urge them to engage in peaceful use of nuclear power. If they did that, they wouldn't have these concerns, they wouldn't have these problems. The international community would be working with them rather than having them work on their own.

TAPPER: How likely do you think it is that Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities within the next two years?

PANETTA: I think, you know, Israel obviously is very concerned, as is the entire world, about what's happening in Iran. And they in particular because they're in that region in the world, have a particular concern about their security. At the same time, I think, you know, on an intelligence basis, we continue to share intelligence as to what exactly is Iran's capacity. I think they feel more strongly that Iran has already made the decision to proceed with the bomb. But at the same time, I think they know that sanctions will have an impact, they know that if we continue to push Iran from a diplomatic point of view, that we can have some impact, and I think they're willing to give us the room to be able to try to change Iran diplomatically and culturally and politically as opposed to changing them militarily.

TAPPER: There was a big announcement over the weekend. South Korea and the U.S. agreed to delay the transfer of wartime operational control to Seoul for three years because of the belligerence of North Korea. Kim Jong-il appears to be setting the stage for succession, including what many experts believe that torpedo attack in March on a South Korean warship. They believe that this is all setting the stage for the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un. Is that how you read all this and the sinking of the warship?

PANETTA: There is a lot to be said for that. I think our intelligence shows that at the present time, there is a process of succession going on. As a matter of fact, I think the....

TAPPER: Was the warship attack part of that?

PANETTA: I think that could have been part of it, in order to establish credibility for his son. That's what went on when he took power. His son is very young. His son is very untested. His son is loyal to his father and to North Korea, but his son does not have the kind of credibility with the military, because nobody really knows what he's going to be like.

So I think, you know, part of the provocations that are going on, part of the skirmishes that are going on are in part related to trying to establish credibility for the son. And that makes it a dangerous period.

Will it result in military confrontation? I don't think so. For 40 years, we've been going through these kinds of provocations and skirmishes with a rogue regime. In the end, they always back away from the brink and I think they'll do that now.

TAPPER: The CIA recently entered into a new $100 million contract with Blackwater, now called Xe Services for Security in Afghanistan. Blackwater guards allegedly opened fire in a city square in Baghdad in 2007, killing 17 unarmed civilians and since then, the firm has been fighting off prosecution and civil suits. Earlier this year, a federal grant jury indicted five Blackwater officials on 15 counts of conspiracy weapons and obstruction of justice charges. Here's Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky, a Democrat from Illinois, who's a member of the House Intelligence Committee.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

REP. JAN SCHAKOWSKY (D), ILLINOIS: I'm just mystified why any branch of the government would decide to hire Blackwater, such a repeat offender. We're talking about murder, a company with a horrible reputation, that really jeopardizes our mission in so many different ways.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

TAPPER: What's your response?

PANETTA: Since I've become director, I've asked us to -- asked our agency to review every contract we have had with Blackwater and whatever their new name is, Xe now. And to ensure that first and foremost, that we have no contract in which they are engaged in any CIA operations. We're doing our own operations. That's important, that we not contract that out to anybody. But at the same time, I have to tell you that in the war zone, we continue to have needs for security. You've got a lot of forward bases. We've got a lot of attacks on some of these bases. We've got to have security. Unfortunately, there are a few companies that provide that kind of security. The State Department relies on them, we rely on them to a certain extent.

So we bid out some of those contracts. They provided a bid that was underbid everyone else by about $26 million. And a panel that we had said that they can do the job, that they have shaped up their act. So there really was not much choice but to accept that contract. But having said that, I will tell you that I continue to be very conscious about any of those contracts and we're reviewing all of the bids that we have with that company.

TAPPER: This month, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Assistant United States Attorney John Durham is close to completing a preliminary review of whether or not there's evidence that CIA agents or contractors violated the law when they used brutal methods, some call it torture, to interrogate terrorist detainees. Do you oppose this investigation? Are your officers -- your current officers, concerned about their legal jeopardy in the future under a future administration and what kind of guarantees can you give them?

