The Latest from Iran (26 April): Points of View

2030 GMT: Economy Watch. Mohammad Nabi-Habibi, the Secretary General of the conservative Islamic Coalition Party, has said that the government has not had any major achievement in the privatization process: “Over the recent years, some works have been done to privatize the state-run organizations and strengthen the private sector, but the steps have not yielded any notable result so far."

NEW Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi “We Will Make The Nation Victorious”
NEW Iran: The Mousavi 4-Point Message "Who Defends the Islamic Republic?"
NEW Iran Exclusive: A Birthday Message to Detained Journalist Baghi from His Daughter
Iran Special: Tehran, Defender of Women’s Rights (P.S. Don’t Mention Boobquake
Iran: The Green Movement and the Labour Movement (Assadi)
Iran: Hyping the Threat from Tehran (Walt)
The Latest from Iran (25 April): Build-Up

2025 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Sama Nourani of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters has reportedly been released on bail.


2015 GMT: Our colleague Josh Shahryar has a new opinion piece at The Huffington Post, "Iranian Diaspora Needs to Act": "What the Green Movement urgently needs from the Iranian Diaspora, especially in the United States, is to come together and form a strong voice of political support for the cause of Iran's democratization - if not outright liberalization."

1525 GMT: Ahmadinejad "Look Over There!" Speaking to Iran's police officers, the President today denounced "satanic tools" of oppression.

This may have initially shocked his audience, but eventually it became clear that Ahmadinejad was not referring to them. Instead, his target was nuclear weapons, military invasions, and the veto power granted to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The President continued, "America belittles nations, and questions human values, whereas valuing humanity requires culture. Belittling nations only reaps inflexibility, distance, and malice."

1515 GMT: The Der Spiegel Profile of Karroubi (With a Bonus Surprise). The German magazine's piece on Mehdi Karroubi is now out --- it's more a portrayal than an interview --- and features the cleric's defiance, "The people are just waiting for a spark....I am prepared to accept all consequences."

The surprise,however, is not in the Karroubi material: to be honest, we've heard it before from the resolute opposition figure. Instead, the twist comes in an insert on another Presidential candidate, the "conservative" Mohsen Rezaei:

Does he see himself as an alternative to Ahmadinejad? The corners of Rezaei's mouth turn up in a slight smile: "I will serve my people where I can."

The retired general prefers to avoid critical questions, and seems intent on stirring his tea, as if the sugar could somehow solve his loyalty problems. Like Karroubi, Rezaei refers to "Dr. Ahmadinejad" and avoids using the word president. And like Karroubi the reformer, Rezaei the conservative says: "It can't go on like this."

1450 GMT: Over to You, Dr Rahnavard. And now it's Zahra Rahnavard putting out a declaration. She calls on the Government to free all imprisoned workers and teachers and to hold free and democratic elections.

1445 GMT: We have now posted a full English-translated version of Mehdi Karroubi's statement to former reformist members of Parliament, "We Will Make The Nation Victorious”.

1345 GMT: Karroubi Fights Back. Mehdi Karroubi's website Saham News carries a summary of his latest discussion with former reformist members of Parliament. The cleric, who had to deal with false rumours of his ill health last week, denounced the "new wave of psychological warfare" of the regime. He has promised that, despite this campaign, the opposition's resistance will only increase.
1245 GMT: Photo of the Day. Reformist leader and former Minister of the Interior Mostafa Tajzadeh is surrounded by supporters and well-wishers before his return to prison. Tajzadeh, who was on temporary release, was formally given a six-year sentence last week.



1000 GMT: The Oil Squeeze. The chief executive of the French oil company Total, Christophe de Margerie, said today that it will cease gasoline sales to Iran if the United States passes legislation to penalise fuel suppliers exporting to Tehran.

0925 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Rah-e-Sabz's latest list of detainees has 2560 names. The website estimates that the total arrested since the June election is probably 18,000.

One of those detainees, journalist Mohammad Reza Yazdan-Panah has been indicted for "acting against national security".

0920 GMT: Stop Blogging. Now. RAHANA reports that Google-owned Blogger has been filtered in Iran.

0915 GMT: Economy Watch. Khabar Online posts some troubling figures for the Government, with a 4:1 imbalance between Iran's imports and its exports.

