Petraeus V Obama: It Ain't Over

In January/February, we paid close attention to a running battle between General David Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, with his President over Obama's plans in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It appeared, however, that the compromise over the Iraq withdrawal and last week's Obama announcement of the Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy established consensus. Indeed, Petraeus had won a quiet victory. The headlines said Obama had approved an extra 17,000 troops; in fact, if you include support forces, the boost was 30,000, the amount that military commanders had been seeking. No wonder Petraeus even went alongside Obama envoy Richard Holbrooke on the Sunday talk shows to promote the plan.

All right then?

No.

On Wednesday Petraeus was back to his My Way approach on the US military approach in Afghanistan: "American commanders have requested the deployment of an additional 10,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan next year, [although] the request awaits a final decision by President Obama this fall."

Dave couldn't have been clearer: if you want his plan in Afghanistan (which his spin machine is assuring you is the case), then give him more soldiers: "The ratio of coalition and Afghan security forces to the population is projected through 2011 to be significantly lower than the 20 troops per 1,000 people prescribed by the Army counterinsurgency manual he helped write."

How brazen, even defiant, is this? Consider that on Sunday the President tried to hold the line against precisely this "bit more, bit more, OK, a bit more" demand. He said he had "resourced properly" the strategy and pre-emptively warned his generals, "What I will not do is to simply assume that more troops always result in an improved situation ... There may be a point of diminishing returns."

Michele Flournoy, the Undersecretary of Defense, tried to maintain this position in the Congressional hearing. She insisted that the US plan was to concentrate forces in "the insurgency belt in the south and east," rather than (Petraeus' preference) throughout Afghanistan. "Troops would arrive, as planned, in 2010."

The "comprehensive strategy" announced last Friday means different things to the President and Petraeus. For Obama, the troop increase has to be integrated with the non-military measures. If those measures, then the military approach also has to be reconsidered, not necessarily for another "surge" but for an "exit strategy".

For Petraeus, "comprehensive" means military-first. And, if the violence continues and even increases, then that will be his rationale for yet more soldiers into the conflict.

Lace up your boots, folks. There may be a war brewing in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but there is also one underway in Washington, D.C.

Playing for Time: Clinton-Obama and the Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Related Post: Text of Clinton Remarks to Hague Conference on Afghanistan

Lots of sound and not much substance (yet). That's the quick summary of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's address to the international conference on Afghanistan at The Hague yesterday.

First and very much foremost, the American priority was tipped off in the final paragraphs of Clinton's statement:

Now the principal focus of our discussions today is on Afghanistan, but we cannot hope to succeed if those who seek to reestablish a haven for violence and extremism operate from sanctuaries just across the border. For this reason, our partnership with Pakistan is critical. Together, we all must give Pakistan the tools it needs to fight extremists within its borders.

As for the continuing vagueness of "What Is to Be Done?" on Afghanistan, CNN's headline grab is a tip-off: "Clinton Backs Talks With Moderate Taliban".

At a superficial glance, that seems dramatic. The US talking to the same people who sheltered Al Qa'eda, who held Afghanistan under a reign of terror until they were toppled at the end of 2001? Here is how Clinton framed the call:

We must...support efforts by the Government of Afghanistan to separate the extremists of al-Qaida and the Taliban from those who joined their ranks not out of conviction, but out of desperation. This is, in fact, the case for a majority of those fighting with the Taliban. They should be offered an honorable form of reconciliation and reintegration into a peaceful society if they are willing to abandon violence, break with al-Qaida, and support the constitution.

All well and good, but who gets approached? Vice President Joe Biden is spreading the good news that 75 percent of Taliban members, with no incentive other than "desperation", can be stripped away from the organisation, but it is unclear how the US or the Afghan Government gets to those members.

In practice, if General Petraeus's model for Iraq is used, the manoeuvres will be with local commanders and leaders who may be persuaded --- by kind words or by lots of money --- to join the right side. In the Petraeus model, however, those former Sunni enemies of the US were already in powers in villages and towns. Is Washington considering a similar offer of political influence to ex-Taliban?

And who is to make the approach? Clinton's statement indicates that this will be "the Government of Afghanistan", and she none-too-subtly opened her remarks with an acknowledgement of "President Karzai, who fills a critical leadership role in his nation, and whose government helped to shape the shared comprehensive and workable strategy that we are discussing today".

Yet only weeks ago, some US officials were putting about the story that Karzai was to be curbed or even removed from power, and Washington was desperate not to let the President call a quick election for April. So is Clinton now signalling --- from reconciliation or from a lack of other options --- that the US will now accept Karzai's lead or equal participation in the political strategy?

Beyond the politics, Clinton offered the reconstruction approach of "the raw material of progress – roads, public institutions, schools, hospitals, irrigation, and agriculture". Again, nothing unexpected in the rhetoric. And again no specifics: earlier this year, the US Government was thinking that European and NATO partners could take the burden of non-military projects but President Obama's declaration last Friday of an expanded US civilian corps indicated that Washington may take the lead.

Clinton's statement tilted towards the former option: "We hope that others gathered here will heed the United Nations’ and Afghan Government’s call for help throughout the country with job creation, technical expertise, vocational training, and investments in roads, electrical transmission lines, education, healthcare, and so much else." At the same time, in another indication that Washington --- for all the charges of corruption leveled at the Karzai Government --- is having to put up with Kabul, Clinton supported "the Government of Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy, the National Solidarity Program, and other initiatives".

There was, however, a possible sting in the tail in Clinton's statement. Having set out a political, security, and economic approach which seemed to be premised on co-operation with the current Afghan Government, she declared:

To earn the trust of the Afghan people, the Afghan Government must be legitimate and respected. This requires a successful election in August – one that is open, free, and fair. That can only happen with strong support from the international community. I am, therefore, pleased to announce today that to advance that goal, the United States is committing $40 million to help fund Afghanistan’s upcoming elections.

Clinton's reference to "open, free, and fair" is jarring, to say the least: were previous Afghan elections --- and thus the rule of Hamid Karzai --- illegitimate? Washington's private assessment has been that the President is likely to win re-election in the summer. So is the US bowing to his continued presence, attempting (rather crudely) to put on a bit of pressure, or still pursuing an alternative leadership?

I don't have an answer. Nor, in my reading, does Washington. The more that one parses the Obama speech of last Friday and the Clinton statement yesterday, the more that it appears that the major objective for the Administration was to have something, anything, before next week's NATO gathering. The US is now clearly on its own militarily, and President Obama, for all that charm, will struggle in getting an expanded non-military commitment from European partners outside Kabul.

This is a "hold the line" approach, trying to ensure that the Taliban does not expand its hold on territory, until the right partnership with the right Government in Kabul can be foreseen. More importantly, the line is to be held until the US can resolve its core problem, which lies not in Afghanistan but across the border in northwest Pakistan.

And those prospects are no closer or clearer from last week's events and announcements.