PANETTA: Well look, CIA is an agency that has to collect intelligence, do operations. We have to take risks and it's important that we take risks and that we know that we have the support of the government and we have the support of the American people in what we're doing. With regards to this investigation, I know the reasons the attorney general decided to proceed. I didn't agree with them, but he decided to proceed. We're cooperating with him in that investigation. I've had discussions with the attorney general. He assures me that this investigation will be expedited and I think in the end, it will turn out to be OK. What I've told my people is please focus on the mission we have. Let me worry about Washington and those issues. And I think that's -- they have and I think frankly the morale at the CIA is higher than it's ever been.

TAPPER: We only have a few minutes left, but I want to ask, you're now privy to information about some of the ugliest, toughest tactics carried out by intelligence agencies with the purpose of defending our nation, stuff that probably as a member of Congress or OMB director of White House chief of staff, you suspected, but didn't actually know for a fact. How rough is it, and does any of it ever make it difficult for you to sleep at night or run to do an extra confession?

PANETTA: Well, I didn't realize that I would be making decisions, many decisions about life and death as I do now. And I don't take those decisions lightly. Those are difficult decisions. But at the same time, I have to tell you that the most rewarding part of this job -- I mean, we had a tragedy where we lost seven of our officers and it was tragic. But at the same time, it also provided a great deal of inspiration because the quality of people that work at the CIA are very dedicated and very committed to trying to help save this country and protect this country. They're not Republicans, they're not Democrats, they're just good Americans trying to do their job and that, I think, is the most rewarding part of being director of the CIA.

TAPPER: What's the flip side? Sleepless nights?

PANETTA: The flip side is you have to spend an awful lot of time worried about what the hell is going to go on our there and that keeps me up at night.

TAPPER: What -- this is my last question for you because we only have about a minute left -- what terrorist threat are we as a nation not paying enough attention to?

Or forget terrorist threat, what threat are we not paying enough attention to?

PANETTA: I think the one I worry about is, again, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the fact that one of those weapons could fall into the hands of a terrorist. I think that's one concern. And there is a lot of the stuff out there, and you worry about just exactly where it's located and who's getting their hands on it.

The other is the whole area of cyber security. We are now in a world in which cyber warfare is very real. It could threaten our grid system. It could threaten our financial system. It could paralyze this country, and I think that's an area we have to pay a lot more attention to.

TAPPER: All right, Director Leon Panetta, thank you so much for coming here today. Really appreciate it.

Afghanistan: The Politics Behind McChrystal's Removal --- and Why It's Bad for the War (Shahryar)

UPDATE 1245 GMT: Full credit to Josh Shahryar for nailing this in his analysis. CNN says, from a "senior Pentagon official", that "Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed keeping Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the job because he was vital to the war effort in Afghanistan, but he was overruled". --- WSL

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal is in charge no more. After two days of intense talks about his departure, he tendered his resignation as the man in charge of NATO troops in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama –-- angered by remarks about the White House and the US ambassador in Kabul made by the general and his aides to Rolling Stone magazine--- graciously accepted the resignation. He immediately Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the US troop surge policy in Iraq in 2008 that likely salvaged the war there, in his stead.
Has a crisis been averted? Probably not.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over
Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)

Even though President Obama saved face and probably made small gains with the hawkish portion of the US electorate --- just in time for the November mid-term elections, I might add --– the decision will have dire consequences for Obama’s war plan in Afghanistan. The reason is quite simple; nothing was actually done in the past days to understand the reasons why Gen. McChrystal made his remarks or to address the issues.

The situation with McChrystal and the White House is a by-product of two distinct but interrelated issues. The first is Gen. McChrystal’s relationship with President Obama, the Commander-in-Chief. The second is his relationship with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ret. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was largely ignored in this fiasco by US media.

