Gaza Update: US Says, "Go, Israel, Go" (A Bit Longer)

Just watched CNN's live coverage of the press briefing --- which is not yet posted on the Web --- by White House spokesman Gordon Johndroe from the Bush complex in Crawford, Texas.

The key phrase, repeated by Johndroe in his statement and in responses to questions, is that the US supports a "sustainable and durable cease-fire". Johndroe's further explanation? "We don't just want a cease-fire for the sake of a cease-fire." Until Israel and the US get assurances from Hamas that there will be no rocket attacks, "We are not going to have a cease-fire that's worth the paper it's written on."



In other words, the US is not only accepting but endorsing continued Israeli military action. This is in sharp contrast to calls from the UN Secretary-General, the European Union, and even some British officials for an "immediate cease-fire".

There is a recent and important parallel here. Johndroe's wording is almost exactly that used by the Bush Administration during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 2006. As most in the international community called for an unconditional end of hostilities, Washington and London continued to accept Israeli operations under the guise that they wanted a "meaningful cease-fire".

The key reason for the eventually cease-fire was Hezbollah's resistance and the difficulties faced by Israeli ground forces rather than any action by the US or Britain. My money is on a similar outcome --- with Hamas' resistance being more significant politically rather than militarily --- this time.

Gaza: The Futility of the Israeli War

As Israeli military operations enter a fourth day, our colleague Rami Khouri has published this thoughtful, incisive analysis of why Israeli military operations against Gaza are likely to leave the country less rather than more secure:

Punishing Gaza in Vain

BEIRUT -- God punished the arrogance and hubris of the Hebrews in the Old Testament by making them wander the wilderness for 40 years before allowing a later, more humble, generation to enter Canaan. The current generation of Israeli Jews is not as proficient at learning these 40-year lessons, it seems, to judge from Israel’s current ferocious attack on Gaza.



It was exactly 40 years ago to the day -- December 28, 1968 -- that Israeli commandos raided Beirut airport and destroyed 13 Lebanese civilian aircraft, in retaliation for a Palestinian attack against an Israeli airliner in Athens. Israel aimed to inflict a revenge punishment so severe that it would shock the Arabs into preventing the Palestinians from fighting Israel.

Today, 40 years and countless attacks and wars later, Israel again uses massive retaliatory and punitive force to pummel the Palestinians of Gaza into submission. Hundreds of Palestinians have died in the first 24 hours of the Israeli attack, and several thousand might die by the time the operation ends. For what purpose, one wonders?

The past 40 years offer a credible guide, if anyone in Israel or Washington cares to grasp the historical record instead of merely wallowing in a cruel world of political lies and deceptions. Israel’s use of its clear military superiority against Palestinians, Lebanese and other Arabs has consistently led to five parallel, linked, and very predictable results:

1. Israeli power has momentarily shattered Palestinian and Arab military and civilian infrastructure, only to see the bludgeoned Arabs regroup and return a few years later -- with much greater technical proficiency and political will to fight back. This happened when the Palestinians, who were driven out of Jordan in 1970, eventually re-established more lethal bases in Lebanon; or when Israel destroyed Fateh’s police facilities in the West Bank and Gaza a few years ago, and soon found themselves fighting Hamas’ capabilities instead.

2. Israel’s combination of military ferocity, insincerity in peace negotiations, and continued colonization has seen “moderate” groups and peace-making partners like Fateh slowly self-destruct, to be challenged or even replaced by tougher foes. Fateh has given way to Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and to militant spin-offs from within Fateh like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Hizbullah emerged in Lebanon after Israel invaded and occupied south Lebanon in 1982.

3. Israel’s insistence on militarily dominating the entire Middle East has seen it generate new enemies in lands where it once had strategic allies -- like Lebanon and Iran. Israel once worked closely with some predominantly Christian groups in Lebanon, and had deep security links with the Shah of Iran. Today -- the figurative 40 years later -- Israel sees its most serious, even existential, threats emanating from Hizbullah in Lebanon and the radical ruling regime in Iran.

4. The massive suffering Israel inflicts on ordinary Palestinians transforms a largely docile population into a recruiting pool for militants, resistance fighters, suicide bombers, terrorists, and other warriors. After decades of Israeli policies of mass imprisonment, starvation, strangulation, colonization, assassination, assault and terror tactics against Palestinians, the Palestinians eventually react to their own dehumanization by turning around and using the same kind of cruel methods to kill Israeli soldiers and civilians.

5. Israeli policies over decades have been a major -- but not the only -- reason for the transformation of the wider political environment in the Arab world into a hotbed of Islamism confronting more stringent Arab police states. The Islamists who politically dominate the Arab region -- whether Shiite Hizbullah, or Sunni Hamas or anything else in between -- are the only Arabs since the birth of Israel in 1948 who have proved both willing and able to fight back against Zionism.

All these trends can be seen in action during the current Israeli attack against Gaza: Palestinian and Arab radicalization, Islamist responses amidst pan-Arab lassitude, the continued discrediting of President Mahmoud Abbas’ government, and regional populist agitation against Israel, its U.S. protector, and most Arab governments. None of this is new. And that is precisely why it is so significant today, as Israel’s war on Gaza paves the way for a repetition of the five trends above that have plagued Israelis and Arabs alike.

The biblical 40-year time span between Israel’s attack on Beirut airport on December 28, 1968 and its war on Gaza on December 27, 2008 is eerily relevant. It is time enough for frightened and arrogant Israelis to learn that in all these years their weapons have promoted neither quiescence among neighboring Arabs, nor security along Israel’s borders. The exact opposite has happened, and it will happen again now.

