Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai Joining the Taliban? The Story Behind the Headline (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

The war in Afghanistan is disintegrating before our very eyes. Our counterinsurgency strategy is broken, and the Pentagon knows it. The so-called "emergency" funding requested months ago by the Obama administration now seems destined to die a slow, bureaucratic death in congress due to overwhelming pressure by citizens. Our allies in NATO have either reached their peak of military involvement, as with the UK, or have already begun to dismantle their troop presence, as with Canada and so many others. Other countries in the region are already vying for power after the US leaves, even as the Pentagon insists its July 2011 withdrawal date will only be the "beginning of a process."

But what about Afghanistan itself? What about President Hamid Karzai, our ally and head of the "Host Nation" government? The theory put forward by the pundit class is usually some variation of the "bloodbath" theme. Our allies in Kabul like Karzai will  be overrun and annihilated by the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They’re Rich! (Mull)

This appears to be more media myth-making, however, as we see from Karzai's political manoeuvring. Not only is he threatening to join the Taliban. He may have already done just that.

Karzai has begun negotiating with the Taliban and even received formal terms of a peace treaty from Taliban-aligned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,  but this does not necessarily mean that Karzai has allied with them. Negotiations are merely the first step in any peace process, no matter the circumstances.

Instead we have to look deeper inside this peace process to see the real endgame Karzai is working toward, that of a nominal, Pashtun-nationalist government in Kabul overlaying a Taliban-dominated countryside. Together they function not only as a crime family capable of exploiting Afghanistan's resources (minerals, opium, timber, etc.) but also as a highly effective proxy for Pakistan's interminable battle against Indian influence.

What is this Pashtun-nationalist government? While Karzai was formerly part of the Northern Alliance, he is also a Pashtun, as is the vast majority of the Taliban movement. The Taliban are quite adept at playing up this identity:

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base.

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

They were able to seize power in most of Afghanistan before 2001, although the “Northern Alliance” — made up primarily of ethnic Tajiks – managed to hold out until Americans arrived and smashed the regime in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have had a harder time operating outside “Pashtunistan.”

Not any more. They're now able to expand beyond "Pashtunistan". Thomas Ruttig reports that the Taliban are beginning to move far into Northern Afghanistan, in areas traditionally quite hostile to their oppressive rule. The ethnic Hazara in this region were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the 1990's until the Americans came in 2001. The Taliban have a history of anti-Shi'a Muslim violence there, but this could be changing, as Ruttig notes [emphasis mine]:

Most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taleban’s advance into their region in the 1990s after the movement that considered Shia as non-Muslim had committed some mass murders against the minority group, for example in Mazar-e Sharif, Yakaolang (Bamian province) and at the Robatak Pass (Samangan). The Taleban conquered Bamian, the largest town in Hazarajat, late in their campaign that brought them control over more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory in that period. It was supported by an agreement with one faction of the main Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Ustad Muhammad Akbari (now an MP in Kabul), a rival of the leader of Wahdat’s main wing Abdul Karim Khalili (now a Vice President). Under this deal, Akbari’s fighters guaranteed that Bamian remained calm and accepted a presence of Kandahari Taleban in the town.

In the meantime, the Taleban have – at least officially – moderated their position vis-à-vis the Shia community. Mulla Omar has declared repeatedly that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in Kabul.

In addition to supporting the Taliban presence in Hazara areas, Akbari was also a supporter of Karzai's rape law, claiming it actually protected women's rights. While the Hazara have historically fought the Taliban, Akbari has shown time and again he is willing to compromise with whoever is in power. When the Northern Alliance was winning, Akbari supported them. Until the Taliban came, when he supported them. And now it's Karzai's Pashtun coalition with the Taliban, so Akbari is willing to take oppressive Shi'a laws in exchange for expansion of Taliban control.

In a separate interview, Ruttig explains further the dynamic between the Taliban and former enemies in the Northern Alliance [emphasis mine]:

The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law.[...]