0855 GMT: Is the Government Rattled? There is a notable sharpness today in the attacks on opposition figures by pro-regime newspapers. Kayhan announces that even if former President Mohammad Khatami repents, people will not forgive him for his "sedition".

Resalat asserts that staff from the reformist sites Rah-e-Sabz and Balatarin, with former Minister Ataollah Mohajerani as intermediary, received money from British intelligence officials. The newspaper also "reports" that "the dumb Sheikh [Mehdi Karroubi] met with organisers of fitna [sedition], who proposed to restart this on the election anniversary" but that Mir Hossein Mousavi does not want a call for demonstrations.[

0845 GMT: Interpreting Human Rights. Leading reformist Nasrullah Torabi has drawn a lesson from Iran's withdrawal of its candidacy for the UN Human Rights Council, with its negative effects on Tehran's standing: the step confirms the news of Iran's human rights violations.

0843 GMT: Larijani Watch. Just because he is manoeuvring against the President does not mean Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has to go easy on the US --- indeed, because he is criticising Ahmadinejad, there is even more cause to take the tough line on Washington. In his latest speech, Larijani declared that "people will stand against the US with their lives". (sorry, misunderstanding, your IRGC has to do that ;-)

0838 GMT: Removing Mousavi. The new Constitution of the private group of Iranian universities, Islamic Azad University, has removed Mir Hossein Mousavi from the Board.

0835 GMT: Thanks for That, Ayatollah Khamenei. In his speech to Iran's police forces on Sunday, the Supreme Leader said that respect for people is necessary.

0830 GMT: Karroubi Watch. And while we're summarising Mir Hossein Mousavi's latest steps, Rah-e-Sabz offers Mehdi Karroubi's interview with Der Spiegel, in which he declared that he would be pursuing a demonstration "to protect our Constitution" on the anniversary of the election, 12 June, and called the Ahmadinejad Government a "disaster" for Iran. We're still waiting for the German version.

0825 GMT: Whipping the NGOs Into Shape. Mohammad Reza Alipour, the Deputy Tehran Police Commander, said on Saturday that the police intend to organize non-governmental organizations in a “centralized” way. Alipour explained, “The police’s concern is that there is insufficient supervision over citizen organization and in some of them there is administrative chaos….There is no oversight for issuing licenses for these organizations.”

0815 GMT: The Chinese Angle. Amidst the tangle of signals of Beijing on sanctions, oil imports from Iran, and trade, Mehr News Agency is upbeat:

Iranian and Chinese finance ministers met in the U.S. on Sunday and underlined plans to enhance economic ties and increase the mutual trade level to $20 billion. The Mehr News Agency reported that on the sidelines of the World Bank summit in Washington, Shamseddin Hosseni met Xie Xuren.

Hosseini pointed to Iran's immediate privatization policy and said that foreign companies, especially Chinese firms, can cooperate in the country's lucrative investment projects such as oil refineries and petrochemical plants.

Most of the cheerleading for the trade boost comes from the Iranian side, with the Chinese representative "expressing his satisfaction with the Iranian official's suggestions and noted that the two countries were in a reconstructing phase of their economies meant to benefit their nations".

So is Beijing really boosting its economic stake in Iran, just throwing up reassuring noises, or keeping all its economic and political options open?
0800 GMT: Interpreting Mousavi. With Mir Hossein Mousavi making a flurry of speeches this week, we've offered a quick analysis of his four key points, "Who Defends the Islamic Republic?"

0500 GMT: No significant shifts on the news front this morning. The Ahmadinejad Government has been relatively quiet. Speaker of Parliament Larijani continues his sniping at the President and his inner circle, but without making a significant move. Opposition figures such as Mousavi and Karroubi, with their statements, are signalling a build-up in activity, but plans have yet to emerge. And on the international front, the discussions on the nuclear front --- notably yesterday's encounter between Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano --- still offer more the style of engagement rather than the substance of breakthrough.

A moment, therefore, to look at some points of view. There's an interchange on Press TV on the latest US Government steps on nuclear weapons which offers an opportunity to hear the thoughts of Tehran University students. There's a readers' discussion, sparked by a Tehran Bureau article on "Azeris and the Green Movement", on issues amongst Iran's ethnic groups and the dynamic with the national challenge to the Government. And there's our own readers' dialogue on the legitimacy of the 2009 election and the politics and "justice" beyond it.

