Iraq: The US Strategy for a Government (Visser)

Reidar Visser writes for historiae.org: "One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens."...

As the end of the US combat mission in Iraq is drawing to a close (31 August), there are two basic approaches to the ongoing, stalemated process of government formation in Iraq.

The first approach assumes that Iraq’s citizens are more interested in issues like security, health and services than in sectarian bickering and that it is possible to form a government based on common views on basic political issues instead of taking into consideration calculations relate to ethno-sectarian identities. Typically, this kind of government would be a “minimum-winning” one, i.e. just above the 163 mark needed to secure a parliamentary majority (and hence strong enough to pass whatever legislation it wishes to pass) but not much above that (in order to maximise the prospect for developing internal coherence and avoiding the multiplication of sinecures inside government).

Iraq Follow-Up: 64 Dead in Bombings — What is the Significance? (Cole)

This kind of government would offer the best chances of maximising the autonomy of the Iraqi government versus a hostile regional environment. It is also the approach that presents the best fit with the Iraqi constitution; by way of contrast the idea that all winning lists need to be represented or that all ethno-sectarian groups must be included in government has no constitutional basis as such.

The second, opposite approach, is focused on armistice rather than governance. It presupposes that no proper, issue-based government in Iraq is possible due to assumed insurmountable ethnic and religious tensions, and that the aim should therefore be to make sure as many players as possible are “inside the tent” where they would be less likely to create trouble. These ideas do not come from the constitution; rather they are inspired by Western models of “consociational” democracy and power-sharing and point in the direction of an oversized cabinet with a weak prime minister. It is therefore important to point out that the case of Iraq fits badly with the standard criteria cited by theoreticians of consociational democracy as prerequisites for success – including a relatively low case-load on the political system, a public willingness to accept backroom politics (or the existence of alternative means of expressing the popular will when government becomes invisible, such as frequent referendums), and not least internal coherence in the sub-communities included in government through a formula of power-sharing. Typically in the Iraqi case it would be vitally important that the Sadrists be represented if this kind of “armistice” approach is followed, since the whole idea is to make a compact between what is believed to be the “main tribes” of the community instead of transcending tribal and ethnic loyalties altogether (as in the governance-focused approach). Needless to say, this kind of government is unlikely to develop any internal coherence and will often experience paralysis. It will, in other words, easily fall prey to the schemes of regional powers.

After some initial confusion as far as Washinghton’s preferences are concerned (first it seemed there was a desire to see all four big winners included in an “armistice government”, then some suggested there was interest in a “governance government” of just Iraqiyya and State of Law) it is now possible to situate US policy within this dichotomy. Firstly, it seems clear that the idea of building an issue-based, progressive government is not seen as realistic by Washington: Ambassador Chris Hill recently repeated the view that the Kurds “had to be included”, simply on an ethno-sectarian basis. Thus the US proposal for Iraqiyya and State of Law to move closer together does not really seem to be based on a vision of them excluding the others; rather the idea seems to be that the two would take the most important positions and give the rest to the others in what would still be an oversized power-sharing formula.

Secondly, Washington has now introduced a specific suggestion for how to solve the tug-of-war between the leaders of the two biggest blocs, Nuri al-Maliki and Ayyad Allawi, regarding the premiership. The proposed solution would involve giving one of the two men (i.e. the loser in the premiership contest) compensation in the shape of the presidency for the national security council. Conceptually, then, this kind of proposal – described by American officials as a “way of increasing the number of chairs” – seems to be leaning towards the “power-sharing” end of the government-formation typology, since governance in Iraq today would mean reducing the number of chairs, not increasing them. This is especially so because the security council chosen as the key device for solving the problem (let’s face it, the idea is to create two premierships and kick the problems further down the road), is conceptually related to other institutional innovations supported in particular by the Kurds in the post-2005 period with the aim of further reducing the prospect of a strong government in Baghdad. There are striking similarities between the composition of the national security council of 2006 and the oil and gas commission proposed in 2007 (unsurprisingly, the president of the Kurdish region is supposed to sit on both), and the aim of having consensus decisions in these forums means that they are likely to remain ineffective and weak.

