Shanghai Power Politics: China Shuts Out Iran (Shan Shan)

Two weeks ago, the 10th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council summit, held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, approved the SCO Rules of Procedure and the regulation on procedure for future membership expansion.

Before the summit, Chinese diplomats ritually pointed out that approval of the admission regulations was the first step in forming the basis for a future expansion of SCO membership and would serve as a cornerstone of the organization's rules for external links.

Behind this formality, however, was a more significant story: for now, Iran will not allowed to  join the organisation.

The ostensible reason was that the SCO's regulations proscribe that “any country under UN sanctions cannot be admitted”. At the time of the meeting, Iran was subject to a 4th round of restrictions; a few days after the meeting, the UN Security Council passed yet another resolution.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not attend the summit, although he visited the Shanghai Expo and took part in celebrations at the Iranian pavilion on June 11. The Chinese Foreign Ministry maintained that Ahmadinejad was only visiting the country to attend the Expo, but analysts said he “is here to seek more support from China to water down fresh sanctions”.

The rejection of Iran's membership is far from the entire story, of course. The relationship between China and Iran is still stable. "There is no reason to control or weaken the relationship (with China)”,  Ahmadinejad told a news conference after his visit to the Expo.
Moreover, this summit focused on economic cooperation and security issues in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, such as drug trafficking, terrorism ,and organized crime. Besides, the unrest in in Kyrgyzstan is another hot issue at this summit.

The fact remains, however, that Iran was kept at arm's distance. Zhang Xiao, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's department of European and Central Asian affairs, indicated that the SCO is only considering the legal basis for expanding membership, indicating that there is a long way to go before formal accession will even be contemplated.

Furthermore, Beijing is more cautious than Russia, the other main power of the SCO. According to China Daily, Chinese President Hu Jintao told his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev that SCO cooperation and exchange with outside countries should be done in a proper and stable manner, and on the basis of improving the strength of the bloc. "Blind expansion will spoil it (SCO) with excessive enthusiasm".

Pang Zhongying, a senior expert on world politics at Renmin University of China, assessed, "For a regional bloc, it is definitely not the more the better. Now the European Union has 27 members, and we can see more complex problems. The same reason also resulted in a loose APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum). One of the approaches to ruin a bloc is encouraging it to admit more members."

Add the complicated situation in central Asia and the main concerns of the SCO, and it appears that Iran will be observing the group from outside for some time to come.

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Supporter's of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency policy are heart-broken over his firing.  Very few COINdinistas took the position that McChrystal should be permitted to undermine civilian control of policy, as he did so plainly in the Rolling Stone piece; however, they put out the line, "He's our only hope", with warnings about ruining the war effort.

They also want revenge.

The target of this vengeance is quite clear: Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Take a look at these snippets from across the blogosphere:

Josh Shahryar:

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation.

Bouhammer:

So now I am waiting for that POS [piece of s***] Eikenberry to be fired along with that ineffective Holbrooke. The relationship between the military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan is a two-way street. If the Ambassador and Special Envoy don’t get along with [Afghan President] Karzai and cannot influence him or even get a meeting with him, then they need to be FIRED asap and some people need to be put into place that can be effective at their job and get along with the military leadership.

Anonymous at Danger Room:

In fact, one e-mails: “It would be a travesty if we fired McChrystal and kept Eikenberry.”

Not only is McChrystal the “only one with any sort of relationship with [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai,” says this civilian advisor to the McChrystal-led International Security Assistance Force. Eikenberry “has no plan, didn’t get COIN [counterinsurgency] when he was the commander and still doesn’t.” Plus, the advisor adds: “The Embassy hates Eik. That’s not necessarily an indictment (I’m no fan of the Embassy). But it contributes to the dysfunction and it means that half the Embassy is focused on keeping Eik in line.”

Streetwise Professor:

Eikenberry was a backstabber from day one.

See the narrative building? McChrystal was doing a good job (they've leaked red meat to give pro-McChrystal progressives some lefty cover), it was that "POS Eikenberry" and his "meddling" that are really at fault. He's a backstabber and dysfunctional. McChrystal's violation of the relationship between civilian government and the military is no longer at issue; it's practically ignored.

