Turkey Inside Line: Israel's Unmanned Planes, Iran's Uranium, Trouble with the EU, and More

Turkish-Made Drones to Take Over from Israeli Herons?: Turkish sources stated that the design, detail production, and assembly of the Turkish MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle have been completed and first test flights will be carried out done in the second half of 2010.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRQtM6xzRDI[/youtube]

Turkey Video Special: Prime Minister Erdogan’s 50 Minutes on US Television (29 June)

Director-General Muharrem Dortkasli said, "We can sell this vehicle for use by many friends and allies. That is our project."

Turkey's Call for Implementation of Iran's Nuclear Swap Deal: Turkey has called on Iran and Western powers to implement the nuclear fuel swap agreement, starting talks as soon as possible.

On Monday, responding to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s remarks that Iran would not join discussions until late August, Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Burak Özügergin said:

If they do not sit down and talk, we will be in a worse-off situation this time next year. Time is working against a solution.

We would like this swap deal to be implemented and for negotiations to be held to resolve outstanding issues to secure a peaceful settlement to the dispute over Tehran's nuclear program.

Visa Requirements Lifted with Indonesia: On Tuesday, following a meeting between Turkish President Abdullah Gül and Indonesian President Susilo Bambangu Yudhoyono, agreement was reached to lift mutual visa requirements.

The approach on visas has been a major foreign policy strategy for the Erdogan Government. Requirements have been lifted with Syria, Pakistan, Albania, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Russia, Iran, and other countries.

Turkey and Indonesia also signed eight agreements including cooperation between defense industries, cultural exchange programmes, and sea transportation . The two presidents agreed to increase the trade volume from the current $1.5 billion to $10 billion in the medium-term.

Turkey-EU Relations: Diplomatic sources expect the next chapter of European Union negotiations, focusing on food safety, veterinary safety, and phytosanitation, to be opened at an intergovernmental conference in Brussels on Wednesday.

There are 35 chapters that Turkey needs to fulfill to attain EU membership. Twelve have been opened, but 18 of the other 23 have been blocked, including eight relating to Ankara'ss failure to open its borders to EU member Cyprus.

Turkish Foreign Minister Spokesman Burak Özügergin said:

We expect consistency from the EU. You don’t open negotiation chapters but then say, [The] axis is shifted." The EU should be coherent.

There are 18 chapters which are blocked and we expect Belgium's rotating EU presidency to remove defects caused by the EU in the following period. The EU should consider where it wants to go with Turkey. Turkey recognizes EU membership as a strategic target.

Turkey-Russia Competition: Following the G20 summit in Toronto over the weekend, Turkey and Russia have opened a competition to host the bloc’s 2013 meeting.

Arkady Dvorkovich, a consultant to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, said :

As all we know, the next summit in 2011 will be held in South Korea. The 2012 summit will be held in Mexico. Russia wants to host the 2013 gathering. On Sunday, the Russian government made its application. We know that Turkey has also already applied.

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Supporter's of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency policy are heart-broken over his firing.  Very few COINdinistas took the position that McChrystal should be permitted to undermine civilian control of policy, as he did so plainly in the Rolling Stone piece; however, they put out the line, "He's our only hope", with warnings about ruining the war effort.

They also want revenge.

The target of this vengeance is quite clear: Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Take a look at these snippets from across the blogosphere:

Josh Shahryar:

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation.

Bouhammer:

So now I am waiting for that POS [piece of s***] Eikenberry to be fired along with that ineffective Holbrooke. The relationship between the military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan is a two-way street. If the Ambassador and Special Envoy don’t get along with [Afghan President] Karzai and cannot influence him or even get a meeting with him, then they need to be FIRED asap and some people need to be put into place that can be effective at their job and get along with the military leadership.

Anonymous at Danger Room:

In fact, one e-mails: “It would be a travesty if we fired McChrystal and kept Eikenberry.”

Not only is McChrystal the “only one with any sort of relationship with [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai,” says this civilian advisor to the McChrystal-led International Security Assistance Force. Eikenberry “has no plan, didn’t get COIN [counterinsurgency] when he was the commander and still doesn’t.” Plus, the advisor adds: “The Embassy hates Eik. That’s not necessarily an indictment (I’m no fan of the Embassy). But it contributes to the dysfunction and it means that half the Embassy is focused on keeping Eik in line.”

