Afghanistan Special: New Report on Pakistan's Intelligence Links with Insurgents (Waldman)

There has been a lot of media furour over the last 48 hours about a new report about the relationship between Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence and the insurgents.

This morning, for example, The Guardian of London features a denial by Pakistani President Asif Zardari of the report's claim that he met with insurgents in April to assure them of his support. Surprisingly, however, almost none of the media coverage does more than cite a couple of dramatic sentences from the report, and I can only find one article that takes the reader to the study.



Based on 67 interviews, 22 of them with insurgents in Afghanistan, "The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents"  is written by Matt Waldman of Harvard University and issued by the London School of Economics' Development Studies Institute. This is the Conclusion, followed by the link to the entire report:

Afghanistan: What Happens When Our Allies “Do More”? (Mull)

The Taliban movement has a strong internal impetus and dynamic. Numerous studies have shown that there are endogenous drivers of the insurgency, and this is confirmed by the interviews. Taliban and Haqqani fighters are motivated by a range of factors, many of which relate to government predation, corruption or injustice, and the perceived aggression of foreign military forces.

Thus, despite the claims of many interviewees, the ISI (and elements of the Pakistani
military) may not actually control the Afghan insurgency, which implies power over all major dimensions of the movement and its campaign, and the ability to bring it to an end. However, as the provider of sanctuary, and very substantial financial, military and logistical support to the insurgency, the ISI appears to have strong strategic and operational influence –-- reinforced by coercion. There is thus a strong case that the ISI and elements of the military are deeply involved in the insurgent campaign, and have powerful influence over the Haqqani network.

This relationship appears to be of a different nature, or at least order of magnitude, than
suggested by most studies. However, this assessment has been shared with three experienced Afghan analysts and two senior western security officials, who concur with the principal findings.

It means that without a change in Pakistani behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for international forces and the Afghan government to make progress against the insurgency. It also means that, as one southern commander put it, ‘if the ISI doesn’t support negotiations [with the Afghan government], then they won’t succeed.’

Perhaps more significantly, it is hard to see how the international coalition can continue to treat Pakistan as an ally and ‘effective partner’. Only last December President Obama affirmed that ‘we are committed to a partnership that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect and mutual trust.’92 Since 2001 America has provided Pakistan with $11.6 billion in security-related assistance and $6 billion in economic aid. It is due to provide at least $7.5 billion dollars of aid over the next five years.

Pakistani officers are even represented on the Tripartite Joint Intelligence Operation Center situated in ISAF Headquarters in Kabul. American and other western intelligence agencies must be aware of Pakistan’s conduct. The apparent contradiction –-- backing the enemy’s backer – is perhaps a reflection of America’s preoccupation with the threat it faces from Al Qaeda and associated groups, rather than the Afghan Taliban. It may reflect a reluctance to confront an unstable, nuclear-armed country that faces a serious internal threat from Pakistani Taliban groups. It may also reflect a concern not to jeopardise Pakistani cooperation in preventing terrorist attacks against western targets;
or a fear of galvanising extremism among Pakistani immigrant communities.

Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be playing a double-game of astonishing magnitude. The conflict has led to the deaths of over 1,000 American and 700 other foreign military
personnel; thousands of Afghan soldiers, police, officials and civilians; and an unknown
number of Afghan, Pakistani and other foreign insurgents. It has already cost America nearly $300 billion, and now costs over $70 billion a year (Belasco 2009). As a Haqqani commander put it: ‘Of course Pakistan is the main cause of the problems [in Afghanistan] but America is behind Pakistan.’

The Pakistan government’s apparent duplicity – and awareness of it among the American
public and political establishment – could have enormous geo-political implications. It could jeopardise American financial support: security-related assistance is conditional on Pakistan’s cooperation on Afghanistan.97 Moreover, it could trigger punitive counter-measures by the US and its allies, or direct military action against the Afghan Taliban in Pakistani territory. However, an aggressive American response to Pakistan’s conduct is only likely to generate further instability, especially given the army’s on-going battle against Pakistani militant groups and widespread anti-American sentiment among the population. The priority must be to address the fundamental causes of Pakistan’s insecurity, in particular its latent and enduring conflict with India. This requires a regional peace process and, as Bruce Riedel has argued, American backing for moves towards a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. It should be accompanied by support for military and political reform, and a combination of incentives and disincentives to persuade Pakistan’s elite that support for Islamic militants is no longer in Pakistan’s national interests (see Fair 2009 and Fischer 2010).

