Iran Exclusive: The Latest Nuclear Riddle --- Renewed Talks with "West"?

It all started with a story this morning in Israel's Haaretz: "Iran has suspended its uranium enrichment program for two months, Iranian media sources reported on Monday, saying the move was meant as a gesture of good will toward Western powers."

The only problem with the report is that "the Iranian media sources" were not cited, and analysts, including EA contacts, could not recall seeing any news of a suspension.

Iran Special Analysis: A US Move to “Sanctions for Rights”?
The Latest from Iran (11 January): Reading the Regime

Finally, another Israeli website clarified the source:

....statements made by Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast to quasi-official news agency ILNA [Iranian Labor News Agency] last week. The report was first published in Tehran Times, which is considered the mouthpiece of the Iranian regime.

"A number of neutral countries asked Iran not to enrich uranium for two months in order to give the West time to respond to Iran's proposals. We agreed to this request in order to show our good will to the international community," said Mehmanparast.

According to him, of the two months granted to the West, one month has already passed: "If the other side responds to Iran's requests (to carry out the agreement according to its requests) in the remaining time, we will start working. Otherwise, we will make the necessary decision."

Officials in the West told Ynet that they "are unaware if this kind of suspension was indeed carried out."

That, however, is not the entire story. According to Laura Rozen of Politico, US officials are very much aware of an Iranian attempt to find an agreement: "A U.S. nonproliferation hand confirmed Sunday that Iran had offered a formal response [on third-party enrichment of Iran's uranium] in late December or early January."

The issue is that Iran's preference for an uranium "swap" inside the country is unacceptable to Washington:

While the Iranian fuel-swap response was said to have been conveyed by the highest levels of the Iranian government, U.S. officials contacted Sunday gave no public indication that they have any interest in the counter-offer.

“The Iranians have been saying different things for weeks, but what matters is whether they will accept the IAEA's proposed TRR deal, which they agreed to in principle on October 1 but then walked away from,” an administration official said. “They know what they need to do to satisfy the international communities concerns and to date they have not done so.”

The Tehran Research Reactor proposal, or TRR, calls on Iran to immediately send 1,200 kg of its LEU to Russia, and France would in return supply Iran with nuclear fuel cells for medical use.

Put it all together, and the Ahmadinejad Government has far from closed the doors on discussion. Indeed, needing "legitimacy" in the face of internal troubles, it is Tehran now pressing for a deal.

The Obama Administration, however, does not appear to need to make any concessions to Iran. With the US Congress playing "bad cop" and proposing sweeping sanctions, the White House can be "good cop" and say "the third-party enrichment deal is the best you will get".

Iran: The Genius of Washington's "Strategic Leaking" on Nukes & Sanctions

Gary Sick has offered the following reading of latest US policy, with private manoeuvres and public "spin", on Iran's nuclear programme and sanctions.

My own reaction is that this is "too clever by half", not on the part of the author but as attributed to Washington. As I wrote Sick, "Could it be that there there are two factions still battling within the Administraton? One faction, probably coming out of the State Department, is not as keen on aggressive sanctions. Linked to this is a wish to move the debate to the human rights rather than nuclear focus. The other faction, probably in the National Security Council and Department of Defense, is keener on a sanctions-first, nuclear-first focus. So they use New York Times as the ventriloquist's dummy for their line. I'm not sure Obama is a central player in this battle."

Sick's concise response: "One of the great benefits of strategic leaking is that it conceals the real intentions of the leakers, thereby leaving interpretation up to the observer."

Pretend for a moment that you are the president of the United States and you have gotten yourself into a bit of a hole with your Iran policy.

The Latest from Iran (4 January): Watching and Debating

First you offered to negotiate with Iran over nuclear (and potentially other) issues without the Bush preconditions. But there were powerful political forces that felt this was an example of your inexperience and even appeasement tendencies. So you unwisely accepted a six month deadline for the negotiations to show that you meant business. You tried to soften that by saying you would take another look at the issue at the end of the year, but everyone ignored that and let you know that January 1 was the drop-dead date to solve all the negotiating problems with Iran.

