The Latest from Iran (31 August): Unity? What Unity?

2005 GMT: Execution (Stoning) Watch. The Los Angeles Times, citing Human Rights Activists News Agency, reports that Iranian courts have handed down two more sentences of death by stoning for adultery. The verdict was issued on Saturday to Vali Janfeshani and Sariyeh Ebadi, convicted of having an extramarital affair.

The developments follows international protests over the death sentence given to Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani for adultery. Ashtiani's execution by stoning has been suspended by Iranian authorities, although there has been no clemency over capital punishment.

1905 GMT: Economy Watch. Deutsche Welle offers an article on the growing economic influence of the Revolutionary Guard, "Iran's largest employer".

1855 GMT: Karroubi, Qods Day, and A Nervous Government. James Miller, at Dissected News, offers a concise overview of latest developments from the "siege" of the Karroubi house to the Government's stumbling propaganda ahead of Qods Day this Friday.

NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad's Trash Talk (Theodoulou)
NEW Iran Witness: Activist Mahboubeh Karami on Six Months in Detention
NEW Iran: The Latest on the Karroubi “Siege” and the Qods Day Rally
Iran: The Regime Feels the Pressure on Stoning
Iran Special: Political Prisoners, Election Fraud, & The Regime’s Backfiring Propaganda
Iran Breaking: Karroubi on Election Fraud; House Surrounded by Pro-Regime Crowd
The Latest from Iran (30 August): Khamenei Slaps Down Ahmadinejad

1640 GMT: MediaWatch. Arshama3's Blog has posted a useful list of websites for Iran news and analysis.

1635 GMT: The Protests Are Not Over (Says the Regime). Ali Fazli, commander of the Basij militia, has said that last year's fitna (sedition) is like fire under the ashes; "when we let it go loose, it will start again".

Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi explains: from 1991-2010 Iran's enemies have spent $17 billion to topple the regime through "soft war", with the money handed over by several foreign embassies in Iran, European parties, "Western" foreign ministries, US-connected Iranian organisations, and dozens of foundations.

(If you're in one of these locations, you could be in for some money from "US Bureaus", according to Moslehi: Baku in Azerbaijan, Frankfurt, London, Istanbul, and Dubai.)

1630 GMT: We have updated on the "siege" of Mehdi Karroubi's house by a pro-regime crowd with an interview with Karroubi's wife Fatemeh Karroubi.

1400 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. A bit of a twist with the arrest of Hamid Hassanzadeh, President of the Council of Ahwaz....

Hassanzadeh, whose home was raided and whose belongings and computer were seized, is not a Green or a reformist. He was the Ahwaz campaign manager for the conservative Mohsen Rezaei in the 2009 Presidential election.

1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kurdish detainee Rahim Rashi has ended his hunger strike after 43 days.

1320 GMT: Parliament v. President (cont. --- see 1310 GMT). From the reformist wing, Qodratollah Alikhani has said, that as the government refuses to allocate funds for the Tehran Metro, it also obstructs other laws, as workers go without pay. Alikhani also criticised Minister of Science Kamran Daneshjoo for his statement warning of "flattening" universities that do not adhere to Islam.

Dariush Ghanbari said he was concerned about new restrictions on the press, suggesting that the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance should be summoned to Majlis. Ghanbari made the sharp comment that the dispute over the Family Protection Bill, now sent back to committee, obscured critical issues such as control of inflation and unemployment and stimulation of economic growth.

Meanwhile, MP Mohammad Khoshchehreh has made a conciliatory statement by claiming that the common base of conservatives and reformers is revolutionary principles and anti-imperialism, and any movement to overcome divisions is important.

Which gives us the excuse to publish this not-so-conciliatory photograph of another MP, Mehdi Kouchakzadeh, and Ali Larijani (hat tip Tehran Bureau from Mehr):



1310 GMT: Parliament v. President. Almost two weeks since the Supreme Leader's intervention, let's see how the call for unity is faring....

The President's spokesman Ali Akbar Javanfekr has accused the Majlis of "misunderstanding laws" and "making laws against Constitution", leading to dictatorial behaviour.

On the other side, key member of Parliament (and ally of Speaker Ali Larijani) has denounced Ahmadinejad's "rowdy" statements. Another member of the critical bloc, Ali Motahari, says the government is fleeing from laws and has established a "half-suffocating" situation: "Ahmadinejad refusing to implement laws is a sign of dictatorship."

Expediency Council member Dorri Najafabadi insists that laws approved by the Council are laws of the Islamic Republic and complains that Ahmadinejad is "not too friendly". Fellow Council member Mohammad Hashemi declares that the government is not the interpreter but executor of laws.

Leading conservative Morteza Nabavi has repeated his criticism that the President has been absent from Expediency Council meetings, saying the Supreme Leader expects Ahmadinejad to attend.