McChrystal and Eikenberry have been feuding for some time now, so it's no surprise he draws the most wrath from the general's dismissal. But if we actually look closer at the tension between Eikenberry and McChrystal, we see that the Eikenberry-haters are way off base. Their attacks are at best childish displays of sour grapes; at worst, they are a fundamental misunderstanding of their own strategy.

Ambassador Eikenberry is not at fault here. In fact, Eikenberry was right all along.

What is this feud between McChrystal and Eikenberry about? It's usually described very ambiguously, a disagreement over "implementation" of the strategy or something like that. But, in fact, it is a few specific actions which amount to the battle between general and ambassador over conduct of the war.

From the Washington Post:

At times their differences over strategy have been public, particularly after two of Eikenberry's cables to Washington last year were leaked to the news media. The cables warned that McChrystal's request for new troops might be counterproductive as Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner." McChrystal's staff members were particularly upset that they weren't made aware of Eikenberry's position before he sent the cables to Washington, they said in interviews.

Eikenberry has resisted some of McChrystal's wartime experiments. The ambassador refused to release funds to expand a military effort to turn villagers into armed guards. He opposed one Army brigade's plan to form an anti-Taliban alliance with a Pashtun tribe and funnel it development money. He criticized the military's proposal to buy generators and diesel fuel for the energy-starved city of Kandahar and supported a longer-term hydroelectric dam project.

In each of these cases, including the disagreement over the energy situation in Kandahar, it's clear that Eikenberry has had a better understanding of COIN strategy, the blending of civilian nation building with military combat. Eikenberry consistently prioritized governance, rule of law, and other long-term objectives over McChrystal's short-term concerns about winning battles and killing the enemy.

Stabilizing Afghanistan, not winning battles, is what counterinsurgency is supposedly all about. And yet Eikenberry is made out to be the bad guy.

Counterinsurgency requires the dual (dueling?) roles of military leader and diplomatic leader. As COINdinistas like to say, there has to be "unity of effort." Both sides have to work together. But now what we hear from them is that the McChrystal should have had free rein to do whatever he wanted while anything Eikenberry did was "meddling", some sort of illegitimate interference with the all-important war effort. Do the sellers of COIN even understand their own strategy? It's not clear that they do.

Why would Eikenberry dare question our military leaders? Why would he see Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner?" Possibly because Karzai is corrupt and sits atop an illegitimate government that functions only as an organized criminal enterprise?

Why would Eikenberry oppose arming and bribing local militias? Could it be because support from the military legitimizes these groups, even though they're outlaws that pillage Afghans just the same, if not worse, than the Taliban does, in addition to undermining the central government in Kabul?

Boy, that Eikenberry sure is a jerk for pointing all this stuff out.

When we add up all the leaked cables, the wartime experiments, the history of their involvement in the war, etc, we see the full picture of Eikenberry's trespasses against McChrystal.

The High Crimes and Treason of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry:

• Failing to decisively win the war in Afghanistan when all attention and resources were focused on Iraq


• Leaking important information about the war to the press


• Resisting "short-sighted" military domination of reconstruction/nation building efforts


• Opposing the escalation of 30,000 more US troops


• Criticizing the corruption and illegitimacy of Hamid Karzai


• Opposing a US strategic security guarantee with Karzai's illegitimate administration


• Opposing Karzai's CIA-narco-lord brother having a role in the government


• Opposing formation of militias which undermine the government


• Opposing bribes of development money which corrupt and distort rule of law, nation building, etc


• Opposing short-term energy solutions which are too expensive and cripple an already broken central government

Is it clear why everyone hates Eikenberry so much? No? I don't understand it either.

Don't take any of this the wrong way. Eikenberry is not a saint, a war hero, or even particularly effective in his conflicts with McChrystal. The point here is that Eikenberry was right. He was right to be transparent about strategic deliberations. He was right to oppose the military's faulty tactics. He was right to oppose the escalation of more troops. He was right about all of these arguments with McChrystal, and with the Obama administration itself.