The first action that led to Wednesday's decision was the State Department's despatch of Eikenberry to Kabul in April of last year, two months before McChrystal’s appointment. Before his appointment, Eikenberry had served two terms in Afghanistan, commanding US and international troops. His last posting was as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command for 18 months before he stepped down in 2007.

McChrystal’s complaints about Eikenberry had some merit. During his tours in Afghanistan, Eikenberry’s role in the war was not appreciated, but in that time the Taliban got stronger and the insurgency spread further. And as a former commander of the same troops McChrystal was leading, it does not look like Eikenberry helped the new US commander very much. The clash was inevitable: McChrystal had an agenda, and Eikenberry’s presence in Kabul meant the general had to deal with someone with his own ideas and plans about Afghanistan.

McChrystal worked closely with the Afghan people. He took the war --- for the first time since the ouster of the Taliban –-- straight to the insurgency’s comfort zone. He carefully controlled the bombing of areas with high concentration of civilians. But most of all, he forged links with the Afghan government, which has had a sour relationship with President Obama since last year’s elections in Kabul. All of these strategies helped propel him in popularity within Afghanistan, as local actors looked set to help him accomplish his goals. It was not to be.

There’s an old saying in Urdu, “You cannot hang two swords in one scabbard.” Friction arose because Eikenberry was not as popular as McChrystal. Eikenberry was also a strong critic of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, with whom McChrystal was attempting to forge close ties to help fight the insurgency.

The second catalyst that brought McChrystal’s ouster was the President himself. Obama took an awful lot of time in deciding what to do in Afghanistan when he took office; the entire year of 2009 was wasted on crafting his war policy. By the time it was made public, winter had arrived and offensives against insurgents were impossible in snow-covered Afghan mountains.

Perhaps Obama wanted to study his options carefully. Maybe he had to focus on other issues. Whatever the reason, for a man of action like Gen. McChrystal, political considerations were not the main issue. He needed more troops to follow the US war plan. He only started getting them this spring. No general –-- especially not McChrystal, who’s known to resent civilian meddling in military matters –-- could escape frustration when faced with such a situation.

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation. McChrystal may have been the most popular US general that has been put in charge of troops in Afghanistan. He may have led the offensive deep into Taliban heartland, forged close ties with the Afghan government and the people, and reduced civilian casualties dramatically. But he proved himself to be incompetent when it came to giving interviews to the media.

As word of McChrystal's imminent departure emerged and gathered strength, Afghan policians reacted by heaping praise upon him and pleading how important it was for the commander to stay in the country. Gen. McChrystal might have been forgiven for his Rolling Stone mistake had he not committed it just months before the November --- Defense Secretary Robert Gates seemed to have been open to the possibility of keeping him. President Obama’s political advisers, however, sided with a decision that would improve Obama’s image as a strong Commander-in-Chief and win him more votes. has welcomed his appointment. But the task of forming close ties with the Afghan government people to win a war –-- all in a year before US troops start departing Afghanistan in July 2011 --- looks impossible.

Would Obama look good if he kept someone who disrespected him so publically? Probably not. The President had to make a choice between a successful implementation of his war plan in Afghanistan and votes for the Democrats in November. He chose the latter.

However, the decision is likely going to backfirein Afghanistan once Gen. Petraeus steps into Afghanistan. He is the architect of the troop surge in the country, and the Afghan Government

Gen. McChrystal is not done. He’s around. He’ll be giving out more interviews and throwing some more mud on Obama and his political advisers, as well as Ambassador Eikenberry. So if Obama thinks he’s dodged the bullet by making a tough decision, he’s very wrong. The show’s only began, folks.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over

1805 GMT: The official line, now reinforced by a McChrystal e-mail to press outlets, is that he resigned and was not fired.

1800 GMT: Two thoughts. 1) From the frying pan to the fire: David Petraeus is just as hostile as Stanley McChrystal to Obama's declared intention to withdraw troops by July 2011. 2) Who takes over Central Command and become Petraeus' military boss?

