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Entries in Russia (9)

Friday
Apr092010

Kyrgyzstan Analysis: What Brought On the Colourless Revolution? (Madlena)

Chavala Madlena writes for EA:

As the dust settled on Day 2 of the Kyrgyz "Tulip Revolution: 2.0", an eyewitness said: "We would not rush to name this victory: people are killed and injured, the aggressive and drunk people are walking around the cities, private houses and shops are being looted. The opposition forces seized the power and immediately started portfolio distribution. President Bakiyev disappeared. The south of the republic is waiting for continuation. Nothing is over yet."

Kyrgyzstan LiveBlog: Latest from the Uprising


With 75 people dead and more than 500 injured so far, it is difficult to believe that the Bakiyev Presidency was swept in during a relatively peaceful 'Tulip Revolution" just five years ago. However, ordinary Kyrgyz living with astronomical price increases in utilities and goods, fraudulent elections, and endemic corruption, five years is a long time.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev was swept in during a wave of protests that broke out in response to fraudulent elections in March 2005 under then-President Askar Akayev. This was quickly labelled the 'Tulip Revolution", a romanticised term insipired by the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.


Akayev was former Politburo appointee and the poster-child for Central Asian nepotism. Bakiev soon secured 88% of the vote (though the standards for the initial July 2005 elections fell short of international standards) and was seen as a liberalising, unifying force, coming from the south of the country.

The "Tulip Revolution" soon proved as quixotic as it sounded, and the weak US response to an increasingly undemocratic Kyrgyzstan was accompanied by a growing dependence on the Manas airbase for the war in Afghanistan. Bakiev's Presidency was distinguished by increased powers for the executive, murders of several journalists and opposition politicians, and severe economic problems.

Much of the English-language reportage on the events in Kyrgyzstan has mainly focused on the old narrative of the tussle between Russia and the US for this "strategic" ex-Soviet Republic. But pointing to the Kremlin as the force behind this regime change ignores the other socio-economic and geopolitical factors at play in Bakiyev's disasterous turn as president.

Yet an American military presence in Russia's backyard has been a bone of diplomatic contention. Russia has been putting pressure on successive Kyrgyz governments since the Americans arrived in December 2001, establishing Manas as a back-up to the Karshi-Khanabad base in Uzbekistan at the start of the war in Afghanistan.

After a violent uprising in the Uzbek town of Andijan was put down by force in May 2005, Islam Karimov, the authoritarian president, expelled the Americans. Undersecretary of State R. Nicholas Burns had dared to suggest an international probe into the massacre of civilians who had been protesting poverty, repression, and corruption.

"We always think ahead. We'll be fine," said Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld . However, the US loss of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase ( "Stronghold Freedom") left Manas as the only location in Central Asia for support of operations in Afghanistan.

Over the past year, Bakiyev has been hedging his bets that US negotiations with Uzbekistan to re-instate a military base would collapse. This proved to be a correct assumption, and the Obama Administration not only agreed to the increase in rent from $17.4 to $60 million per year, but continued to turn a blind eye to the corruption running amok. Kevin Gash, former US Agency for International Development officer in Kabul and now resident in Bishkek, also emphasises the "lukewarm response" after the 2008 Kyrgyz presidential elections were labelled fraudulent by European observers.

Still, although the Kyrgyz legislature passed a bill to close the base in February 2009, the decision was reversed by June, and President Obama was sending letters of praise to Bakiyev. Manas has now become a symbol of corruption and broken promises and, from an American perspective, more precarious than ever.

So what about the Russians? The sudden duties Moscow slapped on oil imports, now up to $193.5 per ton for gasoline and diesel fuel, and the subsequent sky-rocketing of prices arguably pushed Bakiyev's government to the brink.

This is not the first time Bakiyev has faced protests; in 2006 and 2007 he faced opposition-led demonstrations against his constitutional changes. However, the recent price hikes in oil duties were another stick against him, wielded after Bakiyev failed to take the carrot of a $1.7 billion package to rescue a hydroelectric station in the south of the country, offered in return for an expulsion of the US.

Bakiyev may have thought he bought himself some time with the electorate and opposition by playing off the US and Russia against each other, however, the gains never translated into investment or infrastructure. The old Soviet system of blat (corruption) and nepotism reared its head when it was discovered that Bakiyev's son was given supply contracts with the Manas base last year.

Still, each of the expat Kyrgyz and Bishkek residents I have spoken to today say that there was little talk of Manas these last few days (except to speculate whether or not Bakiyev was hiding on it).

Unlike 2005, this uprising was not a bubbling up of demands for democratic freedoms. This was first and foremost a backlash against the economic situation and corruption.

What is confirmed now is that Kyrgyzstan has its first female President, Roza Otunbayeva. Her party, the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, are demanding constitutional reform, a change in the tax system, an independent media and judiciary, and foreign investment, especially in agriculture.

