Tuesday
Jan202009
Chris Emery on Israeli Elections and the Gaza Crisis: What Has Changed?
Tuesday, January 20, 2009 at 14:41
Chris Emery, a Ph.D. student at the University of Birmingham, offers a detailed reading of the effect --- if any --- that Israel's invasion of Gaza has had upon the contest to become the next Israeli Prime Minister.
The recent news that Benjamin Netanyahu remains firmly on course to become Israel’s next prime minister, draws into sharp relief the complex domestic political dynamics around the crisis in Gaza.
Though consistently cited as part of a more cynical motivation for the recent conflict in Gaza, the direct significance of the looming election on February 10 is not immediately apparent. Not least, that is because the man most responsible for launching and prolonging the war, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, is not even standing. As Aluf Benn notes, Olmert has his eyes on his legacy rather than any electoral prize. Not so, of course, his ambitious foreign minister and more seasoned defence minister.
The surface reading is that Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak, albeit incorporating different agendas, viewed a popular war as an electoral panacea to their increasingly perilous opinion polls. It was, after all, on the issue of security that Livni was perceived as most vulnerable to attacks from the Likud leader, Netanyahu. Partly on this basis, but more significantly on the issue of Olmert’s corruption and lingering criticism of his handling of the war in Lebanon, Likud had built up a sizable lead in the polls. By mid-December, Likud’s lead peaked at 14 seats. At the same time, Barak’s Labor Party looked to be heading towards electoral annihilation.
This is not the first time Israeli politicians have been accused of seeking political gain from military successes. In March 2006, Olmert's Kadima Party had recently dropped in opinion polls to 38 seats, still far ahead of its closest rivals, raising speculation that a coalition headed by Olmert would not be strong enough to push through his agenda. Olmert subsequently ordered a raid, in which Israeli troops seized the leader of a radical PLO faction, which had wide backing amongst hardliners in Israel. The next polls put Kadima up to 42-43 seats.
Recent polls suggested that the conflict had similarly boosted Labor and Kadima. Up to a few days ago, some polls indicated Kadima had cut Likud’s lead to between 2 and 3 seats. Labor, once the subject of media ridicule, now look to win 15 of the 120 parliamentary seats- an increase of at least 6 since mid December. With hostilities ceasing and campaigning about to begin in earnest it is, however, still Netayahu who remains clear favourite to be the next prime minister. How now then to explain the latest polls that put Likud ahead of Kadima by between 5 and 7?
There was of course always a limit on the extent Kadima’s malaise could be overcome. Many of the issues that placed Likud so far ahead of Kadima, up to late December, have not fundamentally changed since. Not least the underlining reason why there will be an election- a corruption scandal that forced Olmert to resign. Livni’s failure to forge a coalition that could have prevented an election was seen as further evidence of her inexperience in a critical area of Israeli politics.
The current conflict may have displayed Livni’s determination to confront Hamas and her refusal to contemplate the Sarkosy’s cease-fire or acknowledge a humanitarian crisis in Gaza increased her hawkish credentials. But it seems unlikely that she is now substantially better placed to beat the hard-line Netayahu on the grounds of national security. Reports that Livni had wished to end hostilities several days before the ceasefire was announced made her appear less hawkish than Olmert, and also excluded from the major decisions. It is doubtful that the vocal supporters of the war will see Livni as more likely than Netanyahu of protecting the gains they perceive Israel has made in Gaza.
It seems also that any drop Netanyahu did experience in the polls cannot be simply attributed to a surge in right wing support for Kadima following the present conflict. A possible explanation can be found in the controversy surrounding hardliner Likudnik Moshe Feiglin's election to the relatively high 20th spot during the party's primary election last week. Feiglin's ousting from a Knesset seat backfired, causing rightist voters to abandon Likud for sectarian and hardliner parties.
Commentary of the Israeli election had actually been hard to find in either the Israeli or international media. This is in part due to the fact that political campaigning was suspended by all candidates in Israel. Definitive political analysis appears to remain suspended at the Jerusalem Post, which today predicted that the result could be anything “from a Likud blowout to a surprising Kadima come-from-behind victory.”
The conflict is very unlikely to have prevented Netanyahu from becoming the next prime minister. The real political impact of the war in Gaza may be in preventing a Likud landslide. In the context of Israel’s complex political system of alliance building, this could itself make the conflict significant. Broadly speaking, Barak has faired fairly well, avoiding potential electoral disaster and almost certainly securing a top spot in the next administration. Livni has to some extent bolstered her security credentials but has been hampered by an exceptionally poor working relationship with both Barak and Olmert. Netanyahu has probably played his hand as well as he could, the suspension of campaigning has not allowed him to make any mistakes, and he knows he faces little threat from Livni on the grounds of national security.