[Former head of National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh's] resignation might have to do with all this. Politically, he belongs to the current which emerged from the former mujahedin Northern Alliance (NA). This current -- represented by Karzai's 2009 main rival at the elections, Dr. Abdullah -- sees Karzai's reconciliation approach with skepticism. It technically boycotted the peace jirga. (It did not use that word, though.) On one hand, this skepticism reflects concerns broader political and social circles share, like the organized women. On the other hand, the NA had not been known for a tendency toward power sharing and fears losing further influence if the Taliban joined a future government. Finally, if Thursday's Guardian is right, Saleh also saw Karzai moving closer to Pakistan. The relations between the NA and Pakistan have "traditionally" been strained.

Karzai seems to be marginalizing, if not outright rejecting from the political process, members of the Northern Alliance, usually in favor of those willing to side with the Taliban. He isn't so much joining the Taliban in the sense of being subservient to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, but rather in the sense of forming a power-sharing government. The Taliban will still control large amounts of Afghanistan, and we even see them moving back into areas they haven't held since the war with the NA during the 90's. And they may be willing to negotiate as "brothers" with Karzai.

Why would the Taliban share power with Karzai? More Ruttig [emphasis mine]:

We should not believe our anti-terrorism psy-ops and understand that the Taliban are a political movement with political aims. Such a movement will compromise when serious talks are held. Some Taliban know that they cannot rule Afghanistan on their own. We heard this discussion amongst Taliban in 2008 and 2009, but the surge closed their ranks again.

The Taliban will maintain Karzai's government in Kabul to  so they can effectively rule Afghanistan. After all, Mullah Omar is unlikely to have much success as President. Instead, the militants will need Karzai for stuff like this [emphasis mine]:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Friday he was concerned about a looming battle over his country's untapped mineral resources and that Afghanistan's major donors should be prioritised in exploiting them. [...]

"I hope we will be able to manage it properly both in terms of rivalry from the international bidders in Afghanistan and also within Afghanistan, we should be able to manage the returns of those mineral extractions properly for Afghanistan," he said in a seminar hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though maybe not American investors), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan's resources as well as to manage the funds properly "within Afghanistan", which of course means pay-off for the Taliban who legitimise Karzai's presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country's resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a coalition government, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

But what about that other piece of Afghanistan's post-war tyranny, that of being a puppet for Pakistan's war against India? For the same reasons as the Taliban, Pakistan's military dictatorship also appreciates the benefits of a Taliban-Karzai coalition government:

"Morally, Afghanistan should give access as a priority to those countries that have helped Afghanistan massively in the past few years," he said, adding that Japan, the second biggest donor to Afghanistan in terms of money pledged, would be a welcome investment partner.

In addition to providing a training ground for terrorism against India, Afghanistan is also useful for undermining India's economy and trade partners. Japan is indeed the second largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, but the largest in the region is... New Delhi:

India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.

India's contribution has been large, but when weighed against other international donors, like Japan's billions, they fall much farther down the list of "prioritised" trading partners. Not only does Japan push India down the line, which is really not that serious considering India has mines of its own, but it also affects India's bottom line in other ways [emphasis mine]:

Traditionally, Japan has been the second largest destination of Indian exports (major exports include gems, marine products, iron ore, and cotton yarn). India is also a major importer of goods from Japan, and its importance has been growing in recent years (major imports include machinery, plant-related products, transport equipment, and electronic machinery).

Japan will need to import less from India thanks to its opportunity in Afghanistan. Obviously that's good for Pakistan, as it forces India into some uncomfortable economic positions, only one tiny example of how Afghanistan can be used against Indian interests. The Karzai-Taliban government would be compliant with Pakistan across the board, with the Taliban providing foot soldiers for Pakistan's "strategic depth" against India, and Hamid Karzai would be able to counter Indian influence in Kabul, whether that means obscure complications like new trade competition with Indian ore exporters or overtly downplaying India's role in post-war Afghanistan.

That is what will become of Afghanistan when then US withdrawal is over: a Taliban-Karzai coalition government, and a client state for Pakistan.