Even this is no panacea for the Afghan conflict; it merely makes treatment possible. So long as the root causes remain – especially a corrupt, exclusionary, unjust government, and the perception among some Afghans of an aggressive, self-serving foreign military presence –-- then the violence will continue.

Read entire report....

Turkey Analysis: Which Way is Ankara Heading? (Yenidunya)

There seems to be a lot of fuss right now about whether Turkey is "turning its face towards the East".

The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.

This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe  nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.



Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?

That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:

"All options are on the table” is the best phrase to describe how Turkey feels about Israel’s attack on humanitarian aid flotilla carrying more than 600 activists from 32 countries... Israel will, most likely, no longer be seen as a friendly state nor an ally, but will be treated as a rogue state by Turkey.

When I say Turkey will imply that “all options are on the table,” I do not mean that Turkey will wage a war against Israel. However, more dangerously, Israel will be seen as a state against which one should protect itself and should consider any possible action because of its unlawful and rogue character.

Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:

It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors -- especially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system.

Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.

Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.

Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.

The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.

In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the  complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.

The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only  trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.

At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."

The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's  "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.

There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.

The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.

And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".

And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...

Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.

Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.

Afghanistan: What Happens When Our Allies "Do More"? (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

If you've been following the recent military operations in Helmand and Kandahar, you've likely noticed that it's been something of an unmitigated disaster. And not just a disaster in the sense that most of our military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been disasters, this is the make-or-break moment for the US counterinsurgency strategy. My colleague Derrick Crowe writes:

No reporter should let Secretary Gates, General McChrystal, or President Obama off the hook in the coming months regarding the make-or-break nature of the Kandahar operation for their (poorly) chosen COIN strategy in Afghanistan. As described in the report to Congress, Kandahar/Helmand is the main effort, and everything else is either a “shaping,” “supporting,” or “economy of force (read: leftovers)” operation. Kandahar/Helmand is the COIN strategy. If ISAF fails there, it fails, period.

Fail there, fail everywhere. Couldn't be any more clear than that. And that's not his characterization, he's citing the people in charge. Derrick then offers some advice:

Members of Congress considering funding the ongoing Kandahar/Helmand/escalation strategy should read these comments from Secretary Gates with alarm. He’s hedging and trying to set expectations because he knows the COIN effort is in serious, “bleeding ulcer” trouble. Congress should save us all a whole lot of trouble and vote against the $33 billion war spending supplemental under consideration.

Right, when you pressure your representative to block the funding, they need to be made fully aware that our strategy is broken and ruinous. But the problem is that it won't be that easy. Politicians can be very slippery, even the ones we like, and they'll try to shift the blame on to someone else. "No, it's not the strategy," they'll say, "it's our allies. Our allies need to do more."

The folks on Capitol Hill are big believers in Counterinsurgency doctrine, and as we've seen, COIN is not a doctrine, but an ideology that can never be proven or dis-proven. Communism isn't the problem, it's "human nature" that fails. Conservatism can't fail, only you can fail to be conservative. And our COIN strategy can't fail, it has to be the fault of our allies.

But that's wrong. Our allies have been doing more, a lot more. NATO,  Afghan President Karzai, and Pakistan have all been participating in President Obama's escalation strategy, and that is only making the problem worse. If we see what it is our allies are actually doing, we'll find that the COIN defenders are wrong. Our counterinsurgency strategy, the idea that occupation and war have anything remotely to do with stabilizing and developing a nation, is the problem. The US will try to shift the blame onto our allies, but as we'll see, Derrick is right: it's our war that is the problem.