Here’s something to ponder as the next 40-year period starts ticking down: The only thing that ever did bring Israelis and Arabs genuine peace was equitable, negotiated peace accords -- with Egypt and Jordan -- that treated Arabs and Israel as people who must enjoy equal rights to security and stable statehood.

Gaza: OK, So What's the Endgame?

As the death toll climbs above 300 and Israel threatens the next step of a ground invasion of Gaza, Juan Cole puts the point concisely:

What I can't understand is the end game here. The Israelis have pledged to continue their siege of the civilians of Gaza, and have threatened to resume assassinating Hamas political leaders, along with the bombardment....Do the Israelis expect the population at some point to turn against Hamas, blaming it for the blockade and the bombardment? But by destroying what was left of the Gaza middle class, surely they a throwing people into the arms of Hamas.

Rhetorically, the Israeli Government is pressing ahead, with Defense Minister Ehud Barak telling the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, "This is an all-out war against Hamas and its branches." This has been backed up by a Cabinet call-up of 7000 reservists, a step which should be approved by the Knesset on Monday.

Airstrikes continue, with the Hamas Interior Ministry amongst the latest targets. But as it becomes clear that, for all the destruction, the political situation in Gaza has not changed --- Hamas is still in control --- Israel faces its next decision. How many of the troops and infantry now massing on the border are sent across?

Ethan Bronner inadvertently captures the difficulty in a rather confused piece in The New York Times. He parrots the official but rather misleading line of "Israeli military commanders" that "they did not intend to reoccupy the coastal strip of 1.5 million Palestinians or to overthrow the Hamas government there". The aim is “to stop the firing against our civilians in the south and shape a different and new security situation there.”

Yet Bronner opens his piece with the assertion that the broader Israel objective is "to expunge the ghost of its flawed 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon and re-establish Israeli deterrence".

A moment's reflection would highlight the contradiction, and thus the problem, for Israel. The 2006 war was not one of "deterrence". It was an attempt to shatter Hezbollah as an effective political and military force.

That attempt failed because, after Israel had inflicted all its military might in Lebanon, Hezbollah still remained, killing Israeli forces and avoiding its final destruction. More importantly, the organisation was politically stronger, a boost which means that today it is a key player in the future of the country.

So, to return to Juan Cole, who also notes the 2006 precedent of Israel bolstering, rather than breaking, its enemies:

By refusing to negotiate with Hamas, Israel and the United States leave only a military option on the table. The military option isn't going to resolve the problem by itself.

Meanwhile, the ripples of Gaza spread across the Middle East. The inaction of Arab Governments is prompting large demonstrations by their populations, criticising not only Israel and the United States but their own political leaders.

Absorbing The Lessons Of The Lebanon War

David Axe has a short piece up on Danger Room which engages with one of the questions I've had on my mind this past couple of days- is Hamas aiming to be in a position to give Israel the kind of black eye it was dealt by Hezbollah during the 2006 invasion of Lebanon?:

If Israel ground forces were to roll into Gaza, they would face 15,000 fighters who have absorbed the lessons of the Lebanon War, Haaretz claims. "For two years Hamas, with Iranian assistance, has been working hard on developing its military power, using Hezbollah as a model."

Like Haaretz I don't doubt that Israel could take Gaza, but any ground invasion seems likely to entail IDF casualties. How long would the Israeli leadership have to prove that any move into Gaza wasn't a repeat of 2006?

Gaza Update (6 a.m. Israel/Palestine; 11 p.m. Eastern US): How Far Will Israel Go?

Latest Update: Pressing the Bombardment



The basics of today's developments are unsurprising. Given the lack of political and economic progress, the truce was going to lapse last Friday between Hamas and Israel. There were going to be rockets and mortars fired into southern Israel --- even during the six-month truce, there were rockets and mortars sent across the border. Israel was going to use one or more of those rockets and mortars as the rationale for a military assault.

Israel was going to launch that assault partly because of the dynamics of domestic politics and the electoral campaign. More importantly, it was going to do so to put pressure on Hamas, if not to break the organisation and ensure that it was overthrown in Gaza.

Yet, for all this inevitability --- which includes the inevitability of the deaths of civilians as well as fighters --- significant questions arise from today.



The most immediate concerns how far Israel wants to take its attempt to break Hamas. The scale of the death toll, the largest in a single day in Gaza since 1967, is both unexpected and revealing. Set aside the hypocrisy about wanting to prevent civilian casualties. This was not a surgical strike against Hamas militants.

This was a systematic attempt to damage the political and military infrastructure of the organisation and, at the same time, to punish the population. That punishment, provoking fear, disillusionment, and panic, might also provoke the anger leading Gazans to turn against the Hamas leadership.

I think that is a miscalculation, however, especially in the opening phase of operations when the population is more likely to rally behind its Government and against perceived aggressor. So Israel faces the next step: does it support air attacks with a ground invasion?

The easy answer is yes. A show of force will include tanks across the border. However, that show of force is complicated somewhat by Israel's last experience of sustained ground operations to try and separate the population from an enemy organisation --- the campaign against Hezbollah in 2006.

That attempt failed spectacularly, as Hezbollah grew stronger inside Lebanon and the Israeli military and political leadership was blamed for miscalculation. A second mistake in three years, getting bogged down in a bloody occupation of Gaza, is not a welcome prospect even for the most hawkish of Israelis.