Sunday
Jun132010
Turkey Analysis: Which Way is Ankara Heading? (Yenidunya)
Sunday, June 13, 2010 at 8:18
There seems to be a lot of fuss right now about whether Turkey is "turning its face towards the East".
The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.
This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.
Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?
That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:
Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:
Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.
Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.
Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.
The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.
In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.
The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.
At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."
The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.
There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.
The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.
And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".
And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...
Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.
Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.
The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.
This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.
Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?
That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:
"All options are on the table” is the best phrase to describe how Turkey feels about Israel’s attack on humanitarian aid flotilla carrying more than 600 activists from 32 countries... Israel will, most likely, no longer be seen as a friendly state nor an ally, but will be treated as a rogue state by Turkey.
When I say Turkey will imply that “all options are on the table,” I do not mean that Turkey will wage a war against Israel. However, more dangerously, Israel will be seen as a state against which one should protect itself and should consider any possible action because of its unlawful and rogue character.
Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:
It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors -- especially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system.
Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.
Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.
Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.
The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.
In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.
The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.
At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."
The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.
There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.
The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.
And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".
And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...
Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.
Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.
tagged Afghanistan, Ahmet Davutoglu, Armenia, Avigdor Lieberman, Azerbaijan, Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu, Cyprus, Egypt, European Union, Gaza, Hurriyet, Iran, Israel, Israeli Defense Forces, James Holmes, Jordan, Lebanon, Mavi Marmara, Nuh Yilmaz, PKK, Pakistan, Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Steven A. Cook, Syria, The Foreign Policy, Turkey, United Nations Security Council, West Bank in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (10)
For Turkey, an Embrace of Iran Is a Matter of Building Bridges
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/middleeast/13turkey.html?pagewanted=1" rel="nofollow">http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/middlee...
The article presents both the US and Turkish positions and policies, but focusses on the latter to show that Turkey is not “moving eastward", but simply disagrees with the United States over how to approach the problems in the Middle East. One of the key quotes in it from Halil Berktay, a historian at Sabanci University: “Turkey is saying, ‘You’ve been talking about building bridges. This is the way to build them.’ ”
Ali,
Another well done article and look forward to more. Another angle that may be in play is the political aspect of Islam. From my standpoint it seems the AKP is challenging some aspects of the secular tradition and it is leading to Turkey doing things they wouldn't have done otherwise. One example is the indirect support of IHH and endorsement for the convoy. This is the very same IHH that was investigated and raided in the 90's under previous leadership. It is why many are now openly calling the AKP an Islamist party. Appreciate your thoughts.
Thx
Bill
Many US commentators are saying that Turkey was played by Iran when it negotiated the Tehran Agreement together with Brazil. I have been wondering if Turkey doesn't actually feel it was played by President Obama. I can't stop thinking about Obama's letter of April 20 to Lula and Erdogan detailing the US parameters of a possible deal after having met with both leaders on 13 April and encouraged them to pursue a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran.
This article explains exactly what I'm talking about much better than I can:
Extending Hands or Clenching Fists? Obama's Doublespeak on Iran, by ESAM AL-AMIN
http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/10316" rel="nofollow">http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=...
"Ankara’s ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey’s efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a “strategic” mid-power which can help (re)shape the region."
********
I think it's highly unlikely. The EU would be biting off more than it could chew.
1. The Europeans are busy dealing with restive Muslim communities across Europe.
2. Improving Turkey's living standards and bringing them up to par with the rest of the EU member states would be an enormous drain on the Union's resources.
3. Given its large population (greater than Germany's), Turkey could have the highest number of representatives in the EU parliament than any other member. It could throw its weight around with the UK, France, and Germany. Its foreign affairs interests would DOMINATE Europe's interests which are mostly parochial.
4. Turkey is linked with other extra-regional organizations (outside Europe) -- Asia Group, OIC. This would add more complexity to the already politically weak and fractured EU. (related to #3).
5. 90 million new EU citizens would be Muslims (see #1). Is it really in the best interests of Europeans that the most populated country in the EU is an Islamic country? What kind of effect would it have on Europe's democratic and cultural institutions in the long-term? Are Islam and democracy compatible?
6. We are witnessing a redefinition of the cultural landscape of many parts of Europe with the greater influx of Muslims into Europe. In Britain, pubs in Muslim-majority areas have closed. In France, some indigenous people must travel to neighboring towns/villages to buy pork products as their local grocers no longer stock them.
It's best for Europe to play it safe and say no.
Ali,
If you have the time, I'd really like to hear your thoughts on the subject of my last comment above, that starts, "Many US commentators are saying that Turkey was played by Iran ..." and refers to the article: Extending Hands or Clenching Fists? Obama's Doublespeak on Iran,
Even though Ankara’s ultimate destination may still be full membership in the European Union, I agree with you that the likelihood of this actually happening is remote. Principally for the reasons you mention, but Europe may also feel that it's more advantageous to have Turkey as a bridge-builder outside the Union, connected with those other extra-regional organisations and yet still an ally and NATO member. In addition, the deep trade relationship between the EU and Turkey and re-migration (2nd generation Turks born in the EU are increasingly going back to Turkey to seek jobs and set up businesses there because of the better economic climate) are sure to keep the two very close, so many in Europe don't "feel the need" to get closer.
Catherine, sorry for this late reply, I missed it. You are right that some commentators say that Ankara was played by Iran and some say the opposite. As I already stated, I think there is a consensus between the Obama Administration and Ankara in the sense that the latter is a strategic player in dealing with Tehran despite of UNSC's sanctions. Even before sanctions. Washington reiterated that the dual-track is going to continue and UNSC sanctions are not strict enough to isolate Iran for the time being. Therefore, if we put the neo-conservative bureaucracy aside, we can talk about this beneficial relationship between Washington and Ankara. Indeed, what would Washington gain if Ankara had said "Yes" to sanction in UNSC? In return of this, Ankara is filling the vacuum power left by Israel in the region, up to a certain extent of course.
Hey Catherine,
Yes, both the Turkish media and politicians (especially Erdogan's oppositions) used this and said that Turkey was played by the Americans. In addition to the Ergenekon case and the fight with PKK, this was seen as a tool to criticize the government in the sense that it was reflected as 'slap in the face'. Indeed, those people who argue that a shift of axis is happening took the microphone. However, the government, therefore had to apply to a slightly different discourse and said that the US would understand the importance of this agreement. At the end of the day, it was Erdogan himself who, with a quick manoeuvre, went to Tehran and increased the importance of negotiations.
I am sorry for misunderstanding your question. Thank you for your understanding.
Thanks Ali.
RE "the government, therefore had to apply to a slightly different discourse and said that the US would understand the importance of this agreement."
Well, just 24 hours after the agreement was signed, Clinton (the US) trashed it. That deosn't put Erdogan in a very good position at home does it? Or is has his tough stance on Israel's attack on the Mavi Marmara basically wiped talk of him being played by Washington in the Tehran Agreement off the table?
You are right. It did not put him in a very good position. As I said, the opposition used this to an extent. However, due to the fact that there was no conflict between Washington and Ankara which did not produce any exchange of disappointment along with the arrival of the flotilla crisis, no one remembered the agreement in Tehran.