The recent news that Benjamin Netanyahu remains firmly on course to become Israel’s next prime minister, draws into sharp relief the complex domestic political dynamics around the crisis in Gaza.
Though consistently cited as part of a more cynical motivation for the recent conflict in Gaza, the direct significance of the looming election on February 10 is not immediately apparent. Not least, that is because the man most responsible for launching and prolonging the war, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, is not even standing. As Aluf Benn notes, Olmert has his eyes on his legacy rather than any electoral prize. Not so, of course, his ambitious foreign minister and more seasoned defence minister.
The surface reading is that Tzipi Livni and Ehud Barak, albeit incorporating different agendas, viewed a popular war as an electoral panacea to their increasingly perilous opinion polls. It was, after all, on the issue of security that Livni was perceived as most vulnerable to attacks from the Likud leader, Netanyahu. Partly on this basis, but more significantly on the issue of Olmert’s corruption and lingering criticism of his handling of the war in Lebanon, Likud had built up a sizable lead in the polls. By mid-December, Likud’s lead peaked at 14 seats. At the same time, Barak’s Labor Party looked to be heading towards electoral annihilation.
This is not the first time Israeli politicians have been accused of seeking political gain from military successes. In March 2006, Olmert's Kadima Party had recently dropped in opinion polls to 38 seats, still far ahead of its closest rivals, raising speculation that a coalition headed by Olmert would not be strong enough to push through his agenda. Olmert subsequently ordered a raid, in which Israeli troops seized the leader of a radical PLO faction, which had wide backing amongst hardliners in Israel. The next polls put Kadima up to 42-43 seats.
Recent polls suggested that the conflict had similarly boosted Labor and Kadima. Up to a few days ago, some polls indicated Kadima had cut Likud’s lead to between 2 and 3 seats. Labor, once the subject of media ridicule, now look to win 15 of the 120 parliamentary seats- an increase of at least 6 since mid December. With hostilities ceasing and campaigning about to begin in earnest it is, however, still Netayahu who remains clear favourite to be the next prime minister. How now then to explain the latest polls that put Likud ahead of Kadima by between 5 and 7?
There was of course always a limit on the extent Kadima’s malaise could be overcome. Many of the issues that placed Likud so far ahead of Kadima, up to late December, have not fundamentally changed since. Not least the underlining reason why there will be an election- a corruption scandal that forced Olmert to resign. Livni’s failure to forge a coalition that could have prevented an election was seen as further evidence of her inexperience in a critical area of Israeli politics.
The current conflict may have displayed Livni’s determination to confront Hamas and her refusal to contemplate the Sarkosy’s cease-fire or acknowledge a humanitarian crisis in Gaza increased her hawkish credentials. But it seems unlikely that she is now substantially better placed to beat the hard-line Netayahu on the grounds of national security. Reports that Livni had wished to end hostilities several days before the ceasefire was announced made her appear less hawkish than Olmert, and also excluded from the major decisions. It is doubtful that the vocal supporters of the war will see Livni as more likely than Netanyahu of protecting the gains they perceive Israel has made in Gaza.
It seems also that any drop Netanyahu did experience in the polls cannot be simply attributed to a surge in right wing support for Kadima following the present conflict. A possible explanation can be found in the controversy surrounding hardliner Likudnik Moshe Feiglin's election to the relatively high 20th spot during the party's primary election last week. Feiglin's ousting from a Knesset seat backfired, causing rightist voters to abandon Likud for sectarian and hardliner parties.
Commentary of the Israeli election had actually been hard to find in either the Israeli or international media. This is in part due to the fact that political campaigning was suspended by all candidates in Israel. Definitive political analysis appears to remain suspended at the Jerusalem Post, which today predicted that the result could be anything “from a Likud blowout to a surprising Kadima come-from-behind victory.”
The conflict is very unlikely to have prevented Netanyahu from becoming the next prime minister. The real political impact of the war in Gaza may be in preventing a Likud landslide. In the context of Israel’s complex political system of alliance building, this could itself make the conflict significant. Broadly speaking, Barak has faired fairly well, avoiding potential electoral disaster and almost certainly securing a top spot in the next administration. Livni has to some extent bolstered her security credentials but has been hampered by an exceptionally poor working relationship with both Barak and Olmert. Netanyahu has probably played his hand as well as he could, the suspension of campaigning has not allowed him to make any mistakes, and he knows he faces little threat from Livni on the grounds of national security.