And, for a personal point of view, there are the thoughts of Maryam, expressed in a letter to her father, journalist  Emad Baghi, as he celebrated his 48th birthday in Evin Prison on Sunday.

The Latest from Iran (14 April): Ahmadinejad's Struggle

1720 GMT: Ahmadinjead Brings Culture to the World; Students Aren't Sure. The President's adivsor, Somreh Hashemin, has told university students that "world discourse" has changed because of Ahmadinejad's statements --- therefore it now has culture, science, and ethics.

Students at Allameh Tabatabei University may not have been convinced, however, as both reports and video indicate:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKuNhRZsJQA[/youtube]

Iran’s Nukes: Can Tehran and the US Make A Deal?
The Latest from Iran (14 April): Ahmadinejad’s Struggle

1715 GMT: Out of Jail and On-Line. Former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, jailed for several months after the election and selected for a high-profile "confession" in August, has resumed blogging.


1710 GMT: Economy Watch. MP Alireza Mahjoub has predicted a continuation of the poor situation, with 40% inflation, poverty, and economic "suffocation".

1700 GMT: Absence or Protest? Khabar Online reports that one-third of MPs were missing from the Majlis today.

1555 GMT: The Corruption Case. MP Elyas Naderan, the leading Parliamentary critic of First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, has sarcastically thanked the Government for accusing him of making false charges. Naderan assured that he will continue to press the corruption case.

1545 GMT: The Row Over the 15 June Demonstration. Morteza Tamaddon, the Governor of Tehran Province, may have denied his reported statement that the large 15 June protests were authorised. Kalemeh, the website of Mir Hossein Mousavi, however, is persisting with the claim. The website documents Tamaddon's apparent approval of 15 June rally.

1525 GMT: The "Other" Khamenei. Continuing his show of support for reformist leaders, Seyed Hadi Khamenei, the brother of the Supreme Leader, has visited Mohsen Mirdamadi, the chairman of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. Mirdamadi is on temporary release from his prison sentence.

1510 GMT: But China Eases the Pressure? And while there is the ongoing public show over Beijing's will-it-won't-it join international sanctions, this news --- coming as other oil firms stop imports to Iran --- is striking:

State-run Chinaoil has sold two gasoline cargoes for April delivery to Iran, industry sources said on Wednesday, stepping into a void left by fuel suppliers halting shipments under threat of U.S. sanctions....

While others back out, Chinaoil has sold a total of about 600,000 barrels worth around $55 million to the Islamic Republic.

The cargoes were Chinaoil’s first direct sales to Iran since at least January 2009, according to Reuters data. Chinese firms have previously sold through intermediaries, traders said.

1445 GMT: Is Third-Party Enrichment Back On? Reading President Ahmadinejad's bluster in recent days, we asked (1040 GMT), "Is the President actually holding the door open for another push at a deal on uranium enrichment?"

Well, have a look at Iranian state media's presentation of the latest words from the head of Iran's atomic energy organisation, Ali Akbar Salehi, in an interview with a Russian newspaper:

The head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) says Tehran would accept a nuclear fuel swap, should the West manage to win back its trust.

The US-proposed UN-backed deal requires Iran to send most of its low-enriched uranium abroad for further processing and conversion into fuel rods for Tehran's research reactor....

Salehi said that Iran had agreed to the IAEA-backed proposal [for third once it was proffered but needed guarantees from the West that it would deliver the fuel in a timely manner — a demand shrugged off by the West.

"We did not refuse. We agreed at once and we agree now. The only problem is guarantees. They suggested that we hand over a thousand pounds of our 3.5% low-enriched uranium. And wait until the entire amount of uranium has been enriched to a level of 20%," he said. 'Suppose we have given all our uranium. But where is the assurance [that we receive the fuel in a timely manner]?"

1430 GMT: The German Squeeze. The German carmaker Daimler has announced that it will
almost entirely cease business in Iran.

Daimler's chief executive Dieter Zetsche  told shareholders, The policies of the current Iranian leadership have compelled us to put our business relationship with that country on a new footing. In general, our business activities with Iran will now be limited to meeting our existing contractual obligations and continuing our cooperation with established customers."

Daimler will relinquish its 30 percent stake in Iranian Diesel Engine
Manufacturing, a subsidiary of Iranian Khodro Diesel.

The move is further testimony that behind the public rhetoric of leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, for state-based sanctions on Iran, the real pressure is coming from the disinvestment of private companies. Daimler's move following the pullout from Iran of two of Germany's largest insurance companies.

