UPDATED Iran Snap Analysis: The Karroubi and Khatami Manoeuvres

UPDATE 26 JANUARY: This reading is now overtaken by our special analysis on the significance of the Karroubi statement

UPDATE 1915 GMT: First, an apology. I got this wrong earlier --- I missed the important nuances in Karroubi's statement and made the wrong connection: it is not linked to the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf initiative.

Second, a top EA correspondent is finishing checks with sources and will have the best analysis of this situation later tonight.

Iran Special Analysis: What Karroubi’s Statement on “Mr Khamenei”/”Head of Government” Means
The Latest from Iran (26 January): Now for the Follow-Up….
The Latest from Iran (25 January): Who Makes A Move Today?

UPDATE 1630 GMT: An EA reader points us to a curious piece that appeared in Mehdi Karroubi's Saham News this past weekend. The apparent confusion and even dispute between Karroubi and Khatami over a supposed approach to the Supreme Leader has been at the back of my mind while trying to read latest events. Any assistance from readers appreciated.

UPDATE 1500 GMT: EA sources, as well as readers, offer important amendments to our reaction:

First, it should be noted that Hossein Karroubi contacted a number of press outlets after Fars News claimed that Mehdi Karroubi had declared, without reservation that, he "recognised the President". Given Fars' past record, as well as the unlikely scenario that Karroubi would make such an important statement through that outlet, the scenario is that Hossein Karroubi was putting out a hasty "clarification" to prevent the Fars story from getting any traction.

Second, Hossein Karroubi's clarification had two important qualifiers. First, he made clear that his father saw Ahmeadinejad as "selected leader" rather than "elected President". Second, even though that selection was on the basis of the Supreme Leader's endorsement, there was a pointed reference to this as the action of "Mr Khamenei".

So the story seems to move away from a concerted response linking Karroubi and the "establishment" critics of the Government. Still, questions remain:

Why did Hossein Karroubi not give a simple repudiation of the Fars report? For the statement he offered has a curious tension: Mehdi Karroubi accepts the overriding verdict of the Supreme Leader (and thus velayat-e-faqih) even as he diminishes leader and system with the "Mr" tag.

And perhaps more importantly, is the Khatami letter to the Supreme Leader legitimate? For if so, Karroubi's response is not only to Ayatollah Khamenei; it is to the former President's attempt to bring together a group for reconciliation.

A quick reaction to emerging events, combined with the inside information Enduring America received last week:

Last week, as part of our articles on a possible "Plot Against President Ahmadinejad", we noted that the key participants (Ali Larijani-Mohsen Rezaei-Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf) had extended invitations to Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to join the move.

This morning, we are processing news that 1) Mehdi Karroubi, through his son, is saying that he is recognising Ahmadinejad as President because of the Supreme Leader's endorsement; 2) Mohammad Khatami has written to the Supreme Leader upholding the process of reform but recognising the legitimacy of the Iranian system and has suggested the arbitration of Hashemi Rafsanjani in a resolution of political issues.

No one has yet been able to put forward a reason for the apparent shift, so here goes: the overture by the "establishment group" was not rebuffed. Instead, a deal may have been struck: the Supreme Leader and velayat-e-faqih are beyond dispute. The June election will not be overturned (primarily because Ayatollah Khamenei endorsed it), but the "reformist" leaders can put their grievances and recommendations for change to a working group.

And Ahmadinejad remains on the outside of the process.

A lot of holes at this stage in the hypothesis. After all, this assumes that the Karroubi and Khatami statements are as reported (I tend to think that is the case). Mir Hossein Mousavi has not made a declaration. And, of course, there will be nothing in public to connect this to a Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf initiative.

But, given how much rough water will be stirred rather than smoothed by these developments, best to cling on to something....

The Latest from Iran (23 January): Looking for Clues

2155 GMT: Kalemeh reports that the wife of the late Seyed Ahmad Khomeini, the son of Ayatollah Khomeini, has been attacked by clerical students.