Obviously there is plenty of room left to criticize Eikenberry and the State Department as a whole. Their continued association with criminal organisations like Blackwater all but negates any positive outcomes they might reach, and certainly erases any honor or integrity the institution might have. Corruption is a thriving malignancy throughout our development operations, from the contractors at the bottom to the sleazy crooks at the top.

Then, of course, there's the State Dept's participation in the first place in COIN, which is a deviant, militarist perversion of traditionally civilian-controlled policies like foreign aid, development, and nation building.

General McChrystal's downfall was his own making. Eikenberry should not be thrown in with that, least of all as part of some pathetic blame game by McChrystal supporters. What's at stake here is the war in Afghanistan, and that is clearly hopeless and unwinnable. Firing McChrystal didn't change the fact that the US has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose by continuing its war in Afghanistan, and neither will the revenge-firing of Ambassador Eikenberry. To get to the root of any of these problems, to really see solutions for countering terrorism and developing a stable Afghanistan, America's longest war has to end.

Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai Joining the Taliban? The Story Behind the Headline (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

The war in Afghanistan is disintegrating before our very eyes. Our counterinsurgency strategy is broken, and the Pentagon knows it. The so-called "emergency" funding requested months ago by the Obama administration now seems destined to die a slow, bureaucratic death in congress due to overwhelming pressure by citizens. Our allies in NATO have either reached their peak of military involvement, as with the UK, or have already begun to dismantle their troop presence, as with Canada and so many others. Other countries in the region are already vying for power after the US leaves, even as the Pentagon insists its July 2011 withdrawal date will only be the "beginning of a process."

But what about Afghanistan itself? What about President Hamid Karzai, our ally and head of the "Host Nation" government? The theory put forward by the pundit class is usually some variation of the "bloodbath" theme. Our allies in Kabul like Karzai will  be overrun and annihilated by the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They’re Rich! (Mull)

This appears to be more media myth-making, however, as we see from Karzai's political manoeuvring. Not only is he threatening to join the Taliban. He may have already done just that.

Karzai has begun negotiating with the Taliban and even received formal terms of a peace treaty from Taliban-aligned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,  but this does not necessarily mean that Karzai has allied with them. Negotiations are merely the first step in any peace process, no matter the circumstances.

Instead we have to look deeper inside this peace process to see the real endgame Karzai is working toward, that of a nominal, Pashtun-nationalist government in Kabul overlaying a Taliban-dominated countryside. Together they function not only as a crime family capable of exploiting Afghanistan's resources (minerals, opium, timber, etc.) but also as a highly effective proxy for Pakistan's interminable battle against Indian influence.

What is this Pashtun-nationalist government? While Karzai was formerly part of the Northern Alliance, he is also a Pashtun, as is the vast majority of the Taliban movement. The Taliban are quite adept at playing up this identity:

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base.

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

They were able to seize power in most of Afghanistan before 2001, although the “Northern Alliance” — made up primarily of ethnic Tajiks – managed to hold out until Americans arrived and smashed the regime in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have had a harder time operating outside “Pashtunistan.”

Not any more. They're now able to expand beyond "Pashtunistan". Thomas Ruttig reports that the Taliban are beginning to move far into Northern Afghanistan, in areas traditionally quite hostile to their oppressive rule. The ethnic Hazara in this region were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the 1990's until the Americans came in 2001. The Taliban have a history of anti-Shi'a Muslim violence there, but this could be changing, as Ruttig notes [emphasis mine]:

Most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taleban’s advance into their region in the 1990s after the movement that considered Shia as non-Muslim had committed some mass murders against the minority group, for example in Mazar-e Sharif, Yakaolang (Bamian province) and at the Robatak Pass (Samangan). The Taleban conquered Bamian, the largest town in Hazarajat, late in their campaign that brought them control over more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory in that period. It was supported by an agreement with one faction of the main Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Ustad Muhammad Akbari (now an MP in Kabul), a rival of the leader of Wahdat’s main wing Abdul Karim Khalili (now a Vice President). Under this deal, Akbari’s fighters guaranteed that Bamian remained calm and accepted a presence of Kandahari Taleban in the town.

