Saturday
Jan232010
UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
Saturday, January 23, 2010 at 10:10
URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.
Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.
Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".
These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".
And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.
UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.
UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?
Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.
(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)
EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.
An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.
UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.
---
For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.
The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?
Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:
1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN
Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.
The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.
The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.
(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)
The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".
So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.
Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.
The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.
It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.
To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....
2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.
"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."
Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.
Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”
Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."
3. THE OUTCOME?
EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.
The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.
That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.
Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?
Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.
Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)
Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News
Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".
These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".
And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.
UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.
UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?
Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.
(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)
EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.
An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.
UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.
---
For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.
The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?
Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:
1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN
Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.
The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.
The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.
(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)
The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".
So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.
Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.
The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.
It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.
To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....
2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.
"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."
Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.
Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”
Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."
3. THE OUTCOME?
EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.
The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.
That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.
Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?
tagged Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, Abdolhossein Ruholamini, Ali Larijani, Ali Motahhari, Ashura, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Babak Dad, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Farda, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Republican Party, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Kahrizak Prison, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mohsen Rezaei, Mohsen Ruholamini, Pouran, Ramin Pourandarjan, Saeed Mortazavi, Tabnak, Velayat-e-Faqih, Voice of America Persian in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (53)
This sounds very much like a conspiracy theory Keyhan newspapers editor Shariatmadari would right and spread around in order to get rally Ahmadinejad supporters to get rid of Larijani/Rezaei/Qalibaaf.
I very much doubt that this is credible. Infact, I read something like this on RajaNews a few months back.
This all may or may not have happened. The content of it may or may not have any real meaning. The importance of the meeting of these 3 ( conspirators?) may or may not be important. Ruholamini's anger and desire for vengeance may or may not have any effect.
But it spells out one thing for me --- " FAMILY MELTDOWN!!!"
Has anybody experienced a really nasty family divorce??? He said this - She said that - He did this - She did that!!! Who can work it out ?? Nobody !!
It is like a fishing line that has so many knots in it that each individual knot snags surrounding knots . You finish up with a fishing line that is completely curled up and unusable. The ONLY solution - is to cut the line free!! Completely remove all the snags and loops and curls - it is simply too difficult to remove all the knots , even if you would like to save the fishing line. It cannot be saved! The line has to be cut and the knots removed entirely before it is usable again.
This is certainly the beginning of the End
Barry
Anthony,
The sources are solid and are most definitely not in the Kayhan-Raja camps.
S.
[...] Ein Putsch gegen Ahmadi-Nedjad? http://enduringamerica.com/2010/01/22/iran-the-plot-against-president-ahmadinejad/ [...]
Good scoop Scott:-)
This reads to me like we are heading toward checkmate.
IF they manage to make the accusations stick to Mortazavi and IF they manage to dispose of Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai and IF they get rid of Ahmadinejad, which would be extremely convenient for Larijani & Rafsanjani - since they have always wanted rid of him.
Then what do they do WHEN the protests/opposition continue?
It's as if they still don't get it, what the people might have grudgingly settled for last summer - they have now gone way beyond that- it's as if they don't hear the cries for a secular Iran. They don't hear that no one has said 'where's my vote?'
for a very long time!
(Remembering that this anger has been brewing for 30 years)
And if they do get rid of these three people, does that not send a message to the Greens? 'We have capitulated to you on these issues, and are thus weakened not strengthened by giving in - therefore keep on pressing and you will sooner or later get the biggest crown of all - the end of the IRI'
(The men involved no doubt have wanted rid of An for a very long time, but to get rid of him now, is clearly giving in to the pressure that they feel on the whole system, and by so openly declaring their support for the system they are signing their own 'death warrants'!)
My feeling is none of the regime are safe and it doesn't matter who they sacrifice - the whole lot of them have to go!
This very well may be part of the deal between Khamenei, Khatami and Rafsanjani I posted at 6:51 http://enduringamerica.com/2010/01/21/the-latest-from-iran-21-january-speaking-in-codes/comment-page-1/#comment-23626
[...] America, January 22 Special: The Meeting & Plan to Remove President In last night’s debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah [...]
These men may very well have met and plotted such things, but I have to ask, "You and what army are going to remove Ahmadinejad? Because he has the IRGC." If people are going to jail just for "insulting" the president I imagine starting impeachment proceedings is right out. As Ahmadinejad said in the summertime, accusing him of lying hurts his feelings. And when his feelings get hurt, people get assassinated and beaten down by IRGC goon squads.