And in an intriguing statement, Habibollah Asgarowladi, leader of the Islamic Coalition Party, says that a principlism with former President Hashemi Rafsanjani on one side and Ahmadinejad on the other is "not desirable".

1240 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Heidi Hautala, the head of the European Parliament's Human Rights Commission, has called for the immediate release of activist Shiva Nazar Ahari.

Ahari has been detained since July 2009. She is due in court on 4 September, reportedly to face charges that include "mohareb" (war against God), which carries the death penalty.

Intellectuals, academics, activists, and family members have issued a statement calling for the freeing of Azeri political prisoners.

1110 GMT: The Battle Within. Monavar Khalaj of the Financial Times is on the case with "Iran's Warring Factions Reignite Tensions": "Iran’s radical and conservative fundamentalists have ignored the orders of the regime’s supreme leader and begun exchanging recriminations once again."

1105 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The court hearing for Emad Bahovar, a member of the reformist Freedom Movement of Iran and of Research Supporting Khatami and Mousavi, has been postponed again.

Bahovar has been detained since March.

1100 GMT: All the President's Men. Of Iran's 290 members of Parliament, 216 have signed a statement supporting the suspension of Presidential aide and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi, ordered by the judiciary because of Mortazavi's alleged complicity in the post-election abuses at Kahrizsak, and hoped for a quick end to the case.

1034 GMT: The Supreme Leader Slaps Down Ahmadinejad. The website of Ayatollah Khamenei has published the English summary of his Monday meeting with the President and the Cabinet, including the rebuke of Ahmadinejad for carrying out a parallel foreign policy.

However, Khamenei has offered public support for the Government subsidy reduction plan.

1030 GMT: Execution (Ashtiani) Watch. The members of Parliament of Portugal's ruling party have joined the call for clemency for Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, sentenced to death for adultery.

1015 GMT: It's All About Me. I would not dare to call the President's Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, self-centered; however, for the record, here is the banner from his personal website:



1010 GMT: Endorsing the Supreme Leader's Slapdown of the President. The Iranian Foreign Ministry, given cover by Ayatollah Khamenei's criticism of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Monday, has said that it is essential to avoid "parallel work" in foreign policy.

Last week Ahmadinejad appointed four special representatives for international affairs.

1000 GMT: We have posted a separate feature, written by Michael Theodoulou, on the language being used by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iranian media about internal and international disputes, "Ahmadinejad's Trash Talk".

Already there have been further developments. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has said that it does not agree with insulting another country's officials and specifically denounced the description, offered by Keyhan, of French President Nicolas Sarkozy's wife Carla Bruni as a "prostitute".

Keyhan, however, does not seem to be listening. Today it wrote, "Studying Carla Bruni's record clearly shows the reason why this immoral woman is backing an Iranian woman who has been condemned to
death for committing adultery and being accomplice in her husband's murder and, in fact, she herself deserves to die."

Bruni had spoken out for Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, the Iranian woman sentenced to death for adultery.

0850 GMT: We have posted an interview with women's right activist Mahboubeh Karami, freed on bail this month but facing a four-month prison sentence, about her six months in detention.

0710 GMT: Shutting Down Information. A reader's comment to Tehran Bureau says that the site is now blocked in Iran.

0700 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Reports say Arjang Davoudi, on Day 49 of his hunger strike, is in a coma. Davoudi, a poet and teacher, is detained in Gohardasht Prison.

The detention order for blogger Hossein Ronaghi (Babak Khoramdin), who has been imprisoned for 10 months, has been extended for another month. He is reportedly being held in solitary confinement.

0655 GMT: Execution Watch. For days now, we have followed stories on the Internet that hundreds of prisoners have been put to death in Mashhad. Rah-e-Sabz is now posting the claim.

0650 GMT: In a separate entry, we post the latest on the "siege" of Mehdi Karroubi's house and, via a Deutsche Welle interview with his son Hossein, his declaration that he will not be prevented from rallying on Qods Day this Friday.

0600 GMT: A busy, tense, and dramatic Monday --- from the surrounding of Mehdi Karroubi's house by a pro-regime crowd to the Supreme Leader's slap-down of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to uncertainty in the Iranian establishment over its image on the stoning issue --- and today offers the prospect of more.

Khamanei Slaps Down the President on Foreign Policy

Very cute (and telling?) approach by Press TV to the Supreme Leader's criticism of Ahmadinejad in a meeting with the President and the Cabinet's. The website does note, from Khamenei's official website, the Leader's statement that "Iran's Foreign Ministry is in charge of leading all matters related to the country's foreign policies and affairs".

