The Latest from Iran (30 January): Threat

2355 GMT: Just checking in to say we have posted a video of a Tehran University academic defending Thursday's executions of Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour.

1910 GMT: We're taking an evening break. We may be back for a late-night wrap-up. If not, all the latest news will open our Sunday updates.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Defending the Executions (30 January)
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi-Karroubi Declaration on Rights and 22 Bahman (30 January)
NEW Iran Patriotism Special: Wiping the Green From The Flag
The Latest from Iran (29 January): Sideshows and Main Events

1900 GMT: Pressure on Ahmadinejad. The "conservative" campaign against the President's advisors has not ceased. The high-profile member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakoli has attacked the controversial Deputy Minister of Culture, Mo-Amin Ramin, and Ahmadinejad aide Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

1855 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz reports that Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, Hassan Rohani, and Ayatollah Mohammad Emami-Kashani have not attended meetings of the Combatant Clergy Association since the June election.

1845 GMT: On the Economic Front. Raja News reports that a 20-day ultimatum has been given to 100 people, most of them well-connected, who have not repaid $20 billion in funds from national banks. The article has a lengthy discussion of the reasons for this uncontrolled spending and problems in gettng the money back.

The website also quotes Arsalan Fathipour, chief of parliament's economic commission, that $15 billion of National Development Funds has been given to banks.

1840 GMT: Reza Mahabadian, children's rights activist & member of the Assembly of Iranian Writers, has reportedly been arrested.

1835 GMT: For the second week in a row, family members of the martyrs of 7-Tir, the terrorist attack in the early days of the Islamic Revolution that killed 72 people including Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, held a prayer ceremony at the grave of Ayatollah Beheshti to protest the detention of his son, Alireza Beheshti, a key advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi.

1800 GMT: The Regime's Accusations. An Iranian activist has posted a summary of the allegations against one of the Ashura defendants in today's trial:

Participation in gatherings and collusion in acts against national security. Insulting the Leader by sending e-mail to the International [Criminal] Court in The Hague, propaganda against Islamic Republic. Soft war, membership in Facebook and [Iranian Web portal] Balatarin, mass distribution of news to foreign media outlets. Participation in illegal protests...and preparation and forwarding a complaint against the honorable Leader to the World Court in the Hague.

The defendant's testimony:

I did participate in illegal protests...and did chant slogans against the regime. After the speech of the honourable Leader, I participated in three more protests in my car only and honked the horn. I was present in front of Laleh Park in the afternoon of Ashura (27 December) only as an observer. I read the news on sites like Balatarin and did send information and news to foreign news outlets. The first three weeks after the election I did chant Allah-O-Akbar (God is Great) on my rooftop. I did sent about 100 SMS (text messages) informing people of gatherings on 4 November and 7 December.

I was a member on Mohsen Sazegara's news site. Thinking because he was an ex-member of the establishment and is a dissident now, I believed him saying there was cheating in the election.

Regarding the letter to the World Court in the Hague, the petition was published on Balatarin site. I did sign this petition and encouraged my friends to sign it.

1755 GMT: We have posted a full summary and quotes from today's meeting between Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi about the rights of the people and the marches on 22 Bahman (11 February).

1745 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz reports that 40 people were arrested at a 40th Day memorial service for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri yesterday. Eight are still detained.

1725 GMT: Labour News. The Flying Carpet Institute reports that Reza Rakhshan, a leader of Haft Tapeh Sugar Cane Workers’ Syndicate was released on 19 January after 17 days of detention. Rakhshan was freed on $150,000 bail money—a hefty sum for a workers’ family.

1710 GMT: "Confessions". Back from a break to learn more about the regime's manoeuvres with the threats and trials. An Iranian activist reports that, on Wednesday night, Iranian television featured the "confessions" of four post-election detainees: Mahmod Dowlatabadi, Mehdi Saiedi, Abbas Balikhani, and Borzo Kamrani. The activist considers that the show may be setting up the "mohareb" (war against God) charges and executions.

More on the charges in the trial of Ashura detainees today (see 1415 and 0945 GMT): looks like subscribing to the newsletter of supporters of IRGC founder and current regime critic Mohsen Sazegara constitutes a threat to national security.