Many dictators have made the mistake of allowing their personal guard to grow too large and powerful, so a group that was originally created to serve his every whim decides that since they have all the power, they should make the rules, and if the supreme figurehead doesn't like it, he'll have an accident like the others. For all we know Khamenei could be a bird in a gilded cage. He has certainly never tested what would happen if he countermanded an IRGC order as he technically has the power to do.
Hopefully when these plotters try and fail to achieve their objective they will realize that what the people have been shouting for eight months is right, the IRGC have taken over in a coup and being Speaker of Parliament or Ayatollah or Mayor means nothing anymore. Maybe then they'll finally join the people and get on the right side of history.
Or...maybe they DO have an army, and that's what they're counting on.
Roholamin is claiming that SL gas told him “Go ahead. The way is clear for you.”
The question is:
Is SL genuine, or is he just saying something to keep Ruholamin off his back for a while?
Even if he is genuine, does SL have enough room for manoeuvre to actually see such a thing through?
SL had staked too much (almost everything he has) on Ahmadinejad (a mistake, but he has done it). He even went as far as saying in 19 June prayers that he has known Rafsanjani for 50 years, but Ahmadinejad’s views are closer to his than Rafsanjani’s. And he gave the order in that speech for the use of unrestrained violence against the protestors. And don’t forget that he approved Ahmadinejad’s election less than a day after the polls closed while votes were still being counted and way before the vote was to be certified by Guardian Council. These few actions here show that during the first week after the elections SL staked all his revolutionary credentials on Ahmadinejad, broke IRI laws and discredited his own religious credentials, all to keep Ahmadinejad as president (I’m not even going to list the other things that SL has done over the past 7.5 months).
So if Ahmadinejad was to be removed, SL would be finished. I’m wondering if he is prepared to go out so quietly. Also don’t forget that Ahmadinejad and his people are actually a gang of thugs. They will definitely not go quietly or easily.
Before they could get rid of Ahmadinejad they need to prepare the ground for his supporters to accept the fact that he is to be gotten rid of and that will take time. Daheyeh Fajar starts in just over a week and 22 Bahman is 3 weeks away. Are we to expect that this is all done by then?
Anyway if Ahmadinejad were to be removed, it would leave SL all exposed. He would have lost everything with nothing to gain from it. Don’t forget that SL has used every possible rude expression is describing the people who have protested the election results. He has publicly ordered their killing. And has publicly said that although the prisoner abuses or rape are bad, but exposing such crimes is a bigger sin. So I am wondering what the regime is hoping to gain for Khamenei out of all this? Unless there is another part to this plan: to start the process to get rid of Khamenei.
According to IRI law if a president is removed, dies or is incapacitated a presidential council should be formed and election held within a couple of months (50 days I think). I can’t see that being very feasible. Another option would be to appoint a caretaker president (this not a legal way to do it, but they can use SL’s unlimited power to decree it). Who would be such a president under this plan? Qalibaf? I doubt that it people would accept him, just because he is managing to sweep Tehran’s streets once in a while (BTW he is no way as good as Karbaschi was as Tehran mayor). Ali Larijani? Even the reformists within the establishment don’t accept him much (Khatami, when presindet, barred him from attending cabinet meetings as IRIB head). Rezaii? Does anyone take him seriously (except some Sepah old guard, and even they out of nostalgia perhaps)?
The plan seems to be ill conceived. There are many questions marks and blanks in it. It does not account for the supporters of Ahmadinejad, who are few in number, but who can cause a lot, a lot, of damage. It most critically does not account for the public. After all this if you grant people their original demand, you are opening a whole new can of worms. The plan have looked more acceptable if they were able to suppress the protests first. But they can't.
Rev,
See EA correspondent in separate post but my immediate question is: how significant is Rezaei's former leadership of IRGC? Does that command any loyalty in a move against the President?
S.
I don't think it's any secret that all these prominent individuals want Ahmadinejad out (and probably already did even before June), but their main dilemma lies in the fact that Khamenei has personally committed himself to backing Ahmadinejad to such an extent that he may not want to back down for fear of losing face. This means that if Rezai, Larijani et al cannot persuade Khamenei to drop Ahmadinejad through backroom negotiations, their only option is to defy him openly - in the process undermining the authority of the Leader as a central ideological pillar of the system and most likely providing the opposition with a significant boost. As far as I understand their views, these politicians are after a political system that is more pragmatic and open (especially the economy) but still largely authoritarian in character. If Khamenei refuses to budge they may be reluctant to cross the line and risk creating an opening for an eventual process that leads to wholesale political reform in a more democratic direction.