Streetwise Professor:

Eikenberry was a backstabber from day one.

See the narrative building? McChrystal was doing a good job (they've leaked red meat to give pro-McChrystal progressives some lefty cover), it was that "POS Eikenberry" and his "meddling" that are really at fault. He's a backstabber and dysfunctional. McChrystal's violation of the relationship between civilian government and the military is no longer at issue; it's practically ignored.

McChrystal and Eikenberry have been feuding for some time now, so it's no surprise he draws the most wrath from the general's dismissal. But if we actually look closer at the tension between Eikenberry and McChrystal, we see that the Eikenberry-haters are way off base. Their attacks are at best childish displays of sour grapes; at worst, they are a fundamental misunderstanding of their own strategy.

Ambassador Eikenberry is not at fault here. In fact, Eikenberry was right all along.

What is this feud between McChrystal and Eikenberry about? It's usually described very ambiguously, a disagreement over "implementation" of the strategy or something like that. But, in fact, it is a few specific actions which amount to the battle between general and ambassador over conduct of the war.

From the Washington Post:

At times their differences over strategy have been public, particularly after two of Eikenberry's cables to Washington last year were leaked to the news media. The cables warned that McChrystal's request for new troops might be counterproductive as Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner." McChrystal's staff members were particularly upset that they weren't made aware of Eikenberry's position before he sent the cables to Washington, they said in interviews.

Eikenberry has resisted some of McChrystal's wartime experiments. The ambassador refused to release funds to expand a military effort to turn villagers into armed guards. He opposed one Army brigade's plan to form an anti-Taliban alliance with a Pashtun tribe and funnel it development money. He criticized the military's proposal to buy generators and diesel fuel for the energy-starved city of Kandahar and supported a longer-term hydroelectric dam project.

In each of these cases, including the disagreement over the energy situation in Kandahar, it's clear that Eikenberry has had a better understanding of COIN strategy, the blending of civilian nation building with military combat. Eikenberry consistently prioritized governance, rule of law, and other long-term objectives over McChrystal's short-term concerns about winning battles and killing the enemy.

Stabilizing Afghanistan, not winning battles, is what counterinsurgency is supposedly all about. And yet Eikenberry is made out to be the bad guy.

Counterinsurgency requires the dual (dueling?) roles of military leader and diplomatic leader. As COINdinistas like to say, there has to be "unity of effort." Both sides have to work together. But now what we hear from them is that the McChrystal should have had free rein to do whatever he wanted while anything Eikenberry did was "meddling", some sort of illegitimate interference with the all-important war effort. Do the sellers of COIN even understand their own strategy? It's not clear that they do.

Why would Eikenberry dare question our military leaders? Why would he see Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner?" Possibly because Karzai is corrupt and sits atop an illegitimate government that functions only as an organized criminal enterprise?

Why would Eikenberry oppose arming and bribing local militias? Could it be because support from the military legitimizes these groups, even though they're outlaws that pillage Afghans just the same, if not worse, than the Taliban does, in addition to undermining the central government in Kabul?

Boy, that Eikenberry sure is a jerk for pointing all this stuff out.

When we add up all the leaked cables, the wartime experiments, the history of their involvement in the war, etc, we see the full picture of Eikenberry's trespasses against McChrystal.

The High Crimes and Treason of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry:

• Failing to decisively win the war in Afghanistan when all attention and resources were focused on Iraq


• Leaking important information about the war to the press


• Resisting "short-sighted" military domination of reconstruction/nation building efforts


• Opposing the escalation of 30,000 more US troops


• Criticizing the corruption and illegitimacy of Hamid Karzai


• Opposing a US strategic security guarantee with Karzai's illegitimate administration


• Opposing Karzai's CIA-narco-lord brother having a role in the government


• Opposing formation of militias which undermine the government


• Opposing bribes of development money which corrupt and distort rule of law, nation building, etc


• Opposing short-term energy solutions which are too expensive and cripple an already broken central government

Is it clear why everyone hates Eikenberry so much? No? I don't understand it either.

Don't take any of this the wrong way. Eikenberry is not a saint, a war hero, or even particularly effective in his conflicts with McChrystal. The point here is that Eikenberry was right. He was right to be transparent about strategic deliberations. He was right to oppose the military's faulty tactics. He was right to oppose the escalation of more troops. He was right about all of these arguments with McChrystal, and with the Obama administration itself.

