Iran: Obama Rejects a Public "Red Line" on Nuclear Capability (Porter)

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

President Barack Obama's refusal in a White House briefing earlier this month to announce a "red line" in regard to the Iran nuclear programme represented another in a series of rebuffs of pressure from Defence Secretary Robert Gates for a statement that the United States will not accept Tehran's existing stocks of low enriched uranium.

The Obama rebuff climaxed a months-long internal debate between Obama and Gates over the "breakout capability" issue which surfaced in the news media last April.

Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?

Gates has been arguing that Iran could turn its existing stock of low enriched uranium (LEU) into a capability to build a nuclear weapon secretly by using covert enrichment sites and undeclared sources of uranium.

That Gates argument implies that the only way to prevent Iran having enough bomb-grade uranium for nuclear weapons is to insist that Iran must give up most of its existing stock of LEU, which could be converted into enough bomb-grade uranium for one bomb.

But Obama has publicly rejected the idea that Iran's existing stock of LEU represents a breakout capability on more than one occasion. He has stated that Iran would have to make an overt move to have a "breakout capability" that would signal its intention to have a nuclear weapon.

Obama's most recent rebuff of the Gates position came in the briefing he gave to a select group of journalists Aug. 4.

Peter David of The Economist, who attended the Aug. 4 briefing, was the only journalist to note that Obama indicated to the journalists that he was not ready to lay down any public red lines "at this point". Instead, Obama said it was important to set out for the Iranians a clear set of steps that the U.S. would accept as proof that the regime was not pursuing a bomb.

Obama appeared to suggest that there are ways for Iran to demonstrate its intent not to build a nuclear bomb other than ending all enrichment and reducing its stock of low enriched uranium to a desired level.

Iran denies any intention of making nuclear weapons, but has made no secret that it wants to have enough low enriched uranium to convince potential adversaries that it has that option.

At a 2005 dinner in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, then secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, told George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that Iran didn't need a nuclear weapon, as long as it had the "mastery of the fuel cycle" as a deterrent to external aggression.

Gates raised the issue of the Iranian ability to achieve a breakout capability in a three-page memorandum addressed to national security adviser Jim Jones in January 2010, as first reported in the New York Times Apr. 18.

In reporting the Gates memo, David E. Sanger of the New York Times wrote, "Mr. Gates's memo appears to reflect concerns in the upper echelons of the Pentagon and the military that the White House did not have a well-prepared series of alternatives in place in case all the diplomatic steps finally failed."

In the statement issued on the memo Apr. 18, Gates said it "identified next steps in our defense planning process where further interagency discussion and policy decisions would be needed in the months and weeks ahead."

The Sanger article appeared eight days after differences between Obama and Gates over the Iranian breakout capability issue had surfaced publicly in April....

Thus far the Obama administration has not given emphasis to the threat of U.S. attack on Iran. Instead it has sought to use the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran as leverage, even as it warns the Israelis privately not to attempt such an attack.

Read full article....

Iran's Nukes: The CIA's Latest Analysis (Thielmann)

Greg Thielmann, a former analyst in the State Department, writes for the Arms Control Association:

Comments by senior U.S. officials in 2010 have continued to endorse the principal conclusions of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities." This may come as a surprise for those accustomed to seeing that earlier document described by pundits and journalists as "flawed," or "erroneous." In fact, from the moment the NIE's sanitized Key Judgments were released in late November 2007, the estimate has been subject to virulent criticism, particularly by those who regret that it did not provide justification for a preventive attack on Iran's nuclear program.

Many critics have impugned the motives of its authors. Former CIA Director James Woolsey has called the NIE "deceptive." Rep. Peter Hoekstra, Ranking Minority Member (and former Chairman) of the House Intelligence Committee has called it "a piece of trash."

There is some considerable irony in hearing such criticism from those intimately familiar with the inner workings of the intelligence community, who seemed to have sleep-walked through the serious professional lapses of the 2002 NIE on Iraq WMD.

It is time to take another close look at the claims made by the Iran Nuclear NIE in light of the critical choices now confronting policy makers.

The most important conclusions from the fall of 2007 still obtain:

* Iran had been working steadily on the facilities and expertise for
enriching uranium, which would eventually allow it to make fissile material for a bomb, if it chose. (Making fissile material is generally considered the most technically demanding and time-consuming hurdle to developing a
nuclear weapons capability.)

* For many years, Iran had had a government-directed and clandestine nuclear weapons program (defined as: "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work"), but Tehran halted it in the fall of 2003 and the halt lasted at least several
years.

* The estimate indicated that the Department of Energy and the National Intelligence Council were less certain that the halt to these activities represented a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.

* Iran still faces significant technical problems operating its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz, but would probably be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.

* Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so. Only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from producing nuclear weapons.