In the meantime, the most serious internal revolt in 30 years exploded in Iran. It was not clear how this would affect the behavior of the regime on international issues. Some said the regime was weakened and vulnerable and so would more readily yield to pressure; others thought Iran’s rulers would become more belligerent internationally to compensate for their internal weakness.

You had a couple of rounds of meetings with the Iranians and jointly came up with a fiendishly clever ploy. Iran would ship out quite a lot of its low enriched uranium (LEU), thereby reducing its stockpile that might be turned into a bomb, and Russia and France would provide them with more highly enriched fuel to be used in their research reactor that makes medical isotopes. Everybody wins. But when the Iranians took this home, they were savaged by their own political opposition for buying a pig in a poke. In disarray, they backtracked and started looking for a face-saving alternative, specifically to conduct the swap on Iranian soil or, later, in Turkey.

This situation was complicated by the discovery (or Iranian announcement, we’re not quite sure) of a previously unannounced uranium enrichment site, which was immediately inspected by the IAEA. Some think that this was Iran’s Plan B, to have a separate enrichment capability if the primary site at Natanz was bombed by Israel or the US; others think the site was intended as a covert production line to produce a bomb. The punditocracy decides that it was a covert bomb production line.

Moreover, the punditocracy, which had already decided on the deadline of January 1, now decides that the Iranians negotiated in bad faith and the negotiations were at a total dead end. The congress, which had reluctantly stayed quiet on the subject, now returned to its usual political game of looking tough by bashing Iran. Sanctions bills threatening interdiction of gasoline shipments to Iran were passed overwhelmingly in the House and were due to pass with equal margins when the Senate returned in January.

Your critics (who wanted merely token negotiations followed by crippling sanctions and, if possible, war) rubbed their hands in anticipation. A leading neoconservative gleefully remarked that everything was proceeding according to script. AIPAC issued a triumphant declaration as gasoline sanctions rolled through the Congress.

So, Mr. President, here you are on January 1. The “deadline” is upon you. Your allies and your opponents in congress are ready to hit you with a dilemma — either impose crippling sanctions or look like an appeaser. Yet you know that gasoline sanctions are perhaps the worst idea to come out of the congress since they opposed the purchase of Alaska. The sanctions would enrich and empower the Revolutionary Guards, undercut the Green opposition, identify the US as the enemy of the ordinary citizen in Iran, and possibly start us down the slippery slope to another disastrous war in the Middle East. But it looks great on a bumper sticker, and Glenn Beck [of Fox Television] will savage anyone who dares oppose it.

So what to do?

Well, Mr. President, you have some cards of your own up your sleeve. You know that Israel is not really going to attack Iran. They can’t do anything significant without US help, and George Bush already told them not to expect that. But they have invested so much in their campaign to convince the Israeli population and the entire world that Israel’s survival as a nation is imminently in peril that they can’t be seen to back down. They might welcome some help to get them off their own sticky wicket.

You also know that the Iranian nuclear program is nowhere near a bomb and has actually made little progress in that direction for years, regardless of the punditocracy consensus to the contrary in defiance of the facts. There is plenty of time if you can just calm the domestic political furor.

It’s time for some strategic leaking.

First, give an exclusive interview to The Washington Post just before the New Year’s “deadline” that makes two major points: (1) The administration’s policy of engagement has succeeded in creating turmoil and fractures within Iran’s leadership, i.e. the policy has been a success, not a failure; and (2) the administration is planning for highly targeted sanctions that will hit the Revolutionary Guards rather than the average Iranian citizen. That sends a clear signal to the congress that its infatuation with petroleum sanctions is not replicated in the White House, for all the reasons listed above, and to the uber hawks that there will be no rush to war with Iran in the new year. At the same time, launch a major rhetorical campaign by the president in support of the civil and political rights of the Iranian opposition.

