The Latest from Iran (22 April): This Isn't Over

1230 GMT: EA On the Move. Hopefully, we'll be relocating from the US to the UK today, so updates will be restricted until tomorrow afternoon. My thanks to all for their patience, and for keeping up going through news and comments while I'm heading home.

1215 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (If You Know Someone in MKO, You're a Criminal). There seems to be a pattern in a number of recent sentences, including death penalties. As we reported yesterday, six people have been handed down orders for execution because they are related to or acquainted with members of the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, the political wing of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq "terrorist" movement.

An Iranian activist now reports that Monireh Rabaei has received a five-year sentence, upheld on appeal, on the basis that she has an uncle in Camp Ashraf in Iraq, home to many PMOI members. The following sentences have also been passed on the basis of "connections with MKO": Zia Nabavi 15 years, Ozra Ghazi-Mirsaied three years, and Mahdiyeh Golro 28 months.

NEW Iran Document: Detained Nourizad’s Letter to Khamenei “We Have Lost Our People”
NEW Iran Document: Ayatollah Sane’i “Some Want Islam For Their Own Agendas”
Iran: The Latest Post-Election Death Sentences
NEW How Iran News is Made: Adultery, Earthquakes, and the BBC
The Latest from Iran (21 April): Waiting for News

1115 GMT: Economy Watch. Rooz Online's claims of layoffs are not quite as dramatic as those in the Human Rights Activists report (see 1100 GMT), but they are still striking:

Labor news sources report the laying off of at least 2,500 industrial and leather workers in Ilam and Mashad. Counting other laid-off workers in industrial and large cities such as Abadan, Ahwaz, Khorramshahr and Shiraz, during the last two weeks, more than 4,000 workers have lost their jobs just in the recent past.

...The crisis in Iran’s industrial sector has reached such a level that, in an interview yesterday, the head of Iran’s House of Labor predicted the closure of hundreds of large and medium industrial firms per year and the subsequent laying off of 200,000 workers every year after that.

1100 GMT: Firings and Abuses. Human Rights Activists in Iran has released a report claimed more than 38,000 cases of firings and human rights abuses in Iran in the past month.

Of the cases, more than 90% (37,519) are the layoffs of workers in Iran, as 166 production lines in the country have been shut down every month, according to a labour official. At least 11 protests and gatherings have been staged by workers in the country in the last month alone.

The group cites 537 cases of abuse of students’ rights, 255 cases of abuse against political and civil activists, 34 cases of capital punishment, 259 cases of torture and prisoner abuse, at least seven cases of citizens killed in frontier provinces, 124 arrests and abuse of national minority rights, and 68 cases of arrest and abuses against religious minorities.

Human Rights Activists says that, because of the scale of the abuses and the difficulties in documenting them in a rigid security atmosphere, the cases are only a fraction of the abuses that are occurring.

1055 GMT: Is Google A Regime Enemy? The Iranian Labor News Agency reports that a ban on Google Images has been lifted by Iranian authorities, 24 hours after it was imposed.

1045 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Women’s rights activist Dorsa Sobhani has been released after a detention of more than six weeks. Sobhani spent 25 days in solitary confinement.

The brother of Majid Tavakoli says that the student leader, detained on 7 December after a speech at a National Student Day rally, remains in solitary confinement.

Student activist Nader Ahsani has been re-arrested and taken to Evin Prison.

1040 GMT: "We Had to Save the System". A potentially explosive admission....

Aftab, from the weekly Panjareh, quotes an unnamed high-ranking intelligence official, who admits that post-election arrests, especially those of the first round of senior reformists, were planned ahead of the 12 June vote.

The detentions were a preventive measure because Iranian intelligence agencies anticipated major unrest which could get out of control. The official said, "Our law is not appropriate to fight against 'soft war', so we had to take these measures [to save the system]. The fifth statement of Mosharekat party [Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution] clearly speaks of establishing a secular system."

1030 GMT: Rafsanjani Watch. On another front, Mehdi Hashemi, the son of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, has warned the regime to "stop spreading lies" and to "beware of the time, when I speak out". Hashemi, who is currently in London, has been threatened by the Iranian authorities with prosecution for alleged corruption and misuse of funds during the Presidential election.