1415 GMT: The Great Regime Change Conspiracy. Rah-e-Sabz has a lengthy account of today's trial of 16 Ashura detainees. Amidst the statements of the defendants, not only the BBC and CNN but also Balatarin, the Iranian portal for Web stories, and Facebook emerges as evil instigators of violence against the Iranian Government.

1405 GMT: Rafsanjani's Balancing Act. The Los Angeles Times, noting the statement from Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi (see 1105 GMT) calling on their supporters to join 22 Bahman rallies, also picks up the more cautious declaration from Hashemi Rafsanjani:

[Rafsanjani] called on Iranians "of all groups and camps" to turn out en masse for the holiday, but warned that any violence will serve the interests of Tehran's "enemies."

"I invite all people and political camps across the country to march on 22 Bahman and renew their allegiance to the Islamic Republic despite certain differences of opinion," he said in an address to the powerful Expediency Council.

1330 GMT: Blair and Iran. I had intended to refrain from comment until Monday on the former Prime Minister's testimony to the British enquiry into the 2003 Iraq War --- anger needs to subside in favour of reflection. (We have posted, however, a 2005 item from our archives which pointed to Blair's agreement --- in a March 2002 meeting with then-US Vice President Dick Cheney --- to join the US in a military invasion for "regime change".)

That said, The Guardian of London sizes up Blair's rather extraordinary attempt to avoid blame for Iraq 2003 by putting forth an Iran 2010:

Tony Blair has been accused of warmongering spin for claiming that western powers might be forced to invade Iran because it poses as serious a threat as Saddam Hussein.

Sir Richard Dalton, a former British ambassador to Iran, accused Blair of trying to make confrontation with Iran an electoral issue after the former prime minister repeatedly singled out its Islamic regime as a global threat in his evidence to the Iraq war inquiry yesterday.

Blair said many of the arguments that led him to confront the "profoundly wicked, almost psychopathic" Saddam Hussein seven years ago now applied to the regime in Tehran.

"We face the same problem about Iran today," he told the Chilcot inquiry....

"One result of Tony Blair's intervention on Iran – he mentioned Iran 58 times – is to put the question of confronting Iran into play in the election," [Dalton] told the BBC Radio 4 Today programme.

"We need to be much clearer, as voters, with our politicians and with our candidates that we expect a different behaviour and a greater integrity in our democracy next time."

The silver lining in yesterday's travesty is that the illusions and delusions of Blair's approach to Iraq --- whether or not one agrees that military action was necessary for regime change --- are exposed by his easy analogies with today's situation and his equally-easy implication that war is a simple answer. And it is a 2nd silver lining that there is no one in the current British Government who shares that illusionary/delusionary approach to Iran 2010.

1215 GMT: Press TV has published its English-language report of today's trial, recycling the points made in Iranian state media and summarised below.

1105 GMT: Taking a Stand. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, after meeting this morning, have expressed sorrow over Thursday's executions, denounced other sentences and the "continuation of the current situation", and called on their supporters to participate in rallies on 22 Bahman (11 February).

With the statement, Mousavi and Karroubi have gone beyond their positions on Ashura (27 December). On that occasion, neither made a call for public demonstrations.

0945 GMT: The Trial. IRNA's website simply lists the charges against each of the 16 defendants. Everything from "support of terrorism" to "Communist tendencies" makes an appearance. Significantly,as previewed by Iranian officials this week, five of the 16 are charged with mohareb (war against God), a crime which carries the death penalty.

Fars' report focuses on the prosecution's opening statement, headlining the "terror training" abroad for the protesters. Here is an example of such training: the well-known terrorist centre The Brookings Institution in Washington apparently put out a report, a few months before Iran's Presidential election, setting out economic strategies.

0930 GMT: Threat. It is no pleasure to report how quickly both our headline and our morning analysis have been upheld by the regime this morning: "Iran Puts 16 Protesters on Trial". Both the Islamic Republic News Agency and Press TV feature the hearing for demonstrators arrested on Ashura (27 December), with the prosecution putting out the ritual rhetoric: "The defendants have confessed to spying, planning bomb attacks and damaging public and private properties....The defendants sent videos on the clashes between protesters and Iranian police to the ''foreign hostile networks."

0800 GMT: While catching up with this morning's news, we have posted a special analysis of the latest regime move (indeed, gamble), "We Will Kill You". We also have published the English translation of the questions put by the reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front to Iran's head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, over the executions of Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour.