It works. The increasingly hawkish Washington Post editorial board commends the president for his “shift” on human rights (though piously calling for more) and ignores the sanctions game in congress.

Of course, having fed the Washington Post, the New York Times is jealous and needs its own exclusive. Provide that over the New Year holiday by letting as many as six top administration officials meet privately and anonymously with two NYT reporters to let them in on some more secrets: (1) In another cunning success, the administration has outed the covert Iran bomb production facility at Qom thereby rendering it useless; (2) hint that the administration may be responsible for sabotaging Iran’s centrifuges, which accounts for the fact (completely unacknowledged until now, despite being reported for the past two years by the IAEA) that Iran is not actually using about half of its installed centrifuges; (3) reiterate that the coming sanctions are to be aimed at the Revolutionary Guards, not the average Iranian citizen, and are likely to succeed because the regime is so weakened internally; and (4) declare unequivocally that the Iranian “breakout capability,” i.e. its ability to shift from nuclear energy to actually building a bomb, is now years away.

This also works. The two NYT reporters, though apparently a bit confused about this U-turn in threat assessment from only three months ago, dutifully report what they have been told. The administration is credited with several successes, and the reporters seem convinced that the White House is showing toughness and skill in derailing the Iranian nuclear rush to the bomb. In the meantime, the reporters scarcely note that the administration is not declaring the negotiations dead after all and is pursuing the Turkish option of a uranium swap. No mention of a deadline.

Finally, the NYT reports that the Israelis have been persuaded that the targeted sanctions now being discussed are worth trying “at least for a few months.” That was attributed to a senior Israeli official on the basis of back channel talks, but it had actually been announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the Knesset a week earlier in a speech that received almost no attention in the U.S. No more talk of deadlines, crippling sanctions or air strikes.

In short, Mr. President, you have taken what appeared to be a losing hand and, with a few well-placed leaks, transformed it into a victory over Iran. You have converted a lose-lose proposition of crippling sanctions vs appeasement into an Iranian nuclear collapse. The imminent threat of Iran has become an indefinite delay of its breakout capability. The huffing and puffing of the congress has been rendered irrelevant even before it hits your desk. A deadline has become a new beginning of negotiations. And you brought the Israelis along with you, without a peep of complaint. As for the punditocracy, so far so good.

Not bad for a beginner, Mr. President!

The Latest from Iran (3 January): Re-positioning

2220 GMT: BBC Persian is reporting on the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution. One interesting claim in the statement: anti-establishment monarchist slogans were encouraged by Government agent provocateurs in the Ashura crowd.

222055 GMT: The Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, following the earlier endorsement of the Islamic Iran Participation Front of the Mousavi post-Ashura statement (1420 GMT), have issued their response to the declaration.

NEW Iran: Authority and Challenge — Bring Out the (Multi-Sided) Chessboard
Iran Video of Week: Ahmadinejad 0, Tractor 1
Iran: The Non-Violent “Watershed” of the Mousavi Statement (Shahryar)
Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi’s “Martyrdom v. Compromise” Statement (Lucas)
Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)
The Latest from Iran (2 January): The Ripples of the Mousavi Statement

2000 GMT: The Regime's Fist-Waving. Edward Yeranian of the Voice of America has a useful summary of today's denunciations of protesters, invocation of "foreign agents", and threats of prosecution from Minister of Interior Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar (1645 GMT) and the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani. Press TV continues to play up the Larijani combination of assurance ("fair trial") and warning ("investigate the events quickly and firmly").

1800 GMT: Green 88 members Mohammad Rafati and Mohammad Keighobadi have been arrested.

1645 GMT: Your Daily US-UK-Israel-MKO Announcement. It's Minister of Interior Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar reciting the litany today: "The rioters are encouraged and supported by Britain, the US and the Zionist regime. The involvement of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), enemies and those who seek to take revenge on the Islamic establishment during the past 30 years is quite clear."