Obviously there is plenty of room left to criticize Eikenberry and the State Department as a whole. Their continued association with criminal organisations like Blackwater all but negates any positive outcomes they might reach, and certainly erases any honor or integrity the institution might have. Corruption is a thriving malignancy throughout our development operations, from the contractors at the bottom to the sleazy crooks at the top.

Then, of course, there's the State Dept's participation in the first place in COIN, which is a deviant, militarist perversion of traditionally civilian-controlled policies like foreign aid, development, and nation building.

General McChrystal's downfall was his own making. Eikenberry should not be thrown in with that, least of all as part of some pathetic blame game by McChrystal supporters. What's at stake here is the war in Afghanistan, and that is clearly hopeless and unwinnable. Firing McChrystal didn't change the fact that the US has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose by continuing its war in Afghanistan, and neither will the revenge-firing of Ambassador Eikenberry. To get to the root of any of these problems, to really see solutions for countering terrorism and developing a stable Afghanistan, America's longest war has to end.

The Latest from Iran (22 June): Rumbling On

2130 GMT: The University Argument. Having started with this in the morning, I guess we should conclude this evening with the Parliament v. President fight over control of Islamic Azad University.

Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has criticised the pressure on Parliament, from demonstrations outside the Majlis to remarks in "hard-line" newspapers: "If the norms are observed in the criticism of (government) branches, it will be good and will promote the progress of that branch, but (this should) not (be done) with bad language,” Larijani told lawmakers.

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Indirectly responding to stories, including an assertion by Iran's Attorney General, that the Parliament's bill on Islamic Azad could be set aside, Larijani said that what the lawmakers chose to ratify, if endorsed by the Guardian Council, would come into force and should be respected.

1915 GMT: The Energy Squeeze. Pakistan has backed  away from a deal with Iran to construct a gas pipeline because of impending US sanctions.

Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani told a press conference, “If the U.S. imposes sanctions, they will have international implications and Pakistan as a member of the international community will follow them.”

Tehran had announced the deal earlier this month, but President Obama's special envoy for Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke urged Pakistan to be wary of proceeding.

1900 GMT: Khatami's Back. Returning from a break (and the General McChrystal fiasco in Afghanistan), I find that former President Mohammad Khatami has made another pointed intervention, starting with the recent attacks on clerics and moving to a renewed call for civil rights:

Unfortunately today insults, lies and false accusations even against those who were allies of Imam Khomeini even before he came to the scene and after the Islamic Revolution were major figures of the revolution has become common and they are being accused of various kinds of accusation without being able to defend themselves.

When in the national-TV constantly false and biased issues are being mentioned (even if they were right, insults and cursing are wrong) is a catastrophe.”

Let the legitimate freedoms mentioned in the constitution exist and people will be the judge and this will solve many of the problems.

Many of the good individuals who have been arrested or are wanted should be able to come to the scene, the groups and parties should be able to restart their legal activities, we never want to confront the system although are being accuse unjustly to all sorts of accusations and those who are accusing us are causing the most damage to the system.

1310 GMT: Meanwhile in Parliament. Amidst the university dispute, this news --- significant, I think --- has received little notice: the Majlis has approved a bill postponing municipal elections for two years.

1300 GMT: The University Conflict Escalates. Fars News is claiming that, following this morning's Basij/student protest in front of the Parliament, the Majlis' bill asserting control over Islamic Azad University will be nullified.

Radio Farda, via Peyke Iran, reports that Iran's Attorney General, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, has written to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. The message? The Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution has the final say on the issue, effectively overruling any Parliament decision.

1020 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Amnesty International has issued a call for "urgent action" over the detentions of Narges Mohammadi, the Deputy Head of the Center for Human Rights Defenders, and CHRD member and journalist Abdolreza Tajik.

Mohammadi, an associate of Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi, was arrested late on 10 June at her home in Tehran. Up to 18 June, she had been permitted to make only one phone call to relatives.

Tajik was arrested on 12 June, after being summoned to the office of the Ministry of Intelligence in Tehran. He has been held incommunicado in his third detention since June 2009. (see UA 171/09 and updates).

1005 GMT: The University Argument. Well, well, Press TV has decided to cover an event inside Iran (see 0720 GMT). The website notes:

Hundreds of Iranian students have staged a demonstration in front of the Parliament in protest at a bill passed by lawmakers regarding the Islamic Azad University.