1110 GMT: And, cutting through the Presidential rhetoric and posturing, we've posted an analysis by Julien Mercille on the possibility of a US-Iran deal on enriched uranium for Tehran's medical research reactor.

1040 GMT: Blowing Smoke. How many dramatic foreign policy pronouncements do we get to enjoy from President Ahmadinejad this week?

Following his assessment of foreign leaders as "retarded" and his letter to the United Nations implying that the US Government set up 9-11 for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the President has said that "[US President Barack] Obama cannot do anything in Palestine, they won't let him do anything and he has no chance" and there is no possibility of success in Iraq and Afghanistan: "What can he do in Iraq? Nothing. And Afghanistan is too complicated."

So Ahmadinejad concludes, "Mr. Obama has only one chance and that is Iran. This is not an emotional comment, it's scientific."

Which only leaves the question, success with Iran through what? Is the President actually holding the door open for another push at a deal on uranium enrichment?

1000 GMT: The 15 June March. Still some confusion over whether Iranian authorities --- specifically, Morteza Tamaddon, the Governor of Tehran Province --- said they had authorised the mass demonstration three days after the election.

The Green Voice of Freedom repeated the claim of Parleman News, itself taken from an alleged Tamaddon interview with a magazine, that the march "was actually held with legal authorisation". It appears, however, that GVF has not noted Tamaddon's subsequent denial, which we reported yesterday, of the supposed statement. His line remains that the protest, which brought hundreds of thousands and possibly millions on the streets, was illegal.

0245 GMT. Rafsanjani Watch. Make of this what you will: Hashemi Rafsanjani has made a well-publicised visit this week to Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.

Hassan Khomeini has been under sustained pressure from the Government throughout the post-election crisis over his apparent support for opposition demands,

0240 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ashura protester Hossein Vahed has received a two-year prison sentence.

0230 GMT: Economy Watch. Khabar Online reports that Iran has "lost" $2 billion on oil fields.

0215 GMT: You Can't Keep A President Down (Or Can't You?).

The President-Parliament battle over economic plans escalates. Ahmadinejad has insisted that all changes will be implemented this year.

Key legislators and Ahmadinejad critics are not being so positive, Ahmad Tavakoli has declared that an agreement between two or three MPs and the President doesn't mean an agreement between the Majlis and the Government. That line is also taken by Elyas Naderan.

How serious is the dispute? Vice President Fatemeh Badaghi has threatened MPs by asserting that immunity for their actions exists only in Parliament.

The Latest from Iran (13 April): Getting Beyond the Sideshow

1830 GMT: Economy Watch. It is reported that, in the "slow death" of domestic production because of Chinese-made goods, more than 75% of Iran's imports are now consumer items.

1815 GMT: Rubbing It In. The President's "establishment" opposition are crowing over his supposed retreat over the subsidy cut and spending proposals: they claim that Ahmadinejad has begged the Parliament to let him have a free hand in implementing the plan.

Iran: Mousavi to Students “Spring is Unstoppable”
The Latest from Iran (12 April): Signals from Mousavi & Rafsanjani?

1800 GMT: The 15 June Dispute. Some Government officials have been saying, rather curiously, that the mass marches of 15 June, three days after the election, had been granted a permit by the authorities.

Morteza Tamaddon, the Governor of Tehran Province, has issued a denial, carried in Khabar Online: there was no permit for the "fitna" (sedition) rally.


1150 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Emad Bahavar has told his wife that he is still being kept in solitary confinement.

1140 GMT: Labour Watch. More than 50 workers of the Abadan municipality have gone on strike to protest over more than three months of unpaid wages.

1130 GMT: The Latest on Scholarship. Rah-e-Sabz reports that a Government-sponsored conference on "Nuclear Iran" at Elm-o-Sanat University was boycotted. Two university has also expelled two more professors.

1110 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An Iranian activist is reporting that Abdollah Momeni, a leading member of the student organisation Advar-e Takhim Vahdat, has been summoned to court and rearrested.

Momeni has been out on $800,000 bail. Last week he was a prominent participant in a meeting with Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1040 GMT: Militarising the Judiciary? Rah-e-Sabz is pondering the significance of a General Muhammad Bagher-Zolghadr being nominated as the new cultural, social, and anti-crime deputy of Iran's judiciary.

