Iraq: Requiem for A US Mission (Los Angeles Times)

As the US Government declares today that the official number of American troops in Iraq has fallen below 50,000, the Los Angeles Times offers an evaluation of the seven-year intervention:

Those who have lived through the Iraq war have never been certain whether they were at the beginning, middle or end of hostilities. Preparations for the U.S.-led invasion began well before the March 2003 launch of "shock and awe." American forces toppled Saddam Hussein within weeks, but rather than bringing an end to the combat as expected, the collapse of the regime and subsequent dismantling of the Iraqi army gave rise to an insurgency and brutal sectarian conflict. Now, as the United States formally concludes its combat role on Aug. 31, it is time once again to ask: What was the U.S. mission in Iraq, and what was accomplished?

Iraq Video & Analysis: Odierno Sets Up the Long Haul Non-Withdrawal

Hussein was a ruthless dictator whose henchmen tortured the political opponents they didn't execute. He invaded Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. He tried to build nuclear weapons, and he used chemical weapons against Iran as well as against his own citizens, killing at least 5,000 Kurds in Halabja alone in March 1988. All told, more than 180,000 Kurdish men, women and children were slaughtered in his Anfal campaign in the north. Meanwhile, the regime drained marshes and starved hundreds of thousands of Shiite Arabs out of the south. These were horrible crimes committed over decades, many of them long before President George W. Bush decided to seek a "regime change." But did they warrant a U.S. invasion?

The Bush administration made the decision to go to war in Iraq in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that were plotted by Al Qaeda from Afghanistan and carried out by Saudis, not by Iraqis. It offered many reasons for turning its sights on Iraq. First, Bush made the radical case that the attacks in the United States justified preemptive strikes against potential threats to Americans. He said it was necessary to disarm Hussein, who allegedly was hiding a program to develop weapons of mass destruction in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The administration claimed a connection between Hussein and Al Qaeda and warned that Hussein could provide the terrorists with WMD. Neoconservative ideologues added that removing Hussein would open the way for a democratic government in Iraq and have a ripple effect throughout the Middle East — domino democracy — that would stabilize the region.

Opponents of the war ascribed other motives to Bush: He sought to "finish the job" for his father, who stopped short after driving Hussein out of Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War, or, as many Iraqis believed, he wanted to get his hands on Iraqi oil.

At least 4,415 American troops died in combat, and tens of thousands were wounded. Iraqi casualties have been harder to count. The Iraq Body Count's website puts the civilian death toll between 97,000 and 106,000; hundreds of thousands were wounded, and many others displaced, forced into exile. The Bush administration initially calculated that the war would run $50 billion. Seven years later, the bill is tallied at about $750 billion, and nearly as much likely will be needed to tend to the physically and psychologically wounded service members who have returned. By any measure, the price has been high in blood and treasure, and in the damage to American moral authority.

From the beginning, this page argued against the war, saying the administration had failed to prove that Hussein had WMD or a connection to the 9/11 perpetrators. Then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld famously responded to skeptics by asserting that "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." The administration pointed to suspect aluminum tubes and alleged mobile bio-laboratories, and went to war despite the opposition of most of its allies and without United Nations approval.

After the fall of Hussein, it quickly became clear that the administration had been seeing things it wanted to find rather than finding the truth. There were no WMD; no 9/11 plotters in Iraq. Bush had taken the country to war on false pretenses. The United States was not safer after the war, because there had been no imminent threat before it. Arguably, Americans were more at risk. Al Qaeda exploited Iraqi resentment of U.S. troops, who were viewed as occupiers rather than liberators by much of the Muslim world. Abuses committed by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison fanned anger and anti-Americanism. Though Al Qaeda was not a force in Iraq before the war, it was after. And rather than stabilizing the region, the war shook a strategic balance. Hussein's Sunni regime had served as a useful if unsavory counterweight to the Shiite government of Iran.

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Iraq Special: Obama Declares Victory. Sort Of. Depends How You Look at It. (The Onion)

Amidst all the chatter about the claimed withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq and whether it means "We Won" --- The Wall Street Journal may get the award for hyperbole with "Somewhere down the road, we trust that August 18, 2010 will be remembered as Victory in Iraq day" --- let's leave it to The Onion to set matters straight.

Or Not So Straight. Quite Muddled, Really:

Iraq Special: When a Withdrawal Is Not a Withdrawal (Alaaldin)
Iraq Special: When a War is Not Over (Bacevich)
Iraq: The Political Worries Beyond the US “Withdrawal” (Shadid)

Addressing troops at Andrews Air Force Base Tuesday, President Barack Obama claimed victory in Iraq, saying that formal combat operations in the region would end Aug. 31, and that the United States had emerged from the seven-year war triumphant, kind of.