What Press can't bring itself to say is the rest of the Supreme Leader's rebuke, where he denounced "parallel" structures for foreign policy. That, of course, refers to Ahmadinejad's appointment last week of four special representatives for international affairs.

Indeed, the Press headline is all happiness: "Leader praises Govt. 'Diplomatic Spirit"

The Latest from Iran (28 August): Music, Sanctions, and Science

2020 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch (Cosmetics Edition). Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi, who has been putting himself on front pages all week with tales of danger and how Iran's services are triumphing, does it again today by accusing the Swedish cosmetics firm Oriflame of trying to harm Iran's security: "Oriflame intended to fight the (Iranian) system. There are no economic reasons behind the company. We realised through the evidence that the arrogants (Western powers) and intelligence agencies sought to create security problems for the country through this company."

Oriflamme's chief financial officer Gabriel Bennet responded, "We are a cosmetics company, we are selling direct. We are of course not involved in any political activities in the country (Iran). It is very very difficult to comment on [the accusations]."

On 22 August, Iranian authorities closed Oriflamme's Tehran office and arrested five employees, reportedly on charges that the company was running a pyramid scheme.

NEW Iran: Obama Rejects a Public “Red Line” on Nuclear Capability (Porter)
NEW Iran Music Special: The Kanye West No-War Rap
NEW Iran: Conservatives v. Ahmadinejad (Jedinia)
NEW Iran Special: The Supreme Leader and One Voice on Nuclear Talks with US?
The Latest from Iran (27 August): One Voice in Iran?

1625 GMT: The American Detainees (cont.). There is chatter, amidst the statement of Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi that the case of Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd and Josh Fattal "is nearing its end", that the US hikers could be released before the end of Ramadan.

There have been a number of moments over the last 13 months when there were indications that freedom was imminent, and each time hopes have been dashed. So the attitude might be "believe it when we see it".

The lesson could be --- as with many other cases and seen this week in the campaigns for Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani (see 1415 GMT) and Shiva Nazar Ahari --- that pressure not be relaxed for justice and resolution of the situation.

1500 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Ten days after he was summoned back to prison, journalist/filmmaker Mohammad Nourizad has finally been allowed to see his family.

Reformist politician Mostafa Tajzadeh, who also returned to detention and shares a cell with Nourizad, has written an open letter to the Tehran Prosecutor General. In the message, he talks about seeing his wife after 11 days incommunicado.

1435 GMT: The American Detainees. Minister of Intelligence Heydar Moslehi has said the case of three detained American nationals --- Shane Bauer, Sarah Shourd and Josh Fattal --- is near closure: "The investigations in the case of the three (Americans) is nearing its end and the verdict to be announced soon."

The trio were arrested in July 2009 when they allegedly crossed an unmarked border into Iran while hiking in Iraq's Kurdistan region.

1420 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. HRANA reports that the four-year prison sentence for human rights activist Mahboumeh Karami has been confirmed.

1415 GMT: Political Prisoner (Ashtiani) Watch. The Iranian judiciary has released a statement on the case of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, sentenced to death for adultery.

The judiciary, implicitly recognising the international presssure for clemency and/or freedom for Ashtiani, said that the rights of all citizens were defended; however, the charges of adultery and complicity in her husband's murder had been proven against the 43-year-old woman.

1120 GMT: Diplomatic Service. Iranian official Mohammad Reza Sheibani Rauf has defended the President's appointment of four special representatives, including Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, for areas of foreign policy. He claimed this was "not uncommon" and cited the example of the US.

Rauf also noted that the President's office had appointed a Special Representative on Caspian Affairs in the past.

1100 GMT: The Battle Within. Leading conservative Morteza Nabavi has criticised the President for his failure to attend meetings of the Expediency Council, saying this was a "legal claim" as well as a political issue.

Nabavi noted the possible conflict between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the head of the Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, but said both should reject "inflexible positions" and show an example of "political maturity" in reaching resolutions.

0900 GMT: Uranium Watch. Peyke Iran, drawing from Asr-e Iran, claims that Moscow is unsure about Tehran's proposal for a joint consortium to produce fuel for the Bushehr nuclear plant.

0850 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Dr. Shiravi, Professor of Mechanical Engineering and former Dean of Shahid Chamran University in Dezfoul, has been arrested.

0615 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Muhammad Sahimi, writing in Tehran Bureau, has a lengthy profile of Shiva Nazar Ahari, the activist detained since July 2009 and facing death on the charge of "mohareb" (war against God).

0610 GMT: Economy Watch. Street Journalist, relaying an item we saw in Peyke Iran, quotes Ali Deghan Kia, a member of the Higher Islamic Council Association Board, who says there has been a 40% increase in unemployment in manufacturing and "more than 90 percent of productive units transferred to the private sector are at risk of bankruptcy”.