In the meantime, the Taleban have – at least officially – moderated their position vis-à-vis the Shia community. Mulla Omar has declared repeatedly that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in Kabul.

In addition to supporting the Taliban presence in Hazara areas, Akbari was also a supporter of Karzai's rape law, claiming it actually protected women's rights. While the Hazara have historically fought the Taliban, Akbari has shown time and again he is willing to compromise with whoever is in power. When the Northern Alliance was winning, Akbari supported them. Until the Taliban came, when he supported them. And now it's Karzai's Pashtun coalition with the Taliban, so Akbari is willing to take oppressive Shi'a laws in exchange for expansion of Taliban control.

In a separate interview, Ruttig explains further the dynamic between the Taliban and former enemies in the Northern Alliance [emphasis mine]:

The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law.[...]

[Former head of National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh's] resignation might have to do with all this. Politically, he belongs to the current which emerged from the former mujahedin Northern Alliance (NA). This current -- represented by Karzai's 2009 main rival at the elections, Dr. Abdullah -- sees Karzai's reconciliation approach with skepticism. It technically boycotted the peace jirga. (It did not use that word, though.) On one hand, this skepticism reflects concerns broader political and social circles share, like the organized women. On the other hand, the NA had not been known for a tendency toward power sharing and fears losing further influence if the Taliban joined a future government. Finally, if Thursday's Guardian is right, Saleh also saw Karzai moving closer to Pakistan. The relations between the NA and Pakistan have "traditionally" been strained.

Karzai seems to be marginalizing, if not outright rejecting from the political process, members of the Northern Alliance, usually in favor of those willing to side with the Taliban. He isn't so much joining the Taliban in the sense of being subservient to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, but rather in the sense of forming a power-sharing government. The Taliban will still control large amounts of Afghanistan, and we even see them moving back into areas they haven't held since the war with the NA during the 90's. And they may be willing to negotiate as "brothers" with Karzai.

Why would the Taliban share power with Karzai? More Ruttig [emphasis mine]:

We should not believe our anti-terrorism psy-ops and understand that the Taliban are a political movement with political aims. Such a movement will compromise when serious talks are held. Some Taliban know that they cannot rule Afghanistan on their own. We heard this discussion amongst Taliban in 2008 and 2009, but the surge closed their ranks again.

The Taliban will maintain Karzai's government in Kabul to  so they can effectively rule Afghanistan. After all, Mullah Omar is unlikely to have much success as President. Instead, the militants will need Karzai for stuff like this [emphasis mine]:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Friday he was concerned about a looming battle over his country's untapped mineral resources and that Afghanistan's major donors should be prioritised in exploiting them. [...]

"I hope we will be able to manage it properly both in terms of rivalry from the international bidders in Afghanistan and also within Afghanistan, we should be able to manage the returns of those mineral extractions properly for Afghanistan," he said in a seminar hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though maybe not American investors), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan's resources as well as to manage the funds properly "within Afghanistan", which of course means pay-off for the Taliban who legitimise Karzai's presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country's resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a coalition government, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

But what about that other piece of Afghanistan's post-war tyranny, that of being a puppet for Pakistan's war against India? For the same reasons as the Taliban, Pakistan's military dictatorship also appreciates the benefits of a Taliban-Karzai coalition government:

"Morally, Afghanistan should give access as a priority to those countries that have helped Afghanistan massively in the past few years," he said, adding that Japan, the second biggest donor to Afghanistan in terms of money pledged, would be a welcome investment partner.

In addition to providing a training ground for terrorism against India, Afghanistan is also useful for undermining India's economy and trade partners. Japan is indeed the second largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, but the largest in the region is... New Delhi:

India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.

