Iran Document: The Supreme Leader's Speech (4 June)

An excerpt from the Supreme Leader's remarks at the Tehran Friday Prayers commemorating the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Translation by Iran Focus:

Today, in the first part of the sermon, I will share some points about the esteemed Imam [Khomeini]. We will study the Imam as a symbol or a criterion. This is important because the main challenge of all sizeable social developments, including revolutions, is to safeguard the principal course of action offered by the said revolution or development. This is the most important challenge for any powerful social change, in the sense that such a change embodies certain goals and is geared to move towards those goals, inviting others to join in. This sense of direction towards the goals of a revolution or social movement must be preserved. Otherwise, that revolution will turn into its complete opposite and operate against its own goals.

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The sense of direction for any revolution serves as its fundamental identity. If the sense of direction were to change and attention is diverted from the main path, then the revolution will not achieve its ends. This is significant because such change is gradual and intangible. It is not as if a 180 degree turn would take place right at the outset. Rather, it starts from smaller angles, and as it continues, the distance between the main path, which is the right one, will increase with such deviations on a daily basis.


Usually, those who seek to alter the identity of the revolution will not have an official flag or will not label themselves as such. They do not act in a way that shows their opposition to the [main] path, and sometimes, they even perform an action or make a statement to show support for the path of the revolution. They are creating a divergence to make the revolution move away from its direction and ultimately bring it down. In order to prevent this wrong direction or deviation from taking hold, there must be certain criteria. If such criteria are in place, and if they are clear and readily observed by the people, then a deviation would never take place. Moreover, if someone were to move in the direction of that deviation, they will be identified by the masses of people. But, if such criteria were absent, then the threat will become serious. Now, what is the criterion for our own revolution?

There is a threat. The enemy, the enemy of the revolution and the enemy of the Imam will not stand by. The enemy is trying to uproot this revolution. How? Through deviations from the path of the revolution. So, we must have a criterion, and the best criterion is the Imam himself and his path.

We must explicitly make reference to the Imam, along with his stance against the arrogant powers, against reactionary movements, against western liberal democracy, and against hypocrites and charlatans. One must make a direct reference to the Imam with regards to such matters. Those who were influenced by the Imam’s outstanding personality, and those who heard his positions, surrendered themselves. We cannot cover up or hide the Imam’s positions, or diminish the power of the ones we deem as too radical, so that certain people would appreciate it.

Those who follow the Imam must know that the Imam would not have joined a coalition that explicitly waves the flag of opposition against the Imam and Islam. It cannot be accepted that the US, Britain, CIA, Mossad, monarchists, and the Monafeqin [pejorative term used by the regime to refer to the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran] are all in agreement about an axis, and then the same axis claims to follow the Imam’s path. This is not acceptable.

Another fundamental point about the path of Imam is that he repeatedly stated that judgment about people must take place using their current circumstances as a criterion. The individuals’ past actions are not of concern. The past comes into play when the current situation is not clear. That is when we would resort to the past to discover how it was in order draw a line to the present. But, if the individuals’ current situation is the complete opposite of their past, then the latter would be irrelevant. This is the judgment that Imam Ali made in the case of Talhe and Zobeyr. You should know that Talhe and Zobeyr were not insignificant figures. Zobeyr had a glowing history, which very few of Imam Ali’s followers shared. After Abu Bakr became the caliph, during the very first days, a number of Muslims rose up during Abu Bakr’s sermon and opposed him. They told him, ‘you are wrong. Ali is right.’ The names of these people have been recorded in history, and it is not just recounted by the Shiites. It is all recorded in history books. One of the people who had risen up to defend Ali’s right was Talha bin Ubaidullah. Such was his background. Twenty-five years separate that day from the day Zubayr pulled out a sword against Ali. Now, our Sunni brothers want to excuse Talhe and Zubayr ibn al-Awwam and say their knowledge could only lead them to that point. Anyhow, whatever the case was, we are not in a position to say what their situation is as they face God. But, what did Ali do with them? He fought against them. He took an army from Medina to Kufa and Basra to fight against Talha and Zubayr. This means that their pasts simply vanished.

This was Imam’s criterion. [In 1979] there were some people who were on the plane alongside Imam and came to Iran from Paris. There were executed during the Imam's time for treason. There were also some who had contacts with Imam during the periods he was in Najaf and later in Paris. They were treated cordially by the Imam at the beginning of the revolution. But, later, their positions and deeds led Imam to reject them....