We'll start with our friends in NATO, Canada. We've talked about the new Canadian strategy before, but their "signature project" is especially important to note. They're working on a huge water distribution system in Kandahar province, and if completed, could provide a sustainable development for Afghans to maintain and operate on their own without Western assistance, that supposedly being the overarching goal of our mission in Afghanistan. However, the project has hit a bit of snag [emphasis mine]:

The $50-million Dahla Dam irrigation project, touted as Canada’s best chance for a lasting legacy in Afghanistan, has all but stalled as its lead contractor, a partnership involving the Canadian engineering giant SNC Lavalin, battles for control against a sometimes violent Afghan security firm widely believed to be loyal to Afghanistan’s ruling Karzai family, insiders close to the project say.[...]

Foremost among the setbacks, insiders say, was a dramatic confrontation on Feb. 20, when rising tensions between Canadian security officials hired to oversee the project and members of Watan Risk Management, a group of Afghan mercenaries with close ties to the Karzai family, culminated in a “Mexican standoff” — the guns hired to protect the project actually turned on each other in a hair-trigger confrontation.[...]

“Ever since, the project has been basically held hostage by the Karzai mafia, who are using ‘security concerns’ to stall the work. They are able to put fear in the heart of the Canadian contractors, telling them ‘There is evil outside the gates that will eat you.’ The longer they delay, the more money the Afghan security teams make. The Canadians have good intentions but that is the reality.”

Oops, it looks like the Canadians tried to do more and accidentally bumped into another one of our allies, President Karzai. He's got militia in Kandahar busily working on another part of our COIN strategy, extending the control of the central Kabul government, the "Host Nation" as it's called.

Only Karzai is a criminal with no legitimacy, so he has to extend central government control the only way you can expand an illegitimate, criminal enterprise: violence, intimidation, coercion, all are in play here. Karzai is also desperately dependent on western welfare, so if he expects to remain in power, he'll need to drag out western development projects as long as he possibly can. If "security concerns" will delay a project, then you make your own if you have to. Our strategy requires him to expand his mafia empire; what else is he supposed to do?

And what about the Pakistani military? Our politicians are constantly whining for them to do more for our awful strategy. Well, they are doing more. Here's what that looks like:

"I lost my sense when I reached the door of my house and saw and heard the crying of my close neighbors and relatives--as if hell fell on me. When I saw people putting the dead bodies of my children, parents, and other relatives in bed I couldn't bear it anymore and fell on the ground..."

- A 25-year-old man who lost nine family members when two shells fired by security forces hit his house during the battle of Loi Sam (FATA).

Nice job "protecting the civilian population" there by the Pakistani army --- those innocent women and children will never again be threatened by the Taliban. And the army's "doing more" has the same results as the US "population-centric" strategy of killing civilians by the houseful across the border in Afghanistan. The military assaults legitimize the insurgency and turn the population against the government. That works out great for the other part of our strategy, showering Pakistan's military dictatorship with money and weapons.

Pakistan's army supports the Taliban as "strategic depth" in its war with India. As long as the Taliban are empowered by US and Pakistani military assaults, they survive to be used against India in proxy wars spanning Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and really most of the sub-continent. And as long as those extremist militants are there to threaten, the US has an excuse to give Pakistan...tada! Money and weapons to use in military assaults in the tribal regions. See how this works? Our allies in the Pakistani military are working our COIN strategy with everything they've got, and it's going great for them. Want Pakistan to do more? Gladly.

Our allies are working hard. Canada, one of our last friends in NATO, took our notion of development seriously and are replacing their military with aid projects. But Karzai is also working hard to extend the authority of the host nation, and that requires him to derail development in favor if violence, insecurity, and criminality. Pakistan's army is also working hard to clear its tribal area sanctuaries, so the Taliban can be safe elsewhere to engage in proxy war with India, and that includes in Afghanistan. And then we're back at the beginning, with the US then escalating its occupation to fight the Taliban.

The problem is not NATO, Karzai, or Pakistan. They're doing exactly what they're supposed to do. You might reason that Karzai and Pakistan's military despots aren't good choices for allies, but that misses the point. They are the strategy. And that strategy is the problem, not action or lack of action from our allies.