There has been no retreat from the key historical judgment that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and no advance to a conclusion that Iran had decided to develop nuclear weapons. According to open source information, foreign intelligence services have suggested that some level of nuclear weapons program activity has been underway since 2003. (See, for example, Mark Hosenball, Newsweek, June 28, 2010). It is reasonable to conclude that Iran wants at least to develop the capability to build nuclear weapons.

Yet Lt. Gen. Ronald Burgess, Jr., Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in early 2010 that: "The bottom line assessments of the NIE still hold true. We have not seen indication that the (Iranian) government has made the decision to move ahead with the program." The State Department's July 2010 Compliance Report stated flatly that: "Iran had a comprehensive nuclear weapons development program that was ordered halted in fall 2003."

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reached a similar conclusion in his Annual 2010 Threat Assessment: "We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons."

If a decision is made to manufacture and deploy nuclear weapons, CIA Director Leon Panetta claims that it would probably take a year for Iran to enrich sufficient uranium from its current stockpile of LEU (following the expulsion of IAEA inspectors) "and another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable."

It would appear then that the long-anticipated "Memorandum to Holders", which is expected to update the 2007 NIE, is likely to revise it rather than revoke it by acknowledging that some kind of ongoing research on nuclear weapons is occurring, without questioning the validity of the 2003 halt that was detected or concluding that Iran has definitively decided to build a bomb.

Iran's secret construction of a uranium enrichment facility near Qom, exposed and effectively neutralized in September 2009, deepened suspicions that Iran was interested in developing at least a breakout capability for clandestinely producing fissile material for weapons, independent of its existing LEU stockpiles, which are monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

However, if there were shocking discoveries of unambiguous nuclear weapons intent in the revelations of defectors like Asgari and Amiri, one would have expected to see an alteration in the phraseology used by senior U.S. intelligence officials to describe Iran's nuclear program. This has not happened.

Unfortunately, the U.S. Government has decided to withhold from the American people even the bottom line judgment of the next estimate on this critical issue for U.S. security policy. This means that we will have to do our best to divine what our government thinks it knows and when it is making an educated guess. This also means that the public and the press will continue to be vulnerable to careless or deliberate misinterpretations of estimates by pundits with an axe to grind.

US-Iran: Strikes, Sanctions and Scapegoats (Sick)

Gary Sick, a former official in the Carter and Reagan Administrations and a leading analyst of contemporary US-Iran relations, assesses the current state of play:

For the pundits, there are only two questions about U.S.-Iran relations that are of any importance: (1) Will Israel and/or the United States attack Iran? and (2) will the new sanctions have enough bite to persuade Iran to change its nuclear policy? Despite all the printers ink spilled on these two issues, the answers are an easy no and no.

Neither the United States nor Israel will take the military option off the table, thereby giving the pundits (and the crowd that is dying to repeat Iraq) latitude to keep the distant prospect of military action on the front pages, where it has been for years. As a lede, it sells columns and newspapers, so it will not go away. But as analysis it is either blinded by the momentary hype or else is simple wish fulfillment.

Uber-neocon John Bolton had it right. If any such attack were to occur, it would have been at the end of the Bush administration when there was nothing left to lose. Bolton thought it was so inevitable that he predicted it unequivocally in a Wall Street Journal column in 2008. Dick Cheney apparently agreed, judging from his subsequent statements of regret. So it is fair to say that George W. Bush, after looking the potential consequences, resisted the advice of his neocon advisers, his previously dominant vice president, and the reported direct request from the government of Israel — and rejected a strike. What is the likelihood that Barack Obama, with the same catastrophic scenario before him, will approve? Forget it.

Sanctions do not persuade dictatorial regimes to abandon projects that they think are central to their security and survival or even their self-image. Just look at Saddam Hussein. The international sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1980s make the current Iran sanctions appear anemic in comparison. Every item that went in and out of Iraq was subject to approval by a UN committee dominated by a vindictive United States. Yet, although Iraq had abandoned its nuclear weapons program years earlier, Saddam could not bring himself to let his own people and his enemies know that. Instead he was prepared to gamble that the United States would not attack him.

One of the reasons for this bad bet was that he and his cronies were doing so well under the sanctions that there was no immediate necessity to come clean. They, after all, controlled the smuggling routes. And their henchmen managed the thriving and enormously lucrative black market. As for concern with their own people, a rotund Tariq Aziz, sitting with a fine Scotch and a Cuban cigar, informed a worried UN representative that it would be good for the Iraqi people to lose some weight. An Iraqi friend of mine told me at the time that the sanctions had made criminals of the entire Iraqi middle class, which had to resort to illegal behavior in order to survive. The biggest – and most successful – of this new criminal class was the privileged group immediately around Saddam Hussein.