Pakistan Analysis: Preparing the American Invasion (Mull)

Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminaland Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Gareth Porter has an interesting article detailing the CIA's misgivings about the drone program in Pakistan. He reports [emphasis mine]:

"Some of the CIA operators are concerned that, because of its blowback effect, it is doing more harm than good," said Jeffrey Addicott, former legal adviser to U.S. Special Forces and director of the Centre for Terrorism Law at St Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas, in an interview with IPS. [...]

Because the drone strikes kill innocent civilians and bystanders along with leaders from far away, they "infuriate the Muslim male", said Addicott, thus making them more willing to join the movement. The men in Pakistan's tribal region "view Americans as cowards and weasels", he added. [...]


The complaints by CIA operatives about the drone strikes' blowback effect reported by Addicott are identical to warnings by military and intelligence officials reported in April 2009 by Jonathan Landay of McClatchy newspapers. Landay quoted an intelligence official with deep involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as saying al Qaeda and the Taliban had used the strikes in propaganda to "portray Americans as cowards who are afraid to face their enemies and risk death".

It's easy to see this as only the 10,000th reason why the drone strikes are a terrible idea, but the CIA's complaints here could  hint at something even more dangerous. The "blowback" is that Taliban and Al-Qa'eda recruit heavily from propaganda about American cowardice.

The CIA is not questioning fundamental assumptions about the War on Terror, like whether or not extra-judicial executions of suspected criminals is actually a real solution, rather than an escalation of senseless political violence. No, let's be very clear about what the CIA complaint is: we're far away, and that's bad. There's more:

"The people at the top are not believers," said Addicott, referring to the CIA. "They know that the objective is not going to be achieved."

That objective is to destroy the leadership of the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda.  But the American officials believe they can't do that with drone strikes, or at least drone strikes alone. The drone strikes are politically unpopular, and even some serious counter-insurgency bloggers criticize the program bitterly. Basically, they're looking for an excuse to do something more than drone strikes in Pakistan. President Obama may have found that excuse:

The U.S. military is reviewing options for a unilateral strike in Pakistan in the event that a successful attack on American soil is traced to the country's tribal areas, according to senior military officials.[...]

The U.S. options for potential retaliatory action rely mainly on air and missile strikes, but could also employ small teams of U.S. Special Operations troops already positioned along the border with Afghanistan.[...]

In other words, if there is another incident like the car bomb in Times Square, America could send troops into Pakistan. Beyond these new plans, the military already has the authorization to deploy American soldiers [emphasis mine]:

The secret directive, signed in September by Gen. David H. Petraeus, authorizes the sending of American Special Operations troops to both friendly and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa to gather intelligence and build ties with local forces. Officials said the order also permits reconnaissance that could pave the way for possible military strikes in Iran if tensions over its nuclear ambitions escalate. [...]

Its goals are to build networks that could “penetrate, disrupt, defeat or destroy” Al Qaeda and other militant groups, as well as to “prepare the environment” for future attacks by American or local military forces, the document said. [...]

In broadening its secret activities, the United States military has also sought in recent years to break its dependence on the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies for information in countries without a significant American troop presence. [...]

Looks like the military agrees with the CIA that the agency's drone strikes can't do the job. They want American military forces on the ground.

For their part, Pakistan doesn't want any American troops on the ground in those tribal areas. Or do they? The Pakistani military supports the Taliban as part of its national security strategy, so even when they attack Taliban areas, they usually only succeed at displacing huge numbers of civilians while the Taliban flees, which creates enormous popular backlash. The military declares victory, pulls out, and the Taliban returns safely. Take the most recent army incursion into Orakzai district:

A statement issued by the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said that the Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s visit to Orakzai marked the end of the military operation in the region, and that people displaced due to the war could expect to return to their homeland soon.[...]

However, locals said that the battle is far from over, as extremists are still holding a large part of the agency.

“The military has cleared only Lower Orakzai, while the situation in upper and central Orakzai has not changed much, as the army is yet to evict the Taliban from these areas. The battle is far from over,” The Daily Times quoted local residents of Lower Orakzai, as saying.

“In Upper Orakzai, security forces took control of Daburi, while Mamozai, Ghaljo and Shahoo areas are still in Taliban control,” they added.