Whatever one may think of this US strategy, the challenges and the uphill struggle it faces seem rather obvious. Firstly, at the procedural level, and judging from leaks from the talks held so far, it seems designed to fit a scenario in which Maliki would continue as premier and Allawi would get the newly revived post as head of the national security council. There are several problems here. In the first place, Allawi does not seem particularly interested, since he is still hoping for the premiership instead. Secondly, if Maliki is to continue as premier he also needs to be the candidate of the biggest bloc in parliament, meaning that unless he allies with Allawi in a bloc (in which case no further partners would be needed and a more governance-focused cabinet could be formed instead of a power-sharing one), a Maliki premiership, as per the apparent US preference, is predicated on the survival of the Shiite alliance of both State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance, i.e. Iran’s preferred scenario (otherwise Maliki would not have the seats to form the biggest bloc).  Again, absent a bilateral deal with Iraqiyya, the sole legal path to a second Maliki premiership is a perpetuation of a Shiite alliance on the pattern of the United Iraqi Alliance in 2006, and even that would be disputed by Iraqiyya for being a much too flexible reading of the constitutional article 76 on the entitlement of the biggest bloc to form the government since it involves post-election bloc formation.

In other words, this outcome would be the exact opposite to what Joe Biden and other US leaders have been telling Washington lately about a supposed decline in Iranian influence in Iraq. Not a big surprise, though: Ambassador Chris Hill told a USIP audience in Washington last week that he expected the next Iraqi premier to be a Shiite – an assertion that completely lacks any basis in the Iraqi constitution and represents exactly the kind of sectarian paradigm of Iraqi politics that Iran prefers. One cannot fail to get the impression that either US policy is grossly contradictive, or there is an unspoken underlying policy of détente with Iran in Iraq, at the expense of the governance of that country and its citizens. Had Washington truly put Iraqi interests first, it would instead have aimed to draw a wedge between the two Shiite-led alliances by having one inside government and the other on the outside, thereby allowing the one in government to develop a more lasting bond with the other main forces in Iraqi politics, without being susceptible to cheap tricks like the de-Baathification revival that brought Iraqi politics to a standstill earlier this year.

Read full article....

Iraq Follow-Up: 64 Dead in Bombings --- What is the Significance? (Cole)

Juan Cole writes:

On Wednesday, the Sunni Arab guerrilla insurgency of Iraq demonstrated it is alive and able to plan and carry out a nation-wide set of terrorist operations. The covert organization set off bombs in 13 cities, killing some 64 and wounding an estimated 274, and targeting mainly police stations and checkpoints. Indeed, the bloody events could be termed a one-day war on the Iraqi police.

In Baghdad, 7 police were killed and 26 wounded in the al-Qahirah district. In Kut, a car bomb struck the central police station, killing 15 and wounding 90. Among those killed was Gen. Walid Sami, the director of the police station, according to al-Hayat. Attacks in Karbala, Muqdadiya, Ramadi, Basra and other cities took smaller tolls but underlined that it is dangerous to be a policeman supporting the new, American-installed order in Iraq. In Mosul an army base was attacked, and in Baghdad a bomb was set off at the entrance to the Kadhemiya district that houses the Shiite shrine of the Seventh Imam, among the holiest sites for Shiites.

Iraq Breaking: Bombings Kill Dozens, Wound More than 200 Across Country

The ability of the Sunni Arab insurgents to strike in Kut and Basra is remarkable, given that both are in the Shiite zone. That they have recovered somewhat from their defeat in al-Anbar is made clear by the attacks in Ramadi and Fallujah.

But remember that although these bombings took a lot of lives and maimed a lot of people, they could have been carried out by a relatively small group of people, perhaps as few as 100. In addition, it is not clear what practical gain they could have realized from these attacks. Is anyone really not going to join the police because of a few bombings? Are the police really going to respond by giving the insurgents greater leeway to operate? Would the public really be intimidated? Can the bombings change the government or provoke a coup or revolution? No, no, no and no. Rather, the guerrillas are just making themselves even more hated and are provoking the army and police to improve their counter-terrorism capabilities.