1751 GMT: Obama says, "It was a difficult decision I made today. Indeed it saddens me to lose the service of a soldier whom I have come to respect and admire." But this decision was necessary "for the strength of our military and our nation".

And with that Obama exits, taking no questions.

NEW Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
NEW Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)
Afghanistan Special: McChrystal and the Trashing of the President (US Military v. Obama, Chapter 472)
Afghanistan Document: The McChrystal Profile (Hastings — Rolling Stone)

1750 GMT: Obama is flanked during the statement by Vice President Biden --- one of the targets of the McChrystal teams in the Rolling Stone interview ("Vice President Bite Me") --- and General Petraeus.

Obama is now on the section of the statement on how super-fantastic Petraeus is.

1749 GMT: Obama now reinforcing his play for support by stressing decision was necessary because of responsibility to troops and demand to defeat Al Qa'eda: "Our nation is at war. We face a very tough fight in Afghanistan....We are going to break the Taliban's momentum. We are going to rebuild Afghanistan."

1743 GMT: Obama begins his statement. Have accepted McChrystal resignation with "regret" but "with certainty" that is right thing to do for US troops and war effort.

Obama stresses that decision not because of any difference on policy with McChrystal or "any sense of personal insult". He expresses "great admiration" for McChrystal and his service in Iraq and Afghanistan as "one of America's finest soldiers".

But "war is bigger than one man or woman", and "this is right decision to make". McChrystal's conduct in Rolling Stone interview "did not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general. It undermines the civilian control of the military, the core of our democratic system, and it erodes the trust that is necessary for our team to work together to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan."

1725 GMT: CNN and Associated Press are reporting from sources that General David Petraeus, currently the head of Central Command, will take over the Afghanistan command from General McChrystal. This follows earlier leaks to CNN and NBC that Obama would "fire" McChrystal, who met the President for 30 minutes this morning but left the White House and did not attend a strategy meeting on Afghanistan.

That is pretty stunning, not because McChrystal is out but because Petraeus is effectively demoting himself from moving from Central Command --- where he is currently McChrystal's boss --- to the Afghanistan role.

Obama is making a statement within the next few minutes.

1430 GMT: The meeting between President Obama and General McChrystal, which lasted about 30 minutes, has concluded. The Afghanistan strategy meeting at the White House is at 1535 GMT --- will the general return for the discussion?

1325 GMT: Getting to the Important Point. A prominent activist ponders, "If McChrystal f**** up public outreach to Americans this often, how is he going to win hearts and minds of Afghans?"

1320 GMT: The Hot Tip? A "senior a

dministration official" has told CNN that the White House has asked the Pentagon to make a list of possible replacements for McChrystal.

1305 GMT: Beyond the Drama. A couple of commentaries to note, alongside our analysis this morning, that usefully note the policy issues beyond the McChrystal "crisis". Matthew Yglesias, drawing from his colleague Max Bergmann, writes:

The military can easily continue to pursue a McChrystal-style strategy on both the Afghan and US media fronts under different leadership. The more important question facing the White House is how they feel about that. A determined president will always prevail over the opinions of generals, but the political costs of attempting to do so can be quite high since military officials have a lot of prestige in American society.

(My caveat is the question as to whether Obama has ever --- when the crunch came --- been "determined [enough to]...prevail over the opinions of generals.")

And Juan Cole puts the challenge --- that will remain long after the Rolling Stone gathers moss --- to the President:

Obama needs to define an attainable goal in Afghanistan and then execute it swiftly. As it is, when he is pressed about what in the world we are doing there, he retreats into Bushisms: “So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.”

Well that isn’t a good enough reason to be in Afghanistan. There is no al-Qaeda to speak of in Afghanistan. And although insurgents and Taliban probably control about 20 percent of the country, they have not let al-Qaeda set up shop in their territory.

1255 GMT: On Day 2 of the Great McChrystal Balls-Up (with the reminder that we've posted the important story --- the US military v. Obama --- beyond the media noise), here's the latest....