Can't say this wins award for originality, although Mohammad-Najjar's promise that some MKO members will soon appear in court --- reportedly some Ashura detainees went on trial today --- has an ominous hint of a new scene in the staged drama.


1625 GMT: More Tough Shows for the Media. On a day when Governments in Washington and Tehran have been spinning tales away from the central front of the internal conflict in Iran, it did not take long for this one to get a headline.

This morning Press TV gave up space to a bit of tough puffery from the Iranian military, with Brigadier General Ahmad-Reza Pourdastan announcing a large military exercise next month to "improve the force's defensive capabilities" and "boost the region's security".

No big prizes for breaking the political code in this move: facing diplomatic pressure and possibly more sanctions on the nuclear issue and looking more than a bit shaky at home, Tehran puts up a show of strength against the ever-present "foreign enemies". CNN has already obliged, recycling the Press TV report and immediately putting it in the context of the US and Israeli portrayal of "time running out" to address Iran's "threat".

Meanwhile, the media's set-up of a case for more sanctions on Iran continues. The New York Times advertisement for the pro-sanctions forces in the Obama Administration (see 0840 GMT), who are working with pro-sanctions forces in Israel, has turned into a magic media circle, with Israel's Haaretz citing the article and bolstering the line: if there are more sanctions, then no Israeli military action.

1455 GMT: The Exam Strike. For the second day in a row, students at Amir Kabir University in Tehran have protested by refusing to sit their examinations.

1425 GMT: A Victory for the Regime. Amidst the political and religious challenges it is facing, the Iranian authorities have succeeded in curbing Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib. After days of attacks on the Qoba Mosque in Shiraz, the Government has confiscated Dastgheib's offices and restricted the cleric's movements.

1420 GMT: Boosting the Mousavi Initaitive. The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front has issued a statement of enthusiastic support for the Mousavi five-point resolution in the post-Ashura statement.

1245 GMT: Regime Divisions (cont.). Ayande News criticises the attempt by Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, in the name of the Qom Seminary Teachers Association, to denounce the marja (eminent cleric) status of Ayatollah Sane'i (see yesterday's updates).

Ayande has also launched a full-blooded attack on the editor of Kayhan, the "hard-line" Hossein Shariatmadari, accusing him of past duplicity (opposing Ayatollah Khamenei) and current misinformation (minimising the number of anti-regime demonstrators in protests).

Now here's the intriguing part: Ayande has been claimed to be linked to the Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, who just wrote the Supreme Leader asking for reconciliation with a "retreating" Mir Hossein Mousavi. Is this the other part of the initiative, an assault upon those, including allies of President Ahmadinejad, who would block such a deal?

1230 GMT: Breaking the Freedom Movement. Iran's authorities have detained three more senior members of the party: Amir Khorram, Mohsen Mohagheghi, and Sara Tavassoli (daughter of the director of the Freedom Movement's offices).

1200 GMT: Let's Crush Them (But Do It Fairly). Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is featuring a story of the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, speaking about "fair trials" for those who have caused "fitna" (secular sedition).

1150 GMT: More Media Follies. This time it's Paul Harris of The Observer of London who goes Nuclear Critical. His attention to Iran is part of a wider piece on the challenges for President Obama, but the headline points to Tehran Emergency: "Barack Obama talks tough on terror as Iran raises nuclear stakes". Harris bases this diplomatic Red Alert on:

--- "A deadline for Iran to accept a UN-brokered deal passed on Thursday and raised the prospect of a fresh round of sanctions against Tehran" (as we noted months ago, the Obama Administration was going to let any deadline slip because it has not declared a break-down of the nuclear discussions);

--- "A senior Iranian figure said the west had just one month to come up with a better deal for it to swap its low-enriched uranium for nuclear fuel" (as we noted yesterday, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's "ultimatum" was more a rhetorical defence against likely sanctions and an intervention in the domestic crisis, trying to boost the Government with "nationalist" sentiment)

--- "Many experts, however, think any resolution to the situation is unlikely." (no names, no details)

What "distinguishes" Harris' analysis, however, is not an omission of Iran's domestic situation but a distortion of it. He makes a point of noticing "last week, tens of thousands of supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regime demonstrated in Tehran in organised protests against foreign interference in Iran's affairs" --- you see, this is not only a Iranian Government on the verge of nuclear weapons, but one with popular support --- but he never mentions the anti-regime protests that took place only three days earlier.

