The Engagement is Official: US, Iran in Nuclear Talks

Related Post: A Beginners' Guide to Engagement with Iran

The  initial news last night was that Undersecretary of State William Burns was in London in  "5+1" talks with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China on Iran's nuclear programme. Then came the revelation. Iran will soon be there as well: Washington is dropping its policy of no direct discussions with Tehran. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the brief announcement, "There's nothing more important than trying to convince Iran to cease its efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon." You can choose the political spin on this from different newspapers. For both The New York Times and The Washington Post, "U.S. to Join Iran Talks Over Nuclear Program". For The Daily Telegraph, desperate to prove Tehran is giving way, "Iran Offered New Nuclear Talks". So let's leave it to a State Department official to make the concise summary, "It was kind of silly that we had to walk out of the room" whenever Iranians were nearby.

While Iranian media have highlighted the US change in position, there has been no official Iranian reaction to the news. However, the 5+1 meeting and Clinton's statement follow contact between US and the Iran at The Hague conference on Afghanistan. Ensuing signals indicated that Iran was happy to take up engagement: last week President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Tehran will shake an "honest hand".

This American decision confirms a significant break from the Bush Administration's attempt to isolate Iran. First, Bush officials broke off direct contact with Tehran in May 2003, rejecting an Iranian letter which offered detailed talks. A double game followed: Washington would push for more economic sanctions against Iran while European countries persisted in negotations. When those negotiations were close to a breakthrough, the US Government would pull back from any agreement, and the finger-wagging --- from both the US and Iran --- would resume.

Perhaps more importantly, the offer of direct talks may put Obama's military commanders in their place. Last week both Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, pointedly warned that Israel would be attacking an operating Iranian nuclear facility. Vice President Joe Biden finally stepped in publicly, telling CNN that Israel "would be ill-advised" to carry out an airstrike.

The Obama Administration has also made this move despite (possibly because of) reports that President Ahmadinejad will today announce that the nuclear plant at Bushehr is now active. And it has done so despite yesterday's news that Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, detained in Iran since January, has been charged with espionage.

This is the clearest signal that Obama, in contrast to his predecessor, has decided that it is better to live with an Iran with a nuclear programme rather than to pursue confrontation. Doing so, Washington hopes to reap the benefit of Iranian assistance --- or non-interference --- with American initiatives from Afghanistan to the Middle East.

Afghanistan: The Problem of Military-Led Development

Readers will know of our concern over a "militarised" US approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan. While President Obama's declared strategy called for an increase in civilian participation, and while Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General David Petraeus have declared the need for non-military involvement, the fundamental point remains: the Pentagon is, or is seeking to be, in control of American programmes in both countries.

Last week, a 25-page report by 11 non-governmental aid organisations (ActionAid, Afghanaid, CARE Afghanistan, Christian Aid, Cordaid, DACAAR, Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation,
International Rescue Committee, Marie Stopes International, Oxfam International, Save the Children UK) eloquently set out these concerns.

The report is available in full on the Oxfam website. Pertinent and troubling extracts include:

1. On the US emphasis on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, involving the military, State Department, and Agency for International Development:

When security and other conditions exist which allow specialised civilian development actors to operate, the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or humanitarian sector. PRT engagement in development activities is neither effective nor sustainable.

2. On the damage to the distinction between humanitarian and military operations:

There has been an increasing blurring of this distinction....Some military actors engage in relief activities for the purposes of force protection; and certain...contingents, such as the US and France, are failing to identify themselves as combatants by the continued use of unmarked, white vehicles, which are conventionally used by the UN and aid agencies. The expansion of PRT activities and the use of heavily protected contractors to implement reconstruction projects have also contributed to a blurring of the civil-military distinction. Ultimately, these practices have contributed to a diminution in the perceived independence of NGOs, increased the risk for aid workers, and reduced the areas in which NGOs can safely operate.

3. On the difficulties of building up local groups, the counter-insurgency strategy favoured by General Petraeus:

Through the Afghan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) district councils are established by the
government purportedly to build local support, improve communications and gather information about
militant activities. The programme carries a high risk of failure and may even exacerbate local security
conditions....[We should] support the development of a civil society strategy to build the capacity of the central authorities in matters of local governance and justice.

The report concludes:

There is a need for a truly comprehensive strategy for the long-term reconstruction
and stabilisation of Afghanistan. However, NATO and other international military actors should
acknowledge the limits to the scope of activities which are suitable and legitimate for their engagement.
The military should focus on providing security, while civilian actors must determine and implement
policies that address the wide range of reconstruction, development and humanitarian challenges
currently facing the country.

Iran: No Giving Up the Nuclear Program. No Way.

Even as General David Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen defy the Obama engagement strategy and try out the latest scare line --- Israel is most definitely going to take out an Iranian nuclear facility --- here's a little tip-off from Agence France Presse that Tehran will not be giving up its atomic-energy programme:

Former Iranian prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, who is running for the presidency in the June election, said he will push ahead with the country's controversial nuclear drive if elected.

"Having nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without being a threat to the world is our strategic objective," Mousavi said in a speech to his election campaign managers on Tuesday.

"I do not think any government will dare to take a step back in this regard, since people will question the decision. Given the long-term interest, we are obliged not to back down on this or other similar issues."

The statement is even more significant because Mousavi is considered the "reformist" candidate in the election.

Put bluntly, the nuclear-energy issue is one of sovereignty for anyone running for high office in Iran. That is a given, beyond the speculation and exaggeration of an Iranian move towards the Bomb, and any American strategy should begin from that recognition.