It's worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan's military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

If the US has any interest in seeing a different outcome for Afghanistan, troops, special forces, or any kind of war are simply not an option. Rather Afghanistan's post-war tyranny can be undermined through other ways, such as developing Afghanistan (everything from roads to education to a free press) to the point where extremist ideologies, as well as the endemic corruption and oppression, like those of Karzai and the Taliban, will no longer be tolerated or sustainable. The US can also push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, allowing a credible test of legitimacy for Afghanistan's government, to allow for more ethical international trade activities. And the US can engage directly with the civilian government of Pakistan, allowing peaceful Pakistani citizens to set and implement their own foreign policy, rather than have it controlled by the unaccountable warmongers under the head of the military, General Kiyani.

As domestic pressure finally chokes off support for the war in Washington, it's helpful to keep a close eye on these machinations by Karzai and the Taliban. Supporters of the war in the US will make claims about an impending bloodbath, but clearly Karzai's regime will survive our absence. War supporters will also claim that these problems which were created by our war can only be fixed by...more war. It's simply not true.

Post-war Afghanistan will be a miserable place indeed, but just as in 2009, 2007, 2001, and 1979, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the answer. The US occupation which feeds Afghanistan's misery must be brought to an end, and only then can we set about the process of developing the country, eradicating extremism, and making peace for the region as a whole.

Afghanistan: What Happens When Our Allies "Do More"? (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

If you've been following the recent military operations in Helmand and Kandahar, you've likely noticed that it's been something of an unmitigated disaster. And not just a disaster in the sense that most of our military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been disasters, this is the make-or-break moment for the US counterinsurgency strategy. My colleague Derrick Crowe writes:

No reporter should let Secretary Gates, General McChrystal, or President Obama off the hook in the coming months regarding the make-or-break nature of the Kandahar operation for their (poorly) chosen COIN strategy in Afghanistan. As described in the report to Congress, Kandahar/Helmand is the main effort, and everything else is either a “shaping,” “supporting,” or “economy of force (read: leftovers)” operation. Kandahar/Helmand is the COIN strategy. If ISAF fails there, it fails, period.

Fail there, fail everywhere. Couldn't be any more clear than that. And that's not his characterization, he's citing the people in charge. Derrick then offers some advice:

Members of Congress considering funding the ongoing Kandahar/Helmand/escalation strategy should read these comments from Secretary Gates with alarm. He’s hedging and trying to set expectations because he knows the COIN effort is in serious, “bleeding ulcer” trouble. Congress should save us all a whole lot of trouble and vote against the $33 billion war spending supplemental under consideration.

Right, when you pressure your representative to block the funding, they need to be made fully aware that our strategy is broken and ruinous. But the problem is that it won't be that easy. Politicians can be very slippery, even the ones we like, and they'll try to shift the blame on to someone else. "No, it's not the strategy," they'll say, "it's our allies. Our allies need to do more."

The folks on Capitol Hill are big believers in Counterinsurgency doctrine, and as we've seen, COIN is not a doctrine, but an ideology that can never be proven or dis-proven. Communism isn't the problem, it's "human nature" that fails. Conservatism can't fail, only you can fail to be conservative. And our COIN strategy can't fail, it has to be the fault of our allies.

But that's wrong. Our allies have been doing more, a lot more. NATO,  Afghan President Karzai, and Pakistan have all been participating in President Obama's escalation strategy, and that is only making the problem worse. If we see what it is our allies are actually doing, we'll find that the COIN defenders are wrong. Our counterinsurgency strategy, the idea that occupation and war have anything remotely to do with stabilizing and developing a nation, is the problem. The US will try to shift the blame onto our allies, but as we'll see, Derrick is right: it's our war that is the problem.

We'll start with our friends in NATO, Canada. We've talked about the new Canadian strategy before, but their "signature project" is especially important to note. They're working on a huge water distribution system in Kandahar province, and if completed, could provide a sustainable development for Afghans to maintain and operate on their own without Western assistance, that supposedly being the overarching goal of our mission in Afghanistan. However, the project has hit a bit of snag [emphasis mine]:

The $50-million Dahla Dam irrigation project, touted as Canada’s best chance for a lasting legacy in Afghanistan, has all but stalled as its lead contractor, a partnership involving the Canadian engineering giant SNC Lavalin, battles for control against a sometimes violent Afghan security firm widely believed to be loyal to Afghanistan’s ruling Karzai family, insiders close to the project say.[...]