The bill allows the University to donate its property worth $200 billion dollars for public purposes. The government says the bill violates the articles of association of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution.

The body, chaired by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, supervises the country's universities. The ongoing controversy between the government and the Azad University started after the government decided to take control of the university.

However, according to Khabar Online news service, Majlis members voted for the public endowment of the university's properties under the condition that the premises belong to the university's board of trustees.

0933 GMT: Remembering the Dead. Rah-e-Sabz profiles Moharram Chegini, "a worker killed for freedom and his vote" last June.

Meanwhile, the website worries that, as the trial of 1 civilian and 11 security forces over the Kahrizak Prison abuses concludes, the former Tehran Prosecutor General (and current Ahmadinejad advisor) Saeed Mortazavi will get away without punishment. It features the plea from the father of Mohammad Kamrani, one of those killed in the prison, that a film of the court proceedings be made public.

0930 GMT: The Warning Within. Mohsen Rezaei, former Presidential candidate and current Secretary of the Expediency Council, has warned that defaming revolutionary figures [a challenge to the opposition or a challenge to those who verbally attacked Seyed Hassan Khomeni?] brings grave consequences for the next 10 years.

0920 GMT: The Wider Parliament-President Conflict. What does this latest row mean? Here are a couple of clues. Ali Larijani, countering attacks on Parliament from outlets like Keyhan, has said that Government supporters are ruthless and "insurgent" (ghougha-salar).

From the reformist side, MP Mostafa Kavakebian asks, "Don't we have a Guardian Council in this country to cope with these people, accusing the Majlis?"

0915 GMT: But the Next Move on Universities Begins. Peyke Iran is reporting that Basij students, protesting the rejection of the President's proposal to take control of Islamic Azad University, have gathered in front of Parliament.

Rooz Online follows up on Ahmadinejad's immediate protest, cancelling a meeting with Ali Larijani, the head of Parliament, and Sadegh Larijani, the head of judiciary.

0850 GMT: Blocking Ahmadinejad's University Move. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has more on the battle between the President and the Parliament over control of Iran's Islamic Azad University.

Ahmadinejad was seeking to remove the current head of the university, which is closely linked to Hashemi Rafsanjani, and to change the members of the governing board. Mir Hussein Mousavi but was removed from the board this spring.

In a vote on Sunday, the legislators rejected the President's proposal.

0720 GMT: The Issues Within. Let's see: has Press TV, international flagship outlet of the Iranian state, noticed the political, economic, social, and religious discussions in the country? The current top 7 "Iran" stories from the Press website:

1. Iran Warns against Cargo Inspections
2. Bahrain Calls for Expanded Iran Ties
3. Larijani: Deep Mistrust in US-Iran Ties
4. "West Must Compensate for Rigi Crimes"
5. Iran "Keeps Watchful Eye on PG [Persian Gulf] Skies"
6. Iran Wants UNSC [United Nations Security Council] Held Accountable
7. IRGC Offers to Contain BP Oil Spill (see separate entry)

Answer: No.

0635 GMT: We've published two features to start the day.

There is a look at the cartoons reflecting and reflecting upon the relationship between Mir Hossein Mousavi and the Green Movement. And we've got a surprise --- it looks like oil has brought Revolutionary Guard friendship for the US.

0515 GMT: No dramatic developments on Monday but a far from quiet day, with manoeuvres and criticisms, especially within the "establishment". There was scrapping over the economy, corruption, control of the universities, the enforcement of hijab, budget discrepancies....

So what does today bring?

Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai Joining the Taliban? The Story Behind the Headline (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

The war in Afghanistan is disintegrating before our very eyes. Our counterinsurgency strategy is broken, and the Pentagon knows it. The so-called "emergency" funding requested months ago by the Obama administration now seems destined to die a slow, bureaucratic death in congress due to overwhelming pressure by citizens. Our allies in NATO have either reached their peak of military involvement, as with the UK, or have already begun to dismantle their troop presence, as with Canada and so many others. Other countries in the region are already vying for power after the US leaves, even as the Pentagon insists its July 2011 withdrawal date will only be the "beginning of a process."

But what about Afghanistan itself? What about President Hamid Karzai, our ally and head of the "Host Nation" government? The theory put forward by the pundit class is usually some variation of the "bloodbath" theme. Our allies in Kabul like Karzai will  be overrun and annihilated by the Taliban.