1140 GMT: The Domestic Troubles. Testimony to our New Year analysis about the complex challenges to the Ahmadinejad Government --- "Iran's parliament rejected on Sunday the government's request to withdraw a bill aimed at gradually cutting energy and food subsidies".

The Government put forth the subsidy reduction plan as a key plank in its economic programme last autumn. In November, however, the Parliament linked any cut to the overall budget, requiring the Government to put the money into a special account for public spending.

At that point, Ahmadinejad called for the withdrawal of the entire proposal. He got his answer --- economically and politically --- today.

1025 GMT: Handling the Mousavi Statement. A bizarre article from Press TV's website, "Mousavi's statement draws varied reactions" --- instead of considering the political responses that we have noted in our analyses, the article opens with this clumsy attempt at belittling the opposition leader: "The Tehran Municipality has been clearing the Iranian capital of graffiti containing negative comments about defeated presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi."

The last paragraphs do try to set out a party line, but even this is uncertain: "Some, such as Mohsen Rezaei, another defeated presidential candidate, described the declaration as a "retreat" from the position of denying the legitimacy of Ahmadienjad's administration. Others however, condemned the statement, repeating their earlier calls for judicial action against the "leaders of Fitna (Arabic for anarchy)."

1020 GMT: Iranian television is reporting that the first trials, held in Revolutionary Court, of those arrested on Ashura (27 December) have begun.

1010 GMT: Latest Arrests. Journalist Rouzbeh Karimi and his wife, lawyer Forough Mirzaee, have been detained.

0840 GMT: US Sanctions and the Nuclear-First Approach. After weeks in which the White House seemed to shift to a rights-first vision of Iran, a faction in the Obama Administration appear to have re-staked the "All about Nukes, All about Sanctions" ground.

An article by The New York Times' David Sanger and William Broad, the go-to reporters for the nukes/sanctions officials, bluntly opens with the statement that the recent internal tension and demands of the Green movement are again pawns in the nuclear game:

As President Obama faces pressure to back up his year-end ultimatum for diplomatic progress with Iran, the administration says that domestic unrest and signs of unexpected trouble in Tehran’s nuclear program make its leaders particularly vulnerable to strong and immediate new sanctions....

Although repeated rounds of sanctions over many years have not dissuaded Iran from pursuing nuclear technology, an administration official involved in the Iran policy said the hope was that the current troubles “give us a window to impose the first sanctions that may make the Iranians think the nuclear program isn’t worth the price tag.”

Beyond the relegation of the internal conflict in Iran to a supporting role in other campaigns, what is bizarre about this public-relations piece is that it promotes sanctions even though the possibility of any supposed Iranian nuclear weapon has diminished in recent months:

Obama administration officials said they believed that the bomb-development effort was seriously derailed by the exposure three months ago of the country’s secret enrichment plant under construction near the holy city of Qum....

In addition, international nuclear inspectors report that at Iran’s plant in Natanz, where thousands of centrifuges spin to enrich uranium for nuclear fuel, the number of the machines that are currently operating has dropped by 20 percent since the summer, a decline nuclear experts attribute to technical problems. [Note: EA pointed this out in the autumn; Sanger and Broad ignored the technical issue until the article today.]

The illogic and the (cynical?) political manoeuvring is beside the main point, however. This articles and others, such as a recent piece in The Washington Post that Israel was quite happy to go with the sanctions route, all point to the Administration's acceptance of sanctions measures that will be passed by the US Congress within the next month.