1905 GMT: Economic Rumour or Reality (cont. --- see 1135 GMT)? The "bank crisis" continues to spark Internet chatter, whether accurate or mischievous --- the German-based Akhbar Rooz reports on bank closures after panicked customers tried to withdraw their money because of reports of bankruptcies. And Voice of America Persian is now broadcasting on the topic.

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)
Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

1900 GMT: You Couldn't Make It Up (Unless You're Iranian State Media). Earlier this week Kayhan, the "hard-line" Iranian newspaper, reported that a US "HARP" energy-shifting weapon caused the earthquake in Haiti.

We noted the item in amazement and good humour --- as a reader noted, shrewd Iranians think of Kayhan as Iran's version of The Onion, the satirical US "newspaper" --- and thought that would be that. However, Press TV, linking up with Venezuelan partners, keeps the joke going today:

An unconfirmed report by the Russian Northern Fleets says the Haiti earthquake was caused by a flawed US Navy 'earthquake weapons' test before the weapons could be utilized against Iran.

United States Navy test of one of its 'earthquake weapons' which was to be used against Iran, went 'horribly wrong' and caused the catastrophic quake in the Caribbean, the website of Venezuela's ViVe TV recently reported, citing the Russian report.

1845 GMT: Arrest at Beheshti Ceremony. Norooz reports that the son-in-law of Ali Reza Beheshti, the detained Mousavi chief of staff, was taken away by Iranian authorities today. The arrest occurred at the protest/ceremony (see 1500 GMT) at the grave of Ayatollah Beheshti, Ali Reza's father.

1635 GMT: Rafsanjani Chooses A Side or Issues a Warning? The Los Angeles Times, via Iranian Labor News Agency, reports on remarks by Hashemi Rafsanjani today: "At the present juncture, I consider the Supreme Leader to be the most competent individual to resolve the problems the Islamic Republic is currently faced with."

Rafsanjani's remarks follows Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's speech this week calling on "elites" to stop being ambiguous in the current conflict and to choose sides. Beyond his apparent declaration of allegiance --- note the "at the present juncture" --- Rafsanjani maintained a customary general call for unity, "I'm quite sure that moderate individual from both political camps in the country can help the Supreme Leader find solutions to the existing problems."

Then, however, Rafsanjani offered some intriguing remarks on "extremism":

I've always based my action on moderation and refrained from any extremism. Since the victory of the revolution, we have not witnessed proper conditions any time extremists were given room to maneuver....

Extremists have always cleared the way for counterrevolutionaries to damage Islam, the regime and its leadership. As far as I know (emphasis added) the Supreme Leader, he never favors illegal acts and extremisms from any political factions.

Rafsanjani followed this with an invocation which could be read either as a defense of velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy) or a veiled put-down that Ayatollah Khamenei has not maintained the high standards required of his position:

The Islamic Republic has managed to reach stability thanks to popular support and the leadership of Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini who won people's hearts. Today, all forces loyal to the system and the revolution should feel obliged to safeguard this valuable legacy. The world will open to us if we effectively create a free and developed country free of any superstition.

1630 GMT: Fars News has posted an article on today's trial of three detainees arrested during the Ashura protests. The three are among five defendants who are on trial; all today were accused of links to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO).

1623 GMT: Neda's Birthday Ceremony. Setareh Sabety translates the account, provided by an Iranian activist (see 1500 GMT), of today's ceremony on the birthday of Neda Agha Soltan:

Near 2 p.m. we reached plot 257, Neda’s grave was adorned with candles, rose petals and pictures of her childhood. From the first moments...plainclothesmen in cars and on motorcycles started surrounding the plot.

Neda’s mother claimed (Iranian authorities) had not allowed her to hold a 40th day memorial for her daughter so she had to commemorate her birthday instead. The previous day authorities had told Neda’s brother that holding a birthday (celebration) for her was allowed as long as no slogans were chanted.