US Army Intelligence: We're Losing In Afghanistan (and Al Qa'eda is Not Reason Number One)

Amidst all the flurry of Presidential announcements and Congressional hearings on Pakistan-Afghanistan, this is the most important document to sneak onto the Internet this week.

Wikileaks has posted a report of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, circulated on 1 March 2009. TRADOC is based in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where General David Petraeus developed his counter-insurgency approach before returning to Iraq in 2007 and then becoming head of US Central Command.

The document is burdened by acronyms, not to mention confusion over the numerous insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but a careful reader can pick out the high (or low) points:

"Permanent Taliban presence [heavy Taliban/insurgent activity now amounts to 72% of the total landmass", as of November 2008. The figure in 2007 was 54%.
http://sydwalker.info/blog/2009/04/04/afghanistan-leaks-and-lies/
"4 main highways into Kabul compromised by Taliban; Taliban infiltrate Kabul at will."

"IEDs [improvised explosive devices attacks rose late summer 2008 and continued to rise in 2009....Winter violence are at highest levels since 2001 invasion."

The number of US troops Killed in Action rose 50 percent in 2008.

All of this is depressing but unsurprising. Even more revealing are some other numbers and statements that will not be mentioned by any Obama Administration official:

Number of Al Qa'eda in Pakistan-Afghanistan: 2,000. On its own, that figure is frustrating --- how many members does it take to constitute a "global terrorist organisation" --- but it takes on some significance when compared to Taliban in Afghanistan (30,000), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan led by Baitullah Mehsud (15,000); the [Jalaluddin] "Haqqani Network" (unknown, "numbers are included in Taliban of Pakistan‟s total strength"); and "Warlord Militias" (tens of thousands).

The most significant role of Al Qa'eda, according to the document, is to provide "funding, foreign fighters and other assistance" to an "enemy [which] is primarily Pashtun in nature and Sunni Muslim (Wahhabi and Deobandi)". However, the insurgency is also funded by drug economy and Gulf Arab money.

"This enemy is trained and assisted by ISID or ISID affiliated elements". The acronym hides the impact of the statement: "ISID" is Pakistan's intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

Syd Walker blogs that the report is "more like a teenage scrapbook than an official ‘Intelligence’ document....It might work as a motivational Powerpoint Presentation for rookies." He's got a point, given the analysts' attempt to get over complexity with an "Insurgent Syndicate" linking, rather than differentiating, between Al Qa'eda and local movements (not to mention inaccurate conflations of those local movements, such as the asserted alliance between the "Haqqani Network" and Baitullah Mehsud).

Still, the devil of significance is in the detail lurking in the pages. And it's that detail, beyond the spectral 2000 Al Qa'eda, that show the shallowness of an Obama rhetoric of "an al Qaeda network that killed thousands on American soil" and is "still plotting today".

Petraeus v. Obama (Part 158): Israel and Iran

There was a bit of a media rumble this week over an interview that the new Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, gave Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic. Netanyahu made it quite clear that he held open the option of an airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilties.

This is not dramatic news. Tel Aviv has been shaking an aerial fist at Tehran for years, but a unilateral Israeli operation, even if technically possible, risks an Iranian political and military response --- and reaction from other countries and groups --- throughout and beyond the Middle East.

So, at the least, Israel needs the US to cover its back. And the Bush Administration, despite all its pro-Israeli and anti-Iranian sympathies, refused such support in summer 2008.

This is where America's other President, General David Petraeus, enters the scene. Even as the Obama Administration has been pursuing engagement with Iran, Petraeus --- both directly and through acolytes --- has been loudly talking about Iranian support for insurgent operations against US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
On Wednesday, the General went a step further. He told the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Israeli government may ultimately see itself so threatened by the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon that it would take preemptive military action to derail or delay it.”

This may not be an outright endorsement of a Tel Aviv strike, but it is comfortably close to acceptance of an operation. Petraeus didn't risk the usual (unsupported) pretext that Iran is close to a Bomb; instead, he stretched justification to “Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the assurances and transparency necessary for international acceptance and verification”.

You could try out the explanation that the Obama Administration is playing "good cop, bad cop" with Tehran; on Tuesday, envoy Richard Holbrooke signals co-operation at The Hague conference on Afghanistan, 24 hours later Petraeus warns of consequences if Iran doesn't accept the extended hand.

That, however, is a fool's approach. The most casual observer could tell you that Iran does not react kindly to blatant pressure. And the consequences of Tehran walking away from talks in the face of Petraeus' threats, given the American position in Afghanistan, are far greater than they were in 2003 when the Bush Administration pulled a similar stunt.

No, the latest Petraeus intervention is as much a response to his President as it is to Tehran.

The General has a previous record on this issue. In 2007, he was serving under the then head of Central Command, William Fallon. The two men didn't see eye-to-eye: a year later, Fallon was gone with Petraeus on his way to succeeding him.

The standard narrative, for those who noted the battle, was that Petraeus had to get his Iraq "surge" past a resistant Fallon. That is certainly true, but more broadly, to deal with regional issues, Fallon advocated a strategy of engaging Iran rather than isolating it. That was also opposed by Petraeus.

Move forward two years. After the muddle in US policy, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton clumsily trying to press Iran via the spectre of conflict with Arab states, Washington settles on the possibilities of a step-by-step engagement.

Who doesn't like that?

Israel. And President Obama's most prominent military commander.