Deghan Kia blamed "uncontrollable importation and smuggling of Chinese goods [as] the number one cause for unemployment....Every billion dollars of smuggled good entering the country is responsible for unemployment of 25,000 workers in Iran.”

0600 GMT: Academic Corner. Science follows up on the firing of Professor Yousef Sobouti, the astrophysicist and founder-director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Basic Sciences who was Chancellor of Zanjan University. It claims that Sobouti's replacement, Rasoul Khodabakhsh, is a "nuclear scientist known to have links with the pro-government Basij militia".

Science that the Government has also replaced the leaders of at least 17 other academic and scientific institutions over the past month, including the chancellors of Sharif University of Technology in Tehran, the University of Golestan in north Iran, and Arak University.

0545 GMT: We open Saturday with a music special, as Kanye West and Jay-Z put out a rap against war with Iran.

Meanwhile, the Swiss energy group EGL spins another message, saying that 18 billion Euro ($23 billion) gas contract with the National Iranian Gas Export Company is not affected by American sanctions: “We are not violating any regulations, and follow rules; we feel we are not really deserving to come on the sanctions list.”

“Using of the revenues by Iran from the EGL deal to finance terrorism and its allies Hamas and Hizbullah. That is speculation. We do not pay money for supporting terrorism. I cannot really comment on such a speculation,” spokeswoman Lilly Frei said.

Last week EGL put out a somewhat different rationale: “As we noted in the past when this deal was first announced, oil and gas deals with Iran send the wrong message when Iran continues to defy UN Security Council resolutions. We have raised our concerns with the Swiss government about this arrangement on multiple occasions."

However, Frei is now saying, “We have a contract with the company, not with Ahmadinejad." Asked about other connections, Frei said EGL did “not know if the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is affiliated with National Iranian Gas Export Company".

UPDATED Iran Analysis: What Has Green Movement Achieved? (Sahimi)

UPDATED 18 August: There has been a good deal of chatter about a response to Sahimi's article by an unidentified blogger: "The Green Movement has achieved a lot, but not through the help or leadership of the so-called reformers (which in reality acted as a damage control to avoid any major pressure on the regime that may lead to regime change), but through the courage of the Iranian people who took to the streets and protested, even confronted the brutal and fully armed thug regime by their own bare hands to delegitimize and expose the Islamic Republic while expressing to the world that how different the Iranian people are compare to the Islamic occupiers of the Islamic regime. "



Muhammad Sahimi writes for Tehran Bureau:

The Green Movement is over one year old. The large street demonstrations and gatherings, both before and after the rigged presidential election of June 2009, that gave birth to the movement, have largely ended. The world has shifted its attention back to Iran's nuclear program and away from the struggle by a large majority of the Iranian people for a better society. Disappointment and even hopelessness permeate a small, but significant, segment of Iranian society, both at home and in the diaspora. We must ask, Is the Green Movement still alive or is it dead? If it is still alive, what has it achieved, given the heavy price that Iranians have paid over the last 15 months?....

[Sections on Three Perspectives and Background of Movement]

Achievements of the Green Movement

This is the environment in which the Green Movement was born. Let us now consider its achievements.

Demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Velaayat-e Faghih

The backbone of Iran's political system is the doctrine of Velaayat-e Faghih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist), represented by the Supreme Leader. The 1989 revisions of the Constitution gave nearly absolute power to the Leader on many fronts, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not hesitated to use the power in his attempt to crush the opposition. But his attempts have come at a heavy price: the republican aspect of the political system has essentially become irrelevant, and the vast majority of the people do not recognize the legitimacy of the Faghih. The erosion in the doctrine's legitimacy and its glaring ineffectiveness has forced the hardliners to claim that it is, in fact, not the people that represent the source of legitimacy forVelaayat-e Faghih. Rather it is God who appoints the Supreme Leader and the role of the people -- or their representatives in the Assembly of Experts, the constitutional body that names the Supreme Leader -- is to discover the appointee. It is now clear, more than ever, that a large, complex, and dynamic nation such as Iran cannot be run by the system of Velaayat-e Faghih,a concept that is not even accepted by the majority of Shia clerics. In fact, only the hardliners' use of force has allowed Velaayat-e Faghih to survived as long as it has.

The fall of Ayatollah Khamenei

Long before last year's election, it was clear to the nation that Ahmadinejad was Khamenei's preferred candidate. In a meeting with Ahmadinejad's cabinet a year before the election, the ayatollah told the ministers, "Do not work as if you will be in charge for only one more year, but plan for five more years." The ayatollah had also strongly supported Ahmadinejad during his first term, even when his incompetence had become too obvious to ignore.