0820 GMT: As the drama of public conflict recedes for the moment --- although the regime continues to arrest activists, journalists, and key organisers ---and is replaced by the political manoeuvres both inside and outside the Iranian establishment, we have posted an analysis, "Bring Out the (Multi-Sided) Chessboard".

The Latest from Iran (2 January): The Ripples of the Mousavi Statement

2240 GMT: Just Remember, It's the Zionists. And the Americans. At the end of a tiring, sometimes confusing day trying to interpret the political signals not only from Mir Hossein Mousavi but from others "within the Establishment", the simplicity of Kayhan offers a refuge from thought. Here is its front page:

Mousavi's latest statement was written by Mossad. And the CIA.

That's that, then. Thanks, guys, for saving me any further need for research. Or reflection. Or sense.

2155 GMT: Another Attack  on Mousavi's Organisation. Kalemeh reports that Mohammad Reza Tajik, a senior aide to Mir Hossein Mousavi, has been arrested.

2110 GMT: Larijani's Latest. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament, continues his tour of the country and his denunciation of the opposition, telling an audience in northeastern Iran: ""In the parliament we have considered such moves [of unrest] like walking on a minefield which would only cause deep rifts and damage the country's prestige."

Is Larijani playing bad cop to the conservative/principlist not-so-bad-cop (Rezaei, Motahari) in pressing for a resolution? Is he beyond compromise, setting out "they shall not pass" either as his personal position or as the (unacknowledged) representative of the Supreme Leader?

I leave it to others to work through the possibilities. Just wanted to ponder this: how many times have we mentioned Larijani in the updates in last few days? And how many times have we mentioned Ahmadinejad?

NEW Iran: The Non-Violent “Watershed” of the Mousavi Statement (Shahryar)
NEW Iran: A Gut Reaction to Mousavi’s “Martyrdom v. Compromise” Statement (Lucas)
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi’s “5 Stages to Resolution” Statement (1 January)
NEW Iran: 2009’s Year of Living Dangerously (Part 1)
Latest Iran Video: Protests Against and for the Regime (31 December)

1750 GMT: What Say You, Rafsanjani? As both Mir Hossein Mousavi and conservative/principlist factions make their political moves for a resolution, attention has now turned to a statement by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani at today's meeting of the Expediency Council, which he chairs.

Both Mousavi's Kalemeh and the state outlet Islamic Republic News Agency say Rafsanjani called for "unity" and "peace" by strengthening the bonds between Iranian people and the Government and that he praised the demonstrations of Iranians on the streets. IRNA then adds, however, that Rafsanjani said:

The Islamic establishment became victorious and continues its existence by relying on the people. I hope the desecrators will learn a lesson from the meaningful presence of the people on the street.

Press TV then adds the gloss, "Rafsanjani said the Wednesday rally also rendered ineffective the plots against the Islamic establishment."

1745 GMT: The Court of Appeals has upheld the six-year prison sentence of journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi.

1740 GMT: Karroubi and Mousavi Move? Saham News reports that Mehdi Karroubi has met Mir Hossein Mousavi for an hour in the home of Mousavi's nephew Seyed Ali, slain last Sunday by security forces. In addition to paying respects, Karroubi discussed "issues surrounding Mousavi's statement".

1715 GMT: The "Conservative/Principlist" Manoeuvre With Mousavi. OK, here's the political game: conservative and principlist activists within the establishment are going to play up the Mousavi statement as a route to compromise in the post-election conflict. This will fit both the Mohsen Rezaei letter to the Supreme Leader (1050 GMT) and the proposals of MP Ali Motahari (1400 GMT). This is being propelled by Tabnak, which is linked to Rezaei.

Here's the tip-off: the English-language Tehran Times, citing Tabnak, has declared:

Former presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi has issued a statement in which he condemned the disrespect of religious sanctities by some protesters on Ashura day (December 27) and made five proposals for resolving the current issues facing the country....Mousavi’s first and second proposals imply that he has accepted that the election is over, a Tabnak analyst said.

