History Lesson: From the Big Muddy of Vietnam to the Quagmire of Afghanistan (Ryan)

David Ryan of University College Cork draws on original research to write a guest analysis for EA:

Recently Robert Wright drew the conclusion in The New York Times that Afghanistan was and would be worse than the US experience in Vietnam, and that the effects would be more far-reaching. Obama had retreated and moved withdrawal from 2011 to 2014. The war had already outpaced the Vietnam War, not in lives lost, but in years, budget, and potential impact. While many commentators eschew point-by-point comparison between Vietnam and Afghanistan, Wright concludes that today's experience could be worse because despite the death toll, in strategic terms Vietnam was "just a medium-sized blunder." It wasted resources, yet it did not make the United States more vulnerable to attack.

The US was stuck in the “Big Muddy” for years, but it finds itself just as stuck today in Central Asia, drawn in by the enemy. Wright opens his article with the quotation from Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander in 2000: “We did the Cole [the bombing of a US warship off the coast of Saudi Arabia in 1998] and we wanted the United States to react. And if they reacted, they are going to invade Afghanistan and that’s what we want....Then we will start holy war against the Americans, exactly like the Soviets."

About a month ago Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, observed that the alternative to withdrawal from Afghanistan was “another Vietnam”: because victory is impossible, “Obama is right to pull the troops out no matter how difficult it will be.”

Gorbachev speaks from his experience in the Afghanistan of the 1980s: like Obama, he took over a war he did not start yet had to find an exit strategy. In both cases, predecessors had rushed into the country without adequate strategic planning, without an exit strategy, and without clear objectives that were obtainable in a limited engagement.

Indeed, as Jonathan Steele writes, Gorbachev had it easier than Obama. Some of the hawks in the Kremlin were disillusioned by the war in Afghanistan by 1985; others wanted one more push. But Gorbachev had decided to withdraw; those seeking a surge were rebuffed eventually when it was understood that this would not make a strategic difference. Obama’s generals, especially David Petraeus, still seek their one more push.

Once upon a time, US advisors recognised how a country could get stuck. Just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, invoked Vietnam but then rejected the analogy: “While [Afghanistan] could become a Soviet Vietnam, the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us.” Brzezinski continued, “We should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam” because the guerrillas were disorganised, they had no sanctuary, no organised army, and no central government --- “all of which North Vietnam had” --- and they had limited foreign support.

By September 1987, however, the CIA was reporting on “Afghan Quagmire: No End in Sight After Eight Years”. Extracts from the report ring with poignant irony today: “During the eight years of the Afghan war, the Soviets have repackaged their political and diplomatic initiatives, restructured their military force, and refined their approach to counterinsurgency --- with little to show for their efforts. Moscow is clearly probing for a way to establish a stable government in Kabul and to bring Soviet troops home. Just as clearly, it has not decided to do so at the price of accepting less than a Marxist-dominated regime.”

Under Petraeus, the gloves have come off the counterinsurgency tactics of his predecessor, General Stanley McChrystal, with their greater restraint against some civilian targets. The American introduction of the Abrams tanks, reports indicate, have escalated destruction and brought a rise in civilian casualties.

This too has a notable precedent. In 1987, the CIA report observed, “Having recognized the need to revise their strategy, the Soviets in 1985-6 added troops and equipment that improved their firepower and mobility and decreased the vulnerability of their own forces. They shifted to medium sized campaigns to widespread use of small mobile groups ‘for raids and ambushes against insurgent arms caches, support bases, and supply lines.”

Yet, the report continued, Moscow faced ongoing setbacks. For example, “the Soviets failed this summer in an attempt to overrun an insurgent base camp at Ali Khel on the Pakistan border.” Such failures were leading the Soviets to conclude that “'Afghanization of the war is increasingly remote”.

Gorbachev remained under considerable pressure to get some form of a result in 1987. The CIA concluded that “a decision to accept less in Afghanistan...would be a major risk for Gorbachev, who has already spent considerable political capital to push through domestic and economic reforms in the face of opposition from conservatives in the party and, presumably, the military....Gorbachev’s opponents would cite the 'loss' of Afghanistan as a blow to Soviet prestige and a threat to Soviet security, and might attempt to use the issue to force a retreat from domestic reform or even as a catalyst to bring about his removal.” Eventually the CIA concluded, “Given that the costs of involvement in Afghanistan – while increasing – remain tolerable and that Gorbachev is now apparently in a period of political retrenchment in Moscow, we believe that, rather than run such a risk, he is likely to continue current Soviet policy over the next year.”

The tensions between reform and war have vitiated the agenda of several presidencies throughout the twentieth century. Concerned that performance in war will reflect on their credibility, they have continued with objectives that remain ill-defined and out-of-reach, while always expanding in both range and depth.

Obama’s recent decisions on Afghanistan, on Yemen and on Pakistan, coupled with the baying from Congress about Iran and the ongoing Tea Party tirades paint an American system that favours the tactical and symbolic over the strategic. There is no space to consider the observations of a man like Mikhail Gorbachev; the US is condemned to remain in their "quagmires", both real and imagined.