The violence and lack of security, to be sure, is making Iraqis depressed, as Arwa Damon of CNN bravely describes it. But, again, it is hard to see a political gain for the guerrillas in creating such a dark mood in the public.

As for those who argue that the bombing campaign is a reason to halt or reverse the American military withdrawal, I don’t understand their argument. What practical thing could US troops do to stop random bombings in Kut and Muqdadiya? When they were in charge of Iraq, they were unable to stop bombing waves, so how would they do so now? They can support the Iraqi military in counter-terrorism, but they can do that whether the US is in Iraq in strength or not.

The Iraqi military has two major security challenges. One is to patrol the cities and keep them from being in the hands of militias and gangs. In that task, the new Iraqi military seems to perform just all right. They can patrol independently, and will stand and fight if they come under fire from a militia. But the other major task is counter-insurgency, and in that struggle the new Iraqi military is still not very good. They don’t do checkpoint well, and they have a superstitious belief in divining rods that are supposed to discover explosive in the trunk (they don’t). In any case, both these security tasks are best undertaken by Iraqis.

As I argued at CNN on Monday,, the very presence of the US troops in such large numbers may retard Iraqi political parties’ progress toward reconciliation. The Shiites and Kurds are made arrogant by their knowledge that the US will back them, and so haven’t tried very hard for reconciliation with the Sunni Arabs– the only thing that would end the insurgency.

The bombings are getting on the nerves of the Iraqi public in part because of the political uncertainty of the moment. The March 7 parliamentary elections produced a hung parliament (just as all the recent elections in the countries with a Westminster parliamentary system have produced hung parliaments). So far no party has put together a ruling coalition, leaving the state in the hands of a weak caretaker hold-over government.

It would be fairly easy to form a government if the Shiite religious parties formed a super-coalition, as they have in the past. But this time they are divided between the State of Law coalition of incumbent prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and the more fundamentalist parties grouped in the National Iraqi Alliance. The latter include the Sadr Bloc led by clergyman Muqtada al-Sadr, who is studying in the Iranian seminary city of Qom. Sadr does not like al-Maliki because the prime minister sent troops against his Mahdi Army militia in 2008. If Sadr would accept al-Maliki as PM for a second term, the government could be formed tomorrow.

Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports that Muqtada in Iran is coming under strong pressure both from the government of Mahmud Ahmadinejad and from his clerical teachers, themarja`iyyah or spiritual and legal Exemplars to accept al-Maliki for the sake of Shiite power in Iraq. Muqtada has been flirting instead with an alliance with ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi, the darling of the Americans, who is perceived as anti-Iran. Iran really does not want a prime minister Allawi next door in Iraq, and so is trying to strong-arm Muqtada.

Muqtada is not, however, easy to strong-arm, and is now reportedly considering relocating to Beirut as a way of escaping Iranian pressure and also of retaining his independence from the Iraqi political scene. (He may also be thinking he could fill the vacuum created by the death of Lebanese grand ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah.) The rumors were denied by Muqtada’s spokesmen in Baghdad, who said it was much more likely that he would return to Iraq.

It would be so ironic if the American hopes for an Allawi government were made to come true by Muqtada al-Sadr.

Iraq Special: Obama Declares Victory. Sort Of. Depends How You Look at It. (The Onion)

Amidst all the chatter about the claimed withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq and whether it means "We Won" --- The Wall Street Journal may get the award for hyperbole with "Somewhere down the road, we trust that August 18, 2010 will be remembered as Victory in Iraq day" --- let's leave it to The Onion to set matters straight.

