Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai Joining the Taliban? The Story Behind the Headline (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

The war in Afghanistan is disintegrating before our very eyes. Our counterinsurgency strategy is broken, and the Pentagon knows it. The so-called "emergency" funding requested months ago by the Obama administration now seems destined to die a slow, bureaucratic death in congress due to overwhelming pressure by citizens. Our allies in NATO have either reached their peak of military involvement, as with the UK, or have already begun to dismantle their troop presence, as with Canada and so many others. Other countries in the region are already vying for power after the US leaves, even as the Pentagon insists its July 2011 withdrawal date will only be the "beginning of a process."

But what about Afghanistan itself? What about President Hamid Karzai, our ally and head of the "Host Nation" government? The theory put forward by the pundit class is usually some variation of the "bloodbath" theme. Our allies in Kabul like Karzai will  be overrun and annihilated by the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s New Propaganda Scam: Poor Afghans, They’re Rich! (Mull)

This appears to be more media myth-making, however, as we see from Karzai's political manoeuvring. Not only is he threatening to join the Taliban. He may have already done just that.

Karzai has begun negotiating with the Taliban and even received formal terms of a peace treaty from Taliban-aligned Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,  but this does not necessarily mean that Karzai has allied with them. Negotiations are merely the first step in any peace process, no matter the circumstances.

Instead we have to look deeper inside this peace process to see the real endgame Karzai is working toward, that of a nominal, Pashtun-nationalist government in Kabul overlaying a Taliban-dominated countryside. Together they function not only as a crime family capable of exploiting Afghanistan's resources (minerals, opium, timber, etc.) but also as a highly effective proxy for Pakistan's interminable battle against Indian influence.

What is this Pashtun-nationalist government? While Karzai was formerly part of the Northern Alliance, he is also a Pashtun, as is the vast majority of the Taliban movement. The Taliban are quite adept at playing up this identity:

The Taliban are more than an expression of Pashtun nationalism, of course. They represent a reactionary movement that idealizes the simplicity and extreme conservatism of 7th century Islam. By burnishing this ideology, the Taliban is able, absurdly, to attract support beyond its Pashtun base.

The ethnic component, though, is a formidable one. It all but guaranteed a certain degree of success by the Taliban in all of “Pashtunistan,” in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan. Yet all the while, the ethnic map imposes constraints, if not limits, on how far the Taliban can expand.

They were able to seize power in most of Afghanistan before 2001, although the “Northern Alliance” — made up primarily of ethnic Tajiks – managed to hold out until Americans arrived and smashed the regime in Kabul. Since then, the Taliban have had a harder time operating outside “Pashtunistan.”

Not any more. They're now able to expand beyond "Pashtunistan". Thomas Ruttig reports that the Taliban are beginning to move far into Northern Afghanistan, in areas traditionally quite hostile to their oppressive rule. The ethnic Hazara in this region were part of the Northern Alliance, which fought the Taliban during the 1990's until the Americans came in 2001. The Taliban have a history of anti-Shi'a Muslim violence there, but this could be changing, as Ruttig notes [emphasis mine]:

Most Hazaras had been hostile to the Taleban’s advance into their region in the 1990s after the movement that considered Shia as non-Muslim had committed some mass murders against the minority group, for example in Mazar-e Sharif, Yakaolang (Bamian province) and at the Robatak Pass (Samangan). The Taleban conquered Bamian, the largest town in Hazarajat, late in their campaign that brought them control over more than 90 per cent of Afghanistan’s territory in that period. It was supported by an agreement with one faction of the main Hazara party Hezb-e Wahdat, led by Ustad Muhammad Akbari (now an MP in Kabul), a rival of the leader of Wahdat’s main wing Abdul Karim Khalili (now a Vice President). Under this deal, Akbari’s fighters guaranteed that Bamian remained calm and accepted a presence of Kandahari Taleban in the town.

In the meantime, the Taleban have – at least officially – moderated their position vis-à-vis the Shia community. Mulla Omar has declared repeatedly that the movement would not tolerate any ‘sectarian’ bias. This can be interpreted as an attempt to woo the Hazara population that feels neglected by the central government in Kabul.

In addition to supporting the Taliban presence in Hazara areas, Akbari was also a supporter of Karzai's rape law, claiming it actually protected women's rights. While the Hazara have historically fought the Taliban, Akbari has shown time and again he is willing to compromise with whoever is in power. When the Northern Alliance was winning, Akbari supported them. Until the Taliban came, when he supported them. And now it's Karzai's Pashtun coalition with the Taliban, so Akbari is willing to take oppressive Shi'a laws in exchange for expansion of Taliban control.

In a separate interview, Ruttig explains further the dynamic between the Taliban and former enemies in the Northern Alliance [emphasis mine]:

The Karzai government already has shown that it is more sensitive about what conservative sectors in the clergy -- the so-called jihadi leaders -- demand than what civil society is concerned about - remember the "Shia Personnel Law.[...]