0945 GMT: After an extended break, we return today to a series of powerful responses to the regime, all of which make clear that the challenge to legitimacy will not be crushed.

In a separate entry, we have posted the latest statement of Grand Ayatollah Sane'i, criticising the Government for its misuse of Islam in its lies and detentions.

We also have a second feature: from inside Evin Prison, the detained journalist and filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad has written a letter to the Supreme Leader requesting that he "declare this year the year of national reconciliation and do not fear the reproach". In itself, that is not a direct challenge to the regime --- it acknowledges Khamenei's authority, after all --- however, the letter has special potency because Nourizad's detention was prompted by a previous appeal to the Supreme Leader to recognise the illegitimacies of the election.

Mohsen Armin, member of Parliament and former Vice Speaker, has also launched a spirited criticism of the Government. A senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party, which is now under threat of suspension, Armin denounced lies and threats of prosecution and demanded that the regime address the basic issues of rights and equality.

MP Mohammad Reza Khabbaz has asserted that the inability of the Ahmadinejad Government to make appropriate use of $370 billion oil income is a "catastrophe".

Comments

[M.Ali]

Bill, also honestly, "Maybe one day you’ll realize why the general populace of the West fixates on this issue as it does–it’s because we care and it reminds us of our ancestors who fought to attain freedom we often take for granted today. We simply want to see you have the same freedom and rights we enjoy everyday"

I think Asia & Africa has kind of had it with white people trying to help us because "they care". Enough shit has been done to African countries by western colonies and US in the middle east to make sure they give us freedom that you guys enjoy. It's okay, you can keep it, stop trying to shove it down our throats. Your tough love is really really tough.

[M.Ali]

Also, Bill, Eric was being sarcastic...

[Catherine]

WitteKr,
RE your post 1: "*My* sources tell me everybody expected a second round, between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi. We seem to have forgotten there was total mood swing only a few days before the election, due to the TV debates which began on June 2nd. The campaigns of all candidates suddenly became extremely lively and the final turnout at the polls was exceptionally high. Iran had in those days become very politicized. In an atmosphere like that one would expect at least *some* reaction of the Ahmadinejad supporters…

As said before, I respect your work. I applaud you for taking the time to reply to all the remarks that are being made here. But I *still* feel uncomfortable with the outcome of the election. It just doesn’t add up: the mood and the numbers."

+++++++++++++++++

WitteKr, I didn't have any sources in Iran telling me what was going on - I simply was there myself from 1-13 June last year, closely observing and even participating in the election activities. And I can attest to what you heard from your contacts.

We watched the televised debates with hotel guests and staff, visited campaign houses of the 2 main candidates in multiple small cities and towns, attended an Ajmadinejad rally in a town along the northwest Caspian as well as Mousavi's huge final campaign march towards Azadi Square on 10 June. We witnessed the growing excitement about the election amongst all supporters and potential voters as the debates progressed and literally sent shock waves through the electorate. I was intrigued to see one of our guides, a 24 year old student, slowly changed his intention to vote for Amadinejad to Mousavi because of the TV debates. Every afternoon campaigners would hit the streets at intersections and in front of their campaign houses, playing music, jumping all over the place and handing out posters of their candidates. What we saw everywhere, from small towns and villages to cities, from Shahrud, Gorgan and Gonbad e Kavus to Chalus and Abbas Abad, and in Tehran where we spent 1, 2 and 10-13 June, was that the enthusiasm and numbers of Mousavi supporters was equal to or greater than the enthusiasm and numbers of Ahmadinejad supporters. Now, of course this is no guarantee that there would be more votes cast for Ahmadinejad, but it created a certainty in everyone’s minds - including many Amadinejad supporters - that there would be a second round with a run-off between Mousavi and Amadinejad. That was the main topic of conversation on the streets of Tehran the night of 11 June - as well as warnings to bring your own pen to the polls the next day because of fears that the pens at voting booths would be filled with erasable ink ;-). After watching ordinary people vote in a small town about 1 1/2 hours from Tehran, we spent the evening of election day in Tehran cruising the city with a student friend who was busy letting his friends know which polling stations were still open (there was total chaos regarding how long they were supposed to be open, some closing at 18:00 and others not till 22:00 or later!).