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)

Chris Emery and another top EA correspondent respond to yesterday's "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad" and readers' question by considering the process for the President's removal and the political questions that would follow:

EMERY: First of all, we should not overlook that there would have to be another election within 50 days in the case of impeachment. The massive question then would be whether (Mir Hossein) Mousavi would be barred from standing. If he was, then the exercise in restoring legitimacy is worthless. If he wasn't, then the regime would be taking a monumental step. Can't see it happening for those reasons alone.

Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

But if it did....


My understanding is that constitutionally the Majlis Speaker would take a central role in any impeachment. They would also be responsible, along with the Deputy President and head of the Judiciary to arrange for the new President to be elected within 50 days. This may be complicated if (Speaker of Parliament) Ali Larijani is standing.

That would partly explain Rafsanjani's influence in 1981 as head of the Majlis. It might not give him quite as an important role now. On the other hand, in the above scenario, there would be two Larijanis and a weak Deputy (President) at the center of the process.

I also believe that in the case of dismissal of the President, the Deputy would take over until a new election. That would put (Mohammad Reza) Rahimi in temporary power.

However, in the case of "other matters which prevent him to perform his duties", the Leader "shall appoint another person in his place". Even if Rahimi doesn't have the "approval" of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei can appoint another for the interim. So the SL could have his pick for 50, probably quite important, days. But I assume they would not get rid of Rahimi and declare an election quickly.

(Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer) Qalibaf or Larijani or possibly (Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen) Rezaei most likely to be acceptable to (Revolutionary) Guards and Supreme Leader. The Greens would take Qalibaf, but I suspect the international community would be happy with Larijani.

I said on Enduring America a while back that getting rid of Ahmadinejad and a modest amount of judicial reform or scapegoating would be the best way of splitting the opposition and isolating the fringe who want to dismantle the Islamic Republic. This initiative makes perfect sense but for the problem of an election.

Let me know where I am going wrong.

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, your reading is substantially correct, however the lack of precedent under the present Constitution, i.e. the one in place since 1989, means that it is likely that none of the gritty details contained in it will be respected. My gut feeling is that we won't see new elections in 50 days time, if and when Ahmadinejad is dethroned, but rather a temporary Presidential council taking over, with the usual suspects --- Larijani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, perhaps some Mousavi-leaning people --- part of it.

However, the big, unattended question in my view is --- what happens to Ahmadinejad himself if he is ousted? He certainly won't take the [deposed President in 1981, Abdolhassan] Bani Sadr route and challenge the regime before fleeing abroad, and he won't be chucked into regime retirement homes like the Supreme Leader's office and/or the Expediency Council either. How quite anyone intends to handle an impeached Ahmadinejad is quite a mystery for me, given that the man arguably has more popularity now than what Bani Sadr enjoyed at the moment of his ousting.

EMERY: I agree there is a lack of precedent, but the provisions and mechanisms for impeachment were not altered in 1989.

Would they really make up an entirely extra-Constitutional body? Perhaps they could amend the Constitution, but that was a lengthy undertaking last time and took a public referendum.

Perhaps I'm thinking too orthodox, and they could do this on the fly, but I remain skeptical that this will really happen. Not least because of the problem of what to do with Ahmadinejad. Can't quite see him donning a chador, escaping to France, and joining forces with MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq, opposed to the Iran regime since 1979)! Of course the sensible thing to do would be to have Ahmadinejadmeet an accident and blame MEK-US-Israel-Mousavi....

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, the impeachment scenario today is very different from 30 years ago. At the time, executive power was in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Bani Sadr was technically impeached because he was relieved of his technically ceremonial office.

This time round the whole executive branch of state enters a state of paralysis, collapse, and uncertainty which cannot be rapidly hushed up like 1981, when prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai's government, at the time totally estranged from President Bani Sadr, kept on working --- ironically one of the very first decisions after the ouster of Bani Sadr was appointing one Mir-Hossein Mousavi to the vacant Foreign Minister position. Besides, at the time there was Khomeini who could rally everyone around himself. Khamenei will not be able to redeem himself via a simple ouster of Ahmadinejad.