[Former head of National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh's] resignation might have to do with all this. Politically, he belongs to the current which emerged from the former mujahedin Northern Alliance (NA). This current -- represented by Karzai's 2009 main rival at the elections, Dr. Abdullah -- sees Karzai's reconciliation approach with skepticism. It technically boycotted the peace jirga. (It did not use that word, though.) On one hand, this skepticism reflects concerns broader political and social circles share, like the organized women. On the other hand, the NA had not been known for a tendency toward power sharing and fears losing further influence if the Taliban joined a future government. Finally, if Thursday's Guardian is right, Saleh also saw Karzai moving closer to Pakistan. The relations between the NA and Pakistan have "traditionally" been strained.

Karzai seems to be marginalizing, if not outright rejecting from the political process, members of the Northern Alliance, usually in favor of those willing to side with the Taliban. He isn't so much joining the Taliban in the sense of being subservient to Mullah Omar's Quetta Shura, but rather in the sense of forming a power-sharing government. The Taliban will still control large amounts of Afghanistan, and we even see them moving back into areas they haven't held since the war with the NA during the 90's. And they may be willing to negotiate as "brothers" with Karzai.

Why would the Taliban share power with Karzai? More Ruttig [emphasis mine]:

We should not believe our anti-terrorism psy-ops and understand that the Taliban are a political movement with political aims. Such a movement will compromise when serious talks are held. Some Taliban know that they cannot rule Afghanistan on their own. We heard this discussion amongst Taliban in 2008 and 2009, but the surge closed their ranks again.

The Taliban will maintain Karzai's government in Kabul to  so they can effectively rule Afghanistan. After all, Mullah Omar is unlikely to have much success as President. Instead, the militants will need Karzai for stuff like this [emphasis mine]:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai said on Friday he was concerned about a looming battle over his country's untapped mineral resources and that Afghanistan's major donors should be prioritised in exploiting them. [...]

"I hope we will be able to manage it properly both in terms of rivalry from the international bidders in Afghanistan and also within Afghanistan, we should be able to manage the returns of those mineral extractions properly for Afghanistan," he said in a seminar hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs.

Karzai has enough credibility to deal with foreign investors (though maybe not American investors), allowing them to exploit Afghanistan's resources as well as to manage the funds properly "within Afghanistan", which of course means pay-off for the Taliban who legitimise Karzai's presidency. Afghanistan will be ruled by oligarchs, a mafia family controlling the country's resources. Karzai is not simply joining the Taliban, they are forming a coalition government, albeit a criminal and oppressive one.

But what about that other piece of Afghanistan's post-war tyranny, that of being a puppet for Pakistan's war against India? For the same reasons as the Taliban, Pakistan's military dictatorship also appreciates the benefits of a Taliban-Karzai coalition government:

"Morally, Afghanistan should give access as a priority to those countries that have helped Afghanistan massively in the past few years," he said, adding that Japan, the second biggest donor to Afghanistan in terms of money pledged, would be a welcome investment partner.

In addition to providing a training ground for terrorism against India, Afghanistan is also useful for undermining India's economy and trade partners. Japan is indeed the second largest donor of aid to Afghanistan, but the largest in the region is... New Delhi:

India has offered $750 million in aid to Kabul (Reuters) since 2001, making it the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. Besides helping to rebuild Afghan roads, airlines, and power plants, and providing support to the health and education sectors, New Delhi also seeks to spread its own brand of democracy in Kabul. Not only will future Afghan parliaments sit in a building that India helped construct, but Afghan civil servants, diplomats, and police officials will have received training from their Indian counterparts.

India's contribution has been large, but when weighed against other international donors, like Japan's billions, they fall much farther down the list of "prioritised" trading partners. Not only does Japan push India down the line, which is really not that serious considering India has mines of its own, but it also affects India's bottom line in other ways [emphasis mine]:

Traditionally, Japan has been the second largest destination of Indian exports (major exports include gems, marine products, iron ore, and cotton yarn). India is also a major importer of goods from Japan, and its importance has been growing in recent years (major imports include machinery, plant-related products, transport equipment, and electronic machinery).

Japan will need to import less from India thanks to its opportunity in Afghanistan. Obviously that's good for Pakistan, as it forces India into some uncomfortable economic positions, only one tiny example of how Afghanistan can be used against Indian interests. The Karzai-Taliban government would be compliant with Pakistan across the board, with the Taliban providing foot soldiers for Pakistan's "strategic depth" against India, and Hamid Karzai would be able to counter Indian influence in Kabul, whether that means obscure complications like new trade competition with Indian ore exporters or overtly downplaying India's role in post-war Afghanistan.