Slowly the number of people attending the ceremony increased. Present were mourning mothers and their supporters and tens of (other) individuals who had made it to the cemetery. When Neda’s mother saw the people appearing one by one, as she was crying loudly, she addressed her martyred daughter, "Neda darling, wake up and see how many guests are here for you. Last year you were alone. Wake Up!” The distraught mother would sometimes sit by her daughter’s grave and stare at it, remembering her.... It seemed like the people surrounding this mother and her daughter’s tomb were remembering Neda’s last open-eyed look. The look that seemed to scream freedom!

Neda’s birthday cake was placed on her tomb with a ‘27’ on it, while her mother cried, “My darling Neda is twenty-seven, People’s Neda is 27 years old." As the crowd increased around 2:45 p.m., two cars from security forces stood facing plot 257. The security forces stepped out with three plainclothes men --- Neda’s aunt was taking pictures of the tomb when the forces spoke to Neda’s father and asked to see the pictures in Neda’s aunt’s mobile phone.

Ashkan Sohrabi’s mother called and (said) that on Navab St. officers stopped cars and kept them from going to Behesht-e Zahra cemetery. For as long as 15 minutes they had prevented Ashkan’s family from moving. Finally they managed to get to Behesht-e Zahra from another route.

At the end of the commemoration the Mourning Mothers stood in front of Neda’s tomb and quietly sang this poem from Parvin:

You left my heart is heavy
From the night you did not return
Blissful world turned sad
From the night you failed to return

At 3:25 p.m. an unmarked white van stopped in front of plot 257 and a few plainclothes men came out as though to make the crowd disperse.

1610 GMT: Radio Farda reports that, during today's meeting with the family of Ali Reza Beheshti after the ceremony protesting his detention (see 1500 GMT), Mehdi Karroubi declared that the road to resolve the issue of detainee abuse "had been closed".

It is unclear whether Karroubi's statement was in response to the overtures from Ali Larijani (see yesterday's updates) for opposition leaders to join a process of reconciliation.

1505 GMT: Amidst his further allegations of Government abuses and crimes over the Kahrizak Prison scandal (noted as part of the coverage of "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad"), Abdolhossein Rumolamini claimed that a fourth detainee, Ramin Aghazadeh Ghahremani, was killed at the facility last year. The incident was covered up to “avoid hurting the public's conscience”.

1500 GMT: Two Ceremonies. Family, mourning mothers, and supporters gathered at the grave of Neda Agha Soltan this afternoon. Activists report that security forces stopped some people from attending.

A ceremony was also held at the grave of the late Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti to protest the detention of his son Ali Reza, chief advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi. Those attending were family members of the martyrs of 7-Tir, killed in an attack soon after the 1979 Revolution which took 72 lives, including Ayatollah Beheshti. The family members also Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his role as the head of the Expidency Council and the Assembly of Experts, to protest Ali Reza Behesti's imprisonment.

1300 GMT: We have posted an urgent update in "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad": a new interview with Abdolhossein Ruholamini with claims on the Kahrizak Prison deaths, printed in the newspapers linked to both Mohsen Rezaei and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf.

1235 GMT: Alef News has continued its pressure on the Government, opening a discussion on the problems of the Presidential election.

1225 GMT: Mohammad Hassan Haeri Shirazi, the son of Ayatollah Haeri Shirazi, has continued his challenge to the Supreme Leader. Having criticised Khamenei for overseeing a deterioration of democracy and the moves to an oppressive regime, Haeri Shirazi has declared that the Supreme Leader must be accountable for the actions of his headquarters and associated institutions (IRIB, Revolutionary Guards and Basiji, Islamic Propaganda Organization, deputies in universities, Kayhan newspaper, and the Guardian Council).

1150 GMT: Health Concerns. In addition to the heart attack of Mousavi advisor Ali Reza Beheshti, Rooz Online notes the transfer to hospital of Hassan Ahmadian, head of the Mousavi campaign's public committee, because of a worsening kidney condition.