"For nearly a decade, our mission in Iraq has been to root out those who would choose violence over peace, to create a stable Iraqi government, and to transfer power to an incorruptible civilian police force," Obama said. "And, in a manner of speaking, we sort of did some of that, right? More or less?"

"Granted, this is not the definitive, World War II–like victory most of us expected," Obama continued. "But there's a military triumph in there somewhere, I swear. You just have to look at it from the right angles."

According to the president, the relative victory could be credited to a number of achieved benchmarks, depending upon how strict one's definition of "achieved" is. Obama pointed to the democratic election of an Iraqi parliament currently being held together by a thread; the streets of Iraq being slightly less hellish than they were in 2006; and the fact that women are now, for the most part, free to move around the country so long as they don't make a big production out of it.

Obama also noted that during the war more Iraqi insurgents died than American troops, which, he admitted, isn't necessarily the best way to determine a war's victor, but is nonetheless still preferable to the other way around.

"By the end of this month, victory, to a certain extent, will be ours, and we can finally welcome our troops back home," Obama concluded. "That is unless they are one of the 50,000 U.S. soldiers who will have to stay in the region for the foreseeable future."

Following the president's address, a car bomb ripped through an outdoor market in Baghdad killing eight Iraqis and wounding 32.

Pentagon officials also declared the mission, in a sense, kind of sort of accomplished Tuesday, citing the handful of Iraqi hearts and minds that may have been won over by the U.S. occupancy, and the fact that Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki had not yet been assassinated.

"In cases where we were unable to rebuild infrastructure or quell violent civil unrest, it wasn't for lack of trying," Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, said during last Sunday's taping of ABC's This Week. "And trying your best, one could argue, is technically a triumph in and of itself."

"And hey, Saddam Hussein isn't in power anymore," Odierno continued. "So that's something."

With the cessation of combat operations, and the declaration of what sources said couldn't be called a complete and utter failure because to do so would be to admit that the U.S. wasted $750 billion, lost 4,400 troops, and killed 100,000 Iraqi civilians for absolutely nothing, both Democrats and Republicans have attempted to take credit for the quasi-victory.

"President Obama deserves zero praise for this borderline accomplishment," Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) told reporters. "After all, if it weren't for President Bush ordering the initial invasion of Iraq and making it his central foreign policy initiative, we wouldn't be here right now awkwardly celebrating the muddled outcome of whatever the hell it is we've been doing over there for the past seven years."

Pentagon and White House sources said the American people should expect more wince-inducing victory-if-you-can-call-it-that celebrations 10 or 15 years from now when we kind of, but not really, win in Afghanistan.

Iraq Special: When a War is Not Over (Bacevich)

Andrew Bacevich writes for The Daily Beast:

Within hours of the much ballyhooed withdrawal of the last U.S. combat brigade from Iraq, Wikipediadeclared that the Iraq war had “ended on August 19, 2010.” Although no doubt reflecting the fondest hopes of the Obama administration and of the American soldiers who have for so many years fought in Iraq, that judgment is unlikely to stand.

The Anglo-American forces that invaded Iraq in March 2003 did so for the purpose of deposing Saddam Hussein. The war’s architects expected this to be an easy and straightforward task, one that they approached with a surgeon’s expectations: They planned to cut open the diseased organ, remove the cancer, close, pat the patient on the head, and be done, moving on to the next sickly Muslim nation requiring Washington’s saving ministrations.

Iraq Special: Obama Declares Victory. Sort Of. Depends How You Look at It. (The Onion)
Iraq Special: When a Withdrawal Is Not a Withdrawal (Alaaldin)
Iraq: The Political Worries Beyond the US “Withdrawal” (Shadid)

They miscalculated badly. In fact, once exposed to the elements, the organ became the site of virulent infections. As chief surgeon, George W. Bush—not especially adept to begin with—ended up with a much bigger problem than he had bargained for.

The war launched to achieve regime change in Baghdad metastasized into three wars. First there was the war to replace Saddam Hussein, imposing a pro-Western Iraqi government in his place. Second was the Iraq civil war, touched off as a result of Saddam’s overthrow, Iraqi tribes, sects, and ethnic groups vying for power in the resulting vacuum and more than happy to use violence to achieve their ends. Finally was the jihadi war, radicals from across the Islamic world seizing on the chaos created by the Americans to convert Iraq into a new battlefield in their campaign to purge the umma of occupying Western infidels.

Seven and a half years later, what can we say of these three wars?

The war to replace Saddam with a legitimate, pro-Western government remains, to be generous, a work in progress....

