Text of the International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Iran's Nuclear Programme

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

1. On 19 November 2008, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2008/59). This report covers relevant developments since that date.

A. Current Enrichment Related Activities

2. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has continued to feed UF6 into the 3000-machine IR-1 unit (Unit A24), and six cascades of Unit A26, at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).1 Nine other cascades of Unit A26 have been installed and are under vacuum.2 Installation of the three remaining cascades of that Unit is continuing. Installation work at Units A25, A27 and A28, including the installation of pipes and cables, is also continuing.

3. The Agency has finalized its assessment of the results of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out at FEP on 24–26 November 2008, and has concluded that the physical inventory as declared by Iran was consistent with the results of the PIV, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with enrichment plants of a similar throughput. The Agency has verified that, as of 17 November 2008, 9956 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades since February 2007, and a total of 839 kg of low enriched UF6 had been produced. The results also showed that the enrichment level of this low enriched UF6 product verified by the Agency was 3.49% U-235. Iran has estimated that, between 18 November 2008 and 31 January 2009, it produced an additional 171 kg of low enriched UF6. The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and surveillance.3

4. On 29 September 2008, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), the results of which confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran, within the measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility. Between 29 October 2008 and 15 January 2009, Iran fed a total of approximately 50 kg of UF6 into the 20-machine IR-1 cascade, the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and the single IR-1, IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges. The nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance.3 Iran has transferred a few kilograms of low enriched UF6 produced at PFEP to the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories4 at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre for research and development purposes.

5. To date, the results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP5 indicate that the plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment). Since March 2007, 21 unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP.

6. On 12 January 2009, Iran provided updated Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for FEP and PFEP. Iran informed the Agency in the DIQ for FEP that it plans to include a room for functional testing of single centrifuge machines. There were no other changes in the capacity of the facilities or of their schedules for operation.

B. Reprocessing Activities

7. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these two facilities, as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.

C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

8. The Agency last visited the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) in August 2008 (GOV/2008/59, para. 9). On 21 January 2009, the Agency again requested access to carry out a DIV at the IR-40. In a letter dated 26 January 2009 referring to previous communications concerning the submission of design information, Iran informed the Agency that it would not permit the Agency to carry out the DIV. In a reply dated 29 January 2009, the Agency reiterated its request for access to
carry out the DIV. In its response, dated 7 February 2009, Iran reiterated its view that since IR-40 was not in a situation to receive nuclear material, no DIQ was required, and, hence, the request for access to perform DIV was not justified. Iran requested that, as long as the decision stipulated in Iran’s letter of 29 March 2007 was valid,6 no DIV for IR-40 be scheduled.

9. Iran’s refusal to grant the Agency access to IR-40 could adversely impact the Agency’s ability to carry out effective safeguards at that facility, and has made it difficult for the Agency to report further on the construction of the reactor, as requested by the Security Council. In addition to the roofing having already been completed for the other buildings on the site, construction of the reactor building’s domed containment structure has also been completed, as observed in images taken on 30 December 2008, rendering impossible the continued use of satellite imagery to monitor further construction inside the reactor building or any of the other buildings.

10. On 7 February 2009, the Agency conducted an inspection at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant, at which time it was noted that the process line for the production of natural uranium pellets for the heavy water reactor fuel had been completed and fuel rods were being produced.

11. Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which appears to be in operational condition.

D. Other Implementation Issues

D.1. Uranium Conversion

12. As of 9 February 2009, approximately 42 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) since 8 March 2008, the date of the last PIV carried out by the Agency at UCF. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 357 tonnes, some of which was transferred to FEP and PFEP, and all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

D.2. Design Information

13. As previously reported to the Board of Governors, the Agency has still not received preliminary design information, requested by the Agency in December 2007, on the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin (GOV/2008/38, para. 11).

D.3. Other Matters

14. A PIV was carried out at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) on 13–14 December 2008. The fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at BNPP remain under Agency seal. Iran has informed the Agency that the loading of fuel into the reactor is scheduled to take place during the second quarter of 2009.

E. Possible Military Dimensions

15. As detailed in the Director General’s previous reports to the Board (most recently in GOV/2008/59, para. 15), there remain a number of outstanding issues which give rise to concerns, and which need to be clarified, to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in those reports, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, provide the information and access requested by the Agency.