General Stanley McChrystal, after his recall to Washington over his profile in Rolling Stone magazine, is now in the Pentagon for discussions before his meeting at the White House with President Obama. On the way into the building, he denied rumours --- spread by Joe Klein of Time magazine and picked up by other outlets from CBS News to Britain's Daily Telegraph --- that he had offered his resignation.

McChrystal told reporters, ""Come on, you know better than that.  No!"

Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$$...To "Warlords" (DeYoung)

Want a break from the whipped-up drama over General Stanley McChrystal and his "mistake" of an interview? Possibly to read something more significant?

Karen DeYoung writes for The Washington Post:

The U.S. military is funding a massive protection racket in Afghanistan, indirectly paying tens of millions of dollars to warlords, corrupt public officials and the Taliban to ensure safe passage of its supply convoys throughout the country, according to congressional investigators.

The security arrangements, part of a $2.16 billion transport contract, violate laws on the use of private contractors, as well as Defense Department regulations, and "dramatically undermine" larger U.S. objectives of curtailing corruption and strengthening effective governance in Afghanistan, a report released late Monday said.

The report describes a Defense Department that is well aware that some of the money paid to contractors winds up in the hands of warlords and insurgents. Military logisticians on the ground are focused on getting supplies where they are needed and have "virtually no understanding of how security is actually provided" for the local truck convoys that transport more than 70 percent of all goods and materials used by U.S. troops. Alarms raised by prime trucking contractors were met by the military "with indifference and inaction," the report said.

"The findings of this report range from sobering to shocking," Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.) wrote in an introduction to the 79-page report, titled "Warlord, Inc., Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan."

The report comes as the number of U.S. casualties is rising in the Afghan war, and public and congressional support is declining. The administration has been on the defensive in recent weeks, insisting that the slow progress of anti-Taliban offensives in Helmand province and the city of Kandahar does not mean that more time is needed to assess whether President Obama's strategy is working.

"I think it's much too early to draw a negative conclusion," said a senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. "I think there's more positive than negative. We're heading toward a year-end assessment, which will be a big one for us." The review was set when Obama announced in December that he would send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan and begin to withdraw them in July 2011.

Tierney is chairman of the national security subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, whose majority staff spent six months preparing the report. A proponent of a smaller U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan and targeted attacks on insurgents, Tierney said in an interview Monday that he hopes the report will help members of Congress "analyze whether they think this is the most effective way to go about dealing with terrorism. Or the most cost-effective way."

The report's conclusions will be introduced at a hearing Tuesday at which senior military and defense officials are scheduled to testify. The report says that all evidence and findings were made available to Republicans on the subcommittee. A spokesman for Rep. Jeff Flake (Ariz.), the ranking Republican, said the lawmaker will not comment until he has seen the entire report.

In testimony shortly after Obama's strategy announcement, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said that "much of the corruption" in Afghanistan has been fueled by billions of dollars' worth of foreign money spent there, "and one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money."

Military officials said that they have begun several corruption investigations in Afghanistan and that a task force has been named, headed by Navy Rear Adm. Kathleen Dussault, director of logistics and supply operations for the chief of naval operations and former head of the Baghdad-based joint contracting command for Iraq and Afghanistan.

Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith, communications chief for U.S. and NATO forces in Kabul, said that the entire Tierney report has not been examined but that Dussault will be "reviewing every aspect of our contracting process and recommending changes to avoid our contribution to what is arguably a major source of revenue that feeds the cycle of corruption."

The U.S. military imports virtually everything it uses in Afghanistan -- including food, water, fuel and ammunition -- by road through Pakistan or Central Asia to distribution hubs at Bagram air base north of Kabul and a similar base outside Kandahar. From there, containers are loaded onto trucks provided by Afghan contractors under the $2.16 billion Host Nation Trucking contract. Unlike in the Iraq war, the security and vast majority of the trucks are provided by Afghans, a difference that Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, has praised as promoting local entrepreneurship.

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