India's contribution has been large, but when weighed against other international donors, like Japan's billions, they fall much farther down the list of "prioritised" trading partners. Not only does Japan push India down the line, which is really not that serious considering India has mines of its own, but it also affects India's bottom line in other ways [emphasis mine]:

Traditionally, Japan has been the second largest destination of Indian exports (major exports include gems, marine products, iron ore, and cotton yarn). India is also a major importer of goods from Japan, and its importance has been growing in recent years (major imports include machinery, plant-related products, transport equipment, and electronic machinery).

Japan will need to import less from India thanks to its opportunity in Afghanistan. Obviously that's good for Pakistan, as it forces India into some uncomfortable economic positions, only one tiny example of how Afghanistan can be used against Indian interests. The Karzai-Taliban government would be compliant with Pakistan across the board, with the Taliban providing foot soldiers for Pakistan's "strategic depth" against India, and Hamid Karzai would be able to counter Indian influence in Kabul, whether that means obscure complications like new trade competition with Indian ore exporters or overtly downplaying India's role in post-war Afghanistan.

That is what will become of Afghanistan when then US withdrawal is over: a Taliban-Karzai coalition government, and a client state for Pakistan.

It's worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan's military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

If the US has any interest in seeing a different outcome for Afghanistan, troops, special forces, or any kind of war are simply not an option. Rather Afghanistan's post-war tyranny can be undermined through other ways, such as developing Afghanistan (everything from roads to education to a free press) to the point where extremist ideologies, as well as the endemic corruption and oppression, like those of Karzai and the Taliban, will no longer be tolerated or sustainable. The US can also push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, allowing a credible test of legitimacy for Afghanistan's government, to allow for more ethical international trade activities. And the US can engage directly with the civilian government of Pakistan, allowing peaceful Pakistani citizens to set and implement their own foreign policy, rather than have it controlled by the unaccountable warmongers under the head of the military, General Kiyani.

As domestic pressure finally chokes off support for the war in Washington, it's helpful to keep a close eye on these machinations by Karzai and the Taliban. Supporters of the war in the US will make claims about an impending bloodbath, but clearly Karzai's regime will survive our absence. War supporters will also claim that these problems which were created by our war can only be fixed by...more war. It's simply not true.

Post-war Afghanistan will be a miserable place indeed, but just as in 2009, 2007, 2001, and 1979, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the answer. The US occupation which feeds Afghanistan's misery must be brought to an end, and only then can we set about the process of developing the country, eradicating extremism, and making peace for the region as a whole.

Afghanistan's New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They're Rich! (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

By now everyone has just about lost their damn minds about this New York Times article detailing Afghanistan's "discovery" of vast amounts of mineral wealth. Yes, it's way crazy old information (like 1970s old). Yes, it's Soviet Pentagon propaganda. As regular readers know, the International Security Assistance Force's counter-insurgency strategy is a flaming wreck, and you can guess what they're going to do about that, including with propaganda and misinformation.

Afghanistan Special: New Report on Pakistan’s Intelligence Links with Insurgents (Waldman)

But if your reaction has been typical, that of only sneering derision and snide condescension (guilty!), you've missed the point. Part of understanding propaganda is knowing its intended audience. We do this automatically when, say, Iranian President Ahmadinejad blames evil CIA spies for whatever it is that's bothering him that day: unemployment, tummy ache, whatever. We understand right away that this is not about us, about Americans. Rather, it's aimed at a domestic Iranian audience with very real fears about foreign interference. Only in the case of Afghanistan's minerals, we're personalizing it, assuming it's aimed at us. It's not for you, though. This propaganda has a very specific audience, and so far it's working perfectly.

Steve Hynd picks up on the scheme [emphasis mine]:

However, guaranteed U.S. access to "strategic reserves" of "strategic minerals", where possession is nine tenths of the game and the resources are just as valuable still in the ground as mined and processed for market, is a heady brew to mostly-hawkish senior policymakers and Very Serious think-tankers, especially if the end of the sentence goes 'and China doesn't get them". Risen's stenography isn't aimed at us, but at them and will be used to add some geopolitical weight to the arguements McChrystal and others are already beginning to make as to why they should be allowed to break their promise to Obama and the U.S. should stay in Afghanistan a few years longer.