Foremost among the setbacks, insiders say, was a dramatic confrontation on Feb. 20, when rising tensions between Canadian security officials hired to oversee the project and members of Watan Risk Management, a group of Afghan mercenaries with close ties to the Karzai family, culminated in a “Mexican standoff” — the guns hired to protect the project actually turned on each other in a hair-trigger confrontation.[...]

“Ever since, the project has been basically held hostage by the Karzai mafia, who are using ‘security concerns’ to stall the work. They are able to put fear in the heart of the Canadian contractors, telling them ‘There is evil outside the gates that will eat you.’ The longer they delay, the more money the Afghan security teams make. The Canadians have good intentions but that is the reality.”

Oops, it looks like the Canadians tried to do more and accidentally bumped into another one of our allies, President Karzai. He's got militia in Kandahar busily working on another part of our COIN strategy, extending the control of the central Kabul government, the "Host Nation" as it's called.

Only Karzai is a criminal with no legitimacy, so he has to extend central government control the only way you can expand an illegitimate, criminal enterprise: violence, intimidation, coercion, all are in play here. Karzai is also desperately dependent on western welfare, so if he expects to remain in power, he'll need to drag out western development projects as long as he possibly can. If "security concerns" will delay a project, then you make your own if you have to. Our strategy requires him to expand his mafia empire; what else is he supposed to do?

And what about the Pakistani military? Our politicians are constantly whining for them to do more for our awful strategy. Well, they are doing more. Here's what that looks like:

"I lost my sense when I reached the door of my house and saw and heard the crying of my close neighbors and relatives--as if hell fell on me. When I saw people putting the dead bodies of my children, parents, and other relatives in bed I couldn't bear it anymore and fell on the ground..."

- A 25-year-old man who lost nine family members when two shells fired by security forces hit his house during the battle of Loi Sam (FATA).

Nice job "protecting the civilian population" there by the Pakistani army --- those innocent women and children will never again be threatened by the Taliban. And the army's "doing more" has the same results as the US "population-centric" strategy of killing civilians by the houseful across the border in Afghanistan. The military assaults legitimize the insurgency and turn the population against the government. That works out great for the other part of our strategy, showering Pakistan's military dictatorship with money and weapons.

Pakistan's army supports the Taliban as "strategic depth" in its war with India. As long as the Taliban are empowered by US and Pakistani military assaults, they survive to be used against India in proxy wars spanning Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and really most of the sub-continent. And as long as those extremist militants are there to threaten, the US has an excuse to give Pakistan...tada! Money and weapons to use in military assaults in the tribal regions. See how this works? Our allies in the Pakistani military are working our COIN strategy with everything they've got, and it's going great for them. Want Pakistan to do more? Gladly.

Our allies are working hard. Canada, one of our last friends in NATO, took our notion of development seriously and are replacing their military with aid projects. But Karzai is also working hard to extend the authority of the host nation, and that requires him to derail development in favor if violence, insecurity, and criminality. Pakistan's army is also working hard to clear its tribal area sanctuaries, so the Taliban can be safe elsewhere to engage in proxy war with India, and that includes in Afghanistan. And then we're back at the beginning, with the US then escalating its occupation to fight the Taliban.

The problem is not NATO, Karzai, or Pakistan. They're doing exactly what they're supposed to do. You might reason that Karzai and Pakistan's military despots aren't good choices for allies, but that misses the point. They are the strategy. And that strategy is the problem, not action or lack of action from our allies.

You're going to see this meme more and more in the coming weeks and months. As we see from Derrick's reporting, the military is well aware that it's failing big time in Afghanistan. So rather than admitting our COIN strategy is a flaming wreck, look for the blame to fall on our allies. Folks who talk about the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan will be elevated, so look forward to [re-]learning old factoids such as that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence  helped create the Taliban and so forth. The White House will continue to pretend to be outraged and confused with Karzai, even though they know full well he's corrupt and illegitimate. And of course, the US will continue to gripe that NATO allies won't send more troops, even though it's the non-military development projects that work.