The "mood", as you put it, was one of great anticipation and hope for a change - not because of a defeat for Amadinejad, but because of the expectation of a second chance that a run-off would give opposition supporters to campaign even harder and maybe, JUST MAYBE, who knows ? Inshallah.....

So you can imagine the shock that descended upon the country when the election results were announced so quickly and the difference between the number of votes for the two main candidates was so great. In Tehran on the morning of 13 June, it was like a bomb had fallen - and before we left the country we heard that it was unusually quiet in many parts of Iran despite the fact it was the equivalent of a Monday morning. You write: "But I *still* feel uncomfortable with the outcome of the election. It just doesn’t add up: the mood and the numbers." Well, you're not the only one. The Green Movement has since moved on from the initial "Where is My Vote" protest, but the malaise about the election remains.

[WitteKr]

Catherine, as always I have great admiration for your contribution to this forum - especially now since you can tell first hand what my sources told me, almost a year ago. Your description as an eye witness is so much more powerful.

It needed to be said again, because I think we seem to forget what happened in those days - and what took us, and also the people *in Iran* so much by surprise.

I wonder what Eric A. Brill has to say about this... Analysis of the election outcome isn't complete without taking those few crazy days that preceded it into account.

Dankjewel!

[Catherine]

Dag WitteKr,
Before I have to leave for an obligatory Dutch family birthday party ;-), I wanted to ask you if you were being serious or ironic yesterday when you wrote: Respect, Eric A. Brill! You have captured all articles, links I assembled over the months and put them into one logical, long, article that leads up to the conclusion “The election appears to have been fair”.
http://enduringamerica.com/2010/04/22/the-latest-from-iran-22-april-this-isnt-over/comment-page-1/#comment-41481

[Bill]

M.Ali,

Wow I am not sure if you caught what I was saying in my first post? Please read your post #25 then mine at #22. Now ask yourself how my comment " it’s because we care and it reminds us of our ancestors who fought to attain freedom we often take for granted today. We simply want to see you have the same freedom and rights we enjoy everyday" somehow was interpreted as "Enough shit has been done to African countries by western colonies and US in the middle east to make sure they give us freedom that you guys enjoy"? My view has somehow been translated into the regime byline of "those always interfering Westerners." While I understand your position and I can sense the emotion behind it my words were in the context of ordinary Americans not our government or institutions. It was simply a personal expression of hope not one of overt action to make something a reality. I would only encourage you to not look at every comment from a westerner in that context.

Thx
Bill

[WitteKr]

@catherine #30

You asked whether I was serious or ironic yesterday when I wrote: "Respect, Eric A. Brill! You have captured all articles, links I assembled over the months and put them into one logical, long, article that leads up to the conclusion “The election appears to have been fair”.

I was serious, I'm afraid, because Eric A. Brill's compilation is the only comprehensive summary of all that has been published around the election process. And I respect the time and effort he put in it.

I even share his conclusion "*appears* to have been fair". But I don't believe they have been. Like I said: the mood and the numbers didn't add up... and he didn't take that context into account.

Brills compilation will be an excellent starting point for academic and journalistic 'sleuths' to find out how things came about - in a few years time, when Iran has become a real democracy and starts to process the past :-) Because, as you rightfully said "the Green Movement has since moved on", it even grew and cannot be ignored much longer!

I hope you had cake? :-)

[Catherine]

Thanks for your clarification, WitteKr.

And no cake yet as it's a dinner party starting a bit later, but I expect there will be some - one slice per person! ;-)

[gunni]

Eric A. Brill

Thanks for your kind answer. Eric – I`m sorry - I didn`t found my questions anwered – could you please give me a helping hand in this one, please.

1. In 1997 80 % of the Iranian voters elected Khatami ( Reformist)
2. In 2005 Rafsanjani, Karroubi, Moeen and Mehralizadeh ( Reformist Camp) collected 57% of the votes cast. The turnout was 63% - because a lot of political groups had boycotted the elections in 2005.
3. As you already know the turnout in June 2009 was something like 83% - because a much bigger part of Iranian people wanted to cast their votes in 2009.

My questions:
a. Asuming the facts above what kinds of political trends do you see in Iran between 1997and 2010?
b. If you are going to feed the Benford - Law Formula with the data above what is your result? – When I tried it – and I must tell you that I `am not a specialist in this matter – I found out the same Indication for election - fraud – as you found out in the case of Kharoubi.