That is what will become of Afghanistan when then US withdrawal is over: a Taliban-Karzai coalition government, and a client state for Pakistan.

It's worth noting, however, that this is not a rationale for more war in Afghanistan. This maneuvering is happening now, in the middle of a massive US escalation. Our military involvement does nothing but exacerbate these effects on Afghanistan. Our violent war against the Taliban legitimizes them as freedom fighters. Our support of the crooked Karzai regime gives him credibility to run a sovereign state, as well as assuming all of the economic responsibilities that entails. And our support for Pakistan's military dictatorship, at the expense of their democratically elected civilian government, enables the Pakistani national security strategy of perpetual war against India, whether through terrorism, trade, or conventional means.

If the US has any interest in seeing a different outcome for Afghanistan, troops, special forces, or any kind of war are simply not an option. Rather Afghanistan's post-war tyranny can be undermined through other ways, such as developing Afghanistan (everything from roads to education to a free press) to the point where extremist ideologies, as well as the endemic corruption and oppression, like those of Karzai and the Taliban, will no longer be tolerated or sustainable. The US can also push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, allowing a credible test of legitimacy for Afghanistan's government, to allow for more ethical international trade activities. And the US can engage directly with the civilian government of Pakistan, allowing peaceful Pakistani citizens to set and implement their own foreign policy, rather than have it controlled by the unaccountable warmongers under the head of the military, General Kiyani.

As domestic pressure finally chokes off support for the war in Washington, it's helpful to keep a close eye on these machinations by Karzai and the Taliban. Supporters of the war in the US will make claims about an impending bloodbath, but clearly Karzai's regime will survive our absence. War supporters will also claim that these problems which were created by our war can only be fixed by...more war. It's simply not true.

Post-war Afghanistan will be a miserable place indeed, but just as in 2009, 2007, 2001, and 1979, more war in Afghanistan and Pakistan is not the answer. The US occupation which feeds Afghanistan's misery must be brought to an end, and only then can we set about the process of developing the country, eradicating extremism, and making peace for the region as a whole.

Afghanistan: What Happens When Our Allies "Do More"? (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes at Rethink Afghanistan:

If you've been following the recent military operations in Helmand and Kandahar, you've likely noticed that it's been something of an unmitigated disaster. And not just a disaster in the sense that most of our military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been disasters, this is the make-or-break moment for the US counterinsurgency strategy. My colleague Derrick Crowe writes:

No reporter should let Secretary Gates, General McChrystal, or President Obama off the hook in the coming months regarding the make-or-break nature of the Kandahar operation for their (poorly) chosen COIN strategy in Afghanistan. As described in the report to Congress, Kandahar/Helmand is the main effort, and everything else is either a “shaping,” “supporting,” or “economy of force (read: leftovers)” operation. Kandahar/Helmand is the COIN strategy. If ISAF fails there, it fails, period.

Fail there, fail everywhere. Couldn't be any more clear than that. And that's not his characterization, he's citing the people in charge. Derrick then offers some advice:

Members of Congress considering funding the ongoing Kandahar/Helmand/escalation strategy should read these comments from Secretary Gates with alarm. He’s hedging and trying to set expectations because he knows the COIN effort is in serious, “bleeding ulcer” trouble. Congress should save us all a whole lot of trouble and vote against the $33 billion war spending supplemental under consideration.

Right, when you pressure your representative to block the funding, they need to be made fully aware that our strategy is broken and ruinous. But the problem is that it won't be that easy. Politicians can be very slippery, even the ones we like, and they'll try to shift the blame on to someone else. "No, it's not the strategy," they'll say, "it's our allies. Our allies need to do more."

The folks on Capitol Hill are big believers in Counterinsurgency doctrine, and as we've seen, COIN is not a doctrine, but an ideology that can never be proven or dis-proven. Communism isn't the problem, it's "human nature" that fails. Conservatism can't fail, only you can fail to be conservative. And our COIN strategy can't fail, it has to be the fault of our allies.

But that's wrong. Our allies have been doing more, a lot more. NATO,  Afghan President Karzai, and Pakistan have all been participating in President Obama's escalation strategy, and that is only making the problem worse. If we see what it is our allies are actually doing, we'll find that the COIN defenders are wrong. Our counterinsurgency strategy, the idea that occupation and war have anything remotely to do with stabilizing and developing a nation, is the problem. The US will try to shift the blame onto our allies, but as we'll see, Derrick is right: it's our war that is the problem.

We'll start with our friends in NATO, Canada. We've talked about the new Canadian strategy before, but their "signature project" is especially important to note. They're working on a huge water distribution system in Kandahar province, and if completed, could provide a sustainable development for Afghans to maintain and operate on their own without Western assistance, that supposedly being the overarching goal of our mission in Afghanistan. However, the project has hit a bit of snag [emphasis mine]:

The $50-million Dahla Dam irrigation project, touted as Canada’s best chance for a lasting legacy in Afghanistan, has all but stalled as its lead contractor, a partnership involving the Canadian engineering giant SNC Lavalin, battles for control against a sometimes violent Afghan security firm widely believed to be loyal to Afghanistan’s ruling Karzai family, insiders close to the project say.[...]