Last September, Zolghadr outlined the notion of “soft war” in a speech: “In a hard war, the line between you and the enemy is clear, but in a soft war there is nothing so solid. The enemy is everywhere.”

1030 GMT: Handing Out Justice. The head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, has assured a Parliamentary commission that, "if culpable, even my relatives would be persecuted".

I don't think this means that Ali Larijani should watch his back. Instead, Sadegh Larijani is trying to fend off growing pressure for the prosecution of First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi over corruption allegations.

1025 GMT: The Battle Within. While we wait for confirmation of the reports, in Press TV (see 1010 GMT) and Khabar Online, that the President has backed down in the fight over the subsidy plan, more signs that all is not well within the dominant "principlist" faction:

As the members of the Principalist fraction of Iranian Parliament Majlis have expressed different views on the actions taken by the faction’s presidium, Majlis speaker Ali Larijani is to settle their dispute.

....Mohammad Ali Bozorgvari a member of the Principalist fraction of the Parliament delivered a speech last week blasting the members of fraction's presidium and Larijani in particular. He asked them to give clear answers to those criticisms.

Significantly, the report is in the pro-Larijani Khabar Online.

1015 GMT: When Sideshows Get Silly. Here is one reason why we were somewhat dismissive of press coverage of the first day of the Obama nuclear summit (see 0850 GMT), which converged on the line that China was ready to back a US-led sanctions resolution in the UN. For months, Beijing has played the cautious game of appeasing American sentiments by saying, Yes, We'll Talk, while in complementary statements saying, No, We Don't Do Anything Drastic.

So, hours after reporters fed by US officials were declaring Washiington-Beijing unity on the sanctions path, this from the Chinese Foreign Ministry: "We believe that the Security Council's relevant actions should be conducive to easing the situation and conducive to promoting a fitting solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations."

Bless 'em, Reuters are still trying to wedge that tactically convoluted statement into their Monday story-line that All is Going Well: "[The] comments appeared to leave scant doubt that Beijing accepts that fresh Security Council action over Iran is coming, even if China wants room to negotiate over the sanctions proposed by Western powers."

1010 GMT: A Presidential Subsidy Climbdown? Rooz Online offers a lengthy analysis, "Continuation of Conflict Dangerous", but Press TV may have put up the signal that the battle is ending with a Parliamentary victory.

The website reports that, at the start of the Majlis session today, Deputy Speaker Mohammad Hossein Abu Torabi announced, "In a meeting with a group of Iranian MPs, the President has agreed to facilitate the implementation of the subsidy bill without introducing a complementary bill."

That would seem to indicate that Ahmadinejad has given up his attempt to get $40 billion in extra spending from subsidy cuts, rather than the $20 billion authorised by Parliament.

1000 GMT: Now to Important Matters --- Karroubi. The latest statement of Mehdi Karroubi has slipped under the radar, with his meeting last Thursday with the reformist Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party only emerging on his website yesterday.

Karroubi criticised the recent speech of Ahmadinejad in Azerbaijan: “The language used is by no means appropriate for a president....[It is] an insult to thousands of years of Iranian civilisation.” He dismissed the President's attempt to focus attention on the US v. Iran. American threats against the country “were not something new” and, in the event of any attack, “we will all defend the country”:

Creating enemies is not a big deal. A big deal would be to respond to threats with reason and logic so that the public opinion of nations and [the opinion] of governments are drawn towards the truth such that threats are eliminated and turned into opportunities.

Bringing attention back to the domestic front, Karroubi warned of the consequences if Ahmadinejad continued putting down the Parliament and its importance: “If he degrades the Majlis today, tomorrow, the Parliament will lose all respect,” Denouncing the treatment of political prisoners and arguing for the respect of women's rights, he asserted, “We demand the implementation of the Constitution and stand even more firm than ever before.”

0900 GMT: Economy Watch. On another public-relations, Press TV tries to whip up some hope over Iran's international economic position:

Brazil has opened its doors to Iranian businessmen and welcomes any project, which will help the economy and encourage trade between the two countries.

"Iran is a big country in the region and enjoys considerable capacity to develop cooperation with Brazil," Brazilian Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Minister Miguel Jorge said Monday in Tehran after visiting his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Mehrabian.