You're going to see this meme more and more in the coming weeks and months. As we see from Derrick's reporting, the military is well aware that it's failing big time in Afghanistan. So rather than admitting our COIN strategy is a flaming wreck, look for the blame to fall on our allies. Folks who talk about the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan will be elevated, so look forward to [re-]learning old factoids such as that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence  helped create the Taliban and so forth. The White House will continue to pretend to be outraged and confused with Karzai, even though they know full well he's corrupt and illegitimate. And of course, the US will continue to gripe that NATO allies won't send more troops, even though it's the non-military development projects that work.

Don't fall for it. You can demand that Congress block any more funding for the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cut off the COIN strategy at its source, the money. You can demand that congress abandon Karzai and push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, so that the central government has legitimacy. You can demand that the US engage with and empower the elected civilian government of Pakistan, rather than  its military despots like General Kiyani. And you can demand they support non-military projects like our allies, Canada. Don't let them get away with pushing the blame off.

The problem lies squarely with the US war.

Pakistan Analysis: Preparing the American Invasion (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Gareth Porter has an interesting article detailing the CIA's misgivings about the drone program in Pakistan. He reports [emphasis mine]:

"Some of the CIA operators are concerned that, because of its blowback effect, it is doing more harm than good," said Jeffrey Addicott, former legal adviser to U.S. Special Forces and director of the Centre for Terrorism Law at St Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas, in an interview with IPS. [...]

Because the drone strikes kill innocent civilians and bystanders along with leaders from far away, they "infuriate the Muslim male", said Addicott, thus making them more willing to join the movement. The men in Pakistan's tribal region "view Americans as cowards and weasels", he added. [...]


The complaints by CIA operatives about the drone strikes' blowback effect reported by Addicott are identical to warnings by military and intelligence officials reported in April 2009 by Jonathan Landay of McClatchy newspapers. Landay quoted an intelligence official with deep involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as saying al Qaeda and the Taliban had used the strikes in propaganda to "portray Americans as cowards who are afraid to face their enemies and risk death".

It's easy to see this as only the 10,000th reason why the drone strikes are a terrible idea, but the CIA's complaints here could  hint at something even more dangerous. The "blowback" is that Taliban and Al-Qa'eda recruit heavily from propaganda about American cowardice.

The CIA is not questioning fundamental assumptions about the War on Terror, like whether or not extra-judicial executions of suspected criminals is actually a real solution, rather than an escalation of senseless political violence. No, let's be very clear about what the CIA complaint is: we're far away, and that's bad. There's more:

"The people at the top are not believers," said Addicott, referring to the CIA. "They know that the objective is not going to be achieved."

That objective is to destroy the leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda.  But the American officials believe they can't do that with drone strikes, or at least drone strikes alone. The drone strikes are politically unpopular, and even some serious counter-insurgency bloggers criticize the program bitterly. Basically, they're looking for an excuse to do something more than drone strikes in Pakistan. President Obama may have found that excuse:

The U.S. military is reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan in the event that a successful attack on American soil is traced to the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials.[...]

The U.S. options for potential retaliatory action rely mainly on air and missile strikes, but could also employ small teams of U.S. Special Operations troops already positioned along the border with Afghanistan.[...]

In other words, if there is another incident like the car bomb in Times Square, America could send troops into Pakistan. Beyond these new plans, the military already has the authorization to deploy American soldiers [emphasis mine]:

The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate. [...]

Its goals are to build networks that could “penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy” Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to “prepare the environment” for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. [...]

In broadening its secret activities, the United States military has also sought in recent years to break its dependence on the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies for information in countries without a significant American troop presence. [...]

Looks like the military agrees with the CIA that the agency's drone strikes can't do the job. They want American military forces on the ground.

For their part, Pakistan doesn't want any American troops on the ground in those tribal areas. Or do they? The Pakistani military supports the Taliban as part of its national security strategy, so even when they attack Taliban areas, they usually only succeed at displacing huge numbers of civilians while the Taliban flees, which creates enormous popular backlash. The military declares victory, pulls out, and the Taliban returns safely. Take the most recent army incursion into Orakzai district:

A statement issued by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that the Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s visit to Orakzai marked the end of the military operation in the region, and that people displaced due to the war could expect to return to their homeland soon.[...]