As for extra-constitutional bodies, there is ample precedent. The Assembly of Experts was founded in 1983 or 1984 and included in the Constitution in 1989 --- ditto the Expediency Council, which Khomeini created in January-February 1988 and which was finally incorporated in the Constitution in June 1989. All it needs is essentially a decree by Khamenei.

EMERY: So impeachment would for political reasons have to be accompanied, not by the Consitutional provisions, but by the establishment of a temporary Presidential Council which may or may not receive consitutional legitimacy some years down the line. I still think this would be an extraordinary step. It would presumably have to be rubber-stamped by Parliament.

Also, how temporary would this council be? presumably till the next election cycle?

CORRESPONDENT: I think anything, including Ahmadinejad's resignation would be exceptional and extraordinary right now, and would not solve the political crisis in the long term for sure. I am not even sure his impeachment would ensure a working government, I have reasons to believe that it would unleash anarchy.

Besides, Khamenei has erred on the side of caution throughout the past 20 years. To stick a neck out and implicitly acknowledge that he screwed it up big time on [the Presidential election of] 12-13 June would be a step too far. So I think Khamenei would agree to such a plan only if it were backed up by cast-iron guarantees from everyone involved that he and his cronies (Revolutionary Guards especially) would be left unscathed.

As to how Mousavi and (Mehdi) Karroubi would react to all this, considering that they risk alienating their popular base en masse if they appear to buckle under the terms of a pro-Khamenei agreement --- as a Qalibaf-Larijani-Rezaei one would certainly be portrayed as by the reformist media.... That remains also very much to be seen.

The Latest from Iran (2 January): The Ripples of the Mousavi Statement

2240 GMT: Just Remember, It's the Zionists. And the Americans. At the end of a tiring, sometimes confusing day trying to interpret the political signals not only from Mir Hossein Mousavi but from others "within the Establishment", the simplicity of Kayhan offers a refuge from thought. Here is its front page:

Mousavi's latest statement was written by Mossad. And the CIA.

That's that, then. Thanks, guys, for saving me any further need for research. Or reflection. Or sense.

2155 GMT: Another Attack  on Mousavi's Organisation. Kalemeh reports that Mohammad Reza Tajik, a senior aide to Mir Hossein Mousavi, has been arrested.

2110 GMT: Larijani's Latest. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, continues his tour of the country and his denunciation of the opposition, telling an audience in northeastern Iran: ""In the parliament we have considered such moves [of unrest] like walking on a minefield which would only cause deep rifts and damage the country's prestige."

Is Larijani playing bad cop to the conservative/principlist not-so-bad-cop (Rezaei, Motahari) in pressing for a resolution? Is he beyond compromise, setting out "they shall not pass" either as his personal position or as the (unacknowledged) representative of the Supreme Leader?

I leave it to others to work through the possibilities. Just wanted to ponder this: how many times have we mentioned Larijani in the updates in last few days? And how many times have we mentioned Ahmadinejad?

NEW Iran: The Non-Violent “Watershed” of the Mousavi Statement (Shahryar)
NEW Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi’s “Martyrdom v. Compromise” Statement (Lucas)
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)
NEW Iran: 2009’s Year of Living Dangerously (Part 1)
Latest Iran Video: Protests Against and for the Regime (31 December)

1750 GMT: What Say You, Rafsanjani? As both Mir Hossein Mousavi and conservative/principlist factions make their political moves for a resolution, attention has now turned to a statement by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani at today's meeting of the Expediency Council, which he chairs.

Both Mousavi's Kalemeh and the state outlet Islamic Republic News Agency say Rafsanjani called for "unity" and "peace" by strengthening the bonds between Iranian people and the Government and that he praised the demonstrations of Iranians on the streets. IRNA then adds, however, that Rafsanjani said:

The Islamic establishment became victorious and continues its existence by relying on the people. I hope the desecrators will learn a lesson from the meaningful presence of the people on the street.

Press TV then adds the gloss, "Rafsanjani said the Wednesday rally also rendered ineffective the plots against the Islamic establishment."

1745 GMT: The Court of Appeals has upheld the six-year prison sentence of journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi.

1740 GMT: Karroubi and Mousavi Move? Saham News reports that Mehdi Karroubi has met Mir Hossein Mousavi for an hour in the home of Mousavi's nephew Seyed Ali, slain last Sunday by security forces. In addition to paying respects, Karroubi discussed "issues surrounding Mousavi's statement".