Quote:

" Benford's Law analysis of county-level data,[26] Professor Boudewijn Roukema concluded that the number of vote counts starting with 7 for Karroubi (who received less than 1% of the vote) was large enough to indicate that fraud had occurred.

Thanks for your answer.

[Eric A. Brill]

Gunni,

Your Question (a).

I have no answer for your question on "trends" from 1997-2010. My focus was on the actual measure of voter preferences on election day 2009 - specifically, whether there was any evidence that those voter preferences were not accurately measured because fraud had occurred. Since I found no evidence of fraud, it appears to me that, whatever the trends may have been or may be today, on June 12, 2009, 62.6% of the voters picked Ahmadinejad.

I note that you pick 1997 as the starting point for your "trend" question - because, as you note, Khatami was overwhelmingly elected that year (though you overstated his percentage - he got 69% of the vote in 1997, 78% in 2001). I suspect you'd find especially interesting the discussion of the perceived "liberal inevitability" in Iran in the section of my article entitled "The Result Is Not Plausible Because It Conflicts Sharply With Many Predictions and Post-Election Analyses."

Your Question (b).

The "digit frequency" statistical-analysis part of my article is the hardest part to understand. I suggest you read it again, and make sure you understand clearly my point about "aggregated totals" necessarily being free of "manipulation." If you want to challenge that conclusion, I will welcome your challenge. So far, I've heard nothing from Professors Mebane, Beber or Scacco that persuades me it's wrong, despite email exchanges with them. Nevertheless, since strictly logical arguments such as those that appear in that section of my article can be utterly and convincingly knocked down if the logic is faulty, I'm certain to have that happen some day if I've made any logical mistake; it might as well be you who takes credit for that. Good luck.

But if you accept that "aggregated totals" argument, then I think you'll agree you need to reconsider whether your Benford's Law questions still are appropriate.

Eric

[Eric A. Brill]

WitteKr,

"Brills compilation will be an excellent starting point for academic and journalistic ’sleuths’ to find out how things came about"

Thank you for that. That really was my purpose. I'd be less than human if I didn't admit I'll be disappointed if those "sleuths" poke any major holes in my analysis, but I certainly can survive a few small holes. Needless to say, I wouldn't have put it out there if I hadn't concluded, correctly or not, that it is pretty solid. If others find it useful in their effort to present an even more comprehensive picture, with more and better insights than I have come up with, that won't bother me at all. I'd welcome that.

[Eric A. Brill]

BILL WROTE:

"Nor are [the Greens] specifically reaching out for the neocons. They are simply reaching out to anyone who will listen."

Exactly. And many Americans do listen, just as they listened to Iraqi dissidents. Just as with Iraq, some Americans listen principally because they share the Greens' concerns about social justice and human rights. Others – the neo-cons – also listen, in part because they share those same concerns (I believe most people labeled "neo-cons" actually do care a great deal about social justice and human rights – those concerns are merely not at the top of their list), but principally for their own "external to Iran" reasons. The fact that neo-cons listen misleads some Greens to believe they're actually within the first group of "listening" Americans. The difference between the neo-cons and other "listening" Americans does not become apparent until one reaches the "remedies" phase. See below.

BILL WROTE:

"One point that clearly debunks this issue is the fact most of the neocons myopically focus only on the Nukes. Yes they have made some overtures but the next day it’s back to the nukes baby!! I can’t tell you how many readers on EA have chimed in on this strange event perplexed how the neocons could be so blind."

Exactly. But it's not the neo-cons who are walking around with the white canes and seeing-eye dogs. They support the Greens principally because they've concluded that doing so may help them to achieve their own objective: eliminating the threat they believe Iran poses to the United States and its allies in the Middle East. For this reason, they encourage the Greens when they prattle about the "stolen election" because they believe that weakens the Iraqi government. When it comes time to fashion remedies, however, the neo-cons, as one would expect, naturally favor remedies that address the concern that got them interested in Iran in the first place: perceived threats to the United States and its allies in the Middle East. In the case of Iran, that means (in their view) shutting down Iran's nuclear program and, better yet, getting rid of the theocracy because of its support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinians.