However, locals said that the battle is far from over, as extremists are still holding a large part of the agency.

“The military has cleared only Lower Orakzai, while the situation in upper and central Orakzai has not changed much, as the army is yet to evict the Taliban from these areas. The battle is far from over,” The Daily Times quoted local residents of Lower Orakzai, as saying.

“In Upper Orakzai, security forces took control of Daburi, while Mamozai, Ghaljo and Shahoo areas are still in Taliban control,” they added.

General Kiani, the head of the Pakistani military, gets to have it both ways. The Taliban are safe, while he still declares victory over the terrorists. This Dawn editorial explains:

Therein lies a great difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome: moving from the ‘clear’ phase of counter-insurgency to the ‘hold’ stage, so that the ground can be laid for the ‘build’ and ‘transfer’ stages. From Bajaur to Mohmand and Bara to FR Peshawar, the phenomenon has repeated itself: operations by security forces to clear out an area are deemed a ‘success’ only to see militants sneak back in the weeks and months that follow. Sometimes forces are withdrawn from one area to focus on another trouble spot, leaving a vacuum in the first area which is soon filled by militants, as has happened in FR Peshawar after security forces were sent from there to deal with militants in Kala Dhaka, Mansehra.

What also makes the claim about success in Orakzai doubtful is geography. The Khyber-Orakzai-Kurram border areas have long been centres of militancy. If Orakzai is clear, then by that logic the Tirah area in Khyber and the east of Kurram should be clear too. However, the evidence suggests otherwise.

Is it really a difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome? Or is it going exactly according to plan? Are they not clearing at all, but rather "herding" the militants to safety?

The editorial is right that geography is important here. Many of the militants in Orakzai have fled from recent operations in Waziristan. Now they are fleeing from one part of Orakzai to another, farther away from the northern tribal areas. The Pakistani army is, apparently, pushing the militants away from the tribal areas and towards Balochistan, where the Taliban's Quetta Shura is based. The result is that even if the US invades the tribal areas, it still won't damage the military assets of the Taliban.

We see more preparations by the army in Balochistan:

[Baloch Human Rights Council] has learnt through local sources and press statements of Baloch National Movement (BNM) central leadership that within the last couple of days there has been a significant movement of Pakistani troops in the area of district Gwadar and Dasht. A heavy contingent of military including 80 trucks carrying soldiers, 40 armoured vehicles, artillery, 8 gunship helicopters, and 20 water supplying tankers are reportedly part of the first wave of troop deployment in the region. There is news of more troops on the way to join the military operation.

And this isn't some half-assed "Taliban-clearing" operation, this is for real:

Reports coming in from the area stated that the soldiers have complete control of the meager water resources and have blocked all access to the local population. The livestock has been confiscated in the service of the soldiers and a large number was slaughtered to starve the inhabitants. Sources mentioned that people are not allowed to leave their homes even in case of a medical emergency.

There have been reported incidents of artillery fire directed at the civilian residential areas while gunship helicopters hovered over the towns. According to witnesses, incidents of aerial bombardment of villages have taken place and the fear of casualties is growing, complicated by the military blockade and denial of access to media and medical personnel. An unconfirmed number of youth has been taken away by the soldiers and their whereabouts are yet unknown.

Here's the catch: unlike the relatively autonomous Pakistanis in the tribal regions, the Pakistanis in Balochistan are so beat down and oppressed by the army that they would welcome a NATO presence (who they believe, foolishly, would help them fight for independence). But as we noted, the Taliban's all-important Quetta Shura is in Balochistan, so the Pakistani military can't have any American troops that close to a key military asset. So they instead "clear" Balochistan of "Islamic terrorists" (democratic Baloch dissidents, not Taliban) and remove it from American calculations.

What is the end result? The Pakistani military has effectively fortified the Quetta Shura, while paving the way for American invasion of North and South Waziristan, Pakhtunkhwa, etc. And just like Kiani, everyone gets to declare a fake victory. President Obama gets to look tough by cracking down on attacks from the tribal area, the Pakistanis can throw a fit and claim they already "cleared" those areas, we downplay the harm of the drone strikes (we're not cowards anymore), Kayani protects his state-sponsored terrorism program (the Taliban), the army has an excuse to viciously crush Baloch separatists, and even Al-Qa'eda itself will be rewarded with another propaganda victory, that of more American "crusaders" on Pashtun soil.