This story is aimed at the elites who make the wars. The Pentagon has handed the hawks in Washington a powerful factoid to be used and re-used endlessly in pursuit of their war.

How do we know this? Well, there are some very obvious clues. The article is loaded with crunchy, fact-y bits that appear substantive, but in reality have nothing to do with what's actually at stake. Does it matter that they have rare-earth minerals and lithium for laptops and so on? No, it doesn't matter if they struck the mother lode of chocolate ice cream. As Blake Hounsel writes, they don't even have concrete, much less a sophisticated, multi-billion dollar mining industry capable of extracting, processing, and marketing these minerals to international companies. They want it to look like a lot of information ("Wow, lookit all the minerals!") but not actually answer any real questions ("Wait, can they even get it?").

Think-tankers love this kind of crap. They'd like nothing better than to somehow fit counter-insurgency and iPads (like most in the media, they're commercial shills for both) into the same article. If you like your Macbook and your Prius and that application that makes your telephone fart, well, you'd better support our batshit crazy idea of invading and bombing Afghan into a peaceful democracy. Otherwise the Chinese will steal all of that copper, and they don't give us anything (except everything).

But it's better than that. You also have gems like this:

In 2004, American geologists, sent to Afghanistan as part of a broader reconstruction effort, stumbled across an intriguing series of old charts and data at the library of the Afghan Geological Survey in Kabul that hinted at major mineral deposits in the country. They soon learned that the data had been collected by Soviet mining experts during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, but cast aside when the Soviets withdrew in 1989.

During the chaos of the 1990s, when Afghanistan was mired in civil war and later ruled by the Taliban, a small group of Afghan geologists protected the charts by taking them home, and returned them to the Geological Survey’s library only after the American invasion and the ouster of the Taliban in 2001.

Neato, it's just like Tom Clancy! Soviet resource wars, hidden documents - it's all so exciting. And it even contains the secret weapon that bleeds the heart of every think-tanker and foreign policy wonk everywhere: the courageous, pro-American snitch. God bless you for "protecting" information that everybody already knew, "small group of Afghan geologists." And thank you, thank you, for keeping it a secret during your darkest eras and revealing it only when the American invaders arrived. I can only assume all Afghans are just as grateful for your selfish attempt at stifling development as we are!

We love to imagine the brown people we're obliterating with missiles secretly know of our righteousness, deep down on the inside. Oh, that smart local, he secretly knows we're the good guys! If you've ever read Richard Clarke's epic, high fantasy novel Scorpion's Gate, you already know this character. In it, a Saudi oil prince secretly falls in love with American democracy and carries out a coup, pretty much turning Saudi Arabia into Switzerland overnight. Of course, this is about as believable as some old, white Tea Partier in Oklahoma secretly reading the Hadith and the collected works of Sayyid Qutb in his basement, but whatever, foreign policy hawks never get tired of fetishing their own pet locals. Those Afghans know the truth, we're the good guys!

Now that we're clear who this propaganda about Afghanistan's minerals is aimed at, is it working? See for yourself:

in emerging and underdeveloped states, weak legal systems and official corruption create incentives for powerful people to exploit those resources, rather than allow mineral wealth to fuel national renewal. Think Congo or Sierra Leone. It’s easy to tick off the ways in which what political scientists call the “Resource Curse” applies to Afghanistan: a tenuous legal structure; warlordism; war; foreign interventionism; corruption throughout the political system; an uneasy and unstable relationship between provincial and national authorities; and an uneasy and unstable relationship in provinces and districts with instruments of local governance as well as national governance.

Yay, the "Resource Curse." It's one of those well-intentioned western excuses, dripping with irony and ignorance, used to insult other countries and hopefully justify a reason to bomb them. The sales pitch goes something like this: "Why, hold up there Ira---, er, Afghanistan. Looks like you got a case of the failed state. Yessir, on account of the resource curse, that is. Luckily, we can sell you the cure! Y'see, it's called counter-insurgency..."