Naturally the Greens feel jilted. How can these neo-cons fail to understand that Greens care more about other issues, "internal to Iran" issues – political reform, social justice, human rights – than they care about shutting down Iran's nuclear program or putting an end to Iran's support of the Palestinians? Why don't the neo-cons just drop the nukes issue, especially since the Greens can't hope to get the Iranian people on board for that, and focus on what really counts in Iran?

The neo-cons do see all this, and (I think) they do care about political reform, social justice and human rights. Just not enough to pursue remedies aimed at bringing about those changes if those remedies are not also the best ways to achieve what they care about much more: eliminating perceived threats to the United States and its allies in the Middle East.

[Eric A. Brill]

Barry,

"I have seen ["neo-con"] used often – usually spitefully by those who are probably from the left side of American politics – but I am not sure of it’s meaning (or the purpose of it’s creation – being a relatively new expression."

You're quite right to point that out. "Neo-con" is a label that people justifiably resent having applied to them, and I shouldn't use it. I did principally for convenience in writing, but it has too many connotations to justify its use only for that reason.

As I said in later posts, in partial atonement, I do believe that most, perhaps nearly all, people who are labeled (agreeably to themselves or not) as neo-conservatives are thoroughly decent human beings who care deeply about social justice and human rights. I think Paul Wolfowitz, for example, was genuinely motivated by a desire to free Iraqis from an oppressive government and help to give them a better life. I would add many others to that list. I suspect neo-cons differ from other Americans mostly in that they are thought by many to have other strongly held interests that count for more than their concern for social justice and human rights in some foreign country, and some undoubtedly do. I say "thought by many to have" rather than "have" because I think quite a number of other Americans, who escape the "neo-con" label or any other negative label, also have other strongly held interests that may count for more than their concern for social justice and human rights in some foreign country; that simply hasn't been detected and commented upon as much by the intellectual elite as has been the case with the hapless neo-conservatives.

As for me being on the "left" side of politics, I think you'd find yourself utterly frustrated trying to put any "left" or "right" label on me. Just when you were sure you had me pegged as some limp-wristed, quiche-eating liberal, I'd probably shock you with some "right wing" view, or vice-versa. I tend to think it's all consistent, but it's certainly not "left", "right" or even "center."

In any case, you deserve credit for an excellent point on my misuse of "neo-con."

You also deserve my apology - hereby given - for dumping on you in my recent posts. You didn't deserve it.

[Eric A. Brill]

Catherine,

"The Green Movement has since moved on from the initial “Where is My Vote” protest, but the malaise about the election remains."

You describe it well, and I have little doubt I'd have shared your feelings if I'd been there. Nonetheless, there just isn't anything to support it, and 40,000 Mousavi observers approving the count at polling stations is just too hard to get around, or at least I cannot think of how it can be explained away. If I were the Greens, I'd stick with the first part of your sentence, and try to get over the part after the comma. I think the Greens could obtain more support from ordinary Iranians if they'd just move on.

And in doing so, they would help to put an end to efforts by meddlesome outsiders to exploit the Greens' frustration over this election into American and international support for harsher sanctions, and even a military attack, on the country that Greens love just as much or more than other Iranians.

[Scott Lucas]

All,

I have followed the discussion with great interest. I had expressed my views on Race for Iran so won't burden you with great detail. However, beyond thanking all for their excellent points, I would put the following summary:

1. Eric Brill is to be commended for the persistence and dedication in his academic study, and his defense of it. An academic study, however, is only as good as the evidence which supports it.

For better or worse, in this case, that evidence is almost exclusively the Iran system's report on the conduct of its own election. Beyond questions of independence, the final report is hermetically sealed both from complications in the electoral process and the examination of it and from the political context.

A couple of examples: Mr Brill rests his case on the report's assertion that there were more than 40,000 Mousavi observers at the polls. However, Mousavi's chief aides, including Alireza Beheshti, have said that thousands of their observers were not able to carry out their duties (Beheshti estimates only 25,000 were able to attend the polling stations). Mr Brill takes no regard of these assertions, as they are not within the bounds of the official report.