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This appears to be more media myth-making, however, as we see from Karzai's political manoeuvring. Not only is he threatening to join the Taliban. He may have already done just that.

Karzai has begun negotiating with the Taliban and even received formal terms of a peace treaty from Taliban-aligned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,  but this does not necessarily mean that Karzai has allied with them. Negotiations are merely the first step in any peace process, no matter the circumstances.

Instead we have to look deeper inside this peace process to see the real endgame Karzai is working toward, that of a nominal, Pashtun-nationalist government in Kabul overlaying a Taliban-dominated countryside. Together they function not only as a crime family capable of exploiting Afghanistan's resources (minerals, opium, timber, etc.) but also as a highly effective proxy for Pakistan's interminable battle against Indian influence.

What is this Pashtun-nationalist government? While Karzai was formerly part of the Northern Alliance, he is also a Pashtun, as is the vast majority of the Taliban movement. The Taliban are quite adept at playing up this identity:

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base.

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

They were able to seize power in most of Afghanistan before 2001, although the “Northern Alliance” — made up primarily of ethnic Tajiks – managed to hold out until Americans arrived and smashed the regime in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have had a harder time operating outside “Pashtunistan.”

Not any more. They're now able to expand beyond "Pashtunistan". Thomas Ruttig reports that the Taliban are beginning to move far into Northern Afghanistan, in areas traditionally quite hostile to their oppressive rule. The ethnic Hazara in this region were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the 1990's until the Americans came in 2001. The Taliban have a history of anti-Shi'a Muslim violence there, but this could be changing, as Ruttig notes [emphasis mine]:

Most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taleban’s advance into their region in the 1990s after the movement that considered Shia as non-Muslim had committed some mass murders against the minority group, for example in Mazar-e Sharif, Yakaolang (Bamian province) and at the Robatak Pass (Samangan). The Taleban conquered Bamian, the largest town in Hazarajat, late in their campaign that brought them control over more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory in that period. It was supported by an agreement with one faction of the main Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Ustad Muhammad Akbari (now an MP in Kabul), a rival of the leader of Wahdat’s main wing Abdul Karim Khalili (now a Vice President). Under this deal, Akbari’s fighters guaranteed that Bamian remained calm and accepted a presence of Kandahari Taleban in the town.

In the meantime, the Taleban have – at least officially – moderated their position vis-à-vis the Shia community. Mulla Omar has declared repeatedly that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in Kabul.

In addition to supporting the Taliban presence in Hazara areas, Akbari was also a supporter of Karzai's rape law, claiming it actually protected women's rights. While the Hazara have historically fought the Taliban, Akbari has shown time and again he is willing to compromise with whoever is in power. When the Northern Alliance was winning, Akbari supported them. Until the Taliban came, when he supported them. And now it's Karzai's Pashtun coalition with the Taliban, so Akbari is willing to take oppressive Shi'a laws in exchange for expansion of Taliban control.

In a separate interview, Ruttig explains further the dynamic between the Taliban and former enemies in the Northern Alliance [emphasis mine]:

The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law.[...]

[Former head of National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh's] resignation might have to do with all this. Politically, he belongs to the current which emerged from the former mujahedin Northern Alliance (NA). This current -- represented by Karzai's 2009 main rival at the elections, Dr. Abdullah -- sees Karzai's reconciliation approach with skepticism. It technically boycotted the peace jirga. (It did not use that word, though.) On one hand, this skepticism reflects concerns broader political and social circles share, like the organized women. On the other hand, the NA had not been known for a tendency toward power sharing and fears losing further influence if the Taliban joined a future government. Finally, if Thursday's Guardian is right, Saleh also saw Karzai moving closer to Pakistan. The relations between the NA and Pakistan have "traditionally" been strained.

Karzai seems to be marginalizing, if not outright rejecting from the political process, members of the Northern Alliance, usually in favor of those willing to side with the Taliban. He isn't so much joining the Taliban in the sense of being subservient to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, but rather in the sense of forming a power-sharing government. The Taliban will still control large amounts of Afghanistan, and we even see them moving back into areas they haven't held since the war with the NA during the 90's. And they may be willing to negotiate as "brothers" with Karzai.

