From Our Archives (Feb. 2005): When Blair Followed the US into Iraq War

In February 2005, I decided to try my hand at a blog, Rebel Yell: "Better to offer alternative perspectives, not with the certainty of being right but with the hope of unsettling and challenging those who claim a universal perspective and an eternal “right” in the advance of their causes."

Two weeks later, on 28 February 2005, I wrote about the US, Tony Blair, and Iraq. Almost five years later, and a day after Blair's testimony to an enquiry into the 2003 Iraq, I stand by every word:

The Independent on Sunday reveals that Comrade Tony and Her Majesty’s Government decided in April 2002 to follow the Bush Administration’s lead for War in Iraq, almost a year before the formal opening of hostilities.

Credit to the Indy for publishing but this isn’t really news to Rebel Yell. The line here has long been that Dick Cheney came to London in March 2002 to tell Comrade Tony that Afghanistan was now out of fashion and today’s look was regime change in Baghdad. Never mind that Osama might still be skipping around the mountains of eastern Afghanistan --- in early March, eight American troops (then considered, before 1500 US deaths in Iraq, a massive toll) were killed by an ambush in the botched Operation Anaconda. With the face that democracy had been brought to Kabul, Al Qa’eda was now little more than a diversion from the Bush Administration’s priority since January 2001: Saddam Must Go.

Officially the position was “the US does not target states on a day-to-day basis” but the tip-off was in the British announcement that a dossier on Iraq’s WMDs would be published by the end of March. Ah yes, that dossier. It didn’t beat the March deadline because the intelligence on Saddam’s arsenals of death wasn’t there. Indeed, it would take six more months --- after Cheney had proclaimed that Iraq was about to unveil nuclear weapons --- for MI6/Alistair Campbell [Blair's influential press advisor]/Comrade Tony to provide the fig leaf of “Saddam Able to Strike in 45 Minutes”.

So while we’re waiting for the unabridged version of the March 2003 legal opinion, which may or may not have been written by the British Attorney General, that told Parliament that the bombing of Baghdad was legit, how about adding a second request: what was the document in March 2002 that persuaded Comrade Tony that Saddam was an “imminent threat” who must be overthrown? Or was it simply Dick Cheney’s charm and winning smile?

"War on Terror": How to Remove Al Qa'eda From Under Your Bed

Sharmine Narwani, writing for The Huffington Post, takes a long look under her bed, and at the US and the world, to advise how to deal with the fear of Al Qa'eda:

I looked under my bed last night. Just in case. And don't tell me you haven't either. With Al Qaeda popping up in new countries every day, it seemed prudent to make sure a spanking new Salafi jihadist cell wasn't being formed under my California Kingsize mattress.

Known Al Qaeda host nations: Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Jordan - purportedly even Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Jammu and Kashmir, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and - drum roll - the United States.

Actually, with Al Qaeda's strong internet recruitment abilities, let's just scratch that last paragraph and grandly state that this entrepreneurial Salafi franchise is in potentially as many nations as McDonald's.


Afghanistan was the start-up incubator. Operating out of a cave and strapped to a dialysis machine, the canny Saudi-born businessman Osama bin Laden took advantage of the hospitality of fellow Salafists -- the Taliban -- to engineer a magnificent American investment in his franchise, and grow a global brand. And so, thanks to the US's penchant for disproportionate reaction, a rag-tag group of Saudi-funded jihadists hiding out in rough Afghani terrain with a small cadre of operatives scattered around the world, became the new hot stock overnight.

And like any investor worth his salt, the United States looked to an untapped market -- Iraq -- where it then launched its first world-class subsidiary. Yes, that's right. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before the Bush administration initiated its ill-fated market penetration. Not under the watch of the fiercely-secular dictator Saddam Hussein, certainly.

But then American troops swooped in and Al Qaeda, Iraq was born. Every Salafi jihadist still smarting from the US occupation of sacred Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia during Iraq War I -- the raison d'etre of Al Qaeda -- now flocked into the new Iraqi battlefield to prevent a second occupation.

