This is the New Iraq (US "Democracy"/Troops Peripheral)

Journalist Tom Ricks, author of two high-profile books on the US and the Iraq War, featured this comment on his blog from Nir Rosen, who has been notable for his reportage from Iraq. I found it illuminating for several reasons:

1. Rosen offers a pragmatic, rather than wish-driven, assessment that Iraq will not return to sectarian war. That prediction, which is being hotly debated amongst Iraq specialists, is one of the key issues behind and beyond the forthcoming Iraqi national elections on 7 March.

2. Don't confuse this, however, with "democracy", which is likely to be the superficial headline in much press coverage. Democracy promotion was never the goal of the Bush Administration when it invaded Iraq, and it is not the primary concern of the Obama Administration, either. This episode is power politics.

3. And an irony: Rosen's assessment highlights that the US military is largely a bystander in this process. There will continue to be a running argument as to whether the vaunted "surge" of 2007/8 created the space for a measure of stability and security, but those matters are now in the hands of Iraqis. Not sure, however, that Ricks will appreciate this point even as he posts Rosen's thoughts: he is one of the spokesmen for the US military's current push to delay and even break President Obama's declared date for withdrawal of American forces.

It's been frustrating to read the latest hysteria about sectarianism returning to Iraq, the threat of a new civil war looming, or even the notion that Iraq is "unraveling." I left Iraq today after an intense mission on behalf of Refugees International. My colleague Elizabeth Campbell and I traveled comfortably and easily throughout Baghdad, Salahedin, Diyala and Babil. We were out among Iraqis until well into the night every day, often in remote villages, traveling in a normal Toyota Corolla. Our main hassle was traffic and having to go through a thousand security checkpoints a day. Stay tuned for our report next month about the humanitarian crisis in Iraq (which deserves more attention than political squabbles) and the situation of Iraqis displaced since 2003. Stay tuned for my own article about what I found politically as well. And finally stay tuned later this year for my book on the Iraqi civil war, the surge, counterinsurgency and the impact of the war in Iraq on the region.



From the beginning of the occupation the US government and media focused too much on elite level politics and on events in the Green Zone, neglecting the Iraqi people, the "street," neighborhoods, villages, mosques. They were too slow to recognize the growing resistance to the occupation, too slow to recognize that there was a civil war and now perhaps for the same reason many are worried that there is a "new" sectarianism or a new threat of civil war. The US military is not on the streets and cannot accurately perceive Iraq, and journalists are busy covering the elections and the debaathification controversy, but not reporting enough from outside Baghdad, or even inside Baghdad.

Iraqis on the street are no longer scared of rival militias so much, or of being exterminated and they no longer have as much support for the religious parties. Maliki is still perceived by many to be not very sectarian and not very religious, and more of a "nationalist." Another thing people would notice if they focused on "the street" is that the militias are finished, the Awakening Groups/SOIs are finished, so violence is limited to assassinations with silencers and sticky bombs and the occasional spectacular terrorist attack -- all manageable and not strategically important, even if tragic. Politicians might be talking the sectarian talk but Iraqis have grown very cynical.

When you talk to people they tell you that the sectarian phase is over. Of course with enough fear it could come back, but Shiites do not feel threatened by any other group, and Sunnis aren't being rounded up, the security forces provide decent enough security, and they are pervasive, there is no reason for people to cling to militias in self defense and besides militiamen are still being rounded up, I just don't see enough fuel here for a conflagration -- leaving aside the Arab/Kurdish fault line, of course. (Though if Maliki went to war with the Kurds that would only further unite Sunni and Shiite Arabs.) The Iraqi Security Forces like Maliki enough, even if they prefer Alawi. The Iraqi army will not fall apart on sectarian lines, it would attack Sunni and Shiite militias, if there were any, but these militias are emasculated. They can assassinate and dispatch car bombs but they can't hold ground, they can't engage in firefights with checkpoints. The Iraqi Security Forces might arrest a lot of innocent people, but they're also rounding up "bad guys" and getting a lot of tips from civilians. The Iraqi Security Forces might be brutal, sometimes corrupt, but they no longer act as death squads, they take their role very seriously, perhaps too seriously, but these days anything is better than the recent anarchy and sectarian massacres.

Of course Maliki is in the end still a Shiite sectarian actor and has a core constituency, as Chalabi cleverly forced him to reveal, but Maliki is not pro-Iranian (though Iran is too often demonized as well as if the dichotomy is pro-American and good or pro-Iranian and bad). It's not a dichotomy of pro-Iranian or nationalist either.

It's not about whether Iraqis are sectarian or not. They are, though the vitriol and hatred have decreased. It's that they are not afraid of the other sect anymore. Fear is what led to the militias taking power and to the political and military mobilization along sectarian lines. There are attempts by some Shiite and Sunni parties to scare people again but in my conversations I feel it is failing. The fear is gone and the Iraqi Security Forces fill the security void, even if it's not pretty.

There is concern about Sunnis being disenfranchised or getting the shaft. But they have been disenfranchised since 2003. In part they disenfranchised themselves but anyway none of them expect to get unshafted. It's already done. The government is in Shiite hands and now it's a question of whether it will remain in the relatively good Shiite hands of [Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki, who provides security and doesn't bring down an iron fist on you unless you provoke him (sort of like Saddam), or the dirty corrupt and dangerous Shiite hands of Maliki's rivals -- [Ibrahim al-] Jaafari, [Abdul Aziz al-] Hakim, etc. I think these elections mean a lot more to Americans (as usual) and maybe to Iraqi elites than they do to Iraqis.