The record of Otunbayeva, a former Foreign Minister, is mostly as a diplomat in the UK and US. Her newly formed cabinet is made up of key figures from other opposition parties, notably Almazbek Atambaev, Temir Sariev, Azimbek Beknazarov and Omurbek Tekebaev (an ardent opponent of former President Akayev).

Those with access to Internet continue to tweet and blog about continued looting, and rumours abound about the whereabouts of Bakiev. Otunbayeva has been stressing the need for calm and giving assurances, via her Twitter account as well as local media, that the interim government will be restoring order,

Neither Bakiyev or US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Tatiana C. Gfoeller have Twitter accounts although the US Embassy in Bishkek does have a website. The homepage was not updated on Thursday, but a press release on Wednesday stated, "The embassy strongly endorses the April 6 statement of the Secretary General of the UN calling for restraint and immediate dialogue aimed at lowering tensions."

This was ollowed by the second important matter: "Milly and Macy's Parade Book Launch in Kyrgyz".

The business of the American Embassy in Bishkek may take a considerably more sober tone in days to come.
Thursday
Apr082010

The Latest from Iran (8 April): Speeches, Visits, & Pictures

2155 GMT: Break in Service. Apologies for halt in updates today because of extended academic duties.

We'll be back early Friday morning to catch up with all the news and offer analysis.

1355 GMT: You Might Be Catty But Can You Debate Us? Gholam-Reza Mesbahi-Moghaddam, a member of Parliament's Economic Committee has challenged the President to debate him and Ahmad Tavakoli, another high-profile critic of the subsidy/spending plan.

Earlier this week Tavakoli had issued a similar statement, saying Ahmadinejad must follow the Parliament's will.

1345 GMT: Catty Comment of Day. OK, here's the gossip from Rah-e-Sabz:

So key Iranian figures are with the Supreme Leader trying to resolve the Parliament-Ahmadinejad feud over subsidy cuts and revenues. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani says to Ahmadinejad that Parliament is expecting the Government to follow the law. The President is having none of it, however: he says he will not follow what Parliament says and that they "better tell this to the person they congratulated on the evening of the Presidential election".
Whoa. I think that is a reference to the long-standing tale that Larijani told Mir Hossein Mousavi on the evening of 12 June that he had indeed triumphed in the polls.

And that may be why Ayatollah Khamenei then said that in important decisions "we should be united".

NEW Latest Iran Video: Ahmadinejad and the “Non-Crowd” at Orumiyeh
Latest Iran Video: Neda Replaces IRI Flag at Embassy in Netherlands

The Latest from Iran (7 April): Ahmadinejad’s Support?


1340 GMT: Mousavi Meets the Reformists. Mujahedin of Islamic Revolution party members have met with Mir Hossein Mousavi. The take-away line from the meeting --- we hope to have more later --- is Mousavi's declaration that they "must stand up to the ruling group and return to the Constitution" of the Islamic Republic.


1315 GMT: The International Sanctions Dance. President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev two-stepping today after signing the treaty for reduction of nuclear arms....

Obama predicted there would be "strong, tough” sanctions against Iran in coming weeks, which he has to say to keep the all-out sanctions folks in Washington at bay. Medvedev expressed an openness to the idea, since he doesn't want to be rude to the US, as bargains are being stuck on other fronts. Then, however, he drew line: “smart sanctions” rather than sweeping sanctions,  and protection of Russia’s national interests (i.e., no measures that significantly cut Russian trade).

No change in this dance step....

1030 GMT: Converting the Bad News. Press TV notes the development, which we reported yesterday, that Russia's LUKOil is stopping imports to Iran but races to this assurance:
Speaking on April 3, the head of Iran's Committee for Transportation and Fuel Management said Iran was capable of becoming self-sufficient in gasoline production during the current Iranian year (ending March 20, 2011).

"Iran's gasoline consumption stands at 62 million liters (16.38 million US gallons) per day, of which 45 million liters (11.89 million US gallons) are produced domestically," said Mohammad Rouyanian.

0830 GMT: We have posted a purported video of the audience at the Ahmadinejad speech in northwest Iran yesterday.

0700 GMT: Look Over There! The US is Doomed! Continuing his attempt to focus Iranian eyes on the international front, President Ahmadinejad declared Wednesday night, "The US is so bogged down in a quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan that it is doomed to be defeated whether it stays or escapes."

0525 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. More than 3,500 people, including international journalists, writers, and activists have written to the Supreme Leader, asking him to release all journalists, writers, and bloggers currently imprisoned in Iran. The initiative was organised by Canadian Journalists for Free Expression.

RAHANA reports that detained student activist Peyman Aref was taken to Modarres Hospital in Tehran after he suffered a heart attack. EA also has reliable information that reformist leader Abbas Mirza Aboutalebi has suffered a heart attack.

Student activist Behrooz Javid Tehrani is in the eighth day of a hunger strike.

