Iran: Understanding the Assembly of Experts Statement "Crisis Continues"

First, a summary of the official statement of the Assembly of Experts after their two-day meeting. The statement only emerged yesterday, 72 hours after the conclusion of the meeting and after a "leaked" document (possibly a draft of the statement pushed by "hard-liners") appeared on Fars News:

1. Opening point on God and the Iranian nation standing against Iran's enemies.
2. Post-election: there has been much damage. The people passed the test, but a few of the elite did not in these difficult times. [No direct condemnation of the opposition, the door is still open to atonement]. Our triumph is due to our great Supreme Leader, which adds another golden page to the history book of the Islamic Republic. Abiding with the Supreme Leader is necessary for keeping our holy Republic united.
3. Fitna [sedition] has been finished, and the patient people have wiped out wrong-doers [or those on the wrong path].
4. Warning to all enemies who seduced their own people: our duty has not ended, we stand openly by the side of your Supreme Leader.
5. A thousand thanks to our devoted and self-sacrificing security forces for extinguishing the fire. God bless them and congratulations to them for catching the leader of Jundullah's "terrorists", Abdolmalek Rigi.
6. Iranian academics have achieved brilliant victories in all fields of science.
7. A reminder of Khomeini, hoping to bring the Revolution to its real owner, the Imame Zaman.



Mr Verde analyses the meaning and significance of the statement:

Not much of a surprise to be honest.

The basics: the Assembly statement is to show the people that their eight months of protest have not made any difference (they have, but this is what the regime wants people to believe).


It is also to show high-ranking religious figures who have been unhappy with the Supreme Leader’s management of the country since June that the Assembly of Experts is not only approving Khamenei as the best person to be leader but is also approving his methods and actions, to the point that it is saying that it has had enough of the protests (this is exactly how the Supreme Leader must feel about the protest: he must be fed up with it all).

The original idea of the Assembly was to include very high-ranking clerics, with impeccable personal and religious credentials, who were supposed to represent the different views of religious scholars and Grand Ayatollahs. They were supposed to be elected by the people, bringing together the Islamic nature and republicanism of the Republic.

What we have instead is a group of people, most of whom were not known at all until they were “elected” to the Assembly. And even now, most are only known for their membership of the Assembly or their political activity, not their religious credentials (for example, Ahmad Khatami).

The candidates of the Assembly have to go through a very strong filtering process by Council of Guardians and in many seats, there are usually only one candidate for people to vote for or two candidates, both of whom have the same views. So there is no choice in most Assembly constituencies. In fact the process is so flawed that members of the Council of Guardians are also members of the Assembly (e.g. Ahmad Jannati, Ahmad Khatami), a serious and obvious case of conflict of interest.

There is also a fundamental flaw with the implementation of the idea of the Assembly. The Assembly is supposed to select the Supreme Leader, oversee his actions, and, if required, remove him from the post.

But the members of the Assembly have to go through the Council of Guardians filter. The Council has 12 members (six clerics, six lawyers). The six clerics are appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. The six lawyers are nominated by the head of Judiciary and voted on by the Parliament. The head of Judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader and the members of Parliament have to pass through the Council filter to stand for election.

This creates a closed loop assuring the full control of the Supreme Leader and making oversight of him impossible. Only his people get to become members of the Assembly; with the exception of very few people like Ayatollah Dashgheib. (I’ll talk about Rafsanjani below.)

Through its history, the Assembly of Experts has never been what it is supposed to be. Instead of being the supreme body that oversees the top person in the regime, it rubber-stamps decisions that have already been taken elsewhere.

One example was the assignment and later removal of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri as deputy Supreme Leader in the 1980 (both of these were Khomeini’s decisions, not the Assembly’s). The same was true when Khamenei was selected as Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani got together with the right-wing factions (Motalefeh and conservative clerics) of the Islamic Republic and started a plan that resulted in the left (the current Reformists) being gradually pushed away from power. The outcome was Khamenei becoming Supreme Leader on the say-so of Rafsanjani and a few others who were supposedly recounting Khomeini’s wishes on his death bed. Ever since, the Assembly has rubber-stamped whatever Khamenei wants. All the Assembly sessions result is a communique that says that all is well and the Supreme Leader is doing the best job possible.

I view this latest statement exactly the same way. A few days before the latest session started, Kayhan published a report which predicted the final declaration. Remember that Kayhan’s editor is appointed by Khamenei, and the newspaper usually says what Khamenei wants to say. It is the journalistic version form of plainclothesmen (lebas shakhsi) for Khamenei: an unofficial spokesperson that will allow the Supreme Leader to deny everything.

Why the statement was put on the website so late? It could be that they just forgot to post it. Or it could be that someone was trying to indicate some dissatisfaction with the statement, holding back its publication.

I don’t think it matters. The institutions of the Islamic Republic are unable to pull it out of the current crisis. All that have any power (at least on paper) are under the direct, and at times illegal, control of Khamenei.

The root cause of the current crisis is Khamenei and his actions and decisions. And he will not change his mind until there is a lot of pressure on him, not from within the institutions of the regime, but from some area where he does not have full control.

I honestly believe that Khamenei and his advisors are not able to see what they are doing to the regime and to themselves. Maybe 20 years of absolute power does this; they are trying to control a country of 70 million people like a village in the outback with a big stick, lots of superstition, and big lies. The problem they have, and which will get worse, is that many young people in Iran are quite well-educated and well-informed and will not stand for this. Children of the establishment’s figures are part of this group, for example, Mohsen Ruholamini. [Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in the post-election abuses at Kahrizak Prison, was the son of Abdolhossein Ruholamini, the campaign manager of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei.]

I think that, in recent weeks, we have seen a concerted effort on the part of the Supreme Leader and Co. to "wrap things up". Although the 9 Dey [30 December] and 22 Bahman [11 February] pro-regime marches were nowhere as good as they wished and actually caused them, I think they know that this is the best they can do as far as marches are concerned, both by not allowing the opposition a chance to show itself as on Qods Day, 13 Aban [4 November], 16 Azar [7 December], or Ashura [27 December] and by showing at least some form of support for the regime.

Having put a lot of effort in the 22 Bahman show, the regime is trying to get as much out of it as it possibly can. The Assembly statement and Khamenei speech to the Assembly members wer part of this plan: show strength and show resolve. The hope is that it will dishearten the public. If it does, it will improve the public standing of the Supreme Leader and the regime in the short-term. If it does not, it will raise the stakes even higher.

(A side note on Hashemi Rafsanjani....

I think that Rafsanjani and the Supreme Leader both need each other, but each want the other to be weak. I don’t think that Rafsanjani, even if he could, is out to get rid of Khamenei. He wants the Supreme Leader in his post, but in a weaker position. He is trying to use the protests and Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement of the country to say to Khamenei: the people don’t agree with you, and your guy is useless too.

The Supreme Leader on the other hand is worried that getting rid of Rafsanjani would make him lose the support of powerful people within the Islamic Republic.)

It has been said many times on EA that this is a marathon, not a sprint. If I may just modify that: this is a marathon, but the regime would like to change it into (or at least pretend that it is) a sprint. The longer this process takes, the more the regime will lose (and the weaker it will become). So the regime will have to play its hand quickly: a lot of high-value cards are being played for cheap rewards.