16. In a letter to Iran dated 2 February 2008, the Agency reiterated its request to meet with Iranian authorities, in Tehran, at the earliest possible opportunity, with a view to proceeding with the resolution of the issues that remain outstanding.

17. The Agency has still not received a positive reply from Iran in connection with the Agency’s requests and, therefore, has not had access to relevant information, documentation, locations or individuals.

F. Summary

18. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, on the early provision of design information and has continued to refuse to permit the Agency to carry out design information verification at IR-40.

19. Contrary to the request of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Nor has it agreed to the Agency’s request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the Security Council.

20. Regrettably, as a result of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the remaining issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency has not made any substantive progress on these issues. As indicated in previous reports of the Director General, for the Agency to make such progress, Iran needs to provide substantive information, and access to relevant documentation, locations and individuals, in connection with all of the outstanding issues. With respect to the alleged studies in particular, an important first step is for Iran to clarify the extent to which information contained in the documentation which Iran was shown, and given the opportunity to study, is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to non-nuclear purposes.

21. Unless Iran implements the above transparency measures and the Additional Protocol, as required by the Security Council, the Agency will not be in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. The Director General continues to urge Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date. The Director General, at the same time, urges Member States which have provided such documentation to the Agency to agree to the Agency’s providing copies thereof to Iran.

22. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities or its work on heavy water-related projects, including the construction of the heavy water
moderated research reactor, IR-40, and the production of fuel for that reactor.

23. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
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NOTES

1 For more detail on the configuration of FEP, see GOV/2008/38, para. 2.

2 On 1 February 2009, 3936 centrifuges were being fed with UF6; 1476 centrifuges were installed and under vacuum, and an
additional 125 centrifuges were installed but not under vacuum.

3 In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material at the facility, e.g. some waste and samples, are
not under containment and surveillance.

4 GOV/2003/40, paras 7 and 18; GOV/2004/83, paras 14 and 73–74.

5 Results are available for samples taken up to 22 November 2008 for FEP and up to 20 April 2008 for PFEP. These results
have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.2% U-235), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to
0.4% U-235 enrichment).

6 GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14; GOV/2007/48, para. 19.

Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?: An Alternative Analysis

Responding to Scott Lucas' analysis yesterday of the "revelations" of an Israeli covert programme to disrupt Iran's nuclear programme, including economic sabotage and assassinations, Josh Mull offers a far different point of view. The story in The Daily Telegraph is not Western/Israeli psychological warfare against Tehran; instead, it indicates that Israeli pressure has lost and an American engagement with Iran has triumphed.

Earlier this week in The Daily Telegraph, it was revealed by former US intelligence operatives that Israel and the United States have allegedly been waging a covert campaign of kidnappings, assassinations, and sabotage against Iran's nuclear program. In his post "Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?", Professor Lucas proposes that this revelation is "a bit of 'psychological warfare' to keep Tehran off-balance over what might and might not be attempted to undermine its nuclear programme" as well as a "stick" in non-proliferation discussions.

However, the leak could also be interpreted as exactly the opposite of Prof. Lucas's assessment. Not only is this revelation more concrete than mere "psychological" warfare. It is a Loss, not a Win, for Israel and a Carrot, not a Stick, for Iran.

There are already reports that the United States and Israel have targeted Iranian nuclear operatives in the past. In December 2006, the Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Ali Reza Asgari, disappeared while travelling in Istanbul, Turkey. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet speculated at the time that Asgari had hidden his family in Damascus, Syria before defecting to the West. However, according to the Iranian Labor News Agency, Asgari's family was actually back in Iran. They denied Asgari would seek asylum with the west, and Iran publicly accused the US and Israel of kidnapping Asgari, a process known as "extraordinary rendition." Four months later, US non-proliferation expert Robert Levinson disappeared under equally mysterious circumstances in Iran, a possible retaliation for Asgari.

There is also evidence possibly verifying the existence of the shell companies which, the Telegraph article suggests, are used to "dupe" and sabotage Iranian companies involved in the nuclear program. The US Treasury Department regularly designates, or "burns" to use apt intelligence lingo, corporations and financial entities it knows to be connected to illicit Iranian activities. For instance, in December 2008, in a possible closing act of the exiting Bush Administration, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) burned one of its largest shell companies, Assa Corporation.