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US-Iran: Strikes, Sanctions and Scapegoats (Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and a leading analyst of contemporary US-Iran relations, assesses the current state of play:

For the pundits, there are only two questions about U.S.-Iran relations that are of any importance: (1) Will Israel and/or the United States attack Iran? and (2) will the new sanctions have enough bite to persuade Iran to change its nuclear policy? Despite all the printers ink spilled on these two issues, the answers are an easy no and no.

Neither the United States nor Israel will take the military option off the table, thereby giving the pundits (and the crowd that is dying to repeat Iraq) latitude to keep the distant prospect of military action on the front pages, where it has been for years. As a lede, it sells columns and newspapers, so it will not go away. But as analysis it is either blinded by the momentary hype or else is simple wish fulfillment.

Uber-neocon John Bolton had it right. If any such attack were to occur, it would have been at the end of the Bush administration when there was nothing left to lose. Bolton thought it was so inevitable that he predicted it unequivocally in a Wall Street Journal column in 2008. Dick Cheney apparently agreed, judging from his subsequent statements of regret. So it is fair to say that George W. Bush, after looking the potential consequences, resisted the advice of his neocon advisers, his previously dominant vice president, and the reported direct request from the government of Israel — and rejected a strike. What is the likelihood that Barack Obama, with the same catastrophic scenario before him, will approve? Forget it.

Sanctions do not persuade dictatorial regimes to abandon projects that they think are central to their security and survival or even their self-image. Just look at Saddam Hussein. The international sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1980s make the current Iran sanctions appear anemic in comparison. Every item that went in and out of Iraq was subject to approval by a UN committee dominated by a vindictive United States. Yet, although Iraq had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, Saddam could not bring himself to let his own people and his enemies know that. Instead he was prepared to gamble that the United States would not attack him.

One of the reasons for this bad bet was that he and his cronies were doing so well under the sanctions that there was no immediate necessity to come clean. They, after all, controlled the smuggling routes. And their henchmen managed the thriving and enormously lucrative black market. As for concern with their own people, a rotund Tariq Aziz, sitting with a fine Scotch and a Cuban cigar, informed a worried UN representative that it would be good for the Iraqi people to lose some weight. An Iraqi friend of mine told me at the time that the sanctions had made criminals of the entire Iraqi middle class, which had to resort to illegal behavior in order to survive. The biggest – and most successful – of this new criminal class was the privileged group immediately around Saddam Hussein.

Which brings us to Iran. The sanctions are more effective than many anticipated. They have built a web of financial restrictions and limitations around the already weak Iranian economy that is certain to cause significant problems for the leadership. Iran’s critical energy sector is particularly vulnerable. It is in a pincer. Because of cheap energy prices inside the country, artificially propped up by massive subsidies, energy demand is soaring. This siphons off a lot of Iran’s oil production, which would otherwise be sold on the world market for hard currency.

At the same time, because Iran’s oil fields are old and complex, they require modern technology to maintain production. That technology – and the capital investment that can only be provided by the major international oil companies – has been absent for many years. It was driven away partly by the sanctions, ironically assisted by Iran’s own short-sighted negotiating tactics that offered only the most meager profit margins to outside investors. As a result, Iran’s oil production is in decline at the same time that more and more of it is being soaked up by domestic consumption. In a period of relatively low oil prices, this means that Iran’s hard currency earnings are drying up at an alarming rate.

This unenviable economic situation is compounded by what has to be described as perhaps the least competent economic management team of any major country in the world. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the Supreme Leader, seems totally preoccupied with bolstering his own shaky political legitimacy by pandering to the Revolutionary Guards who surround and protect him. The result is corruption on a scale beyond anything the shah’s regime could have imagined.

President Ahmadinejad, also a creature of the Revolutionary Guards, is free to indulge his taste for outlandish and irresponsible rhetoric. His words keep the international and domestic spotlight glued to him; but the effect drives away prospective investors and facilitates the U.S. drive to enlist international support for sanctions against Iran. An American Jewish leader once joked with me that he suspected Ahmadinejad was a Mossad agent: no one, he observed, had been more helpful in promoting donations to Israel and Israeli causes. At the same time, under his leadership Iran has inflation and unemployment that are both in double digits.

But to be fair, Ahmadinejad is the first politician in modern Iranian history willing to address the “third rail” of Iranian politics – the immensely costly subsidies on food and energy. His initial efforts to reduce the amount of subsidized gasoline that Iranians could use met with outbursts of indignation, including torching filling stations. But these rules now seem to be grudgingly accepted and have eased slightly Iran’s energy dilemma. He is now addressing the low tax rates assessed against merchants. This has also resulted in outrage, including closing the bazaars in Iran and other major cities. But his campaign seems to be making progress.