When on June 13, 2009, the day after the rigged presidential vote, Khamenei congratulated Ahmadinejad on his "reelection," not even waiting for the Guardian Council to certify the vote's legitimacy, it became clear that he had tied his maintenance of power to Ahmadinejad. He lost any residual legitimacy six days later when, leading Tehran's Friday Prayers, he threatened the opposition and declared that if any blood was spilled, it would be the opposition's fault. Ever since, Khamenei has been the leader of just one political faction -- and a shaky one at that -- rather than the fatherly figure that the Supreme Leader is supposed to be.

These events have led some of Khamenei's most loyal supporters to desert him. Mohammad Nourizad is one good example. An artist and journalist who used to write for Kayhan, the mouthpiece of the hardliners, he has written several open letters to the ayatollah, criticizing him on all fronts. Hislatest letter is particularly sharp, not only for its content, but also for its tone. Nourizad refers to the ayatollah as "Sayyed Ali." That is totally unprecedented.

The net result of all of this is that Khamenei is now despised by the vast majority of Iranians. He was already held in contempt when he prevented the "smiling Sayyed" -- as people affectionately referred to Khatami -- from carrying out his reforms. But events since last year have made him the most loathed figure in Iran, even more than Ahmadinejad.

Despite their pretense otherwise, even the hardliners are keenly aware of this. Not only have they been attempting to tie the ayatollah and his "legitimacy" to a higher authority -- God Himself -- they have also been busy trying to present a "softer," "gentler" image of the ayatollah to the nation. Thus the arrangement of meetings between him and artists, poets, authors, young people, and so forth. In most cases, the true artists and intellectuals -- those who support the Green Movement -- stay away, and the effort has failed miserably. The hardliners have also tried to portray the ayatollah as someone who lives very simply, is utterly uncorrupted, and has no wealth of which to speak.

Even if the claim is true, he remains corrupt -- his thirst for absolute power seems to have no limit.

Revealing the true nature of the fundamentalists

Iranian Islamic fundamentalists refer to themselves as Principlists, simply because they know that the word "fundamentalist" has very negative connotations. During the Khatami era, they claimed to support a religious democracy. But when the Reformists swept the elections for the 6th Majles and Khatami was reelected by a margin that surpassed the one in his initial victory, it became clear that the fundamentalists would lose almost any competitive vote, let alone ones that were truly free and fair. That is why they have been using the organs of power to hold "engineered elections" -- those whose outcome is a priori fixed in their favor. The Guardian Council vets the candidates and blocks those who are popular and credible from running. Even then, the fundamentalists change the votes (as they did last year) or declare an election flawed so that they can cancel it (as has happened with many elections for seats in the Majles).

Last year's rigged election, and particularly the violent reaction by the hardliners to people's peaceful protests in its aftermath, basically burst the bubble for the fundamentalists. Even they recognize it. There is no longer any pretense to a religious democracy. Some leading fundamentalists now speak openly about the Islamic Government of Iran, rather than the Islamic Republic of Iran. All the talk about the impending return of Mahdi -- the Shiites' 12th Imam, who is supposed to emerge from hiding one day -- represents another facet of the fundamentalists' attempt to distance themselves from any pretense to meaningful elections and democracy. Who can blame them? They cannot win any meaningful election.

Gaping fissures in the ranks of the fundamentalists

Last year's election and its aftermath have also deepened the fissures in the conservative and fundamentalist ranks. There is constant infighting among them. Many Majles deputies criticize Ahmadinejad. Many of them have made revelations about members of his cabinet, such as accusing First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi of having a fake doctoral degree and of involvement in a $700 million embezzlement case. Majles Speaker Ali Larijani has accused Ahmadinejad of breaking the law and appointing those Larijani calls foroumaayegaan (roughly, "utterly unqualified") to the cabinet.

Some Majles deputies have even spoken of impeaching Ahmadinejad. This is all happening in a body in which 200 of the deputies supposedly belong to the fundamentalist camp. Ahmadinejad recently complained to Khamenei that "running the nation has encountered difficulties."

Khamenei effectively sacked Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who Ahmadinejad preferred as his first vice president. Even the reactionary Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad's spiritual advisor, has attacked Mashaei.

Still, the president has appointed his close ally to numerous posts. Mashaei is Ahmadinejad's chief of staff, secretary-general of the government's cultural commission, head of the council for free economic zones, head of the council of young advisors to the president, head of the Razavi pilgrimage and culture, representative of the president in the national council of the Iranians in diaspora, head of the Institute for Globalization, and head of the government's communication council. This means nothing but fissures between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, his most important supporter.

Majles deputy Morteza Nabavi, manager of Resaalat, a leading conservative daily, and a former cabinet member, said in a recent interview, "We do not have the required stability in the ranks of the government officials. They do not all think alike, and are not united. We do not have this even among the elite Principlists. Some of our friends tell me explicitly that they have given up. But you do not see the same in the opposition. Today, only a few defend the Supreme Leader." Khamenei himself has openly talked about the khavaas-e bibasirat (roughly, "unwise, useless elite") who have failed to openly support him.