And when the US "surged" in Iraq and Afghanistan, they went elsewhere to revamp, re-arm and recruit. Hence, the presence in Pakistan. And when we "drone-d" in Pakistan, they swarmed to Yemen and Somalia. And when we "funded" Yemen, they reared up in Jordan.

Ergo, every time we make a move in the Muslim world, we invest in Al Qaeda's nimble fund-and-recruit franchise enterprise. In the world of venture capital, the US would be akin to a Greylock, Softbank or Kleiner-Perkins.

This is serious business. Al Qaeda and its copycats threaten not only our way of life, but that of most Muslims in whose nations we wage our silly battles. And after nine years of this, each and every time there is a new Salafi-related development in the Muslim world, we still react with the same bluster, bullying and stunning lack of creativity as we did when we embarrassingly threatened to "smoke them out of their caves" that first time.

Last July, building on the work of the acclaimed 9-11 Commission, the National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG) was formed to tackle changing security threats to the United States. A bi-partisan Who's Who of distinguished security experts, the group includes terrorism and insurgency authority Dr. Bruce Hoffman who recently authored an insightful opinion piece in the Washington Post entitled"Al Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one too."

Hoffman reveals how a "shrewdly opportunistic" Al Qaeda is playing to the US's weaknesses with only a handful of operatives, while the United States is "stuck in a pattern of belated responses." Having failed to recognize Al Qaeda's changing strategies, this systemic failure in US intelligence, security and military centers is doomed to continue unless we re-jig things. But I would argue that Hoffman and the NSPG are also doomed to fail if they do not consider a broader reshuffle of US Mideast policy to keep future Salafi groups at bay.

What is the solution? Look at it as a business venture, if you will.

A well-crafted exit strategy: Get out as quickly as possible without leaving a worse mess behind as we did in Afghanistan I and Iraq I.

Distribution: Hand over ops to sovereign states. And if we are going to fund them, make sure the funds are going to the right fights. Sometimes these are not military confrontations, but instead education, economic progress, human rights and democracy. Which means that we will have to stop propping up dictators in the Middle East, i.e., most of our closest allies, and start standing firmly behind genuine efforts for reform.

That may mean Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - but you know what? Let them figure it out for themselves. If the Brotherhood, known as the Ikhwan, had been allowed to participate in Egyptian elections decades ago, the whole Middle East may have gone through and come out the other end of "political Islam," which incidentally isn't necessarily a bad thing. Think Turkey.

And we don't have to take on the Mideast's problems ourselves. Distribute the workload and delegate responsibility to other influential nations who have more nuanced relationships with regional players -- some EU nations, Russia, China, Turkey, India and Qatar come to mind.

Partnerships: As hard as this may be for a US administration to stomach, this may be the time to invoke the "your enemy's enemy is your friend" doctrine of foreign policy. Which effectively means that we need to partner with Al Qaeda's biggest regional targets and foes. Who are they? Think Shiites. That means Iran - a country that rang alarm bells when the Taliban rose to power, although we didn't listen then. A country that has offered and delivered help during our worst times in Afghanistan and Iraq, even though we showed no gratitude. More importantly, a country that has been on the receiving end of the same kinds of Salafi attacks by Al Qaeda supported groups as have US troops.

Iran leads a regional bloc of nations and groups included on our dated State Department terrorism lists. We need to start to distinguish between Islamist groups with nationalist agendas (Hezbollah) and those with "cosmic" plans (Al Qaeda) because Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Hamas have all been under Salafi jihadist threat of some sort this past year. They would make smart, resourceful and powerful regional allies - unlike our alliances with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both supremely impotent despite their claims otherwise, and boasting zero street cred, unlike the former bloc.