General Kiani, the head of the Pakistani military, gets to have it both ways. The Taliban are safe, while he still declares victory over the terrorists. This Dawn editorial explains:

Therein lies a great difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome: moving from the ‘clear’ phase of counter-insurgency to the ‘hold’ stage, so that the ground can be laid for the ‘build’ and ‘transfer’ stages. From Bajaur to Mohmand and Bara to FR Peshawar, the phenomenon has repeated itself: operations by security forces to clear out an area are deemed a ‘success’ only to see militants sneak back in the weeks and months that follow. Sometimes forces are withdrawn from one area to focus on another trouble spot, leaving a vacuum in the first area which is soon filled by militants, as has happened in FR Peshawar after security forces were sent from there to deal with militants in Kala Dhaka, Mansehra.

What also makes the claim about success in Orakzai doubtful is geography. The Khyber-Orakzai-Kurram border areas have long been centres of militancy. If Orakzai is clear, then by that logic the Tirah area in Khyber and the east of Kurram should be clear too. However, the evidence suggests otherwise.

Is it really a difficulty that the army has struggled to overcome? Or is it going exactly according to plan? Are they not clearing at all, but rather "herding" the militants to safety?

The editorial is right that geography is important here. Many of the militants in Orakzai have fled from recent operations in Waziristan. Now they are fleeing from one part of Orakzai to another, farther away from the northern tribal areas. The Pakistani army is, apparently, pushing the militants away from the tribal areas and towards Balochistan, where the Taliban's Quetta Shura is based. The result is that even if the US invades the tribal areas, it still won't damage the military assets of the Taliban.

We see more preparations by the army in Balochistan:

[Baloch Human Rights Council] has learnt through local sources and press statements of Baloch National Movement (BNM) central leadership that within the last couple of days there has been a significant movement of Pakistani troops in the area of district Gwadar and Dasht. A heavy contingent of military including 80 trucks carrying soldiers, 40 armoured vehicles, artillery, 8 gunship helicopters, and 20 water supplying tankers are reportedly part of the first wave of troop deployment in the region. There is news of more troops on the way to join the military operation.

And this isn't some half-assed "Taliban-clearing" operation, this is for real:

Reports coming in from the area stated that the soldiers have complete control of the meager water resources and have blocked all access to the local population. The livestock has been confiscated in the service of the soldiers and a large number was slaughtered to starve the inhabitants. Sources mentioned that people are not allowed to leave their homes even in case of a medical emergency.

There have been reported incidents of artillery fire directed at the civilian residential areas while gunship helicopters hovered over the towns. According to witnesses, incidents of aerial bombardment of villages have taken place and the fear of casualties is growing, complicated by the military blockade and denial of access to media and medical personnel. An unconfirmed number of youth has been taken away by the soldiers and their whereabouts are yet unknown.

Here's the catch: unlike the relatively autonomous Pakistanis in the tribal regions, the Pakistanis in Balochistan are so beat down and oppressed by the army that they would welcome a NATO presence (who they believe, foolishly, would help them fight for independence). But as we noted, the Taliban's all-important Quetta Shura is in Balochistan, so the Pakistani military can't have any American troops that close to a key military asset. So they instead "clear" Balochistan of "Islamic terrorists" (democratic Baloch dissidents, not Taliban) and remove it from American calculations.

What is the end result? The Pakistani military has effectively fortified the Quetta Shura, while paving the way for American invasion of North and South Waziristan, Pakhtunkhwa, etc. And just like Kiani, everyone gets to declare a fake victory. President Obama gets to look tough by cracking down on attacks from the tribal area, the Pakistanis can throw a fit and claim they already "cleared" those areas, we downplay the harm of the drone strikes (we're not cowards anymore), Kayani protects his state-sponsored terrorism program (the Taliban), the army has an excuse to viciously crush Baloch separatists, and even Al-Qa'eda itself will be rewarded with another propaganda victory, that of more American "crusaders" on Pashtun soil.

Who doesn't get to declare victory? Everybody else. American troop deaths will continue to skyrocket, American taxpayers will continue to pay for it as their economy crumbles, Pakistani civilians will be massacred by all sides, Pakistani democracy will continue to suffocate under military despotism, and the Taliban will still threaten the national security of countless nations, most notoriously nuclear-armed India.

For those keeping count, that's three simultaneous US wars; Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Shall we go for Iran and make it an even four? North Korea sure is getting uppity.

I feel stupid now for questioning Tom Hayden's claims about the so-called Long War. Even as withdrawal from Iraq becomes conventional wisdom, and we continue to force Congress to end the war in Afghanistan, it's still not over. 104 months into the outrageous War on Terror, it appears we're just getting started.

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