Don't fall for it. You can demand that Congress block any more funding for the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cut off the COIN strategy at its source, the money. You can demand that congress abandon Karzai and push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, so that the central government has legitimacy. You can demand that the US engage with and empower the elected civilian government of Pakistan, rather than  its military despots like General Kiyani. And you can demand they support non-military projects like our allies, Canada. Don't let them get away with pushing the blame off.

The problem lies squarely with the US war.

Pakistan Analysis: Preparing the American Invasion (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Gareth Porter has an interesting article detailing the CIA's misgivings about the drone program in Pakistan. He reports [emphasis mine]:

"Some of the CIA operators are concerned that, because of its blowback effect, it is doing more harm than good," said Jeffrey Addicott, former legal adviser to U.S. Special Forces and director of the Centre for Terrorism Law at St Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas, in an interview with IPS. [...]

Because the drone strikes kill innocent civilians and bystanders along with leaders from far away, they "infuriate the Muslim male", said Addicott, thus making them more willing to join the movement. The men in Pakistan's tribal region "view Americans as cowards and weasels", he added. [...]


The complaints by CIA operatives about the drone strikes' blowback effect reported by Addicott are identical to warnings by military and intelligence officials reported in April 2009 by Jonathan Landay of McClatchy newspapers. Landay quoted an intelligence official with deep involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as saying al Qaeda and the Taliban had used the strikes in propaganda to "portray Americans as cowards who are afraid to face their enemies and risk death".

It's easy to see this as only the 10,000th reason why the drone strikes are a terrible idea, but the CIA's complaints here could  hint at something even more dangerous. The "blowback" is that Taliban and Al-Qa'eda recruit heavily from propaganda about American cowardice.

The CIA is not questioning fundamental assumptions about the War on Terror, like whether or not extra-judicial executions of suspected criminals is actually a real solution, rather than an escalation of senseless political violence. No, let's be very clear about what the CIA complaint is: we're far away, and that's bad. There's more:

"The people at the top are not believers," said Addicott, referring to the CIA. "They know that the objective is not going to be achieved."

That objective is to destroy the leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda.  But the American officials believe they can't do that with drone strikes, or at least drone strikes alone. The drone strikes are politically unpopular, and even some serious counter-insurgency bloggers criticize the program bitterly. Basically, they're looking for an excuse to do something more than drone strikes in Pakistan. President Obama may have found that excuse:

The U.S. military is reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan in the event that a successful attack on American soil is traced to the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials.[...]

The U.S. options for potential retaliatory action rely mainly on air and missile strikes, but could also employ small teams of U.S. Special Operations troops already positioned along the border with Afghanistan.[...]

In other words, if there is another incident like the car bomb in Times Square, America could send troops into Pakistan. Beyond these new plans, the military already has the authorization to deploy American soldiers [emphasis mine]:

The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate. [...]

Its goals are to build networks that could “penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy” Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to “prepare the environment” for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. [...]

In broadening its secret activities, the United States military has also sought in recent years to break its dependence on the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies for information in countries without a significant American troop presence. [...]

Looks like the military agrees with the CIA that the agency's drone strikes can't do the job. They want American military forces on the ground.

For their part, Pakistan doesn't want any American troops on the ground in those tribal areas. Or do they? The Pakistani military supports the Taliban as part of its national security strategy, so even when they attack Taliban areas, they usually only succeed at displacing huge numbers of civilians while the Taliban flees, which creates enormous popular backlash. The military declares victory, pulls out, and the Taliban returns safely. Take the most recent army incursion into Orakzai district:

A statement issued by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that the Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s visit to Orakzai marked the end of the military operation in the region, and that people displaced due to the war could expect to return to their homeland soon.[...]

However, locals said that the battle is far from over, as extremists are still holding a large part of the agency.