World Check reported at the time "the corporate name chosen, Assa Corp. and Co., is deceptively similar to that of a well-known European corporation and of several US companies. This is a tactic frequently employed by financial criminals to confuse and mislead." World Check also pointed out "the address of the New York corporation appears to be that of the law firm that organised the company, which could indicate that it is a shell company with no actual address. The company has no telephone listing in New York, has no Internet footprint, and does not have a principal place of business."

Note there are never any subsequent indictments or investigations into these "designated" entities, just a simple burning, or public destruction, of the intelligence asset. While parallel information from Iran regarding their financial investigations is unavailable, it could be presumed that companies are burned by OFAC after being discovered by Iranian counter-intelligence officials.

The leak can be seen as a major loss, not a win, for Israel. As the CIA officer told the Telegraph, "Disruption is designed to slow progress on the programme, done in such a way that they don't realise what's happening." Obviously, Iran is now fully aware of the operation. Israeli intelligence services will be, or more likely have already been, forced to abort all facets of the operation and Iranian nuclear officials will likely be even more closely scrutinized, controlled, and monitored by state security services.

One of the most grim aspects of Israel's loss is, of course, the gruesome destruction of its intelligence assets remaining in Iran. Fars, an Iranian news agency, reported in November 2008 that three people suspected of spying for Israel, specifically a connection to Defense Minister Asgari's kidnapping, were executed by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. CNN also reports on another man, Ali Ashtari, who "was convicted by [the IRGC) in June of spying for Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad." Furthermore "according to Ashtari's 'confession,' published by Fars, he was a salesman who obtained high-end but security-compromised pieces of electronic equipment...and sold them to military and defense centers in Iran." The covert war, clearly already suffering losses, will now possibly be completely dismantled.

With that in mind, it's possible to see this as not only a "stick" for Israel, but also as a "carrot" for Iran. The consequences for Israel have been noted, but the direct benefits to Iran require more subtlty to discern. As Prof. Lucas points out in his analysis, the sources Radio Farda and STRATFOR, used in the Telegraph leak as well as other similar leaks, have been linked to the US Government and its intelligence agencies in the past. However, rather than interpreting their connection to US intelligence as a disqualification, it should more accurately interpreted as adding legitimacy to the claims. Quite plainly, it could mean the US Government explicitly authorized the release of this information.

The benefit to Iran would be tangible evidence that the administration of President Barack Obama was ending the policy of regime change in Iran. Furthermore, he is willing to use US psychological operations assets previously devoted to targeting Iran to instead target Israel. It will be difficult for Iranian hardliners to argue that the US is a either a puppet or puppeteer of Zionist interests when Obama is burning Israeli intelligence assets on the front page of the Daily Telegraph.

If there is in fact an American and Israeli covert war of disruption being waged against Iran's nuclear program, it is now in my judgement, completely over, with the results being a humiliating loss for Israel, a lowering of hostilities with Iran, and a vastly strengthened American diplomatic position vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear negotiations.

Interpreting Tehran: Professor Gary Sick on the Future of US-Iranian Relations

Last Thursday, In front of an audience at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London that included members of Parliaments, diplomats, senior academics, journalists and representatives from more than a dozen embassies Professor Gary Sick delivered a fascinating survey of the last 30 years of US-Iranian relations. The presentation was made “on the record”, and Chris Emery, our colleague at the University of Birmingham, was there to summarise the remarks.

Professor Sick has served in three US administrations and was the National Security Council’s Iran expert at the time of the Iranian Revolution and US Embassy Crisis. He is now Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University and Director of Gulf2000.

The problem is not a foreign policy problem; it is a domestic policy problem. The baggage of the past is more relevant than any strategic rivalry or threat. Most importantly, the US has never given Iran the opportunity to have an internal debate on the possibilities and consequences of rapprochement with America. The Iranians have therefore not had to think through the important political effects, for example, of ending the chants of “Death to America” at Friday prayers. This statement has become an important expression of the Iranian Revolution; rapprochement, which would surely be incompatible with its encouragement byt the State, may accompany some modifications to Iran’s revolutionary identity.

The Iranian threat to US interests, contrary to the “perceived wisdom” of the Bush Administration and Israeli government, has been wildly blown out of proportion. The newfound strategic confidence of Iran was largely the legacy of recent US foreign policy and the elimination of Iran’s two gravest enemies, the Taliban to the east and Saddam Hussein to the west. The growth of Iran’s influence in the region could not have been achieved, solely by its own actions, as Iran lacks either inclination or capability to project its powers beyond its borders.