But there's a couple problems with this. Right away, it's not a "curse". A curse implies that it's somehow mystical, a supernatural affliction. Turning into Dracula is a curse. Discovering vast mineral wealth is not a curse.

It's not a magical mystery why Afghanistan, or any other country, suffers from this so-called curse. Ackerman was quite clear: "tenuous legal structure; warlordism; war; foreign interventionism; corruption". Well gee whiz, how do you suppose that stuff happened? Foreign intervention? War? Are we so stupid that we don't realize what we're saying? War is a deliberate policy we choose, we fund, and we carry out. It's not "oops, I guess Afghanistan is cursed." We did that.

But this obliviousness is also where we see the exact impact of the mineral propaganda. This isn't "pro-war" propaganda so much as it is feeding excuses for why the war is failing. A failing war simply implies more war as icing on the cake. Remember, you can never blame the COIN strategy, it is sacred. But you can blame everything else, including Afghanistan itself. Andrew Exum spells it out for us:

But counterinsurgency strategies rest on the assumption that you can eventually weaken anti-government forces and reduce levels of violence to the point where a political process can take place in more peaceful circumstances. We now have one trillion fresh reasons why this assumption might not be valid for Afghanistan. I am not yet sure what this means for either U.S. and allied interests or the current strategy. I more or less agree with today's editorial in the New York Times that our current strategy "still seems like the best chance to stabilize Afghanistan and get American troops home". But as the editorial noted, the news last week from Afghanistan was terrible. And I'm not sure this week's news is any better.

Got that? COIN isn't the problem, no, that's our "best chance." The problem is how crappy Afghanistan is, and now they have "one trillion fresh reasons" to fight about something. Damn those ingrate Afghans, always wanting an equitable stake in their country's resources. We're just trying to move in with guns and bombs and dominate their wealth for our narrow corporate interests, you'd think they'd be nicer about it. If only their crooked government that we support wasn't so corrupt and incompetent, like President Obama and his friends from Goldman Sachs.

See, Afghanistan is war torn, so that's why our war isn't working. Clearly the solution is more war. Voila! Resource Curse!

As we see, this isn't some every day propaganda trying pitifully to sell a trillion dollar debt-war to a nation of unemployed. This is a very specific talking point explicitly targeting the foreign policy community, all as a part of the Pentagon's blame game. It makes the Pentagon appear desperate, sure, but this isn't a joke, some embarassing gaffe by the PR department.

This is very real and very effective military propaganda. Blame everything, blame the Afghans, blame their lithium, just please don't blame the war.

Turkey Analysis: Which Way is Ankara Heading? (Yenidunya)

There seems to be a lot of fuss right now about whether Turkey is "turning its face towards the East".

The query, often simplistic, arises from a number of development. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is pursuing a "Zero Problem with Neighbours" policy based on dialogue, various economic agreements, and the lifting of visa requirement. The policy includes a close relationship with both Syria and Iran.

This policy has been part of the uranium swap deal with Iran, dismissed by the West; the friction with Israel, from the "low chair" crisis up tothe  nine deaths on board the Mavi Marmara in the Freedom Flotilla; warming relations with Russia, crowned with a nuclear settlement; and the veto of sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council.



Israeli officials reiterated, following the most recent crisis in high waters, that they view the region separated into two opposite camps. There are "moderates" such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine (West Bank), Jordan, and Israel, There are "extremists" such as Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and (Palestine) Gaza. Israel asks: which will Turkey choose?

That blunt enquiry has been accompanied by some incredibly naive arguments, lacking an apparent notion of the basic principles of international relations. Nuh Yilmaz wrote in Foreign Policy magazine:

"All options are on the table” is the best phrase to describe how Turkey feels about Israel’s attack on humanitarian aid flotilla carrying more than 600 activists from 32 countries... Israel will, most likely, no longer be seen as a friendly state nor an ally, but will be treated as a rogue state by Turkey.

