Saturday
Jan172009
Olmert's War: How the Prime Minister Took Israel Further into Gaza
Saturday, January 17, 2009 at 16:27
In today's Ha'aretz, Aluf Benn has a stunning analysis (reprinted in full below), supported by a wealth of inside information, of the battles within the Israeli Cabinet over the ground offensive in Gaza:
The only problem with Benn's analysis is that it is incomplete. He attributes the difference in positions to Olmert's focus on Gaza while Barak and Livni had an eye on February elections. Fair enough, but he might have also mentioned that Olmert is trying to wipe away the stain of his failure in the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Even more important, it should be noted that it is Olmert, the politician, who is pressing the military campaign while it is Barak, heading the military, who is looking at political considerations and urging a more restrained Israeli position. While Olmert may revel in the short-term military success, it is the politics of occupation that may ultimately prove Barak right.
Unlike Livni and Barak, Olmert is focusing on Gaza, not elections
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert this week likened Israel's situation in the confrontation with Hamas to that of a mountain climber. "When the Guinness Book of Records enters the record set by someone who conquered a peak, he must have been on the peak for a certain amount of time before the record is registered," Olmert explained to his interlocutor. "Israel has a hand on the peak, the slope is slippery, but the goal is within reach. When we get there, we have to stay there for a while."
This is the narrative Olmert is formulating as the Gaza operation seems to near its end. He maintained his determination and tenacity even when the troika's two other members, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, wanted to stop. The successful, highly popular war was his. They were bothered by next month's elections, and this influenced their approach, while he, who is not running for anything, concentrated on running the war.
Olmert and Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.
Olmert has no doubt that the one who was right about it all was Yuval Diskin, the head of the Shin Bet security service, who, together with Mossad espionage agency chief Meir Dagan, presented a tough line in the troika meetings and pressed for the operation to continue. Both of them backed Olmert, who talked about "a success strategy and not an exit strategy." Some gained the impression that Diskin has a "magical influence" over the prime minister. He opposed the earlier cease-fire with Hamas, he evaluated the balance of forces correctly, he was not moved by the pressures.
During Monday night's troika meeting, Olmert, after listening to the proposals made by Barak and Livni, produced an intelligence document stating that Hamas was drawing encouragement from the comments of the defense and foreign ministers and discussing the possibility that if they manage to hold out a little longer, they might secure a victory over Israel. A "senior security figure" supported Olmert: "We are closest to and farthest away from the achievement: close on the ground, but far away because of what is going on in the political echelon, because we are busy pressuring ourselves and being afraid of ourselves."
An irresponsible adventurer?
As early as last week, Barak and Livni reached the conclusion that the Gaza operation had accomplished all it could and that continued military pressure would only harm Israel and heighten the chance of military and international complications. Despite their political rivalry, Barak and Livni presented a similar approach, which brings to mind the similarity of their election slogans on billboards. Barak was afraid of an operational glitch that would cause the deaths of numerous civilians in Gaza; Livni was upset by the humanitarian crisis in the Strip and by the diplomatic and legal price Israel would pay after the war.
From their perspective, Olmert looked like an irresponsible adventurer, who had, in the course of the war, become addicted to glory and lost touch with reality. It happened in Lebanon in 2006 and now again in Gaza. Once again he was leading Israel into a collision with a wall. They, too, do not understand what Olmert means by "the continuation of the operation." After all, he knows as well as they do that Barack Obama will take the oath of office as president of the United States next Tuesday, and that the last thing he wants to see after his inauguration ceremony is a map of Gaza on his desk in the Oval Office. And that if the war does not end by Tuesday, Obama will mercilessly bring down the curtain on it. Barak spoke this week with his counterpart and friend Robert Gates, the U.S. secretary of defense, who will stay on under Obama. It is a safe guess that he picked up the spirit of the new commander-in-chief from him.
Internally, too, Olmert found himself increasingly isolated. The army joined Barak's call for a cease-fire. The GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, who came across as an activist pushing for more, said the conquest of Gaza was within reach - if the military echelon could promise him "a year" to mop up the occupied area. Even Diskin, according to another account, asked for five months to conclude the preventive operations. It is the wont of officers and officials to show determination and tenacity, ostensibly, while leaving it to the political echelon in charge to curb them - to restrain stallions, as Moshe Dayan put it. Of them it will not be said, as Olmert said of the IDF senior officer corps in 2006, that they "did not present plans" to the political echelon.
The wily politician?
On Monday the troika held a lengthy meeting, which ended well after midnight. As usual, there are conflicting versions about what transpired. Olmert's impression was that Barak and Livni were speaking softly, with the tape recorder documenting their remarks, and then shouting aloud to the reporters outside. Their impression was that behind the prime minister's talk about determination and courage lay the wily politician Olmert, who maneuvered them into a decision to continue the operation under the guise of "waiting for answers from Egypt." They are two and he is one, but he has the power.