At the same time, the military faction of the fundamentalists, led by the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia, has been putting relentless pressure on the more moderate, more pragmatic conservatives, in order to coerce their support. The attempt to take over the Islamic Azad University is but one example. Ahmadinejad recently declared, "There is only one political party, and that is the Party of Velaayat," implying that all other political groups, even within the conservative/hardline camp, should be disbanded. The pressure on such parties has been so heavy that it prompted Mohammad Reza Bahonar -- a leading fundamentalist and former Majles deputy speaker, whose nephew Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi is a close confidant of Ahmadinejad's -- to declare, "A threat to the Principlists' front is a small faction within the front itself that is increasingly making more transparent its plan for eliminating the rest of the Principlists." Bahonar's own faction, the Islamic Coalition Party, which represented the backbone of the right wing during most of the Rafsanjani and Khatami eras, feels threatened and left out.

Fissures in the Revolutionary Guards

The Green Movement has also penetrated the rank and file of the Revolutionary Guards, where there has long been speculation about possible fissures. Major General Mohammad Ali (Aziz) Jafari, the top Guard commander, has finally confirmed such speculations. He admitted in a recent news conference, "We have had some casualties in the 'soft war,'" which is how the hardliners refer to the popular struggle for democracy. He also admitted that the Green Movement has supporters among the Guards, and that the events of the past year have created "ambiguities" for some Guard commanders. He said, "We have tried to convince them that they are wrong, which is better than physical elimination."

Credible reports indicate that at least 250 Guard commanders have either been forced into retirement or expelled. Some former Guard commanders who supported Mousavi have been arrested and tortured badly. One recent example is Hamzeh Karami.

Fissures between the Guards and Ahmadinejad

Even though Ahamadinejad could have never risen to power without the active support of the Guards and Basij, there have been consistent and credible reports of tension between him and some of the top Guard commanders. In one episode in February 2010, the president and General Jafari got into a heated argument during a meeting of Iran's Supreme National Security Council.

Jafari shouted at Ahmadinejad, "Have some shame. It is due to your incompetence that Iran has been in chaos for six months."

Fissures between Ayatollah Khamenei and the Guards

Even though the Guard and Basij commanders repeatedly declare their loyalty to Khamenei, I believe that their long-term plan is to eliminate the clerics from the organs of power. Having already described this in an article last year and returned to the topic in an article this June, I will not go into further detail about it here.

Fissures in the ranks of the clerics

Among the most important fruits of the Green Movement have been the deep fissures in the ranks of the clerics, including the leading ayatollahs. The most prominent moderate ayatollahs, such as Yousef Sanei, Ali Mohammad Dastgheyb, Asadollah Bayat Zanjani, and Mohammad Mousavi Khoeinihahave openly supported the Green Movement and harshly criticized the hardliners and Ahmadinejad. The Green Movement has damaged the credibility of Khamenei so much that the only ayatollahs openly supporting him are either those who owe their positions to the fundamentalists and hardliners that prop them up, such as Ayatollah Hossein Noori-Hamedani, or the reactionary ayatollahs who also have reputations for being corrupt, men such as former judiciary chief Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Secretary-General of the Guardian Council Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who is believed to aspire to Khamenei's position. There is not a single ayatollah with any credibility among the people who supports the fundamentalists and Khamenei. The rest of the Supreme Leader's clerical support mostly comes from young former students of Mesbah Yazdi.

The remaining ayatollahs can be divided into two groups. One group comprises those who are totally silent, indicating their displeasure and disapproval of the current regime. The other comprises those who have shown their displeasure by their actions. For example, two important conservative clerics, Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini and Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Ostadi, refused to lead the Qom Friday Prayers for several weeks.Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi Amoli, a maternal uncle of the Larijani brothers, even declared that he would never lead Friday Prayers again. Almost all of these ayatollahs refused to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his "reelection." In a Friday Prayer sermon last year, Ostadi vehemently criticized the supporters of Ahmadinejad.

This has also deepened the fissures between Khamenei and most of the important ayatollahs. He has tried to get some credible ayatollah to certify his son Mojtaba as a mojtahed (Islamic scholar), without success. He pressured some of the major ayatollahs to congratulate Ahmadinejad on his "reelection," but they refused. There are credible reports that the ayatollahs have rebuked Khamenei for supporting "the worst possible person" for the presidency -- Ahmadinejad -- and have told him that if they follow suit, they will lose their popular support and following.