Iran is not the most dangerous threat facing the US and Europe. The Afghan-Pakistan nexus, with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability, was far graver. Even America’s exit from Iraq posed a greater threat.

Iran and Israel are the new polar rivals in the Middle East. The Sunni Arabs are not as important now and ultimately fear any emerging strategic relationship between the US and Iran. (N.B.: Sick later qualified this statement, asserting that the Arabs were not threatened strategically but, instead, feared marginalisation. This sentiment must be factored into US diplomacy: US-Iranian rapprochement, if and when it occurs, should be matched with the complimentary reassurance of America’s Arab allies.)

Israel has viewed US-Iranian rapprochement with a degree of anxiety, and,the recent conflict in Gaza partly demonstrated Israel’s fear of political alienation. Israel has for some time been engaging in signalling actions, and recent Israel manoeuvres, such as the rehearsal of long-distance bombing operations in the Mediterranean, are particularly aimed at Europe. The message is that the pressure on Iran must be maintained or Israel may respond unilaterally to what it maintains is an existential threat to its existence. This signa was also seen in Israel’s recent request to America to use Iraqi airspace.

Israel, however, will not bomb Iran because it is logistically and politically impossible. Having been unable to eliminate Hezbollah or Hamas’s operational capability, despite several weeks of intensive bombing, Israel would be unable to perform any surgical strike. Instead, Tel Aviv would have to commit to sustained bombing missions, with a hitherto unknown degree of accuracy, on a range of targets. An Israeli strike would also effectively take America to war with Iran, who would reasonably assume permission had been given, and Iranian reprisals in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and to Persian Gulf shipping would be disastrous for US interests. Any military strike would thus never be sanctioned by the US.

Iran’s motivation for developing nuclear weapons had been connected to its correct perception that Saddam Hussein was trying to develop nuclear armaments at a time when Iran and Iraq were engaged in a brutal war in which Saddam had shown a ready willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. It is no coincidence that Iran apparently halted all of its weapons designs in the fall of 2003, following Saddam’s removal by US forces.

A reasonably strong case can be made that Saddam “saved” the Islamic Revolution. His attack on Iran created an outpouring of Iranian nationalism which mobilised support for the state at a time when the Revolution looked to be floundering. It also forced the Iranians to organise more efficiently both their financial and political arms of the government and, more importantly, their armed forces which were in chaos in the Revolutionary period. The Islamic Republic of Iran remained a much more nationalist than Islamist state.

Iran is incredibly inefficient in its pursuit of nuclear technology or the West is very wrong about the urgency of preventing it from doing so. Iran has had a nuclear programme, in at least one form or another, for 25 years and yet its only nuclear facility is still not working, despite persistent claims by the Iranian authorities that it would. Considering it took India, Israel and others just 10 years from making the decision to produce a bomb to successful testing, this could be clear evidence of a lack of determination in Tehran. Iran’s enrichment program is also subject to close monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency..

With respect to nuclear technology, there is much continuity between the current and former regimes in Iran. The Shah himself talked, probably unrealistically, of an 18-month “surge” period in which a bomb could be produced after an effective enrichment cycle had been achieved. The Islamic Republic, similarly, probably wants a nuclear program which is capable of delivering a bomb if they decided some time in the future that they needed one. The recognition that a civilian nuclear program gives a certain degree of flexibility, if major geo-political or strategic changes pose a grave future threat to Iranian security, is of course a very different proposition than that currently made by Western and Israeli hawks. At the same time, claims that Iran’s protestations that Islamic law prohibits WMD should be taken with a large dose of salt. As Ayatollah Khomeini said, the “survival of the state takes precedence over Islam”.

How then should the international community respond to the ‘”uclear issue”? US intelligence has regularly claimed, since the early 1990s, that Iran was 3-6 years away from acquiring a bomb This reliable information, which contradicts the assumption that Iran is determined to produce nuclear weapons, can be used more effectively. Certainly, it argues very strongly against any military response. Even if a civilian nuclear program including enrichment allows Iran greater flexibility to produce a weapon sometime in the future, about 40 countries currently have this same potential. The world lives with this prospect every day and doesn’t take countries like Brazil to the UN Security Council.