These are needed reforms that would be recommended by any responsible economic overseer, including the International Monetary Fund. Ahmadinejad attempts to balance his daring assaults on the entrenched economic interests by his belligerent rhetoric, always casting himself as the champion of the little guy. In that he resembles his populist predecessors, from Juan Peron to Huey Long to Hugo Chavez. Ahmadinejad takes on America and Israel the way Governor Long took on Standard Oil. But like other populists, Ahmadinejad is the prisoner of his own eccentric view of the world and his loyalty to lieutenants who may or may not be worthy of his faith in them.

The key question about Iran today is not whether it will be attacked or collapse under sanctions. It is whether Iran is capable under its present leadership to take a sober decision about how to deal with the outside world. The Revolutionary Guards have established a dominant position in Iran’s military, its economy, and its politics. Iran increasingly comes to resemble the corporatist states of southern and eastern Europe in the 1920s and ‘30s that we call fascist. Iran is conducting an interior battle with its own demons, from the millenarians on the far right who choose to believe that Khamene`i is the personal representative of God on earth, to the pragmatic conservatives who simply want a more responsible leadership, to the reformists of the Green movement whose objective is to put the “republic” back into the Islamic Republic by giving the people a greater voice.

This is a yeasty and unpredictable mix. No one knows what is going to happen next.

And this is the reality that the Obama administration must deal with. The danger is not that the administration will back the wrong horse in Iran. The real danger is that the Obama administration will be so preoccupied with domestic American politics and its constant demand to look tough when dealing with Iran that it will inadvertently rescue this cruel but hapless regime from its own ineptitude by providing a convenient scapegoat for everything that goes wrong in Iran.

Honduras: Did Obama Administration Turn Its Back on Democracy? (Engler)

Mark Engler writes for AlterNet:

We’ve recently passed the one-year mark since the coup in Honduras against democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya. Over the past year, the White House’s handling of the coup has become seriously embarrassing. It has needlessly strained U.S. relations with the rest of the hemisphere and has placed a serious blotch on the Obama administration’s human rights record.

Back in January, I gave the White House a “D“ for its response to the coup. Even though it totally botched its approach to the elections in the country last November—reversing its demand that Zelaya be reinstated and allowed to serve the end of his term before legitimate elections for a new Honduran president could take place --- I credited the White House for its early condemnations:

One day after Zelaya’s ouster, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that Zelaya’s removal “should be condemned by all.” The following day, President Obama declared, “We believe that the coup was not legal and that President Zelaya remains the president of Honduras.“

While things grew steadily worse after those statements, I argued against giving the White House an “F” for its response. My rationale at the time was that the Obama administration’s approach was distinctly better than what we might have expected from the Bush cabal:

Some progressives, disgusted by the White House response, may be tempted to contend that it reflects a Latin American foreign policy that is even worse than that of President George W. Bush’s. This would be an error. The stances of Bush appointees such as former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich—who lauded the coup as a necessary measure against the “expansion of Chavist authoritarianism“—shows that the position of the last administration would likely have been far worse than that of the present one. But the prospect that things could be even grimmer than they are now does not mean that the White House deserves passing marks for its efforts.

These days, I’m reconsidering my position and wondering if their initial statements against the coup only gave undeserved credibility to Hillary Clinton and company in later promoting an unacceptable state of affairs. Had White House officials, like Otto Reich, supported the military from the start, the United States would have no legitimacy in arguing that we now need to forgive and forget.

Sadly, that’s currently the Clinton position. In early June, she defied the rest of the hemisphere by arguing at the Organization of American States that Honduras should be readmitted to the body: “Now it’s time for the hemisphere as a whole to move forward and welcome Honduras back into the inter-American community,” she said.

In addition to ignoring major problems with the elections last November, those in the “move on” camp have a terrible tendency to overlook the rash of human rights abuses that have taken place in Honduras since the coup. Conn Hallinan recently noted over at Foreign Policy In Focus:

The U.S. has been silent about the fact that the new president, Porfirio Lobo, has overseen a reign of terror that, since the June 28, 2009 coup, has seen the assassination of some 130 anti-government activists...The murders bear a close resemblance to death squad assassinations carried out under military dictator Policarpo Paz Garcia in the late ‘70s and early ‘80…“We are living in a state of terror,” says human rights activist Dr. Juan Almendares, a former director of research projects at Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania. Almendares currently runs a free clinic in Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital.

The Center for Constitutional Rights adds:

Four judges, including the president of Honduran Judges for Democracy, were fired in May 2010 for criticizing the illegality of the coup. Two of them went on a widely-supported hunger strike in the nation’s capital. Judges who participated in public demonstrations in favor of the de facto government remain in power.

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