Which brings us to Iran. The sanctions are more effective than many anticipated. They have built a web of financial restrictions and limitations around the already weak Iranian economy that is certain to cause significant problems for the leadership. Iran’s critical energy sector is particularly vulnerable. It is in a pincer. Because of cheap energy prices inside the country, artificially propped up by massive subsidies, energy demand is soaring. This siphons off a lot of Iran’s oil production, which would otherwise be sold on the world market for hard currency.

At the same time, because Iran’s oil fields are old and complex, they require modern technology to maintain production. That technology – and the capital investment that can only be provided by the major international oil companies – has been absent for many years. It was driven away partly by the sanctions, ironically assisted by Iran’s own short-sighted negotiating tactics that offered only the most meager profit margins to outside investors. As a result, Iran’s oil production is in decline at the same time that more and more of it is being soaked up by domestic consumption. In a period of relatively low oil prices, this means that Iran’s hard currency earnings are drying up at an alarming rate.

This unenviable economic situation is compounded by what has to be described as perhaps the least competent economic management team of any major country in the world. Ayatollah Khamene`i, the Supreme Leader, seems totally preoccupied with bolstering his own shaky political legitimacy by pandering to the Revolutionary Guards who surround and protect him. The result is corruption on a scale beyond anything the shah’s regime could have imagined.

President Ahmadinejad, also a creature of the Revolutionary Guards, is free to indulge his taste for outlandish and irresponsible rhetoric. His words keep the international and domestic spotlight glued to him; but the effect drives away prospective investors and facilitates the U.S. drive to enlist international support for sanctions against Iran. An American Jewish leader once joked with me that he suspected Ahmadinejad was a Mossad agent: no one, he observed, had been more helpful in promoting donations to Israel and Israeli causes. At the same time, under his leadership Iran has inflation and unemployment that are both in double digits.

But to be fair, Ahmadinejad is the first politician in modern Iranian history willing to address the “third rail” of Iranian politics – the immensely costly subsidies on food and energy. His initial efforts to reduce the amount of subsidized gasoline that Iranians could use met with outbursts of indignation, including torching filling stations. But these rules now seem to be grudgingly accepted and have eased slightly Iran’s energy dilemma. He is now addressing the low tax rates assessed against merchants. This has also resulted in outrage, including closing the bazaars in Iran and other major cities. But his campaign seems to be making progress.

These are needed reforms that would be recommended by any responsible economic overseer, including the International Monetary Fund. Ahmadinejad attempts to balance his daring assaults on the entrenched economic interests by his belligerent rhetoric, always casting himself as the champion of the little guy. In that he resembles his populist predecessors, from Juan Peron to Huey Long to Hugo Chavez. Ahmadinejad takes on America and Israel the way Governor Long took on Standard Oil. But like other populists, Ahmadinejad is the prisoner of his own eccentric view of the world and his loyalty to lieutenants who may or may not be worthy of his faith in them.

The key question about Iran today is not whether it will be attacked or collapse under sanctions. It is whether Iran is capable under its present leadership to take a sober decision about how to deal with the outside world. The Revolutionary Guards have established a dominant position in Iran’s military, its economy, and its politics. Iran increasingly comes to resemble the corporatist states of southern and eastern Europe in the 1920s and ‘30s that we call fascist. Iran is conducting an interior battle with its own demons, from the millenarians on the far right who choose to believe that Khamene`i is the personal representative of God on earth, to the pragmatic conservatives who simply want a more responsible leadership, to the reformists of the Green movement whose objective is to put the “republic” back into the Islamic Republic by giving the people a greater voice.

This is a yeasty and unpredictable mix. No one knows what is going to happen next.

And this is the reality that the Obama administration must deal with. The danger is not that the administration will back the wrong horse in Iran. The real danger is that the Obama administration will be so preoccupied with domestic American politics and its constant demand to look tough when dealing with Iran that it will inadvertently rescue this cruel but hapless regime from its own ineptitude by providing a convenient scapegoat for everything that goes wrong in Iran.

Iran Feature: Did Ahmadinejad Chief of Staff Reveal the Bomb?

President Ahmadinejad's controversial Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai gets us off to a dramatic start today. Rooz reports that, meeting advisors of the Ministry of Education on Saturday, Rahim-Mashai said that the President had spoken last year of the “possibility of uranium enrichment to 100 percent”. This statement, made during a visit to an exhibition on the achievements of a centre for laser science and technology, referred to the manufacture of a nuclear bomb but “not a single foreign media outlet created an uproar on this.”

Rahim-Mashai continued, “They are not concerned the nuclear bomb and Dr Ahmadinejad used this sentence to test them to see how concerned they really are about Iran producing a nuclear bomb.”

Rahim-Mashai's declaration was noted only by Mehr. Other official outlets such as the Islamic Republic News Agency and Fars carried the general remarks but did not quote the chief of staff or mention the words “enriching uranium by 100 percent”.