What is needed, however, is consistent transparency, which Iran is willing to accept. This would allow the world to accurately guage the extent of Iran’s nuclear programme and, with an early warning based on credible non-politicised information, react accordingly and without hysteria.

The Obama Administration’s policy approach has to be seen in the context of previous US and Iranian administrations and the prospect of a new administration in Tehran this summer. There should be no substantial US overtures until after the Iranian elections. America has little to gain by being seen as interfering in this process.

(N.B.: Perhaps disappointingly, Professor Sick did not make any major predictions as to who would be influential in formulating and executing US-Iran policy. Nothing was said, for instance, on the controversial selection of Dennis Ross as Obama’s Middle East envoy. Nor did he examine any potential emerging bureaucratic tensions within the conception of US policy in Iran- of the kind that had blighted the administrations that he himself had served.)

The US has not yet began to decide where Iran policy is going and what its end goal should be. The preceding George H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, and their predecessors before them, had no meaningful policy beyond rhetoric. The Obama Administration would thus have to be prepared to make hard decisions, in a way that previous administrations had failed to contemplate. It would need time to do so.

(N.B.: Professor Sick reserved stinging criticism for the efforts of the previous administration and particularly its contradictory and counter-productive attempts to engage with Iran’s civil society. Whilst Professor Sick praised the work of NGO’s and human rights activists in exposing some of the abuses committed by the Iranian government, he condemned the mixed messages Bush has sent to the Iranian public in its support for outside groups. The Bush administration, he claimed, had fleeted between supporting unpopular external Iranian groups, pursuing (and then denying to be pursuing) regime change and promoting a ‘velvet revolution’. The damage of this approach can not be underestimated and has contributed to the substantial mistrust and paranoia in which Tehran frames US engagement.)

There are some very practical problems that need to be overcome. Optimally, the US should try and forge direct links with the Supreme Leader. America’s isolation from this ultimate source of political authority in Iran places limits on rapprochement. In his final analysis, however, this avenue had been sought, especially during the hostage crisis, and consistently refused. Put simply, Ayatollah Khamenei had shown no interest of talking to America.

There is another practical problem for US diplomacy. A whole generation of career diplomats have never set foot on Iranian soil and thus lack any exposure to its political or popular culture. This makes it critically important for diplomatic relations to be restored. A potential starting point is for the US to open a US “Interests” office in Tehran. As a matter of protocol, it was the Americans who broke relations in 1980, so it is the US that has to formally restore them.

(N.B. Professor Sick also recounted some of his own personal experiences of meeting with president Ahmadinejad, in whose company he had spent roughly eight hours since his election in 2005. Professor Sick noted a partial softening of his attitudes since then and observed that the president genuinely, though it is often dismissed in the western media, believed he was a peacemaker.

Sick recounted one meeting in which US-based specialists had participated, with Ahmadinejad, in a seminar in Washington. Professor Sick asked the Iranian president to imagine he was simply an Iranian academic participating in a discussion with American academics in America. Would he not be arrested by Iranian authorities on his return to Iran? The president laughed off the assumption as inaccurate, but Sick proceeded to supply evidence of Iranian academics who had suffered this very fate. Professor Sick chose not to elaborate further on this discussion. Nor did he comment on the much wider issue of the role academics can play in increasing constructive dialogue, and the limits placed upon them doing so in both countries.

Despite this perhaps provocative anecdote, and a sweeping though not uncommonly made statement that Arabs and Persians generally dislike each other, Sick’s analysis was mostly pragmatic. Yes, some aspects of Iran’s behaviour were cause for some concern in the west. In fact no country, according to Sick, had done a better job of diplomatically shooting itself in the foot. In this latter regard, Ahmadinejad’s unnecessary rhetoric had significantly damaged Iranian diplomacy. However, the threat Iran poses has been widely blown out of proportion.

Professor Sick also acknowledged many of the long term grievances held in Iran towards America as legitimate. More importantly, he observed that US policy had been proved counter-productive. Rather than continue the mistakes made by all US administrations since the Revolution, the US had to be prepared to make hard decisions and recognise the basic failure of all its previous assumptions to achieve tangible benefits to US diplomacy or US interests. A large part of this process involved the abandonment of historical baggage on both sides.)