University lecturer Rahmatollah Bastani, arrested on 28 March during the funeral of Ayatollah Montazeri’s wife in Qom, has been released on $50,000 bail. Journalist Borumand Rostami of Bistoon has been released on $20,000 bail

0520 GMT: Strange Bedfellows. Iranian state media eagerly embraces former Bush Administration official John Bolton, which may seem a bit unusual since Bolton has called for airstrikes against Tehran. The reason? Bolton bolsters the Iranian Government's line, "New Sanctions Won't Work". (Press TV doesn't mention that Bolton is putting out this message to justify military action.)

0510 GMT: A Very Different Picture and Signal. The image is of Mehdi Karroubi visiting the reformist leader Feizollah Arab Sorkhi, still on temporary release from his detention. Karroubi also saw the mother of Sohrab Arabi, killed 15 June by Iranian security forces.





0500 GMT: Thursday begins with a look at contrasting images and signals. As we noted last night, President Ahmadinejad has tried to turn a visit to Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran into a show of support for his Government, but the pictures are conflicting, to say the least. Fars News uses close-up shots at the stadium and images of crowds rushing Ahmadinejad's car en route to claim a large, enthusiastic turnout. Other pictures circulating on the Internet are not so positive:



An EA correspondent offers an explanation:
The Fars photos do not disprove the set on the Internet. Look at the stadium pictures, all close-ups of the front of the crowd. I have been to Ahmadinejad events --- the people you see are right at the front. There is nothing between them and the President

The crowd mobbing the car, apparently en route to the stadium could be edited. It counts for nothing. All the people behind could be easily photo shopped.
Wednesday
Apr072010

The New US Nuclear Policy in 3 Bullet Points

Your easy-to-read version of the 49-page Nuclear Posture Review, released yesterday by the Obama Administration:

1. If you're not in the Nuclear Club --- Tehran, Pyongyang, we're looking at you --- don't even think about it. Shove off. Don't make us angry.

Still thinking about it? Don't.

2. If you're in the Nuclear Club --- Moscow, Beijing, how ya doin'? --- great to work with you to keep others out. Cold War? What Cold War?

3. Israel? Who is this Israel? (Repeat for Pakistan and India.)

Obama Document: The New US Stance on Nuclear Weapons

Wednesday
Apr072010

Obama Document: The New US Stance on Nuclear Weapons

The first part of the Executive Summary of the Nuclear Posture Review, released yesterday by the White House, accompanied by an Obama statement:

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st entury nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He recognized that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly –-- perhaps, he said, not in his lifetime.

The New US Nuclear Policy in 3 Bullet Points


But the President expressed his determination to take concrete steps
toward that goal, including by reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, he pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.


The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration’s approach to promoting the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. The NPR reflects the President’s national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment, the NPR report focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

While the NPR focused principally on steps to be taken in the next five to ten years, it also considered the path ahead for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture over the longer term. Making sustained progress to reduce nuclear dangers, while ensuring security for ourselves and our allies and partners, will require a concerted effort by a long succession of U.S. Administrations and Congresses. Forging a sustainable consensus on the way ahead is critical.

The Changed –-- and Changing –-- International Security Environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon.

Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries –-- especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community –-- may acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of their own.

Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community.

While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers –-- most notably Russia and China. Russia remains America’s only peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. While policy differences continue to arise between the two countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable nuclear forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically. The two have increased their cooperation in areas of
shared interest, including preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, are growing. At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs –-- their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them –-- raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.

These changes in the nuclear threat environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents.

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Force Posture

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear
policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies and partners around the world.

But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years –-- including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries –-- enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most pressing security challenges.

*By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons –-- meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament –-- we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

*By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.

*By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the development of new nuclear warheads or further nuclear testing.

*By modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

*By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and improving transparency and mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for addressing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

*By working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step toward eliminating them, we can reverse the growing expectation that we are destined to live in a world with more nuclear-armed states, and decrease incentives for additional countries to hedge against an uncertain future by pursuing nuclear options of their own.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

As a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime –-- and for the first time, the 2010 NPR places this priority atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. Concerns have grown in recent years that we are approaching a nuclear tipping point –-- that unless today’s dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before very long we will be
living in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

The U.S. approach to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism includes three key elements. First, we seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks.
Second, we are accelerating efforts to implement President Obama’s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years.

And third, we are pursuing arms control efforts –-- including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty –-- as a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

Among key Administration initiatives are:

*Pursuing aggressively the President’s Prague initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, including accelerating the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program. This includes increasing funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 for Department of Energy nuclear nonproliferation
programs to $2.7 billion, more than 25 percent.

*Enhancing national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled nuclear materials, and continuing to expand our nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device.

*Initiating a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.

*Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time.

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

During the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, after the United States gave up its own chemical and biological weapons (CBW) pursuant to international treaties (while some states continue to possess or pursue them), it reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners.

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S.
nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks –-- conventional, biological, or chemical –-- has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.

To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response --– and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable. Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance –-- states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations –-- there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.

Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.

Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR:

*The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.

*The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

*The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

Read rest of Executive Summary and report....
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