“The military has cleared only Lower Orakzai, while the situation in upper and central Orakzai has not changed much, as the army is yet to evict the Taliban from these areas. The battle is far from over,” The Daily Times quoted local residents of Lower Orakzai, as saying.

“In Upper Orakzai, security forces took control of Daburi, while Mamozai, Ghaljo and Shahoo areas are still in Taliban control,” they added.

General Kiani, the head of the Pakistani military, gets to have it both ways. The Taliban are safe, while he still declares victory over the terrorists. This Dawn editorial explains:

Therein lies a great difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome: moving from the ‘clear’ phase of counter-insurgency to the ‘hold’ stage, so that the ground can be laid for the ‘build’ and ‘transfer’ stages. From Bajaur to Mohmand and Bara to FR Peshawar, the phenomenon has repeated itself: operations by security forces to clear out an area are deemed a ‘success’ only to see militants sneak back in the weeks and months that follow. Sometimes forces are withdrawn from one area to focus on another trouble spot, leaving a vacuum in the first area which is soon filled by militants, as has happened in FR Peshawar after security forces were sent from there to deal with militants in Kala Dhaka, Mansehra.

What also makes the claim about success in Orakzai doubtful is geography. The Khyber-Orakzai-Kurram border areas have long been centres of militancy. If Orakzai is clear, then by that logic the Tirah area in Khyber and the east of Kurram should be clear too. However, the evidence suggests otherwise.

Is it really a difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome? Or is it going exactly according to plan? Are they not clearing at all, but rather "herding" the militants to safety?

The editorial is right that geography is important here. Many of the militants in Orakzai have fled from recent operations in Waziristan. Now they are fleeing from one part of Orakzai to another, farther away from the northern tribal areas. The Pakistani army is, apparently, pushing the militants away from the tribal areas and towards Balochistan, where the Taliban's Quetta Shura is based. The result is that even if the US invades the tribal areas, it still won't damage the military assets of the Taliban.

We see more preparations by the army in Balochistan:

[Baloch Human Rights Council] has learnt through local sources and press statements of Baloch National Movement (BNM) central leadership that within the last couple of days there has been a significant movement of Pakistani troops in the area of district Gwadar and Dasht. A heavy contingent of military including 80 trucks carrying soldiers, 40 armoured vehicles, artillery, 8 gunship helicopters, and 20 water supplying tankers are reportedly part of the first wave of troop deployment in the region. There is news of more troops on the way to join the military operation.

And this isn't some half-assed "Taliban-clearing" operation, this is for real:

Reports coming in from the area stated that the soldiers have complete control of the meager water resources and have blocked all access to the local population. The livestock has been confiscated in the service of the soldiers and a large number was slaughtered to starve the inhabitants. Sources mentioned that people are not allowed to leave their homes even in case of a medical emergency.

There have been reported incidents of artillery fire directed at the civilian residential areas while gunship helicopters hovered over the towns. According to witnesses, incidents of aerial bombardment of villages have taken place and the fear of casualties is growing, complicated by the military blockade and denial of access to media and medical personnel. An unconfirmed number of youth has been taken away by the soldiers and their whereabouts are yet unknown.

Here's the catch: unlike the relatively autonomous Pakistanis in the tribal regions, the Pakistanis in Balochistan are so beat down and oppressed by the army that they would welcome a NATO presence (who they believe, foolishly, would help them fight for independence). But as we noted, the Taliban's all-important Quetta Shura is in Balochistan, so the Pakistani military can't have any American troops that close to a key military asset. So they instead "clear" Balochistan of "Islamic terrorists" (democratic Baloch dissidents, not Taliban) and remove it from American calculations.

What is the end result? The Pakistani military has effectively fortified the Quetta Shura, while paving the way for American invasion of North and South Waziristan, Pakhtunkhwa, etc. And just like Kiani, everyone gets to declare a fake victory. President Obama gets to look tough by cracking down on attacks from the tribal area, the Pakistanis can throw a fit and claim they already "cleared" those areas, we downplay the harm of the drone strikes (we're not cowards anymore), Kayani protects his state-sponsored terrorism program (the Taliban), the army has an excuse to viciously crush Baloch separatists, and even Al-Qa'eda itself will be rewarded with another propaganda victory, that of more American "crusaders" on Pashtun soil.