Grand Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi Golpayegani, the first secretary-general of the Guradian Council, recently told Khamenei, referencing his transgressions and his eternal fate, "You have lost this world, and I worry for you in the other world." When pressured by Khamenei's representatives to meet with Ahmadinejad, the grand ayatollah reportedly said, "I will never let such a ----- into my home."

Grand Ayatollah Hossein Vahid Khorasani, father-in-law of Sadegh Larijani, the judiciary chief, is also known to oppose Khamenei. When the right-wing clergy tried to promote Khamenei as a marja' taghlid (source of emulation) in the 1990s, Vahid Khorasani is known to have told him, "You be the sultan, but leave marjaeiyat to others."

Whenever Khamenei visits Qom, Vahid Khorasani and many other leading ayatollahs leave town to avoid having to meet with him.

Such frictions have also created suspicions within Khamenei's inner circle. When he recently traveled to Qom and met with Ayatollah Javadi Amoli at the home of Amoli's sister (Amoli apparently wanted to avoid meeting in Amoli's own home), Amoli's staff brought cups of teas for both men. An aide to Khamenei then switched the tea that had been given to his boss with the one given to Amoli, as if it might have been poisoned. Amoli wasreportedly so angered that he abruptly ended the meeting.

Khamenei clearly recognizes the significance of all these fissures, which is why he constantly emphasizes that the nation needs unity. What he really means, though, is that the hardliners must become united.

Transformation of the Guards into a political-security organization

As pointed out above, Ahmadinejad could not have come to power without significant help from the Guards and Basij. Such intervention by military organs into political affairs violates the creed of Khomeini, who strictly banned political involvement by the military. At first, the Guards would deny that they were intervening politically at all, though it was clear to most observers that the denials rang hollow. Then, as the Guards were increasingly called upon to intervene in affairs of state, they were forced to defend their actions with the excuse that they were protecting the country and the Revolution against "internal enemies." When that was mocked, General Jafari claimed that the Guards, or Sepah-e Pasdaran, had to obey the "the present era Vali," namely, the current Supreme Leader. When that did not work either, he finally had to admit, "Even before being a military organization, the Sepah is, first and foremost, a political-security organization."

The Guards can no longer conceal their aims. By supporting a repressive regime, they have made clear that they are opposing the wishes of a large majority of the people.

In effect, the Guards now play the same role that the military plays in Pakistan. This poses two dangers for Iran: First, it puts national security at risk, because the country's elite military forces are preoccupied with internal affairs, at a time when there is the possibility of foreign military attacks on Iran.

As Mousavi put it, referring to the Guards' economic interests, "When the Sepah is worried about the fluctuations in the stock market, it cannot defend the nation and its national interest, and becomes corrupt." Second, just as in the case of Pakistan, the militarization of Iran gives rise to extremist groups that may fall out of the Guards' control and create problems for the nation with adventurism abroad.

A movement neither religious nor nonreligious

Throughout Iran's modern history, there have been arguments between those who adhere to two opposing schools of thought: Those who claim that the reason Iran is not as advanced as it can and should be is the central role religion plays, and those who insist on keeping religion at the center. The Shah tried hard to eliminate religion as a social force. The Islamic Republic tries to justify everything it does based on religion.

The Green Movement is neither religious, nor nonreligious. It is a social movement that encompasses all those, regardless of their religion, gender, ethnicity, and political views, that worry about Iran and its future and want their country to be run by a just and democratic system in which the rule of law is supreme and all citizens are equal. This has been emphasized by both Mousavi and his wife, Dr. Rahnavard, which has angered the hardliners, who accuse him of planning to eliminate religion from governance.

As such, the movement is unique, and its very nature constitutes a great achievement. This is the first time that Iran has had such a movement, which bodes well for its future.

A nonviolent movement

The Green Movement rejects violence because it aims to achieve national progress lawfully, not through force. It emphasizes the significance of executing the laws without exception. In fact, the movement's leaders correctly recognize that if the fate of the present struggle were to be decided by violence, the sure loser would be the Green Movement. The hardliners are armed to the teeth, and do not hesitate to use violence. Moreover, the hardliners do not even mind if the movement resorts to violence, because it would give them the perfect excuse to carry out a large-scale massacre of the movement's supporters. The nonviolent nature of the movement, despite the hardline-sponsored violence that resulted in the murder of at least 110 people and the torture of countless others in the aftermath of last year's rigged election, is another great achievement.

A noncharismatic movement

The Green Movement is not based on its leaders' charisma. In fact, Mousavi and Karroubi can hardly be considered charismatic. While Khatami can, he has taken a backseat and plays his natural role, that of a deep thinker who criticizes the ruling establishment calmly and rationally. For example, as Khamenei and his supporters refer to the Green Movement as fetneh (sedition), Khatami has responded, "The true fetneh is the amateurish lies that are being told to the nation." He recently observed, "In dictatorships, criticism is interpreted as the effort to overthrow the political system."