One thing that's unclear to me is why Ahmadinejad would want to maintain a connection to Mortazavi. Unlike Rahim Mashai he's not a member of Ahmadinejad's inner circle of cronies. He was around well before Ahmadinejad rose to prominence, as a deeply nasty pet protege of groups close to the leadership. The sacrifice of Mortazavi by these groups to preserve their position wouldn't be unprecedented - in 1999 the well-connected intelligence official Said Emami was blamed for the 'chain murders' and subsequently 'suicided'. This may be the idea behind the leadership giving Ruholamini the green light to go ahead with his campaign.
It's certainly too late for any of these moves to resolve the crisis. Even if a Rezai-Larijani-Qalibaf-supported government could be established it would undermined on one side by resentful hardliners with significant power bases in the security apparatus, and on the other by popular dissatisfaction with the minimal extent of the political reforms that these men would be prepared to make.
Babak Dad’s take on the rumoured plot. The article is titled “Controllable Critics”:
http://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2010/01/099463.php
He says this is all to create the illusion of democracy within IRI. He puts this along side the TV debates on IRIB. He says the Larijani bothers and Qlibaf will become sacrificial lambs for “nezam”. And says people won’t buy it.
Professor Lucas, thank you so much for putting up these analyses, I thought it was great how you had a full response to this post so quickly!
Of course nobody can really know what goes on behind the scenes at the secret meetings of the military leaders, both IRGC and Artesh, but I have heard from many people that there is an "old IRGC" that fought bravely in the war but then when peace came, new commanders started coming in, and those original veterans found themselves out of place in an organization increasingly devoted to financial matters, checking their stocks, as Mousavi said. If Rezaei commands loyalty from the IRGC I think it would be from the old-school ones, who have already been shunted aside by the commanders in this new financially-oriented organization, which Ahmadinejad is basically the frontman for.
So when you ask how much influence does Rezaei have, it's asking how much power does the old-school IRGC have, the ones who are unhappy with what their group has turned into. That's the million dollar question, and has been since the beginning! I suppose Rezaei wouldn't have put himself out there if he didn't have some kind of backing, but everything I've read about the way Ahmadinejad & Co have pretty much turned the IRGC into a regular Mafia, controlling the black market, buying politicians, consolidating power and money into loyal hands, quite frankly I don't like Rezaei's chances. A few brave noble old Lions up against a crime syndicate like this? Well maybe, but I don't think so, unless they can get Artesh to come along.
I think it will take the full power of the grassroots mobilization of the people themselves to remove such an entrenched crime syndicate. Even unarmed, even a "small crowd" of 2 million, half the number at Rafsanjani's last Friday Prayer, could effectively restore law and order, but not much else can.
As Scott, between Larijani and Galibaf, I vote for the latter; but if he accepts he has to be fair :
- all the people who were involved in the murders, rapes and tortures have to be punished.
- all the people in prison, for politiques issues, have to be released.
- he has to have a memorial built for the post electoral turmoil's victims, with all their name engraved on it
- he should work with the figures of opposition, appointing them in his government.
I think it's a minimum.
Thanks to Peace Maker, we had these links:
This is what he ‘really’ thinks :
Audio of a private meeting :
http://news.gooya.com/didaniha/archives/2009/07/091302.php
Video of an interview :
http://tiny.cc/MaL6n
From: Mir Hossein Mousavi's FB page
This is out of topic but I find it important to share especially to those who doesn't have an FB account... everyone who follows the development in Iran must be updated on anything what is happening there.
"Atefeh Maleki, wife of Mohammad Nourizadeh (the former chief editor of Keyhan newspaper who was arrested recently because of his sharp criticism of the supreme leader and the head of judiciary for the brutal crackdown and the events after the election) after one month since the arrest of his husband has not been able to visit him or even talk to him on the phone. During this time the news of hunger strike of Nourizadeh had added to the concerns of his family as well. Wife of Mohammad Nourizadeh visited the general prosecutor and told him how much she and her family are suffering from the situation they are in. In this meeting she reminded the general prosecutor that it has been a month since her husband has been detained and during this time he has been denied his minimum citizen rights. The general prosecutor in response to this objection said: “As long as his (Mohammad Nourizadeh’s) thoughts are not inhibited, we will not respond to any of your demands!” Following this, in an open letter to the people of Iran, wife of Mohammad Nourizeded warned that today, the swords are sharpened against the thoughts and ideas of individuals!"
I have always believed and said that Khatami, Mousavi and Karoubi would not stick their necks out like this UNLESS they have heavy backing. If Hashemi is aware and behind the Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf then who is watching the 3 musketeers backs !? Is there a hidden player we have yet to see !?