1715 GMT: The "Conservative/Principlist" Manoeuvre With Mousavi. OK, here's the political game: conservative and principlist activists within the establishment are going to play up the Mousavi statement as a route to compromise in the post-election conflict. This will fit both the Mohsen Rezaei letter to the Supreme Leader (1050 GMT) and the proposals of MP Ali Motahari (1400 GMT). This is being propelled by Tabnak, which is linked to Rezaei.

Here's the tip-off: the English-language Tehran Times, citing Tabnak, has declared:

Former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi has issued a statement in which he condemned the disrespect of religious sanctities by some protesters on Ashura day (December 27) and made five proposals for resolving the current issues facing the country....Mousavi’s first and second proposals imply that he has accepted that the election is over, a Tabnak analyst said.

The article makes no reference to the first part of Mousavi's statement, with its denunciation of the Government and its declaration that he is prepared to die in the cause of protest against injustice and denial of the Iranian people's rights.

1710 GMT: The Sane'i Demotion (see 1535 GMT). Rah-e-Sabz has claimed that the Qom Seminary Teachers statement, denouncing Ayatollah Sane'i as failing to meet the standards of a marja, was signed by only one person: fervent Ahmadinejad supporter Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi.

Press TV, however, is playing up the "statement bearing the signature of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the former head of Iran's judiciary" as "Ayatollah Sanei no longer qualified: Clerical body" and adds the jibe that Sane'i has "been criticized by millions of Iranians who took part in the demonstration on Wednesday".

1700 GMT: Nemat Ahmadi, whose arrest was reported yesterday, has issued a denial. Ahmadi was at the farm where another activist, Ali Hekmat, was taken by security forces and went to the police station with him.

1535 GMT: Attacking Sane'i. The move against Ayatolllah Yusuf Sane'i continues: the Qom Seminary Teachers Association has announced that he does not meet the conditions to be a marja (eminent cleric, worthy of emulation).

1400 GMT: More on the Move "Within" the Establishment. Earlier today (0740 GMT), Mr Azadi read the Mousavi statement in the context of "unity" calls from clerics, members of Parliament, and high-profile politicians such as Mohsen Rezaei (see 1050 GMT).

Here's more material for the thesis, with the proposals of influential legislator Ali Motahari. Among his seven points:

The leaders of the Green Movement should formally acknowledge the legitimacy of the President, and stop labeling the June election as fraudulent. Furthermore, they should, in the strongest possible terms, distance their positions, slogans, and agenda from anti-Islamic and westernized groups that have infiltrated the Green Movement and seek its leadership....

The President should acknowledge his mistake during the televised debates, and ask for forgiveness from the parties implicated....

Freedom of speech should be established by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and the press should adhere to these standards....

The military atmosphere should be brought to an end, and the national intelligence services must put an end to their unfounded claims against the leadership of the Green movement, accusing them of velvet revolution, soft regime change and months of preparation for regime change based on collaboration with foreigners. They should see the roots of post election developments not in foreign intervention but in our own ambitions, worldly goals, illusions, misjudgments and mismanagements. They should apologize to the nation for their excessive use of force against people....

All the detainees, who have often been arrested for unfounded reasons, should be released as soon as possible , except those who have damaged public properties and have resorted to destroying public buildings, particularly those took part in the riots during Ashura....

The full identify and photos of those guilty of initiating, aiding and carrying out the events that took place in Kahrizak, University of Tehran, and Sobhan Apartment Complex should be revealed to the public, and their sentences should be announced....

The judiciary should not remain indifferent in the face of extremist and sectarian supporters of the government who under the mask of Velayat-e Faghih (Guardian of the Jurisprudence) intend to eliminate all reformist and Principalist political figures and order the disruption of public gatherings.

1330 GMT: And If the Nuclear Distraction Doesn't Work (see 0925 GMT).... Press TV has some more on the interview of  Foreign Manouchehr Mottaki on state television. Having put up headlines on Mottaki's "ultimatum" for the West to accept Iran's offers on uranium enrichment within a month, the website now turns to a Mottaki speech on Friday to play the "foreign intervention" card:

Enemies are afraid of the anti-oppression movement Iran has started in the world. So, they are constantly scheming to stop it from spreading in the Muslim world and elsewhere. Vain enemy support for these scattered incidents that have recently occurred in the country on an insignificant scale, will lead to nothing.