Why would the Taliban share power with Karzai? More Ruttig [emphasis mine]:

We should not believe our anti-terrorism psy-ops and understand that the Taliban are a political movement with political aims. Such a movement will compromise when serious talks are held. Some Taliban know that they cannot rule Afghanistan on their own. We heard this discussion amongst Taliban in 2008 and 2009, but the surge closed their ranks again.

The Taliban will maintain Karzai's government in Kabul to  so they can effectively rule Afghanistan. After all, Mullah Omar is unlikely to have much success as President. Instead, the militants will need Karzai for stuff like this [emphasis mine]:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Friday he was concerned about a looming battle over his country's untapped mineral resources and that Afghanistan's major donors should be prioritised in exploiting them. [...]

"I hope we will be able to manage it properly both in terms of rivalry from the international bidders in Afghanistan and also within Afghanistan, we should be able to manage the returns of those mineral extractions properly for Afghanistan," he said in a seminar hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though maybe not American investors), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan's resources as well as to manage the funds properly "within Afghanistan", which of course means pay-off for the Taliban who legitimise Karzai's presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country's resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a coalition government, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

But what about that other piece of Afghanistan's post-war tyranny, that of being a puppet for Pakistan's war against India? For the same reasons as the Taliban, Pakistan's military dictatorship also appreciates the benefits of a Taliban-Karzai coalition government:

"Morally, Afghanistan should give access as a priority to those countries that have helped Afghanistan massively in the past few years," he said, adding that Japan, the second biggest donor to Afghanistan in terms of money pledged, would be a welcome investment partner.

In addition to providing a training ground for terrorism against India, Afghanistan is also useful for undermining India's economy and trade partners. Japan is indeed the second largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, but the largest in the region is... New Delhi:

India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.

India's contribution has been large, but when weighed against other international donors, like Japan's billions, they fall much farther down the list of "prioritised" trading partners. Not only does Japan push India down the line, which is really not that serious considering India has mines of its own, but it also affects India's bottom line in other ways [emphasis mine]:

Traditionally, Japan has been the second largest destination of Indian exports (major exports include gems, marine products, iron ore, and cotton yarn). India is also a major importer of goods from Japan, and its importance has been growing in recent years (major imports include machinery, plant-related products, transport equipment, and electronic machinery).

Japan will need to import less from India thanks to its opportunity in Afghanistan. Obviously that's good for Pakistan, as it forces India into some uncomfortable economic positions, only one tiny example of how Afghanistan can be used against Indian interests. The Karzai-Taliban government would be compliant with Pakistan across the board, with the Taliban providing foot soldiers for Pakistan's "strategic depth" against India, and Hamid Karzai would be able to counter Indian influence in Kabul, whether that means obscure complications like new trade competition with Indian ore exporters or overtly downplaying India's role in post-war Afghanistan.

That is what will become of Afghanistan when then US withdrawal is over: a Taliban-Karzai coalition government, and a client state for Pakistan.

It's worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan's military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

If the US has any interest in seeing a different outcome for Afghanistan, troops, special forces, or any kind of war are simply not an option. Rather Afghanistan's post-war tyranny can be undermined through other ways, such as developing Afghanistan (everything from roads to education to a free press) to the point where extremist ideologies, as well as the endemic corruption and oppression, like those of Karzai and the Taliban, will no longer be tolerated or sustainable. The US can also push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, allowing a credible test of legitimacy for Afghanistan's government, to allow for more ethical international trade activities. And the US can engage directly with the civilian government of Pakistan, allowing peaceful Pakistani citizens to set and implement their own foreign policy, rather than have it controlled by the unaccountable warmongers under the head of the military, General Kiyani.

As domestic pressure finally chokes off support for the war in Washington, it's helpful to keep a close eye on these machinations by Karzai and the Taliban. Supporters of the war in the US will make claims about an impending bloodbath, but clearly Karzai's regime will survive our absence. War supporters will also claim that these problems which were created by our war can only be fixed by...more war. It's simply not true.

Post-war Afghanistan will be a miserable place indeed, but just as in 2009, 2007, 2001, and 1979, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the answer. The US occupation which feeds Afghanistan's misery must be brought to an end, and only then can we set about the process of developing the country, eradicating extremism, and making peace for the region as a whole.

The Latest from Iran (15 June): Another Anniversary

1850 GMT: Claimed video of today's gathering at Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery, apparently at the grave of Sohrab Arabi:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gikWMCaTbzE[/youtube]

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1730 GMT: The Cemetery Protest. Reports coming in that at least eight people, six of them women, have been arrested in Beheshte-Zahra. One woman was detained as she talk to the mother of the slain protester Sohrab Arabi.