Or Not So Straight. Quite Muddled, Really:

Iraq Special: When a Withdrawal Is Not a Withdrawal (Alaaldin)
Iraq Special: When a War is Not Over (Bacevich)
Iraq: The Political Worries Beyond the US “Withdrawal” (Shadid)

Addressing troops at Andrews Air Force Base Tuesday, President Barack Obama claimed victory in Iraq, saying that formal combat operations in the region would end Aug. 31, and that the United States had emerged from the seven-year war triumphant, kind of.

"For nearly a decade, our mission in Iraq has been to root out those who would choose violence over peace, to create a stable Iraqi government, and to transfer power to an incorruptible civilian police force," Obama said. "And, in a manner of speaking, we sort of did some of that, right? More or less?"

"Granted, this is not the definitive, World War II–like victory most of us expected," Obama continued. "But there's a military triumph in there somewhere, I swear. You just have to look at it from the right angles."

According to the president, the relative victory could be credited to a number of achieved benchmarks, depending upon how strict one's definition of "achieved" is. Obama pointed to the democratic election of an Iraqi parliament currently being held together by a thread; the streets of Iraq being slightly less hellish than they were in 2006; and the fact that women are now, for the most part, free to move around the country so long as they don't make a big production out of it.

Obama also noted that during the war more Iraqi insurgents died than American troops, which, he admitted, isn't necessarily the best way to determine a war's victor, but is nonetheless still preferable to the other way around.

"By the end of this month, victory, to a certain extent, will be ours, and we can finally welcome our troops back home," Obama concluded. "That is unless they are one of the 50,000 U.S. soldiers who will have to stay in the region for the foreseeable future."

Following the president's address, a car bomb ripped through an outdoor market in Baghdad killing eight Iraqis and wounding 32.

Pentagon officials also declared the mission, in a sense, kind of sort of accomplished Tuesday, citing the handful of Iraqi hearts and minds that may have been won over by the U.S. occupancy, and the fact that Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had not yet been assassinated.

"In cases where we were unable to rebuild infrastructure or quell violent civil unrest, it wasn't for lack of trying," Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said during last Sunday's taping of ABC's This Week. "And trying your best, one could argue, is technically a triumph in and of itself."

"And hey, Saddam Hussein isn't in power anymore," Odierno continued. "So that's something."

With the cessation of combat operations, and the declaration of what sources said couldn't be called a complete and utter failure because to do so would be to admit that the U.S. wasted $750 billion, lost 4,400 troops, and killed 100,000 Iraqi civilians for absolutely nothing, both Democrats and Republicans have attempted to take credit for the quasi-victory.

"President Obama deserves zero praise for this borderline accomplishment," Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) told reporters. "After all, if it weren't for President Bush ordering the initial invasion of Iraq and making it his central foreign policy initiative, we wouldn't be here right now awkwardly celebrating the muddled outcome of whatever the hell it is we've been doing over there for the past seven years."

Pentagon and White House sources said the American people should expect more wince-inducing victory-if-you-can-call-it-that celebrations 10 or 15 years from now when we kind of, but not really, win in Afghanistan.

Iraq: Obama's Secret Letter to Ayatollah Sistani (Slavin)

Barbara Slavin, writing in Foreign Policy, writes of a US effort to break the political stalemate in Baghdad:

President Obama has sent a letter to Iraq's top Shiite Muslim cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, urging him to prevail upon Iraq's squabbling politicians to finally form a new government, an individual briefed by relatives of the reclusive religious leader said Thursday.

The individual, who asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the topic, said the information came from members of Sistani's family in the Iranian holy city of Qom, where Sistani maintains a large complex of seminaries, libraries, clinics, and other humanitarian organizations.

Iraq and Iran: Has Ayatollah Sistani Challenged the Supreme Leader’s Authority? (Nafisi)

Iraqi factions have sought in vain since the March 7 parliamentary elections to agree on a government to replace that of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The impasse is of increasing concern to the United States as it draws down its forces to 50,000 and relinquishes a combat role at the end of this month. There have been a number of violent incidents in Iraq in recent weeks including bombings and shootings that have raised questions about the country's future stability. (Fifteen Iraqis died Thursday; 53 were killed on Wednesday, according to media reports.)

Read rest of article....