Who doesn't get to declare victory? Everybody else. American troop deaths will continue to skyrocket, American taxpayers will continue to pay for it as their economy crumbles, Pakistani civilians will be massacred by all sides, Pakistani democracy will continue to suffocate under military despotism, and the Taliban will still threaten the national security of countless nations, most notoriously nuclear-armed India.

For those keeping count, that's three simultaneous US wars; Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Shall we go for Iran and make it an even four? North Korea sure is getting uppity.

I feel stupid now for questioning Tom Hayden's claims about the so-called Long War. Even as withdrawal from Iraq becomes conventional wisdom, and we continue to force Congress to end the war in Afghanistan, it's still not over. 104 months into the outrageous War on Terror, it appears we're just getting started.

Join us on Rethink Afghanistan’s Facebook page and collaborate with the tens of thousands of others around the country working to bring these wars to an end.

Afghanistan Analysis: Assessing the National Consultative Peace Jirga (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan. The views expressed below are my own.

You better bite down on something, because here comes some NATO propaganda:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OFiX9WsWGew[/youtube]

That wasn't so bad, was it? Very short, and they devote a fairly large chunk of time to criticism of the whole affair. It's a little pedestrian for anyone with extensive knowledge of the region, but the explanation for the jirga is accessible.


However, since the jirga has just gotten under way, it's far too early to draw any substantive conclusions about the criticism or the praise of the jirga. Even if they aren't making decisions and only building a broad consensus, it's going to take a while.

However, it's not too early to engage in that most reptilian form of analysis, gauging the "optics" of the event. How does it look? How does it register in your gut? And if we swirl our hands over the newsprint, what secrets of the future can we mystically divine?

Not much, really. Most conclusions we come to about the optics of the meeting will be rendered meaningless soon enough when the jirga wraps up and the consequences to reality begin to take shape. But just as we can live through a little NATO propaganda to learn about the jirga, we'll lower ourselves to the level of gut reactions.

Thomas Ruttig blogs his gut reaction on AAN:

The Peace Jirga that began today in Kabul, will fail its declared main aim: to establish a real national consensus on talks with the Taleban. In order to be able to, too many relevant political forces are absent - and those who attend are massively monitored and manipulated. The jirga does not bring an end – or at least a reduction - of violence closer.

Those are tough words, but again nothing has actually happened yet. Ruttig does raise some important questions, however, about exactly who and what is represented at the jirga. He explains further:

On the surface, the jirga with its 1,600 delegates bears all insignia of Afghan tribal ‘democracy’ which, although, is male-dominated. (The women were only able to push through their 20 per cent attendance quota after Western diplomats intervened – another example of ‘foreign interference’, so often blasted by Karzai.) Bearded and turbaned men from all corners of the country provide a blaze of colour that is supposed to create the impression of plurality that does not exist in reality. The delegates are rather handpicked. The main opposition party is absent and also some women rights activists boycott the jirga which they consider part of a Karzai legitimisation machine. They fear that burning issues like ‚justice’, i.e dealing with the civil war crimes, and human rights might be sacrificed for a deal with the Taleban. This shows: if a pseudo-consensus is pushed through, only new conflicts will emerge.

The intervention of Western diplomats is very important here. It wasn't 100,000 troops that got a solid victory for women's rights, it was tough negotiations. The US didn't gain anything at the barrel of a gun, and the West didn't actually do anything for the Afghans. A tiny bit of Western engagement simply made room for the Afghan women to make positive gains on their own.

After all, the Western-backed 20 percent quota pales in comparison to the benefit of actually having those voices contribute to the jirga. It should also be pointed out that the US Congress is about 20 percent women, and I don't think anyone would say they're somehow impotent or ineffectual because of their relatively small numbers. I'm less pessimistic than Ruttig when it comes to the role women will play in the jirga.