Instead of being based on the personal charisma of its leaders, the Green Movement is based on the social, economic, and political demands of Iran's citizens. In short, the movement wants justice and equality -- social, political, and economic -- for all Iranians. These demands will not be met unless the nation becomes a true republic, which is why the leaders of the movement insist on the republican features of the Constitution and underscore how the hardliners have rendered them meaningless.

A pragmatic movement

The Green Movement is pragmatic. It recognizes its strengths and weaknesses, as well as those of the hardliners. Thus, the movement does not set lofty goals meant to be swiftly achieved. Ideals always sound wonderful on paper. But at the end of the day, one must confront the facts on the ground: The hardliners are armed to the teeth, control the nation's vast resources, have a significant -- albeit narrow -- social base, and are ready to fight to the end, simply because they have no place to go.

At the same time, it is a grave mistake to think that every citizen that is unhappy with the hardliners wants, first and foremost, political and social freedom. It is a grave mistake to believe that every morning, when the dissatisfied citizens of Iran wake up, the first thing that they all think about is respect for human rights or freedom of expression. I am not saying that they do not care about such rights, but that they may not be the top priority of every citizen who is unhappy with the hardliners. For some, for many, economic grievances are primary.

Thus, as Mousavi has emphasized, the most important thing to settle on is a set of minimum demands about which every unhappy citizen agrees, so that the movement can inspire maximum support. Mousavi himself is the embodiment of this pragmatism. He represents the mainstream of the movement. There are some who are more radical than him, and some who are more conservative. In my opinion, pragmatism is crucial to the future success of the movement.

A growing movement

Despite some claims to the contrary, the Green Movement continues to grow. The best evidence is the fact that the hardliners are still on the defensive. Illegal arrests persist. Show trials are still resulting in long jail sentences. The hardliners continue to make absurd claims in the attempt to discredit the movement's leaders, such as the recent assertion by Ayatollah Jannati that the United States, via Saudi Arabia, provided $1 billion to Khatami to spend against the ruling establishment.

Minister of Intelligence Haydar Moslehi then claimed that it was not $1 billion, but $17 billion that the United States spent in Iran. Khamenei recentlywarned the hardliners, "Be prepared for larger fetneh."

The movement has also grown intellectually. The best evidence for this is the dramatic evolution of Mousavi himself.

All one needs do is compare the Mousavi of the period immediately around the rigged election with the present one. Whereas he used to say that the Constitution must be executed word for word, he now says that the Constitution is not God's words and thus inalterable. Rather, after the movement's minimum set of demands has been achieved, the Constitution can be revised and its undemocratic articles eliminated. Mousavi has also emphasized the rights of all citizens, and his positions are now those of a person who truly believes in a democratic political system....

[Section on Green Movement and Iran's Nuclear Programme]

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Iran Feature: Two Faces of Modernity (Vahdat)

Farzin Vahdat writes for Tehran Bureau:

It is often thought that what is currently taking place in Iran, the continuation of what has unfolded there over the past three decades --- violation of human rights, systematic discrimination against women, and belligerence toward the West --- constitutes a rejection of modernity and its fruits.

There are many reasons to find this view plausible. Soon after the victory of the Islamists in the Revolution of 1979, most of the modernizing efforts and institutions of the 55-year-old Pahlavi dynasty were either abandoned or completely reversed. Some of the most visible of these institutions pertained to women.

During the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah, the state had taken some positive steps regarding the status and welfare of women. Some of the most flagrant institutionalized forms of discrimination and abuse were curbed, if not abolished, through the curtailing of arbitrary divorce by men, the institution of more women-friendly custody laws, and the restriction of polygyny.

With the establishment of the Islamic Republic, most of the provisions of the Pahlavi era's Family Protection Law were abandoned. Personal freedoms, which before the Revolution were more or less tolerated, came under severe attack by the revolutionaries. Women were forced to don the hejab, and any form of resistance to the closely-monitored dress codes for both men and women was met with harsh punishment, including public flogging. Ancient retribution laws that entailed the cutting off of thieves' hands and the stoning of adulterers --- which, in fact, had rarely been performed in medieval Iran --- were enforced in many parts of the country.

Human rights, including freedom of belief, among the fundamental features of the modern world, received a fatal blow under the Islamic Republic. Adherents of the Baha'i faith, for example, came under savage attack by the government and zealots soon after the Revolution. Some 200 to 300 Baha'is were killed merely because they were not willing to recant their faith. Many more received long prison sentences. The property of thousands of Baha'is was confiscated and their children were deprived of education, especially of access to higher education. Last week, in a renewed attack on the members of this faith a court in Tehran handed down 20-year prison sentences for seven Baha'i leaders.

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