Besides, what can Sunnis do? Nothing, they're screwed and they have to accept it, and they have. The alternative is far worse for them. Sunnis in the region will not go to war alongside the Sunnis of Iraq. That moment came and went in 2006. Iraqi Sunnis don't even have a single leader who is charismatic and has real appeal, they're divided among themselves and these days your average Iraqi just isn't that into politics. I've heard it hundreds of times by now, they blame the religious parties, they say they got fooled and now they understand. Now that's not completely true, but the militias were able to mobilize people because of a security vacuum. These days it doesn't matter how remote and shitty the village I visit is, there are Iraqi Security Forces, and people have good things to say about them. Compared to the first three years of the occupation, Sunnis seem downright docile, maybe bitter or wistful, maybe angry, but their leadership is emasculated, in jail, abroad, just trying to survive, or just trying to make money.

Maliki will probably emerge the victor in the elections. His more sectarian and corrupt Shiite rivals are discredited and unpopular, but more importantly, he is an authoritarian ruler in the Middle East, he would have to be really incompetent if he couldn't stay in power. If Karzai could do it, then Maliki should be able to as well. Of course there is nothing uniquely Middle Eastern about this. In fact maybe looking at post-Soviet states is useful -- that is, the new ruler will not readily relinquish control, even if he has to bend the rules a bit, or operate outside the constitution. This has happened in Asia, Africa, and other places in transition. I hate to admit that I hope Maliki wins. He's the best of all the realistic alternatives. It's not like a more secular candidate is likely to win, so if it's not Maliki it will be Jaafari or [Ahmad] Chalabi. Frankly this is a rare case where I hope Maliki violates the constitution, acts in some kind of authoritarian way to make sure he wins the elections, because the alternative is fragmentation, or a criminal, sectarian kleptocratic Shiite elite taking over, and then Iraq might unravel. For now it's still "raveling."

Iraq Snapshot: The Dispute over "Democracy" and Elections (Alaaldin)

Relatively little attention has been paid to the complicated dispute over Iraq's forthcoming national elections. Without an understanding of the complexities of Iraq's political system and the manoevures, media interest relies on a dramatic episode, such as the US Government's current allegation that two members of the Accountability and Justice Commission --- former US favourite Ahmad Chalabi and Ali Faisal al-Lami --- have ties to Iran.



The immediate core of the dispute is the Shia-dominated Board's disqualification of numerous Sunni candidates, including leaders of Sunni parties, on the grounds of connections to Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. Ranj Alaaldin outlines the conflict and its significance in an article for The Guardian:

Iraq's national elections will go ahead in a few weeks' time without one of the most prominent Sunni politicians in the country. Salah al-Mutlaq, who had been seeking to stand as part of Ayad Allawi's recently formed Iraqi National Movement (INM), had his appeal rejected on Friday. The decision was made after judges, as a result of an outcry among the great and powerful of Iraq's political actors, reversed their earlier, US-sponsored decision to postpone the appeals process until after the elections.



Fierce critics of the ban on candidates formerly tied to the Ba'ath party have called it a sectarian, pre-election tactic on the part of the Shia parties – particularly the largely sectarian and Iranian-backed Iraqi National Alliance, which also happens to have its own electoral candidates heading the commission that banned the candidates in the first place. The
INM has, for the time being, chosen to suspend its campaigning in protest, but this is unlikely to lead a full boycott of the elections.

The general conclusion has been that Mutlaq's ban represents the liquidation of the threat to the "Shia" hold on power, but it is not yet certain which groups stand to gain the most from the affair. Individuals like Mutlaq may end up being political martyrs, which could then translate into votes for the INM, whose leader Ayad Allawi is predicted to also
attract the secular Shia vote. More broadly, it could turn out to be advantageous for other Sunni and secular groupings, most of whom did not appeal the ban imposed on their candidates (and instead voluntarily replaced them) and who would benefit from the reduced competition, as well as from the heightened sense of nationalistic/anti-sectarian feelings in the tribal Sunni heartlands.

Conversely, Iraq's leading Shia parties may benefit the threat of Ba'athism becoming an electoral issue: protests in the Shia south suggests that it could end up dictating the vote in place of other issues such as the lack of basic services and employment and security – the latter which, but for the recent terror attacks, would have been the main campaign
platform of Nouri al-Maliki, the prime minister. Having the politics marred by an apparent Shia battle against the Sunnis, supplemented by an overarching power struggle between Iran, the US and the Arab world, could be in the interests of essentially sectarian groupings ISCI and the Sadrists. This may then prompt Maliki and his Islamic Dawa party to move away from its secularist, and relatively successful stance that proved fruitful in the provincial electionsin January last year. All in all, it could constitute regression for the Iraqi state, given that it would fix the much-needed cracks that were starting to appear in the rigid sectarian dynamics of the political arena.

Meanwhile, the Kurds are preparing themselves for yet another electoral face-off between the powerful PUK-KDP alliance and political newcomer Change, but they will look on with a smile on their faces as they watch their Arab competitors in the south tear themselves apart. Increased division in the south makes the Kurds – who are largely united on the outstanding disputes – the all-important post-election ally and which, in turn, could give them the upper hand on disputes related to power, oil and land.