1145 GMT: The 31 Manifesto (cont. --- see 0845 GMT). Rooz Online has an English translation of an interview with Dariush Ashouri, one of the expatriate intellectuals who signed this week's declaration: "The Green movement’s strategy of nonviolence is a reflection of a new political philosophy in Iranian society. The foundations of this philosophy are the principles of tolerance and pluralism."

1135 GMT: Economic Rumour or Reality? After chatter this week that Iran's major banks are on the verge of insolvency, Peyke Iran reports that the Bank-e Mellat branch in Tehran's Bazaar was closed by security forces. And Rah-e-Sabz writes that the Government has asked Parliament for 15 billion Toman ($15.2 million) to ease the cash problems of the banks.

1125 GMT: Mediawatch (2). Britain's Channel 4 goes for human interest rather than political recommendation, featuring an interview with Caspian Makan, the fiancé of Neda Agha Soltan. Neda, who died from a Basiji gunshot on 20 June, would have been 27 today.

1010 GMT: Mediawatch. A big symbol of the changing line in the US Government and associated networks towards the Green movement comes in Richard Haass' "Enough Is Enough" for Newsweek, as he explains, "Why we can no longer remain on the sidelines in the struggle for regime change in Iran".

Haass, who was a high-level official in the State Department in the Bush Administration and now heads the Council on Foreign Relations, marks himself out as a "realist" in the artificial divide from "neo-conservative".
However, given the stalemate in the talks on Iran's nuclear programme, Haass now believes, "The United States, European governments, and others should shift their Iran policy toward increasing the prospects for political change. Leaders should speak out for the Iranian people and their rights."

Given Haass' place in the Washington-New York corridor of power and his image as a "moderate", the column is being quickly picked up as a sanction for the US Government's backing of the Iranian opposition. Barbara Slavin of The Washington Times and Laura Rozen of Politico, both channels for and gatekeepers of the acceptable in US foreign policy, are already circulating the article.

0955 GMT: The Moving Image of Protest. More directors, including Britain's Ken Loach, have announced that they will not attend Iran's Fajr Film Festival.

0950 GMT: Launch of the "Greenlist". Sabzlist, a listing service for the Green movement, has been launched. Initial posts include requests for volunteers, offers of assistance, and a call for an MC for a fundraiser.

0940 GMT: Non-Story of the Week. Press TV's website announces, "An Iranian lawmaker says the Parliament (Majlis) has settled on limiting relations with Britain, rather than a full severance of ties as advocated in a bill last week."

The bill, if passed, would still have consequences, reducing the level of diplomatic representation between Iran and Britain from Ambassador to Chargé d'Affaires. However, it is primarily a vehicle for bluster about "foreign intervention", as in lawmaker Hossein Sobhani-Nia's declaration, "Considering the gross interference of the British government in the post-election developments, the Parliament (Majlis) has opted for lowering the level of ties between Tehran and London."

0830 GMT: Claims of the Week. Peyke Iran has two stories which raises eyebrows. The first asserts that the relatives of high-ranking officials are fleeing Iran and seeking asylum abroad.

The website also alleges that children are now being detained when their activist parents are arrested by Iranian authorities.

0825 GMT: The 31 Manifesto. This week's statement by 31 Iranian intellectuals and artists, calling for a new system in which government is separated from religion, continues to attract attention. Deutsche Welle Persian features an interview with signatory Hossein Bagherzadeh, who declares that the Green movement differs from the 1979 Revolution.

0820 GMT: Movin' On Up. President Ahmadinejad's advisor on press affairs, Ali Akbar Javanfekr, is reportedly going to become the head of the Islamic Republic News Agency.

0815 GMT: A new Green website, Neda-ye Sabz-e Azadi, has been launched and has immediately been filtered by Iranian authorities.

0800 GMT: We begin this morning by reviewing yesterday's feature on "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad". There is an update evaluating how the story stands up 24 hours later, and Chris Emery and an EA Iran specialist consider the complications of removing the President and what comes next.

UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad

URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.

Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)
Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".

These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".

And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.

UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview  but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.

UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?

Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.

(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)

EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.

An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.

UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.

---

For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.

The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?

Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:

1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN

Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.

The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.

The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.

(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)

The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".

So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.

Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.

The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.

It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.

To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....

2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.

"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."

Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.

Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”

Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."

3. THE OUTCOME?

EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.

The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.

That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.

Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)

Chris Emery and another top EA correspondent respond to yesterday's "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad" and readers' question by considering the process for the President's removal and the political questions that would follow:

EMERY: First of all, we should not overlook that there would have to be another election within 50 days in the case of impeachment. The massive question then would be whether (Mir Hossein) Mousavi would be barred from standing. If he was, then the exercise in restoring legitimacy is worthless. If he wasn't, then the regime would be taking a monumental step. Can't see it happening for those reasons alone.

Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

But if it did....


My understanding is that constitutionally the Majlis Speaker would take a central role in any impeachment. They would also be responsible, along with the Deputy President and head of the Judiciary to arrange for the new President to be elected within 50 days. This may be complicated if (Speaker of Parliament) Ali Larijani is standing.

That would partly explain Rafsanjani's influence in 1981 as head of the Majlis. It might not give him quite as an important role now. On the other hand, in the above scenario, there would be two Larijanis and a weak Deputy (President) at the center of the process.

I also believe that in the case of dismissal of the President, the Deputy would take over until a new election. That would put (Mohammad Reza) Rahimi in temporary power.

However, in the case of "other matters which prevent him to perform his duties", the Leader "shall appoint another person in his place". Even if Rahimi doesn't have the "approval" of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei can appoint another for the interim. So the SL could have his pick for 50, probably quite important, days. But I assume they would not get rid of Rahimi and declare an election quickly.

(Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer) Qalibaf or Larijani or possibly (Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen) Rezaei most likely to be acceptable to (Revolutionary) Guards and Supreme Leader. The Greens would take Qalibaf, but I suspect the international community would be happy with Larijani.

I said on Enduring America a while back that getting rid of Ahmadinejad and a modest amount of judicial reform or scapegoating would be the best way of splitting the opposition and isolating the fringe who want to dismantle the Islamic Republic. This initiative makes perfect sense but for the problem of an election.

Let me know where I am going wrong.

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, your reading is substantially correct, however the lack of precedent under the present Constitution, i.e. the one in place since 1989, means that it is likely that none of the gritty details contained in it will be respected. My gut feeling is that we won't see new elections in 50 days time, if and when Ahmadinejad is dethroned, but rather a temporary Presidential council taking over, with the usual suspects --- Larijani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, perhaps some Mousavi-leaning people --- part of it.

However, the big, unattended question in my view is --- what happens to Ahmadinejad himself if he is ousted? He certainly won't take the [deposed President in 1981, Abdolhassan] Bani Sadr route and challenge the regime before fleeing abroad, and he won't be chucked into regime retirement homes like the Supreme Leader's office and/or the Expediency Council either. How quite anyone intends to handle an impeached Ahmadinejad is quite a mystery for me, given that the man arguably has more popularity now than what Bani Sadr enjoyed at the moment of his ousting.

EMERY: I agree there is a lack of precedent, but the provisions and mechanisms for impeachment were not altered in 1989.

Would they really make up an entirely extra-Constitutional body? Perhaps they could amend the Constitution, but that was a lengthy undertaking last time and took a public referendum.

Perhaps I'm thinking too orthodox, and they could do this on the fly, but I remain skeptical that this will really happen. Not least because of the problem of what to do with Ahmadinejad. Can't quite see him donning a chador, escaping to France, and joining forces with MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq, opposed to the Iran regime since 1979)! Of course the sensible thing to do would be to have Ahmadinejadmeet an accident and blame MEK-US-Israel-Mousavi....

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, the impeachment scenario today is very different from 30 years ago. At the time, executive power was in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Bani Sadr was technically impeached because he was relieved of his technically ceremonial office.