Mr Brill argues that the process can be verified because the Form 22s, the records of individual polling stations witnessed by observers, were compiled into Form 28s, the compilation of the Ministry of Interior. He argues that as the numbers add up between the forms, they must be accurate. That case, again put in the official report, is sound if there was no manipulation of the Form 22s; however, as we have not seen them --- for example, to establish if they were witnessed by observers, we can make no judgement.

Mr Brill asserts that fairness was observed because of the 10% recount of boxes by the Guardian Council. He leaves out the preceding discussion, in which opposition candidates complained that any partial recount might be selective, with boxes chosen that would bear out the claimed result. Because there was no full recount and because the selection of the boxes was far from transparent (even before the recount occurred, the Supreme Leader asserted that the election outcome was just and must stand), there is no way of judging accuracy.

Mr Brill contends that the Mousavi camp, by refusing to participate in the Guardian Council process because of their objections, effectively ruled themselves out of the procedures that would have established legitimacy. He has a political point --- would it have been better if the Mousavi campaign had gone along, even at the risk of supporting a far-from-transparent review? --- but not a conclusive technical one. The fact remains that two opposition candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) have never accepted the review and the third (Rezaei), while eventually accepting the review, still argues that there were serious flaws in the electoral process.

2. What I find more striking, however, is the attempt to put this academic review of the election, on the ground that it covers, as the whole and entire story. Rarely will the discussion of the Brill document, at least by the defenders of Government legitimacy, notes the suppression, disruption of communications, and detentions that took place not only after the elections but before the 12 June vote. Rarely will those defenders note the suspicions of electoral fraud that were arising just before and on the day of 12 June --- that is the main reason, one unacknowledged by these defenders, that Mir Hossein Mousavi held his press conference on the evening of 12 June. Rarely will those defenders then note that the Supreme Leader effectively short-circuited the electoral process when, in contravention of Iranian procedure if not law, he stepped in only a few hours after the vote to declare an Ahmadinejad victory.

And, because of this narrow focus on the official record of the election, the defenders will pay far less attention to the ten months of political developments, with abuses and injustices, that have followed. Indeed, I would argue that in some cases (though not necessarily that of Mr Brill) the defenders are compelled to maintain this narrow focus precisely to avoid the following ten months.

3. In the end, despite Mr Brill's dogged efforts, what matters is whether Iranians believe the electoral process was fair and that the Government has been legitimated. The evidence from 15 June onwards is that millions do not believe this. Perhaps all of those millions are wrong, but I would suggest that the regime's focus was not on making the persuasive case but on increasing the detentions, disruptions of communications, accusations of "foreign agents" and "terrorists" directing the concerns and protests of those Iranians.

When leading politicians and political theorists like Saeed Hajjarian are put into Evin Prison and forced to "confess" on national television, when human rights activists are swept up and detained, when journalists are blocked from reporting, often by putting them into prison, then the political reality --- as opposed to Mr Brill's academic treatment --- is that the regime does not trust that its account of the election will prevail in a free and fair discussion.

And when events reach that point, let's recognise references to "meddlesome outsiders" for what they are: an attempt to just make the whole situation go away, denying a space for the views, aspirations, and frustrations of those who believe that the values of the Islamic Republic have been or will be upheld.

S.

[WitteKr]

Dear Eric and all,

I'm glad this discussion took place! And I'm glad with the way the tone changed. Thank you all for being passionate but still willing to exchange thoughts.
There's an element (about neo-cons and the like) I cannot quite perceive correctly because I'm not American: let's all please be aware we're coming from different countries and cultures...

Eric, one last remark. You wrote: "I’d be less than human if I didn’t admit I’ll be disappointed if those “sleuths” poke any major holes in my analysis, but I certainly can survive a few small holes."
I don't think it's about poking holes in your analysis - which ended with the conclusion the election *appeared* to have been fair. Your work is solid as a rock, based on what we now know. But appearances can be deceptive...

It's what we *don't* know that might poke a hole. It's about the *how*.
If it was fraud, *how* did they do it?
If it wasn't, *how* come the mood was so different from the outcome?

Let's have history take its turn. And be patient.