The article makes no reference to the first part of Mousavi's statement, with its denunciation of the Government and its declaration that he is prepared to die in the cause of protest against injustice and denial of the Iranian people's rights.

1710 GMT: The Sane'i Demotion (see 1535 GMT). Rah-e-Sabz has claimed that the Qom Seminary Teachers statement, denouncing Ayatollah Sane'i as failing to meet the standards of a marja, was signed by only one person: fervent Ahmadinejad supporter Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi.

Press TV, however, is playing up the "statement bearing the signature of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the former head of Iran's judiciary" as "Ayatollah Sanei no longer qualified: Clerical body" and adds the jibe that Sane'i has "been criticized by millions of Iranians who took part in the demonstration on Wednesday".

1700 GMT: Nemat Ahmadi, whose arrest was reported yesterday, has issued a denial. Ahmadi was at the farm where another activist, Ali Hekmat, was taken by security forces and went to the police station with him.

1535 GMT: Attacking Sane'i. The move against Ayatolllah Yusuf Sane'i continues: the Qom Seminary Teachers Association has announced that he does not meet the conditions to be a marja (eminent cleric, worthy of emulation).

1400 GMT: More on the Move "Within" the Establishment. Earlier today (0740 GMT), Mr Azadi read the Mousavi statement in the context of "unity" calls from clerics, members of Parliament, and high-profile politicians such as Mohsen Rezaei (see 1050 GMT).

Here's more material for the thesis, with the proposals of influential legislator Ali Motahari. Among his seven points:

The leaders of the Green Movement should formally acknowledge the legitimacy of the President, and stop labeling the June election as fraudulent. Furthermore, they should, in the strongest possible terms, distance their positions, slogans, and agenda from anti-Islamic and westernized groups that have infiltrated the Green Movement and seek its leadership....

The President should acknowledge his mistake during the televised debates, and ask for forgiveness from the parties implicated....

Freedom of speech should be established by Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting and the press should adhere to these standards....

The military atmosphere should be brought to an end, and the national intelligence services must put an end to their unfounded claims against the leadership of the Green movement, accusing them of velvet revolution, soft regime change and months of preparation for regime change based on collaboration with foreigners. They should see the roots of post election developments not in foreign intervention but in our own ambitions, worldly goals, illusions, misjudgments and mismanagements. They should apologize to the nation for their excessive use of force against people....

All the detainees, who have often been arrested for unfounded reasons, should be released as soon as possible , except those who have damaged public properties and have resorted to destroying public buildings, particularly those took part in the riots during Ashura....

The full identify and photos of those guilty of initiating, aiding and carrying out the events that took place in Kahrizak, University of Tehran, and Sobhan Apartment Complex should be revealed to the public, and their sentences should be announced....

The judiciary should not remain indifferent in the face of extremist and sectarian supporters of the government who under the mask of Velayat-e Faghih (Guardian of the Jurisprudence) intend to eliminate all reformist and Principalist political figures and order the disruption of public gatherings.

1330 GMT: And If the Nuclear Distraction Doesn't Work (see 0925 GMT).... Press TV has some more on the interview of  Foreign Manouchehr Mottaki on state television. Having put up headlines on Mottaki's "ultimatum" for the West to accept Iran's offers on uranium enrichment within a month, the website now turns to a Mottaki speech on Friday to play the "foreign intervention" card:

Enemies are afraid of the anti-oppression movement Iran has started in the world. So, they are constantly scheming to stop it from spreading in the Muslim world and elsewhere. Vain enemy support for these scattered incidents that have recently occurred in the country on an insignificant scale, will lead to nothing.

Curiously, however, Mottaki located Iran's Number One Enemy not in the great Satanic expanse of the United States but in Britain.

1315 GMT: We've posted our second special analysis of the day on the Mousavi statement: Josh Shahryar assesses the declaration as a non-violent "watershed" for the challenge to the regime.