The next day, things took a different turn. Olmert became entangled in an unnecessary and stupid incident with the U.S. administration after boasting of getting President Bush to interrupt a talk he was giving so that Olmert could tell him to order Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to change her intended vote on a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council. Rice supposedly emerged "shamefaced." The administration responded brutally, presenting Olmert as a teller of tales. There has been no love lost between Olmert and Rice since the Second Lebanon War, and he often complained about her to the president. But until this week's incident, he did so discreetly. His verbal blundering during a visit to Ashkelon strengthened Barak and Livni's claims that Olmert was losing it.
Olmert did not convene the troika on Tuesday and apparently was in no hurry to return phone calls from the defense minister and the foreign minister. The result was a wave of wicked rumors that he had disappeared or had been hospitalized. His office managed to allay reporters who called to ask about the prime minister's whereabouts. Olmert gained another day, but Barak lost his patience; his call for a cease-fire was the main headline in Haaretz the next day.
In the meantime, Hamas' determination also faltered, from a perspiring Ismail Haniyeh on television on Monday, to the announcement that the organization had accepted the Egyptian initiative for a cease-fire on Wednesday evening. Yitzhak Rabin once said that there is generally no military decision in Israeli-Arab wars. So how does one know who won? Simple: The side that requests a cease-fire first is the loser.
During the troika's next meeting, on Wednesday, the atmosphere was far more conciliatory. The discussion focused on the preparation for Amos Gilad's visit to Cairo the following day, to conclude the cease-fire terms. In a parallel move, Livni worked out a draft agreement with the U.S. administration for cooperation in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza. The final decision on ending the operation awaited Gilad's return, yesterday evening.
Problematic successes
What can we learn from this story? First, that it is impossible to explain the Israeli leadership's decision-making on the basis of a theoretical model formulated by a committee of inquiry, or proposals made by strategic experts and consultants. No model can factor in the passions, the personal rivalries, problems of character and political constraints faced by decision makers, all of which can decisively affect the outcome.
Second, every investigation focuses on what happened and not on what might happen in the future. The Winograd Committee, which examined the conduct in the Second Lebanon War, emphasized the "process," the need for prior preparation and the examination of alternatives before entering battle. It looked at the failed battles in Lebanon but did not consider the question of how to pull out of an operation that appears to be successful. The events of the past week show that successes, too, sometimes cause problems.
[Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Defense Minister Ehud] Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for [Foreign Minister Tzipi] Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.
The only problem with Benn's analysis is that it is incomplete. He attributes the difference in positions to Olmert's focus on Gaza while Barak and Livni had an eye on February elections. Fair enough, but he might have also mentioned that Olmert is trying to wipe away the stain of his failure in the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Even more important, it should be noted that it is Olmert, the politician, who is pressing the military campaign while it is Barak, heading the military, who is looking at political considerations and urging a more restrained Israeli position. While Olmert may revel in the short-term military success, it is the politics of occupation that may ultimately prove Barak right.
Unlike Livni and Barak, Olmert is focusing on Gaza, not elections
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert this week likened Israel's situation in the confrontation with Hamas to that of a mountain climber. "When the Guinness Book of Records enters the record set by someone who conquered a peak, he must have been on the peak for a certain amount of time before the record is registered," Olmert explained to his interlocutor. "Israel has a hand on the peak, the slope is slippery, but the goal is within reach. When we get there, we have to stay there for a while."
This is the narrative Olmert is formulating as the Gaza operation seems to near its end. He maintained his determination and tenacity even when the troika's two other members, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, wanted to stop. The successful, highly popular war was his. They were bothered by next month's elections, and this influenced their approach, while he, who is not running for anything, concentrated on running the war.
Olmert and Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.
Olmert has no doubt that the one who was right about it all was Yuval Diskin, the head of the Shin Bet security service, who, together with Mossad espionage agency chief Meir Dagan, presented a tough line in the troika meetings and pressed for the operation to continue. Both of them backed Olmert, who talked about "a success strategy and not an exit strategy." Some gained the impression that Diskin has a "magical influence" over the prime minister. He opposed the earlier cease-fire with Hamas, he evaluated the balance of forces correctly, he was not moved by the pressures.
During Monday night's troika meeting, Olmert, after listening to the proposals made by Barak and Livni, produced an intelligence document stating that Hamas was drawing encouragement from the comments of the defense and foreign ministers and discussing the possibility that if they manage to hold out a little longer, they might secure a victory over Israel. A "senior security figure" supported Olmert: "We are closest to and farthest away from the achievement: close on the ground, but far away because of what is going on in the political echelon, because we are busy pressuring ourselves and being afraid of ourselves."
An irresponsible adventurer?