1725 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. HRANA reports that Sadra Aghassi and Naem Ahmadi of Tabriz University's Islamic Student Association were arrested on 14 June, 2010.

Allameh Tabatabei University student Koroush Jannati was arrested on 12 June by intelligence agents after reporting to the university’s security office.

1715 GMT: The Mousavi Charter. The Los Angeles Times has an interesting reading of today's declaration by Mir Hossein Mousavi of objectives and strategies for the Green Movement.

The website notes that most of Mousavi's statement points to reform within the Iranian system with statements such as....

The Green Movement reaffirms its commitment to human, moral, religious and Iranian principles and values and feels obliged to refine and reform the behaviors of the Islamic Republic of Iran....The Green Movement is in continuation of Iranian people's efforts to attain freedom and social justice and national sovereignty...These objectives had already been pursued in the Constitutional Revolution, Oil Nationalization Movement [of 1951] and the [1979] Islamic Revolution.”

However, the Times notes one passage in the PDF version of the statement, but omitted from the version on Mousavi's website Kalemeh, that points to a separation of state and religion: "Maintaining the independence of religious and clerical bodies from the regime is the only option to preserve the exalted status of religion in the Iranian society and it will be one of the main principles hitting high on the agenda of the Green Movement.

1703 GMT: Today's Demonstrations. Dissected News reports from a source (see comments below) that about 200 family members of "Detainees of 12 June" gathered in front of Evin Prison, demanding the freedom of their relatives. The gathering lasted until dark.

Activists are reporting, and opposition websites are carrying the story, that about 300 people have gathered in Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery to pay their respects to those slain in post-election clashes, including Sohrab Arabi and Ramin Ramezani. Two people who were taping the ceremony have reportedly been arrested, and security presence is high.

1700 GMT: Khordaad 88 have posted an English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Monday statement, which hailed the Iranian people's fortitude over 22 Khordaad (12 June) and condemned the weekend attacks on clerics.

We are still awaiting a full translation of Mousavi's declaration today of a "charter" for the Green Movement.

1650 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labour activist Behnam Ebrahimzadeh was arrested during Saturday's demonstrations. It is claimed that Ebrahimzadeh, beaten during his detention, suffered two broken ribs and multiple injuries.

1645 GMT: Propaganda of Day. This line, set out by Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, may be just a bit too blatant to work.

Moslehi said Tuesday that several people linked to the "terrorist" People's Mujahedin of Iran had been arrested over plans to carry out bombings on 22 Khordaad (12 June), the anniversary of the election: “Two terrorist teams of hypocrites were identified and their key members were arrested” The alleged plan was to “carry out bombings in several Tehran squares" (i.e., the squares where the regime put out security forces on Saturday to deter gatherings).

Britain, France, and Sweden were the foreigners accused of “backing” the PMOI (Britain, of course, as the "Little Satan", France for its recent anti-Iran rhetoric, but why Sweden?). And one of the suspects had been arrested “in a student dormitory” (i.e., a student dormitory like the one that security forces attacked last 14-15 June, killing several people).

1625 GMT: Attack by the Clerics. Rooz Online in English has an overview, covering many of the events we have noted in the updates, of the criticism by clerics of the treatment of Seyed Hassan Khomeini at the 4 June ceremony for his grandfather.

1315 GMT: Mousavi's Charter. The first English-language report on Mir Hossein Mousavi's charter for the Green Movement, posted this morning (see 0940 GMT), comes from Agence France Presse. The article leads with Mousavi's call for "a fair trial of those who committed the election fraud, tortured and killed protesters" and mentions his demand for an "end to the involvement of police and military forces in politics, the independence of the judiciary, and prosecution of those in plainclothes".

1240 GMT: Concluding and Pronouncing. Yet another sweeping assessment of the Green Movement, this time from Karim Sadjadpour.

Most of Sadjadpour's piece consists of recommendations such as "Go Beyond Street Protests", for example, with strikes, "Organize Abroad", and "Reach Out to 'Ali The Plumber'" --- and he does conclude with hope, "The path to democracy is both delicate and daunting, and not guaranteed. A pessimist might argue, however, that a far more daunting task will be for the Islamic Republic to indefinitely sustain a politically repressive, socially restrictive, economically floundering theocracy in the 21st century."