0850 GMT: OK, let's deal with the sideshow now so we can concentrate on other matters later in the day.

The "nuclear summit" in Washington, at least for the mainstream press, turned into an All About Iran festival. Laura Rozen, one of the best journalists for inside information in the US capital, turned herself into a spokesperson for that line: "On summit sidelines, many conversations about Iran". That's courtesy of a "Washington Gulf expert" --- “With the Chinese, Russians and Turks, folks that need to come along on the sanctions track", the show is all about a forthcoming UN resolution --- and National Security Council staffer Jeff Bader: "The President in the meeting made clear the sense of urgency, and the Chinese made clear that they are prepared to work with us." (Bader is also probably the unnamed "US official" in other reports optimistically pointing to China's support.)

Of course Mahmoud Ahmadinejad didn't take this lying down, not with the opportunity to substitute US v. Iran for any internal matters. From his measured description of foreign leaders as "retarded people" to his call on the UN to investigate how the US Government used the 11 September attacks to set up wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was a red-letter day for finger-pointing by the Iranian President.

Ahmadinejad's declarations are propped up by Iranian state media by other signs that the sanctions hammer won't fall on Tehran: there is a speech outside the summit from Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that there is "no evidence indicating that Iran's nuclear activities include efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon".

The New US Nuclear Policy in 3 Bullet Points

Your easy-to-read version of the 49-page Nuclear Posture Review, released yesterday by the Obama Administration:

1. If you're not in the Nuclear Club --- Tehran, Pyongyang, we're looking at you --- don't even think about it. Shove off. Don't make us angry.

Still thinking about it? Don't.

2. If you're in the Nuclear Club --- Moscow, Beijing, how ya doin'? --- great to work with you to keep others out. Cold War? What Cold War?

3. Israel? Who is this Israel? (Repeat for Pakistan and India.)

Obama Document: The New US Stance on Nuclear Weapons

Obama Document: The New US Stance on Nuclear Weapons

The first part of the Executive Summary of the Nuclear Posture Review, released yesterday by the White House, accompanied by an Obama statement:

In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted 21st entury nuclear dangers, declaring that to overcome these grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” He recognized that such an ambitious goal could not be reached quickly –-- perhaps, he said, not in his lifetime.

The New US Nuclear Policy in 3 Bullet Points

But the President expressed his determination to take concrete steps
toward that goal, including by reducing the number of nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security strategy. At the same time, he pledged that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, both to deter potential adversaries and to assure U.S. allies and other security partners that they can count on America’s security commitments.


The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines the Administration’s approach to promoting the President’s agenda for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. The NPR reflects the President’s national security priorities and the supporting defense strategy objectives identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment, the NPR report focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture:

1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

While the NPR focused principally on steps to be taken in the next five to ten years, it also considered the path ahead for U.S. nuclear strategy and posture over the longer term. Making sustained progress to reduce nuclear dangers, while ensuring security for ourselves and our allies and partners, will require a concerted effort by a long succession of U.S. Administrations and Congresses. Forging a sustainable consensus on the way ahead is critical.

The Changed –-- and Changing –-- International Security Environment

The international security environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. As President Obama has made clear, today’s most immediate and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism. Al Qaeda and their extremist allies are seeking nuclear weapons. We must assume they would use such weapons if they managed to obtain them. The vulnerability to theft or seizure of vast stocks of such nuclear materials around the world, and the availability of sensitive equipment and technologies in the nuclear black market, create a serious risk that terrorists may acquire what they need to build a nuclear weapon.

Today’s other pressing threat is nuclear proliferation. Additional countries –-- especially those at odds with the United States, its allies and partners, and the broader international community –-- may acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, North Korea and Iran have violated non-proliferation obligations, defied directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created. Their provocative behavior has increased instability in their regions and could generate pressures in neighboring countries for considering nuclear deterrent options of their own.

Continued non-compliance with non-proliferation norms by these and other countries would seriously weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with adverse security implications for the United States and the international community.

While facing the increasingly urgent threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, the United States must continue to address the more familiar challenge of ensuring strategic stability with existing nuclear powers –-- most notably Russia and China. Russia remains America’s only peer in the area of nuclear weapons capabilities. But the nature of the U.S.-Russia relationship has changed fundamentally since the days of the Cold War. While policy differences continue to arise between the two countries and Russia continues to modernize its still-formidable nuclear forces, Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and prospects for military confrontation have declined dramatically. The two have increased their cooperation in areas of
shared interest, including preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and terrorism, are growing. At the same time, the United States and China’s Asian neighbors remain concerned about China’s current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the arsenals of Russia and the United States. But the lack of transparency surrounding its nuclear programs –-- their pace and scope, as well as the strategy and doctrine that guides them –-- raises questions about China’s future strategic intentions.