I'm also less pessimistic about the absence of the Taliban. For all its faults, this jirga could be construed as an arguably sincere effort by Karzai to reach a peaceful settlement. With the Taliban absent, and worse, attacking the meeting with suicide bombers that Mathew Hoh calls "counter-productive as they distance the [Taliban] from the Afghan people," it appears that it is Karzai who is sincere while the Taliban is only interested in war. In years past, the Taliban have at various times come to the table for talks, only to be greeted by US and/or Pakistani air strikes and arrests. Karzai appeared duplicitous, and the Taliban got the moral high ground. Now the perception is reversed, Karzai is sincere and the Taliban look malicious.

Karzai said in his speech to the jirga, "My dear Taliban, you are welcome in your own soil. Do not hurt this country, and don't destroy or kill yourselves." The Taliban looks bad, and this is all about optics. It's possible pressure from the population over these shameless attacks can bring them to the table once again, if this perception holds sway.

But what about the opposition members and activists boycotting the jirga? That can't be good, right? Well, it's not good that they have to boycott, but a boycott is still political engagement. They want rule of law, not informal consensus-building jirgas. They want accountability for civil war atrocities, past and present, and they're not willing to sacrifice those things for a simple handshake peace with the Taliban and other murderous warlords. Even though the opposition's boycott harms the jirga's legitimacy, it does raise awareness of the issue and is far better than them remaining silent.

Activist engagement may harm this specific meeting, but it shows a political vibrancy that defies the media portrayal of Afghans as helpless and unable to stand on their own. Take a look at this description of Afghan politicians running in the upcoming parliamentary elections:

“The way into parliament this time is going to be by money, having a powerful patron or armed men to issue threats. Which of those routes are these guys taking or are they hoping their fame will win them votes?” [...] “Once catapulted into parliament, they think they’ll get lots of bribes - for example, when it’s time to approve or reject the cabinet. They’re after the money.”

Sound familiar? It's eerily similar to the US government, with its system of plutocratic lobbyists and shady, backroom dealings. It's difficult to argue that President Obama taking huge contributions from Goldman Sachs and then stacking his cabinet with its employees is any different from Karzai taking bribes from powerful drug dealers (Big Poppy?) and then filling his cabinet with his closest accomplices.

Democracy is hard. Accountability is hard. It requires fierce pressure from the citizens to achieve properly, and just as Americans seek to counter the machinations of the banking lobby, Afghans must fight for accountability to counter the forces of lawlessness and corruption in their country. I agree with Ruttig that the opposition boycott looks bad for the jirga, but I also see it as a positive sign that the grassroots democracy movement in Afghanistan is alive and well.

Most telling for US policy are the Afghan activists' demands. They want accountability for crimes committed in the civil war, a civil war in which the US is most obviously taking a side. The intense military presence only exacerbates that civil war, and empowers both the corruption of Karzai and the violent rebellion of the Taliban. If the US sees Afghanistan as important to its national interests or desires any sort of positive outcome in governance, development, or human rights, and as always that is up for domestic debate, then it can achieve those outcomes without the use of the military.

A little Western pressure opens the door to the national jirga for Afghan women. Supporting a free press and fair elections can improve governance and accountability. In contrast, Obama's policy of escalating the occupation runs completely counter to those goals, as does the US refusal to deal with the civilian government of Pakistan. The effect there is the same, with more war, more terrorism, and more despotism.

So we can learn something just from the appearances of the peace jirga, indeed we may even see signs to be optimistic about the process. But, once again, the jirga hasn't actually done anything yet, so it's not really possible to come to any firm conclusions on whether it will turn out positively or negatively. What if the Afghan women in attendance are shunned and ignored by the jirga? What if the Taliban remains defiant, and continues to attack instead of negotiate? What if those activists seeking rule of law fail miserably, and Afghanistan remains a narco-state torn by civil war? Our perception, the optics of the jirga, could change dramatically once the real consequences set in. Some optimism is not out of line, but we'll see.

In the meantime, join us on Rethink Afghanistan’s Facebook page and collaborate with the tens of thousands of others around the country working to bring this war to an end.