As early as last week, Barak and Livni reached the conclusion that the Gaza operation had accomplished all it could and that continued military pressure would only harm Israel and heighten the chance of military and international complications. Despite their political rivalry, Barak and Livni presented a similar approach, which brings to mind the similarity of their election slogans on billboards. Barak was afraid of an operational glitch that would cause the deaths of numerous civilians in Gaza; Livni was upset by the humanitarian crisis in the Strip and by the diplomatic and legal price Israel would pay after the war.
From their perspective, Olmert looked like an irresponsible adventurer, who had, in the course of the war, become addicted to glory and lost touch with reality. It happened in Lebanon in 2006 and now again in Gaza. Once again he was leading Israel into a collision with a wall. They, too, do not understand what Olmert means by "the continuation of the operation." After all, he knows as well as they do that Barack Obama will take the oath of office as president of the United States next Tuesday, and that the last thing he wants to see after his inauguration ceremony is a map of Gaza on his desk in the Oval Office. And that if the war does not end by Tuesday, Obama will mercilessly bring down the curtain on it. Barak spoke this week with his counterpart and friend Robert Gates, the U.S. secretary of defense, who will stay on under Obama. It is a safe guess that he picked up the spirit of the new commander-in-chief from him.
Internally, too, Olmert found himself increasingly isolated. The army joined Barak's call for a cease-fire. The GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, who came across as an activist pushing for more, said the conquest of Gaza was within reach - if the military echelon could promise him "a year" to mop up the occupied area. Even Diskin, according to another account, asked for five months to conclude the preventive operations. It is the wont of officers and officials to show determination and tenacity, ostensibly, while leaving it to the political echelon in charge to curb them - to restrain stallions, as Moshe Dayan put it. Of them it will not be said, as Olmert said of the IDF senior officer corps in 2006, that they "did not present plans" to the political echelon.
The wily politician?
On Monday the troika held a lengthy meeting, which ended well after midnight. As usual, there are conflicting versions about what transpired. Olmert's impression was that Barak and Livni were speaking softly, with the tape recorder documenting their remarks, and then shouting aloud to the reporters outside. Their impression was that behind the prime minister's talk about determination and courage lay the wily politician Olmert, who maneuvered them into a decision to continue the operation under the guise of "waiting for answers from Egypt." They are two and he is one, but he has the power.
The next day, things took a different turn. Olmert became entangled in an unnecessary and stupid incident with the U.S. administration after boasting of getting President Bush to interrupt a talk he was giving so that Olmert could tell him to order Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to change her intended vote on a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council. Rice supposedly emerged "shamefaced." The administration responded brutally, presenting Olmert as a teller of tales. There has been no love lost between Olmert and Rice since the Second Lebanon War, and he often complained about her to the president. But until this week's incident, he did so discreetly. His verbal blundering during a visit to Ashkelon strengthened Barak and Livni's claims that Olmert was losing it.
Olmert did not convene the troika on Tuesday and apparently was in no hurry to return phone calls from the defense minister and the foreign minister. The result was a wave of wicked rumors that he had disappeared or had been hospitalized. His office managed to allay reporters who called to ask about the prime minister's whereabouts. Olmert gained another day, but Barak lost his patience; his call for a cease-fire was the main headline in Haaretz the next day.
In the meantime, Hamas' determination also faltered, from a perspiring Ismail Haniyeh on television on Monday, to the announcement that the organization had accepted the Egyptian initiative for a cease-fire on Wednesday evening. Yitzhak Rabin once said that there is generally no military decision in Israeli-Arab wars. So how does one know who won? Simple: The side that requests a cease-fire first is the loser.
During the troika's next meeting, on Wednesday, the atmosphere was far more conciliatory. The discussion focused on the preparation for Amos Gilad's visit to Cairo the following day, to conclude the cease-fire terms. In a parallel move, Livni worked out a draft agreement with the U.S. administration for cooperation in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza. The final decision on ending the operation awaited Gilad's return, yesterday evening.
Problematic successes
What can we learn from this story? First, that it is impossible to explain the Israeli leadership's decision-making on the basis of a theoretical model formulated by a committee of inquiry, or proposals made by strategic experts and consultants. No model can factor in the passions, the personal rivalries, problems of character and political constraints faced by decision makers, all of which can decisively affect the outcome.
Second, every investigation focuses on what happened and not on what might happen in the future. The Winograd Committee, which examined the conduct in the Second Lebanon War, emphasized the "process," the need for prior preparation and the examination of alternatives before entering battle. It looked at the failed battles in Lebanon but did not consider the question of how to pull out of an operation that appears to be successful. The events of the past week show that successes, too, sometimes cause problems.
tagged Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Gaza, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Shin Bet, Tzipi Livni, Yuval Diskin in Middle East & Iran
Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Gaza, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Shin Bet, Tzipi Livni, Yuval Diskin in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (1)
In America Obama wants to be remember in history as president Lincoln, we though he was the messiah. Now in Israel Olmert wants be remember in history as Moses, that gave Israel its freedom against terrorism.