A Gut Reaction to Obama's Afghanistan-Pakistan Speech: The Halfway House of The Long War (Part 1)

The second part of "A Gut Reaction", covering the Obama policy in Pakistan, will appear on Saturday.

This was a terrible speech. More importantly, it may come to mark a terrible moment in the Obama Presidency. Most importantly, it may come to mark --- in months and years to follow --- a terrible moment in American foreign policy.

The speech is not terrible in its rhetoric or delivery. It is not terrible in its declaration of lofty values. It is not even terrible --- though I think it is evasive and misleading --- in its opening five paragraphs on a past tragedy to rationalise a blank check for current decisions. It is terrible because it is void of political strategy. This speech is either a stunning exercise in being oblivious to failure or hoping against hope that failure will never be exposed.

Afghanistan Special: Josh Shahryar on the Obama Not-So-Grand Plan

I'm plumping for the latter, not just because the President does not seem the oblivious type but because the hodge-podge of measures looks to be an attempt to buy some time for either political fortune or divine intervention to save the day.

So, as we thought yesterday, the number of 30,000 troops is put forward primarily as a domestic political compromise, rather than as the culmination of a military strategy for the campaign against the Afghan insurgency. The US commanders get most of their request, which gives Obama some insulation (but only some, as there are a lot of critics inside and outside the military who want even more of a troops-first approach) against domestic sniping.

So Obama put in, albeit almost as an afterthought to the troop announcement, put in a brief section on non-military measures. For there are those in the US, let alone abroad, who might think that more than a stick is required for stability. And this President is at pains to make clear that Afghanistan 2009 is not another Iraq 2003-2007. (We'll save Obama's Afghanistan 2009 is not Vietnam 1967 for the moment

But, for his domestic audience, Afghanistan 2009 can be Iraq 2007-2009. So, after patting himself on the back for the "responsible" policy in the latter which lays the foundation for a US withdrawal, Obama promised that his soon-to-be-apparent Afghan success would mean the first American troops could leave in July 2011.

It's a neat trick. You like the "surge" myth? Well, you've got a sequel. Not sure about the "surge" myth? Well, just go with me and we'll begin drawing this adventure to a close in 18 months.

Not that it's an easy trick, even for the sake of presentation. It's notable that, contrary to earlier leaks of 6000 additional forces from NATO countries to bolster his plan, Obama didn't cite a number last night. So far, he has only got a fig leaf of 500 more soldiers from Britain. With other allies like Canada now out of this battle, the President --- who emphasised Afghanistan-not-Vietnam because 42 countries were alongside the US --- is going to struggle to make this more than the US way, way out in front.

But let's leave such minor quibbles aside. The audacity of Obama's speech, and thus its terrible roar, was in the willful ignorance of matters closer to Kabul and indeed Islamabad.

Consider first of all the deception that underlay the speech. Five long paragraphs invoking 9-11 does not bring Osama bin Laden and his boys into Afghanistan. If Obama wants to follow the logic of his rhetoric, then the 30,000 US soldiers should be marching into Pakistan.

But that's not possible for political reasons (just as it hasn't been possible since bin Laden and Co. crossed the border in December 2001). So instead there has to be the convoluted horror story of the Taliban getting back into power in part of Afghanistan, inviting Al Qa'eda to a restored sanctuary, and posing no objections as more 9-11s are planned.

I'll leave the dissection of that nightmarish rationale to others who can explain clearly the defects of the thesis of the Taliban-Al Qa'eda "alliance".

Let's assume, however, that the fight in Helmand and Kandahar and Kunduz against Afghan insurgents is essential because of non-Afghan fighters across the border. For granting that assumption exposes the halfway house of Obama's solution: there is no political strategy to match his military escalation.

If the President picked up on anything between his initial escalation in March and last night, it should have been that he has no stable base
in Kabul. Eight months ago, he told the American public and the world that, in addition to the more than 30,000 forces being put into the country, the US would ensure that its Afghan partner focused on development, that it would not be mired in corruption, that it would make progress on security. Have a look between the lines of Obama's address yesterday --- General McChrystal saying that the security situation had worsened, the passing Presidential reference to "corruption" and the Afghan election --- and ask, "What did the March escalation achieve?"

The primary objective of the Karzai Government is to remain in power. If reducing corruption and fighting a battle to the death with the Taliban offered the maintenance of that power, then perhaps the Obama strategy would have a partner. If the US had some meaningful lever of pressure --- the threat of a political alternative? even a coup? --- against Karzai, then perhaps the Obama strategy would have a partner.

But we've been there and done that. Karzai and his circle have maintained power by cutting deals, whether you want to call that "corruption", and accepting that it cannot take on the insurgency throughout Afghanistan in a direct conflict. The Obama Administration considered taking Karzai out in its first three months and found that it had no good options to do so, either through the ballot box or beyond it.

Perhaps, and it is a big perhaps, the Obama Administration can get a convergence of interests with the Afghanistan Government through a political deal beyond Kabul. That's the meaning of Obama's briefly outstretched hand to "Taliban" members who will leave the movement. But the deal in question would have to be much more than that; in short, it would have to accept the Taliban and other insurgent groups as political actors in exchange for a renunciation of violence. And even if it is true that the CIA is broaching such a possibility, and that it is backed by the White House, this is a political negotiation that is far beyond Obama's extra 30,000 troops, far beyond his 9-11 rhetoric, and even beyond his conception of American power.

Comments

[Canuckistan]

I think clearly there is recognition that the mission in Afghanistan has failed. This is about delaying the inevitable in order to pull out some troops (the British media doesn't seem to have picked up on the fact that American troops are going to remain and that the 2011 date is not fixed but that the US in the word of the American ambassador on the radio this morning is "hoping" things will be better) at a later date after some delclaration of "victory" with the Afghans nominally left in charge of the mess. It is geared more toward a domestic audience and the 2012 election more than anything else. Reading the text, I was surprised how Bushian it all sounded with the notable exception of criticism of the invasion of Iraq. Invoking 9/11 was a classic Bushian stroke. Also not mentioned in the speech is that Obama, according to the NYT, has approved an escalation of CIA covert operations in Pakistan including more drone attacks (after a big rise already from the Bush numbers). What implications that will have for stability in Pakistan is anyone's guess.

[Canuckistan]

I think Simon Jenkins has it exactly right:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/dec/02/barack-obama-afghanistan-taliban

[Simon T]

a few things strike me here. the logic of disrupting, dismantling and defeating Al Qaeda by suppressing the Taliban and building an enduring Afghan state still baffles me.
I hate to sound like a Republican but escalating and setting a withdrawal timetable when you are battling a die hard insurgency is totally self-defeating. It will take the best part of 6 months to deploy these additional troops which means they must have an impact within a year before US troops begin to be drawn down. Of course the US has to withdraw at some stage and the hardcore leadership of the insurgency knows this. What has Obama got to offer them to make them abandon the fight? He made passing reference to a Taliban amnesty. Obama could also be accused of his own false reading of history on Vietnam. In Vietnam tens of thousands of insurgents surrendered under the Chieu Hoi amnesty programme but the NLF leadership never once altered its demands. The Taliban will never give up on its goals and the only resolution would be to grant the Taliban the status of a political player. Maybe Obama is buying himself some time to negotiate a ‘decent interval’ which would cover his 2012 election campaign