[Bill]

Eric,

Thank you for your reply. I hope you got my point about the neocons and the affair with Iran not being the product of US meddling. I also hope you got Scott's point because in essence it's the same view I have. My hope is this will spurn you on towards revisting your study within the context of the whole event not just the election data itself. For when you do it will become quite apparent the regime's response is in fact a tacit addmission they don't believe they have a strong case. If they were operating from a position of strength all they would have to do is pursue an objective recount with international monitors. Alas they have not but instead decided to eradicate the reform movement.

Thx
Bill

[Barry]

Scott Lucas

Thank you for your very eloquent refutation of Eric Brill's very long contentions. I was just starting to think that someone had to do it, word by word and sentence by sentence, when your posting appeared.

Many of his statements - eg the one you mentioned about Mousavi's observers - flew in the face of my recollection of many articles flying around in the past year. Of course, NONE of these articles, writings, accusations, etc from either side can be verified. For every allegation thrown, the other side denied it.

I am not an academic - nor a lawyer- nor a forensic scientist -- but at my age, I am sure I can smell a dead dog and/or recognize a duck when I smell one/see one.

My curiosity moves on to why Mr Brill has written his treatise - perhaps an enjoyment of legal argument for the sake of it?? That would be cruel indeed. Because he honestly believes his assertions and arguments?? - how can he rely on any reports issued by the Regime? Or is there some other reason?? We have clearly seen the reach of the Regime elsewhere at other times.

Barry

[Eric A. Brill]

You may be interested in my recent email exchange with WaPo’s Joby Warrick, author of the article cited at the end of this post. Given EA's broad network of contacts, it occurred to me that some readers might be in a position to help Joby Warrick develop some evidence here. If you like, I'll be glad to pass on to Joby whatever you may find, though you probably will prefer to contact her directly at the Washington Post.

JOBY WARRICK ARTICLE;

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/24/AR2010042402710.html?hpid=topnews

Eric A. Brill sent the following message [on April 25, 2010, to Joby Warrick of the Washington Post]:

“Among the defectors was a top diplomat at the Iranian mission in Oslo, who said he was pressured to falsify election returns for Iranian nationals who had cast votes at the embassy.”

Well, assuming that this “top diplomat” defector was pressured to switch votes to Ahmadinejad, one can only conclude that he was remarkably successful in resisting that pressure. Here is the vote count from the polling station at the Iranian embassy in Oslo, as reported on the American Enterprise Institute’s “Iran Tracker” website:

Mousavi: 407
Ahmadinejad: 82
Karroubi: 29
Rezai: 5

http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/2009-iranian-presidential-election-expatriate-and-foreign-voting-results

I applaud your efforts, but please don’t become the next Judith Miller. That sort of fame can be fleeting, as Judy would probably confirm.

On Apr 26, 2010, at 7:40 AM, Joby Warrick wrote:

Hi Eric– Thanks for the note. In this case the Oslo diplomat was “pressured,” according to his own account, but ultimately he refused to change the result, which as you point out came out in favor of Mousavi. He feared the backlash afterward, which is why he quit. Perhaps the story should have made that clearer. Really appreciate the feedback.

best,

joby

ERIC A. BRILL SENT THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE ON APRIL 26:

Joby,

I envy you here.

You have an excellent opportunity to come up with some rock-solid evidence to support the Iranian opposition’s contentions that the 2009 election was rigged. I’ve studied it and found no evidence so far, but that certainly doesn’t prove fraud did not occur. Given my awareness of how little evidence has actually been found to support the “stolen election” claim (none, as far as I know), I am in a better position than most to assure you that it would be a very big deal if you were able to find some. As I probably need not tell you, many thousands of opposition supporters would be quite grateful, and you would receive a lot of well-deserved attention.

This former Iranian diplomat is in an ideal position to provide concrete evidence of his serious charges. Obviously he would not have made these remarks if he had been worried that he, or perhaps family members still in Iran, would be punished. He has defected, and the Iranian government obviously knows what he’s said and who he is (after all, how many defecting “top diplomats” from Iran’s mission in Oslo can there be?).

Judith Miller became a journalistic laughing stock NOT because she reported serious charges made by Iraqi defectors. She became a laughing stock because she published serious charges without bothering to seek corroboration even when there was a plain opportunity to do so. Had she exploited that opportunity and corroborated her stories, Ms. Miller almost certainly would still be working for the New York Times, and far more prominent than she was at the height of her short-lived glory.