Troubleshoot: Deal swiftly and creatively with the Palestinian issue. This is the one regional issue that will continue to be exploited effectively by Al Qaeda and its franchises - the crux of Bin Laden's most recent audiotape message last weekend. Open up Gaza's Rafah border with Egypt and start physically monitoring the delivery of widespread humanitarian aid to the 1.5 million Gazans living under siege - we will build instant goodwill with Palestinians at the negotiating table and remind Arabs of their hopes in a pre-Cairo Obama.

If we can move mountains and send manpower to Haiti in a nanosecond, we can loosen a crumby little border in Rafah, surely?

Strike Deals: Sponsor a timelined Palestinian-Israeli agreement on final solution issues - borders, refugees, sovereignty, natural resources and Jerusalem. Enough with the spineless pussy-footing around the hard issues that has been "all process and no peace" for 18 years now. Utilize J-Street and other sane voices in the American Jewish community to back up a new, firm approach to Israel - the Jewish state, the occupying entity, needs to make some significant concessions for any peaceful resolution of the conflict . Or...get out of peacemaking altogether and let the Palestinians and Israelis find their own way to a One State Solution. Colonial-settler movements never last, and the establishment of a single democratic state consisting of Jews, Muslims and Christians is the natural, organic direction of things without our overbearing, one-sided participation.

And table the failed Iran nuclear talks to deal with the more pressing issues of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan where both the US and the Islamic Republic have an "existential" stake and share much common ground. A focused, mutually-beneficial game plan here will create the necessary trust to tackle the nuclear issue further down the road, which will in turn diffuse a regional nuclear race.

As any savvy CEO will tell you, don't say or do anything unless there are clear quantifiable and qualitative benefits to be reaped. From his lips to Obama's ears...

While it looks like Al Qaeda is spreading like wildfire, the fact is, it isn't. Their numbers have dwindled in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their popularity has generally plummeted amongst Mideast populations. But there is a marked increase in the number of Salafi, jihad-mindedindividuals who are fed-up with the status quo and are happy to risk life and limb. Every silly move we make - and we really know how to do silly - beefs up the Al Qaeda brand and extends the franchise.

So in places like Yemen and Jordan, where local governments have until recently played a careful balancing act and kept their Salafists under wraps, one false American move threatens -- always -- to crack open a can of worms. Think healthcare reform and Teabaggers for a closer-to-home analogy.

And it only takes one bus bombing, one aircraft explosion, one restaurant pipe-bomb to level economies, cripple tourism, incite insurgencies and create an environment of fear. We need to exit these battles and fundamentally alter our disingenuous Middle East policies to allow anger to subside and reform to flourish.

Or I will have to check my closets next.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Special: Mr Obama's Revenge of the Drones

Much tinkling of the keypads has ensued in the drive to comment on the Obama Administration's Afghanistan strategy, in particular the escalation of troop strength. Less noticed in the clatter, particularly in the UK, has been the Pakistan portion of the strategy. Dribs and drabs of that approach have leaked out over the last few months. In February 2009, Senator Diane Feinstein inadvertently (or possibly deliberately in an effort to illustrate the hypocrisy of the Pakistani government) revealed that the unmanned drones carrying out missile strikes in Pakistan were being flown out of a secret base in Pakistan.

Then in the latter half of last year detailed studies of the drones began to appear. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann first looked at the growth in the number of drone strikes in Pakistan. Then they analyzed the casualties from drone attacks in an effort to determine how many civilians were being killed in the strikes. They concluded that of the 750 to 1050 killed by drones between 2006 and October 2009, one third were civilians. Chiming in the same month was journalist Jane Mayer who in a lengthy and thoughtful piece in The New Yorker examined the expansion of drone attacks by the Obama administration, including their effectiveness, and legality.

The statistics related to the drones are startling. Since Barack Obama took office, there have been 58 drone strikes in Pakistan. This is 32 more strikes than occurred in the entire second term of the Bush Administration and represents nearly 70 percent of all drone attacks that have occurred in Pakistan since 2004. Below are statistics drawn from an effort to map out the location of the strikes using Google Earth.