Who doesn't get to declare victory? Everybody else. American troop deaths will continue to skyrocket, American taxpayers will continue to pay for it as their economy crumbles, Pakistani civilians will be massacred by all sides, Pakistani democracy will continue to suffocate under military despotism, and the Taliban will still threaten the national security of countless nations, most notoriously nuclear-armed India.

For those keeping count, that's three simultaneous US wars; Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Shall we go for Iran and make it an even four? North Korea sure is getting uppity.

I feel stupid now for questioning Tom Hayden's claims about the so-called Long War. Even as withdrawal from Iraq becomes conventional wisdom, and we continue to force Congress to end the war in Afghanistan, it's still not over. 104 months into the outrageous War on Terror, it appears we're just getting started.

Join us on Rethink Afghanistan’s Facebook page and collaborate with the tens of thousands of others around the country working to bring these wars to an end.

Afghanistan Analysis: Assessing the National Consultative Peace Jirga (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan. The views expressed below are my own.

You better bite down on something, because here comes some NATO propaganda:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFiX9WsWGew[/youtube]

That wasn't so bad, was it? Very short, and they devote a fairly large chunk of time to criticism of the whole affair. It's a little pedestrian for anyone with extensive knowledge of the region, but the explanation for the jirga is accessible.


However, since the jirga has just gotten under way, it's far too early to draw any substantive conclusions about the criticism or the praise of the jirga. Even if they aren't making decisions and only building a broad consensus, it's going to take a while.

However, it's not too early to engage in that most reptilian form of analysis, gauging the "optics" of the event. How does it look? How does it register in your gut? And if we swirl our hands over the newsprint, what secrets of the future can we mystically divine?

Not much, really. Most conclusions we come to about the optics of the meeting will be rendered meaningless soon enough when the jirga wraps up and the consequences to reality begin to take shape. But just as we can live through a little NATO propaganda to learn about the jirga, we'll lower ourselves to the level of gut reactions.

Thomas Ruttig blogs his gut reaction on AAN:

The Peace Jirga that began today in Kabul, will fail its declared main aim: to establish a real national consensus on talks with the Taleban. In order to be able to, too many relevant political forces are absent - and those who attend are massively monitored and manipulated. The jirga does not bring an end – or at least a reduction - of violence closer.

Those are tough words, but again nothing has actually happened yet. Ruttig does raise some important questions, however, about exactly who and what is represented at the jirga. He explains further:

On the surface, the jirga with its 1,600 delegates bears all insignia of Afghan tribal ‘democracy’ which, although, is male-dominated. (The women were only able to push through their 20 per cent attendance quota after Western diplomats intervened – another example of ‘foreign interference’, so often blasted by Karzai.) Bearded and turbaned men from all corners of the country provide a blaze of colour that is supposed to create the impression of plurality that does not exist in reality. The delegates are rather handpicked. The main opposition party is absent and also some women rights activists boycott the jirga which they consider part of a Karzai legitimisation machine. They fear that burning issues like ‚justice’, i.e dealing with the civil war crimes, and human rights might be sacrificed for a deal with the Taleban. This shows: if a pseudo-consensus is pushed through, only new conflicts will emerge.

The intervention of Western diplomats is very important here. It wasn't 100,000 troops that got a solid victory for women's rights, it was tough negotiations. The US didn't gain anything at the barrel of a gun, and the West didn't actually do anything for the Afghans. A tiny bit of Western engagement simply made room for the Afghan women to make positive gains on their own.

After all, the Western-backed 20 percent quota pales in comparison to the benefit of actually having those voices contribute to the jirga. It should also be pointed out that the US Congress is about 20 percent women, and I don't think anyone would say they're somehow impotent or ineffectual because of their relatively small numbers. I'm less pessimistic than Ruttig when it comes to the role women will play in the jirga.