When I say Turkey will imply that “all options are on the table,” I do not mean that Turkey will wage a war against Israel. However, more dangerously, Israel will be seen as a state against which one should protect itself and should consider any possible action because of its unlawful and rogue character.

Others placed Ankara's "adventurism" at the centre of Turkish-American relations. Steven A. Cook of Foreign Policy argued that Turkey had not only shifted its axis but had dared to a challenge the US:

It is hard to admit, but after six decades of strategic cooperation, Turkey and the United States are becoming strategic competitors -- especially in the Middle East. This is the logical result of profound shifts in Turkish foreign and domestic politics and changes in the international system.

Some tried to find a formula for Turkey's "shift". On Thursday, Turkish daily Hurriyet asked whether there would be a "Middle East Union" under Turkey's leadership in the future. This would build on a joint declaration signed among Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, seeking to lift visas and increase the level of cooperation in the fields of energy, health, agriculture, trade and customs.

Let me be blunt with you and with those who are wringing their hands. There has been no change in Turkey's axis.

Ankara's ultimate destination is still full membership in the European Union. Turkey's efforts and regional diplomatic initiatives are a part of its economic development and a part of its struggle to turn into a "strategic" mid-power which can help (re)shape the region.

The tension between a mid-power in Ankara and an American strategic partner --- a Middle East "spearhead" --- in Israel is the outcome of a power struggle between two allies at a time when the latter is under pressures and the benefits of "direct friendly support" of Washington are being seriously being questioned, inside and outside the US. The perception arises that Turkey is trying to fill the space Israel has left/will be forced to leave.

In the context of Turkey's economic boom and diplomatic manoeuvres to increase its credibility in the region, the  complicating factor is that its part to the European Union is currently blocked. Out of 34 chapters to be confirmed to accept Turkey as a part of the Union, only 12 chapters have been addressed so far. Of the other 22, 17 are being blocked by other countries --- eight alone by Cyprus.

The lesson to take from this dead end is crystal-clear: without political concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea, there will be no European Union in the future for Turkey. So Ankara is not only  trying to gain time by looking to its back garden but also trying to knock on Europe's door with an increased credibility.

At the end of the day, Ankara's manoeuvres are not a new invention but the reflection of an active political agenda. As the president of the Washington-based American-Turkish Council, retired Ambassador James Holmes, said, "Turkey is expanding its interests, rather than isolating itself."

The current international alignments are suitable to Turkey's interests, since Washington needs Ankara more than other countries. That is not because of the political swamp in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also because of the ongoing diplomatic track with Iran and Syria, in the aftermath of Bush the Junior's imperial policies and Israel's perceived aggression in the region. Indeed, engagement and diplomacy is preferable to Washington rather than confrontations that could dynamite Obama's  "change", slapping aside unclenched fists and preventing a settlement between Israel and Ramallah.

There are limits to this political agenda. Although Ankara is ready with an economic surplus to deliver to its neighbours, it has not solved its own problems.

The weakest chain of the "Zero Problem" policy rattled in Turkey's relations with Armenia. Ankara couldn't break through long-standing fearsin the face of threats over energy supplies from the "little brother" Azerbaijan.

And, within Turkey, thousands of Kurdish children are in prisons and more officials of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) are arrested. Indeed, the war with the Kurdish separatist group PKK is accelerating day-by-day since the Erdogan Government see the Kurdish political movement as a "rival".

And, of course, there are always the Armenian "genocide" issue and the Cyprus problem...

Another limit is Israel . West Jerusalem still means more than a regional power to Washington, remaining and a "friend" and a nuclear "democratic" power. Indeed, Washington sorted out the most recent Flotilla problem and gave a green light to Tel Aviv for an internal inquiry into the violence on the Mavi Marmara. Israel is not discredited in the eyes of Washington just because of a few days, not when military/intelligence relations are indispensable for both sides.

Still, if Ankara can show progress in its Kurdish and Cyprus issues in the near future along with continuing diplomacy advances in the region and a move back from blunter discourse towards Israel, it can continue increasing both its credibility to use as leverage against the EU and to promote its strategic importance to Washington.