Curiously, however, Mottaki located Iran's Number One Enemy not in the great Satanic expanse of the United States but in Britain.

1315 GMT: We've posted our second special analysis of the day on the Mousavi statement: Josh Shahryar assesses the declaration as a non-violent "watershed" for the challenge to the regime.

1105 GMT: Jailing the Activists. Two more members of Iran's Human Rights Reporters, Parisa Kakaei and Mehrdad Rahimi, members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, were arrested yesterday. All but two of the organisation's central committee are now detained.

1050 GMT: Connection? The Mousavi Statement and the Rezaei Intervention. There is an intriuing dimension --- possibly parallel, possibly intersecting --- to Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration on martyrdom and compromise.

Before the Mousavi statement emerged, it was being reported that Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei had written to the Supreme Leader urging a political resolution as Mousavi had now allegedly accepted the post-election legitimacy of the Government.

This morning that line is still being pushed by Press TV's website, which quotes Rezaei:

Although he moved later than he should have, Mousavi has retreated from the position of denying the legitimacy of Mr. Ahmadinejad's government. That retreat as well as his constructive proposal about the role that the parliament and judiciary must play in holding the administration accountable can signal the beginning of a new unifying movement from opposing front.

Rezaei has vocally aligned himself with the regime after Ashura, in public statements and in the letter: "Wednesday demonstrations that brought out millions in a magnificent show of national unity will not only make up for the shame of the sacrilegious events of Ashura but will also play a unique role in foiling enemy plots. Once more, it was proven that Imam Hussein (PBUH) and his reviving path will be the savior of the Iranian nation." So it is clear that any accountability, in his eyes, will be limited to officials rather than reaching up to the offices of the Supreme Leader.

Two questions. First, on the nature of a compromise, at least as foretold by Rezaei: does it include an "accountability" that pushes aside President Ahmadinejad?

Second, has Rezaei's intervention been co-ordinated with Mousavi (see Mr Azadi's interpretation below on an interaction between Mousasvi and other "unity" initiatives such as that of Hashemi Rafsanjani)? Alternatively, is it meant to limit and even undermine Mousavi, especially with the Green movement, by emphasising "retreat"? Or is this a parallel initiative by conservatives/principlists which may or may not intersect with Mousavi in coming days?

0925 GMT: No, It's Nukes, Nukes, Nukes. I would not want to suggest in any way that Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki is trying to take everyone's eyes away from what is happening inside Iran, but the timing of this "ultimatum" (his word, not mine) on State TV this morning is interesting: the West must accept accept the Iranian counterproposal either to sell 20-percent uranium to Tehran or swap it for Iran's 3.5-percent stock.

Mottaki declared that the international community "has one month left" to accept, or Tehran will enrich uranium to the 20-percent level.

0840 GMT: We've now posted a special analysis, "A Gut Reaction To The Mousavi Statement".

0740 GMT: We awake this morning to continuing discussion of yesterday's post-Ashura statement by Mir Hossein Mousavi. We have posted the English translation, and we are working on an analysis of the political significance of Mousavi's combination of a passionate condemnation of violence and a readiness to accept martyrdom with his 5-point programme for reconciliation and resolution. In the meantime, EA's Mr Azadi offers this interpretation, which can set against my own thoughts in yesterday's updates:

What is clear is that this statement is to some extent different from Mousavi's previous statements.

Last week, we saw that not only a number of senior scholars in Iran such as Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, Makarem- Shirazi, and Mazaheri recommended all parties and groups to pursue dialogue and unity but also that Ayatollah Fadhlullah in Lebanon emphasised the importance of that dialogue and unity. The seven-point plan of [high-profile member of Parliament] Ali Motahari, the speech of Ali Larijani in Friday Prayers at Mashhad, and the request of [Presidential candidate] Mohsen Rezaei to the Supreme Leader to carefully considering Mousavi’s Statement: all show that Iranian intellectuals and scholars from all parities have come to the same conclusion that this crisis has to stop as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, there have been rumours in Iran that some private dialogue between the Leader and Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken place for resolving the current crisis. In this context, I think Mousavi's statement in a way is very similar to Rafsanjani’s plan for exiting from the current crisis.