This time round the whole executive branch of state enters a state of paralysis, collapse, and uncertainty which cannot be rapidly hushed up like 1981, when prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai's government, at the time totally estranged from President Bani Sadr, kept on working --- ironically one of the very first decisions after the ouster of Bani Sadr was appointing one Mir-Hossein Mousavi to the vacant Foreign Minister position. Besides, at the time there was Khomeini who could rally everyone around himself. Khamenei will not be able to redeem himself via a simple ouster of Ahmadinejad.

As for extra-constitutional bodies, there is ample precedent. The Assembly of Experts was founded in 1983 or 1984 and included in the Constitution in 1989 --- ditto the Expediency Council, which Khomeini created in January-February 1988 and which was finally incorporated in the Constitution in June 1989. All it needs is essentially a decree by Khamenei.

EMERY: So impeachment would for political reasons have to be accompanied, not by the Consitutional provisions, but by the establishment of a temporary Presidential Council which may or may not receive consitutional legitimacy some years down the line. I still think this would be an extraordinary step. It would presumably have to be rubber-stamped by Parliament.

Also, how temporary would this council be? presumably till the next election cycle?

CORRESPONDENT: I think anything, including Ahmadinejad's resignation would be exceptional and extraordinary right now, and would not solve the political crisis in the long term for sure. I am not even sure his impeachment would ensure a working government, I have reasons to believe that it would unleash anarchy.

Besides, Khamenei has erred on the side of caution throughout the past 20 years. To stick a neck out and implicitly acknowledge that he screwed it up big time on [the Presidential election of] 12-13 June would be a step too far. So I think Khamenei would agree to such a plan only if it were backed up by cast-iron guarantees from everyone involved that he and his cronies (Revolutionary Guards especially) would be left unscathed.

As to how Mousavi and (Mehdi) Karroubi would react to all this, considering that they risk alienating their popular base en masse if they appear to buckle under the terms of a pro-Khamenei agreement --- as a Qalibaf-Larijani-Rezaei one would certainly be portrayed as by the reformist media.... That remains also very much to be seen.

Iran: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad"

A valued and well-informed EA correspondent comments on our article on the plan to limit President Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly remove him from power:

The reference to the 1981 scenario is a correct one. It should be reminded that Ayatollah Khomeini's support for the impeachment and removal of [President] Bani Sadr came very late in the day, after the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party succeeded in alienating Khomeini completely from his former lieutenant. Essentially, it didn't happen till pretty much a week or so before the actual impeachment. Guess who was instrumental in the latter happening? One Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was at the time Majlis Speaker. Rafsanjani was also the man behind the ejection of [Grand Ayatollah] Montazeri from the successorship to Khomeini. In short, he's the man with the required CV for the job of removing Ahmadinejad.

Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

Whether the latter will happen or not, also depends on the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps leadership. One of the big remaining enigmas of the post-election events in Iran is the exact relationship patterns in the IRGC-Ahmadinejad-Supreme Leader triangle. Different scenarios emerge. If the IRGC leadership is, as stated on paper, loyal to the persona of Khamenei and reflexively behind AN because of the former's hitherto unswerving support for the latter, then we could see change happening if and when Khamenei reassures his IRGC flock that they will not be affected by any change in the Presidency. Another way out for Khamenei is to bring back the old IRGC leadership into the fold. [Yahiya] Rahim Safavi has been making interesting noises of late, essentially aligning himself to [Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer] Qalibaf in calling for a "third way" out to get past the "power-hungry" group (Government supporters) and the "destabilising" (opposition) one.

Whatever the outcome of this power tussle, we won't be seeing a Mousavi or Karroubi led administration. The only two people I can see fitting the bill in case of the removal of Ahmadinejad are either [Ali] Larijani or Qalibaf. I think I would gladly accept Qalibaf if I were the Green wave leadership, as they will at least be able to get a semblance of proper political activity (newspapers, party meetings, etc.) going under him.