Would AN being replaced by a Larijani or Qalibaf really change the game as it is now in Iran? Would this impact the green movement in any significant way? Would either of these two really be a catalust for change that is being sought or is it, simply a change of the guard so to speak (keeping the question simply as possible..of course there are other ramifications - economics, etc)?
As pointed out above, the movement seems to have been moved from "where is my vote" to a call for a complete overhaul of the IRI as a whole. IMHO, these moves do nothing to appease the green movement (seems Mousavi and Karroubi may have already said "no thanks") and may add more momentum to the movement although I do disagree slightly with @ Roe Lassie that this is not a sign of capitulation but rather may be a sign of space that has been created within which the green movement can occupy or take advantage of.
To the comment posted yesterday by @Megan, I agree as she points out that, even if Khatami is involved in a "plot", Khatami just as all of those from the establishment have a very dark past. What is interesting to me, if the information she kindly shared is true, is how that contradicts some past statements. For both Khatami and Rafsanjani to work on a plan that maintains the regime as is can not be surprising. In the same thought as above, does this, if true, also effect any actions of the "real" green movement.
By the way great post Scott.
Many thanks to all for feedback today. We'll have a follow-up analysis in the morning.
S.
A heads-up and a possible favour. Babak Dad was on VOA Persian about 1700 GMT today and, since he wrote earlier today about Larijani-Rezaei, there is a chance he was asked about the plot story. Has anyone heard the interview and/or can access it?
S.
Ange,
"As Scott, between Larijani and Galibaf, I vote for the latter; ..."
Ouf! That is like choosing between the devil and the deep blue sea. Do you really expect him to change anything within this system? I rather agree with Babak Dad, talking of a mockup "opposition" to deceive the people.
Thanks, Greeny, for this link in #9.
As to the rest of this nasty bunch, here is an exhaustive portrait of IRGC-general Jafari, entitled "A Hardliner's Hardliner" http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/01/a-hardliners-hardliner.html
Scott,
Re. Babk Dad on VOA Persian today. Here is a link to the program:
http://www.voanews.com/wm/voa/nenaf/pers/pers1630vFRI.asx
They discuss Dad’s article I linked to above from the 55:30 mark.
Dad says the same thing as he has in his article. He says that Ali Larijani is trying to play the role of a dissident from within the regime. He says he is not doing a good job and while sometimes he criticises the government, in the middle he praises the leader. He also said the TV debates were in the same line as this and the aim is to ease the people’s anger. He says that the regime, having got rid of all the opponents, is trying to create its own phony opponents to pretend there is democracy in Iran. He says that Larijani does not have much political backing in Iran and is a perfect candidate for a sacrificial lamb for the regime. He says Larijani could become another martyr like the many martyrs the regime has been feeding on (he does not elaborate on it). He also says that the people will not buy any of this. He did not mention the others in his article.
Scott,
The topic of today's VOA discussion was the question, if China by itself would be able to save Iran from its inner and exterior crisis. Guests: American Juan Zarae (?), Babak Yektafar and Babak Dad. http://www1.voanews.com/persian/programs/tv/60778742.html (22 Jan)
Obviously most of the time was spent on this issue, especially the discussion with Mr. Zarae. Babak Dad's reply to the plot story (56th min) was generally the same as in his article, i.e. that this is a mockup "opposition" and that this regime, if necessary, would not hesitate to sacrifice Larijani as it had done with other officials several times before. Babak Yektafar however took these rumours more seriously, stressing in addition the fact that pre-election TV discussions had opened the door to the people (to express their opinions), and welcomed any possibility, even the smallest (recent TV debates) as useful for them to speak out.
In fact, these extremely short comments on the plot story nicely represent the two opposing opinions on your blog. I still do believe that all of it is a tactical play to destabilize the Green movement before 22 Bahman, but I would be delighted, if you, Ange Paris and all others were right ;-)
Arshama
Arshama
Are we able to "define" in any way, what we mean when we use the word "Regime". I am guilty of using it myself - but it is not really clear to me exactly who/what is part of the "Regime" eg I would place both Larijanis in the centre of the Regime - although that does not mean that they could not be sacrificed by the rest of the Regime.
Is the Regime some kind of amorphous amoebic creature, parts of which act to protect the overall creature.? Or is it more rigid/better defined than that? What exactly is at the very heart of it? Samuel always refers to "the Revolution" - as though this abstract concept is what is the very heart of the creature and everything else ( possibly even SL) is subservient to it.
Barry
Greeny has great comments. Is you on Twitter, Greeny? Thanx anyways. Very good article and comments.