Foremost among the setbacks, insiders say, was a dramatic confrontation on Feb. 20, when rising tensions between Canadian security officials hired to oversee the project and members of Watan Risk Management, a group of Afghan mercenaries with close ties to the Karzai family, culminated in a “Mexican standoff” — the guns hired to protect the project actually turned on each other in a hair-trigger confrontation.[...]

“Ever since, the project has been basically held hostage by the Karzai mafia, who are using ‘security concerns’ to stall the work. They are able to put fear in the heart of the Canadian contractors, telling them ‘There is evil outside the gates that will eat you.’ The longer they delay, the more money the Afghan security teams make. The Canadians have good intentions but that is the reality.”

Oops, it looks like the Canadians tried to do more and accidentally bumped into another one of our allies, President Karzai. He's got militia in Kandahar busily working on another part of our COIN strategy, extending the control of the central Kabul government, the "Host Nation" as it's called.

Only Karzai is a criminal with no legitimacy, so he has to extend central government control the only way you can expand an illegitimate, criminal enterprise: violence, intimidation, coercion, all are in play here. Karzai is also desperately dependent on western welfare, so if he expects to remain in power, he'll need to drag out western development projects as long as he possibly can. If "security concerns" will delay a project, then you make your own if you have to. Our strategy requires him to expand his mafia empire; what else is he supposed to do?

And what about the Pakistani military? Our politicians are constantly whining for them to do more for our awful strategy. Well, they are doing more. Here's what that looks like:

"I lost my sense when I reached the door of my house and saw and heard the crying of my close neighbors and relatives--as if hell fell on me. When I saw people putting the dead bodies of my children, parents, and other relatives in bed I couldn't bear it anymore and fell on the ground..."

- A 25-year-old man who lost nine family members when two shells fired by security forces hit his house during the battle of Loi Sam (FATA).

Nice job "protecting the civilian population" there by the Pakistani army --- those innocent women and children will never again be threatened by the Taliban. And the army's "doing more" has the same results as the US "population-centric" strategy of killing civilians by the houseful across the border in Afghanistan. The military assaults legitimize the insurgency and turn the population against the government. That works out great for the other part of our strategy, showering Pakistan's military dictatorship with money and weapons.

Pakistan's army supports the Taliban as "strategic depth" in its war with India. As long as the Taliban are empowered by US and Pakistani military assaults, they survive to be used against India in proxy wars spanning Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Kashmir, and really most of the sub-continent. And as long as those extremist militants are there to threaten, the US has an excuse to give Pakistan...tada! Money and weapons to use in military assaults in the tribal regions. See how this works? Our allies in the Pakistani military are working our COIN strategy with everything they've got, and it's going great for them. Want Pakistan to do more? Gladly.

Our allies are working hard. Canada, one of our last friends in NATO, took our notion of development seriously and are replacing their military with aid projects. But Karzai is also working hard to extend the authority of the host nation, and that requires him to derail development in favor if violence, insecurity, and criminality. Pakistan's army is also working hard to clear its tribal area sanctuaries, so the Taliban can be safe elsewhere to engage in proxy war with India, and that includes in Afghanistan. And then we're back at the beginning, with the US then escalating its occupation to fight the Taliban.

The problem is not NATO, Karzai, or Pakistan. They're doing exactly what they're supposed to do. You might reason that Karzai and Pakistan's military despots aren't good choices for allies, but that misses the point. They are the strategy. And that strategy is the problem, not action or lack of action from our allies.

You're going to see this meme more and more in the coming weeks and months. As we see from Derrick's reporting, the military is well aware that it's failing big time in Afghanistan. So rather than admitting our COIN strategy is a flaming wreck, look for the blame to fall on our allies. Folks who talk about the relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan will be elevated, so look forward to [re-]learning old factoids such as that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence  helped create the Taliban and so forth. The White House will continue to pretend to be outraged and confused with Karzai, even though they know full well he's corrupt and illegitimate. And of course, the US will continue to gripe that NATO allies won't send more troops, even though it's the non-military development projects that work.

Don't fall for it. You can demand that Congress block any more funding for the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Cut off the COIN strategy at its source, the money. You can demand that congress abandon Karzai and push for free and fair elections in Afghanistan, so that the central government has legitimacy. You can demand that the US engage with and empower the elected civilian government of Pakistan, rather than  its military despots like General Kiyani. And you can demand they support non-military projects like our allies, Canada. Don't let them get away with pushing the blame off.

The problem lies squarely with the US war.