1105 GMT: Jailing the Activists. Two more members of Iran's Human Rights Reporters, Parisa Kakaei and Mehrdad Rahimi, members of the Committee of Human Rights Reporters, were arrested yesterday. All but two of the organisation's central committee are now detained.

1050 GMT: Connection? The Mousavi Statement and the Rezaei Intervention. There is an intriuing dimension --- possibly parallel, possibly intersecting --- to Mir Hossein Mousavi's declaration on martyrdom and compromise.

Before the Mousavi statement emerged, it was being reported that Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei had written to the Supreme Leader urging a political resolution as Mousavi had now allegedly accepted the post-election legitimacy of the Government.

This morning that line is still being pushed by Press TV's website, which quotes Rezaei:

Although he moved later than he should have, Mousavi has retreated from the position of denying the legitimacy of Mr. Ahmadinejad's government. That retreat as well as his constructive proposal about the role that the parliament and judiciary must play in holding the administration accountable can signal the beginning of a new unifying movement from opposing front.

Rezaei has vocally aligned himself with the regime after Ashura, in public statements and in the letter: "Wednesday demonstrations that brought out millions in a magnificent show of national unity will not only make up for the shame of the sacrilegious events of Ashura but will also play a unique role in foiling enemy plots. Once more, it was proven that Imam Hussein (PBUH) and his reviving path will be the savior of the Iranian nation." So it is clear that any accountability, in his eyes, will be limited to officials rather than reaching up to the offices of the Supreme Leader.

Two questions. First, on the nature of a compromise, at least as foretold by Rezaei: does it include an "accountability" that pushes aside President Ahmadinejad?

Second, has Rezaei's intervention been co-ordinated with Mousavi (see Mr Azadi's interpretation below on an interaction between Mousasvi and other "unity" initiatives such as that of Hashemi Rafsanjani)? Alternatively, is it meant to limit and even undermine Mousavi, especially with the Green movement, by emphasising "retreat"? Or is this a parallel initiative by conservatives/principlists which may or may not intersect with Mousavi in coming days?

0925 GMT: No, It's Nukes, Nukes, Nukes. I would not want to suggest in any way that Foreign Minister Manochehr Mottaki is trying to take everyone's eyes away from what is happening inside Iran, but the timing of this "ultimatum" (his word, not mine) on State TV this morning is interesting: the West must accept accept the Iranian counterproposal either to sell 20-percent uranium to Tehran or swap it for Iran's 3.5-percent stock.

Mottaki declared that the international community "has one month left" to accept, or Tehran will enrich uranium to the 20-percent level.

0840 GMT: We've now posted a special analysis, "A Gut Reaction To The Mousavi Statement".

0740 GMT: We awake this morning to continuing discussion of yesterday's post-Ashura statement by Mir Hossein Mousavi. We have posted the English translation, and we are working on an analysis of the political significance of Mousavi's combination of a passionate condemnation of violence and a readiness to accept martyrdom with his 5-point programme for reconciliation and resolution. In the meantime, EA's Mr Azadi offers this interpretation, which can set against my own thoughts in yesterday's updates:

What is clear is that this statement is to some extent different from Mousavi's previous statements.

Last week, we saw that not only a number of senior scholars in Iran such as Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, Makarem- Shirazi, and Mazaheri recommended all parties and groups to pursue dialogue and unity but also that Ayatollah Fadhlullah in Lebanon emphasised the importance of that dialogue and unity. The seven-point plan of [high-profile member of Parliament] Ali Motahari, the speech of Ali Larijani in Friday Prayers at Mashhad, and the request of [Presidential candidate] Mohsen Rezaei to the Supreme Leader to carefully considering Mousavi’s Statement: all show that Iranian intellectuals and scholars from all parities have come to the same conclusion that this crisis has to stop as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, there have been rumours in Iran that some private dialogue between the Leader and Hashemi Rafsanjani has taken place for resolving the current crisis. In this context, I think Mousavi's statement in a way is very similar to Rafsanjani’s plan for exiting from the current crisis.