Good luck! I’ll be reading the Post more avidly than ever to see what develops from this promising beginning.

Eric Brill

JOBY WARRICK ARTICLE;

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/24/AR2010042402710.html?hpid=topnews

[Eric A. Brill]

SCOTT WROTE:

"However, Mousavi’s chief aides, including Alireza Beheshti, have said that thousands of their observers were not able to carry out their duties (Beheshti estimates only 25,000 were able to attend the polling stations). Mr Brill takes no regard of these assertions, as they are not within the bounds of the official report."

Here's a perfect opportunity for the opposition to nail the government to the wall. We have two starkly conflicting claims, and a very easy way to disprove the government's position:

1. Mr. Beheshti claims that roughly 15,000 Mousavi observers were excluded (the 40,000+ claimed by the government minus the 25,000 that Beheshti estimates were actually permitted to observe).

2. The government report claims that not a single Mousavi observer who was issued an identification card (40,676, according to the government) was excluded on election day.

Scott, can you or someone you know get a hold of Mr. Beheshti to see whether any of these 15,000 excluded observers can remember which polling station he was excluded from?

[Barry]

Eric

"Scott, can you or someone you know get a hold of Mr. Beheshti to see whether any of these 15,000 excluded observers can remember which polling station he was excluded from?"

You are either being facetious - or unbelievable naive!

Barry

[Barry]

EDIT

Left out this link -- http://www.voteforiran.com/2009/09/mousavi%E2%80%99s-right-hand-man-ali-reza-beheshti-arrested/

Barry

[M.Ali]

The discrepancy in observer discussion for the Green's argument is weak for 2 reasons. One as Eric mentioned, is that Mousavi has not given any additional info. It is very easy for e to dispute ANY election ANY where by making such a statement and not backing it up with any facts that can be checked.

But the additional point I want to make is this. If what Mousavi is saying is true, he could very easily say that look at these boxes that our observers were at, and look at these boxes that we weren't at. See how the ones we were at, WE won, but the ones that we weren't at, we lost?

[Eric A. Brill]

M.Ali,

Good point in your second paragraph (and the first).

Barry,

I am being "facetious," though not for the reason you suggest.

It should go without saying that the opposition would leap at the chance to prove the government wrong when it claims that not a single card-carrying Mousavi observer was excluded on election day. How easy can it get? You don't even need to come up with the 15,000 excluded observers that Mr. Beheshti claims.

Just one. Certainly at least one of those 15,000 people is brave enough to raise his hand and say: "I showed them my card at Polling Station 123 in Shiraz, but they wouldn't let me in."

Protesters, with uncovered faces, shout "Death to the Leader," throw rocks through windows of government buildings and set police cars on fire. Have they used up all the courage the opposition has? Is there really not even an ounce of it left for one of these 15,000 observers to use now?

[Scott Lucas]

Oh, Mr Brill, you are quite the funster with your reply. You bypass almost all the substance in my general dissection of the case --- the problems with the electoral procedure and the post-election review, the context of detentions, communication disruptions, and intimidation, and the core issue of Iranians' perception of Government legitimacy --- to put a single challenge: "Can you or someone you know get a hold of Mr. Beheshti?"

Well, let's see. Alireza Beheshti has been detained twice since the election, in part because he chose to speak out against what he saw as irregularities in the process. He has been held in Evin Prison despite health problems. His family have been initimidated. He has been fired from his lectureship at Allameh Tabatabei University.

And rather than give any credence to his assertion --- which choosing to give full credence to the assertions of the Guardian Council --- you would like me, a "meddlesome outsider", to contact him openly so he can again defy the Iranian authorities?

That's pretty good. But then you go one better: from a position outside Iran, you blithely say to Mousavi campaign workers --- many of whom have been detained or have had colleagues detained or have lost their jobs or have gone into exile --- and you say, "Why, just stand up and make a claim that there was an impropriety!". You do so, expecting them to take personal risk, even though you have already dismissed the claim of a man --- Alireza Beheshti --- who chose to defy the authorities and say exactly that.

I think that's either satire or irony. In any case, instead of putting these whimsical diversions, why not ask for the Form 22s --- all of them --- to be produced publicly so the signatures of observers can be verified?

Best,

S.