I'm also less pessimistic about the absence of the Taliban. For all its faults, this jirga could be construed as an arguably sincere effort by Karzai to reach a peaceful settlement. With the Taliban absent, and worse, attacking the meeting with suicide bombers that Mathew Hoh calls "counter-productive as they distance the [Taliban] from the Afghan people," it appears that it is Karzai who is sincere while the Taliban is only interested in war. In years past, the Taliban have at various times come to the table for talks, only to be greeted by US and/or Pakistani air strikes and arrests. Karzai appeared duplicitous, and the Taliban got the moral high ground. Now the perception is reversed, Karzai is sincere and the Taliban look malicious.

Karzai said in his speech to the jirga, "My dear Taliban, you are welcome in your own soil. Do not hurt this country, and don't destroy or kill yourselves." The Taliban looks bad, and this is all about optics. It's possible pressure from the population over these shameless attacks can bring them to the table once again, if this perception holds sway.

But what about the opposition members and activists boycotting the jirga? That can't be good, right? Well, it's not good that they have to boycott, but a boycott is still political engagement. They want rule of law, not informal consensus-building jirgas. They want accountability for civil war atrocities, past and present, and they're not willing to sacrifice those things for a simple handshake peace with the Taliban and other murderous warlords. Even though the opposition's boycott harms the jirga's legitimacy, it does raise awareness of the issue and is far better than them remaining silent.

Activist engagement may harm this specific meeting, but it shows a political vibrancy that defies the media portrayal of Afghans as helpless and unable to stand on their own. Take a look at this description of Afghan politicians running in the upcoming parliamentary elections:

“The way into parliament this time is going to be by money, having a powerful patron or armed men to issue threats. Which of those routes are these guys taking or are they hoping their fame will win them votes?” [...] “Once catapulted into parliament, they think they’ll get lots of bribes - for example, when it’s time to approve or reject the cabinet. They’re after the money.”

Sound familiar? It's eerily similar to the US government, with its system of plutocratic lobbyists and shady, backroom dealings. It's difficult to argue that President Obama taking huge contributions from Goldman Sachs and then stacking his cabinet with its employees is any different from Karzai taking bribes from powerful drug dealers (Big Poppy?) and then filling his cabinet with his closest accomplices.

Democracy is hard. Accountability is hard. It requires fierce pressure from the citizens to achieve properly, and just as Americans seek to counter the machinations of the banking lobby, Afghans must fight for accountability to counter the forces of lawlessness and corruption in their country. I agree with Ruttig that the opposition boycott looks bad for the jirga, but I also see it as a positive sign that the grassroots democracy movement in Afghanistan is alive and well.

Most telling for US policy are the Afghan activists' demands. They want accountability for crimes committed in the civil war, a civil war in which the US is most obviously taking a side. The intense military presence only exacerbates that civil war, and empowers both the corruption of Karzai and the violent rebellion of the Taliban. If the US sees Afghanistan as important to its national interests or desires any sort of positive outcome in governance, development, or human rights, and as always that is up for domestic debate, then it can achieve those outcomes without the use of the military.

A little Western pressure opens the door to the national jirga for Afghan women. Supporting a free press and fair elections can improve governance and accountability. In contrast, Obama's policy of escalating the occupation runs completely counter to those goals, as does the US refusal to deal with the civilian government of Pakistan. The effect there is the same, with more war, more terrorism, and more despotism.

So we can learn something just from the appearances of the peace jirga, indeed we may even see signs to be optimistic about the process. But, once again, the jirga hasn't actually done anything yet, so it's not really possible to come to any firm conclusions on whether it will turn out positively or negatively. What if the Afghan women in attendance are shunned and ignored by the jirga? What if the Taliban remains defiant, and continues to attack instead of negotiate? What if those activists seeking rule of law fail miserably, and Afghanistan remains a narco-state torn by civil war? Our perception, the optics of the jirga, could change dramatically once the real consequences set in. Some optimism is not out of line, but we'll see.

In the meantime, join us on Rethink Afghanistan’s Facebook page and collaborate with the tens of thousands of others around the country working to bring this war to an end.