Still, it's the opening of the piece, issued as truth even before Saturday had concluded, that sets the tone and catches the eye: "The anniversary of Iranʼs tainted presidential elections came and went without much sign of life from the opposition Green Movement. Aside from scattered protests, activists were understandably cowed by governmental intimidation and heeded the advice of opposition elders to preserve their powder for future battles."

1115 GMT: Beyond Facebook. Amidst the current discussion on new and social media and the Green Movement, an interesting contribution by Mohammad Sadeghi, the organiser of the Mir Hossein Mousavi and Zahra Rahnavard Supporters' Networks on Facebook: "The Green Movement is crafting a new and nonviolent political discourse that holds tremendous repercussions for a region in which the vast majority of civil actors are anything but peaceful. This movement is the culmination of more than 100 years of struggle by the Iranian people to secure their basic rights and liberties. Let's use this opportunity to remind ordinary Iranians of the amazing and very real victories they have already won, and not lecture them about their inefficacy and inefficiency, which is wholly imagined and miscalculated."

0940 GMT: A Charter for the Greens. It was promised, and now it's published: Kalemeh has posted Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement of objectives and strategies for the Green Movement.

Inconveniently, I have to go to an academic meeting, so I'll hand over to readers for perusal and comment.
0935 GMT: Beyond Green Tweets. We've published an analysis by Mahmood Enayat, "Iran's Green Communications: Beyond Twitter to 'Small Media'".

0930 GMT: Remembering. Rah-e-Sabz publishes names and details of 29 people killed on 25 Khordaad (15 June) last year.

0855 GMT: The Battle Within. Khabar Online --- have we mentioned that it is the website linked to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani? --- assesses that President Ahmadinejad's televised interview on the anniversary of his "victory" will upset "even the hardliners".

There's a bit of evidence for that assertion from Kayhan, which analyses that some people have "given wrong advice" to Ahmadinejad, "incompatible with his Islamic revolutionary thoughts". Looks like the President's criticism of "morality police" for pressuring people over "bad hijab" and other transgressions is not going down that well....

On another front, Hamid Reza Fouladgar, who oversees privatisation matters in Parliament, has commented about the dispute over implementation of Majlis laws by Ahmadinejad: "After 1 week of discussions, we were met with his silence, hopefully a good sign/"

0845 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The father of student activist Mohammad Reza Jalaiepour, of the Third Way Movement, has described his son's re-arrest: those carrying out the raid "told us Ahmadinejad will stay for a third term".

0840 GMT: The Attacks on the Clerics. Writing in Rah-e-Sabz, analyst Mohammad Javad Akbarein claims that there is a circle of regime politicians and clerics, including Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, formier Minister of Intelligence Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, Mohammad Golpayegani, and Hamid Rasaie, who have been organising attacks against "opposition" marja (senior clerics) and their followers for years.

0835 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad is returning to Tehran after a visit to Assalouyeh in the Persian Gulf province of Bushehr to sign contracts to expand Phases 13, 14, 23, 22, 19 and 24 of the South Pars oil and gas fields.

The story behind Ahmadinejad's trip is that the contracts have been rewritten after the withdrawal of foreign companies, including Royal Dutch Shell and Spain's Repsol, from development. The work was re-allocated to Iranian firms, including some allegedly connected with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

0830 GMT: We've corrected an oversight by posting President Obama's official statement, emphasising human rights, on the anniversary of Iran's election.

0620 GMT: As Iran marks another anniversary --- this one of last year's mass protest against the outcome of the Presidential election --- we post an analysis considering latest developments and media coverage, "Missing the Important Story?"

Meanwhile....

Getting Around the Energy Squeeze?

Iranian state media is giving big play to the signature of a $7.5 billion "peace pipeline" deal between Iran and Pakistan for delivery of natural gas to Islamabad by 2014.

Which is fair enough, but still does not quite cope with the issue of if Tehran can maintain both its exports and imports of energy supplies over the next four years.

Shutting Down the News...And Literature

We have an update on Iran's filtering of news sites. Meanwhile, Rah-e-Sabz reports that there is widespread filtering of Persian literary blogs and the philosophical magazine Rokhdaad.

Rumour of Day

Tahavole Sabz claims that the word is being sent out to Iran's parents: come out and greet President Ahmadinejad or your kids won't be enrolled in school.