These changes in the nuclear threat environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and strategic objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the materials to build them. At the same time, we must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have to seek their own nuclear deterrents.

Implications for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Force Posture

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear
policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies and partners around the world.

But fundamental changes in the international security environment in recent years –-- including the growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries –-- enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

Therefore, without jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in ways that will better enable us to meet our most pressing security challenges.

*By reducing the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons –-- meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament –-- we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

*By maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, we can reassure our non-nuclear allies and partners worldwide of our security commitments to them and confirm that they do not need nuclear weapons capabilities of their own.

*By pursuing a sound Stockpile Management Program for extending the life of U.S. nuclear weapons, we can ensure a safe, secure, and effective deterrent without the development of new nuclear warheads or further nuclear testing.

*By modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise, accelerate dismantlement of retired warheads, and improve our understanding of foreign nuclear weapons activities.

*By promoting strategic stability with Russia and China and improving transparency and mutual confidence, we can help create the conditions for moving toward a world without nuclear weapons and build a stronger basis for addressing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

*By working to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step toward eliminating them, we can reverse the growing expectation that we are destined to live in a world with more nuclear-armed states, and decrease incentives for additional countries to hedge against an uncertain future by pursuing nuclear options of their own.

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

As a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons, the United States will lead expanded international efforts to rebuild and strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation
regime –-- and for the first time, the 2010 NPR places this priority atop the U.S. nuclear agenda. Concerns have grown in recent years that we are approaching a nuclear tipping point –-- that unless today’s dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before very long we will be
living in a world with a steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing likelihood of terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons.

The U.S. approach to preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism includes three key elements. First, we seek to bolster the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its centerpiece, the NPT, by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and enforcing compliance with them, impeding illicit nuclear trade, and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing proliferation risks.
Second, we are accelerating efforts to implement President Obama’s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide in four years.

And third, we are pursuing arms control efforts –-- including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty –-- as a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.

Among key Administration initiatives are:

*Pursuing aggressively the President’s Prague initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide, including accelerating the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation Program. This includes increasing funding in fiscal year (FY) 2011 for Department of Energy nuclear nonproliferation
programs to $2.7 billion, more than 25 percent.

*Enhancing national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks and interdict smuggled nuclear materials, and continuing to expand our nuclear forensics efforts to improve the ability to identify the source of nuclear material used or intended for use in a terrorist nuclear explosive device.

*Initiating a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.

*Renewing the U.S. commitment to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe haven for such efforts.

Reducing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security and U.S. military strategy has been reduced significantly in recent decades, but further steps can and should be taken at this time.

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

During the Cold War, the United States reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Moreover, after the United States gave up its own chemical and biological weapons (CBW) pursuant to international treaties (while some states continue to possess or pursue them), it reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons to deter CBW attack on the United States and its allies and partners.

Since the end of the Cold War, the strategic situation has changed in fundamental ways. With the advent of U.S. conventional military preeminence and continued improvements in U.S. missile defenses and capabilities to counter and mitigate the effects of CBW, the role of U.S.
nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks –-- conventional, biological, or chemical –-- has declined significantly. The United States will continue to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks.

To that end, the United States is now prepared to strengthen its long-standing “negative security assurance” by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

This revised assurance is intended to underscore the security benefits of adhering to and fully complying with the NPT and persuade non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty to work with the United States and other interested parties to adopt effective measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

In making this strengthened assurance, the United States affirms that any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical or biological weapons against the United States or its allies and partners would face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response --– and that any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable. Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of bio-technology development, the United States reserves the right to make any adjustment in the assurance that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.

In the case of countries not covered by this assurance –-- states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations –-- there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.

Yet that does not mean that our willingness to use nuclear weapons against countries not covered by the new assurance has in any way increased. Indeed, the United States wishes to stress that it would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.

Accordingly, among the key conclusions of the NPR:

*The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.

*The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.

*The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.

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