Drone Strikes by Year [Source, including map]

Drone Attacks in Pakistan by Numbers and Percentages [Source, including map]



Obama Drone Strikes in Pakistan (23 January 2009 to 20 January 2010) [Source: Ben]

For 2010 alone, the number of attacks projected over 365 days would be 201. January 2010 has already seen more than double the previous monthly record of drone attacks and more than occurred in the years 2004 to 2007. This is a massive escalation of drone strikes and points to a particular strategic approach by the current administration to the problem of Pakistan. The administration signaled a further escalation when Obama made his long awaited strategic speech about Afghanistan on 1 December 2009. Nothing about the CIA-operated drones actually appeared in the president’s speech. Instead, administration officials briefed the New York Times that part of the new effort in Afghanistan would involve a substantial increase in CIA covert operations within Pakistan, including drone attacks.

This briefing demonstrated once more that what once occurred under the rubric of counter-terrorism is anything but. One of the striking points made in Jane Mayer's detailed examination of the Obama administration's drone policy is that a growing number of the attacks are not against al-Qaeda targets, the original justification for “targeted killings” by the CIA, but against the Taliban and other Pakistani insurgents. Increasingly, the Pakistani government is apparently having input into the American target selection as the drones become a weapon of counter-insurgency

In a very real sense then drone attacks are less about counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan and more about counter-insurgency operations in support of the mission in Afghanistan. The drones represent the perfect tool for the Obama administration since they can simultaneously fulfill two of his foreign policy promises: to go after al-Qaeda and to make Afghanistan the priority war. Sudden death and destruction from the sky also readily provides the image of a proactive United States savaging its enemies instead of passively waiting for them to strike. The problem with that approach, however, is that it leaves Pakistan out of the equation. The formula doesn’t calculate the wider political damage being done to the image of the United States in Pakistan, something Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently encountered first hand on a visit when Pakistanis complained to her about the attacks, one even calling the tactic terrorism. Driving the escalation of drone attacks appears to be short-term thinking with the drones a convenient and satisfying means to seek vengeance against enemies, witness the escalation of drone attacks against targets in Pakistan since the suicide attack which killed 7 CIA members in Afghanistan on 30 December. An “angry senior American intelligence official” told the New York Times that “[s]ome very bad people will eventually have a very bad day.”

It is worth remembering these words of caution about the path the Obama Administration is enthusiastically following: "We are against targeted killings. We are against the use [by the Israelis] of heavy weaponry in urban areas, even when it comes to people … who have been responsible for the deaths of American citizens. We do think these people need to be brought to justice." So said Bush Administration State Department spokesman Richard Boucher in September 2002.

Pakistan: US "Public Relations Disaster" in Gates Mission

Juan Cole is scathing about the most recent political effort by the Obama Administration in Pakistan:

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates's trip to Pakistan this weekend has in many ways been a public relations disaster, and I think it is fair to say that he came away empty-handed with regard to his chief policy goals in Islamabad. Getting Pakistan right is key to President Barack Obama's policy of escalating the Afghanistan War, and judging by Gates's visit to Islamabad, Obama is in worse shape on the AfPak front than he is even in Massachusetts [after the unexpected Republican victory in the US Senate vote]. Since he has bet so heavily on Afghanistan and Pakistan, this rocky road could be momentous for his presidency.

In one of a series of gaffes, he seemed to admit in a television interview that the private security firm, Blackwater, was active in Pakistan.

The Pakistani public has a widespread resentment against US incursions against the country's sovereignty (64% say the US is a danger to the country's stability). But it also has a sort of paranoid obsession with Blackwater, which they suspect of covert operations to disrupt security in the country (i.e. they blame Blackwater for bombings that Americans see as the work of the Taliban). Thus, Gates's statement produced a media frenzy. (Jeremy Scahill has alleged in The Nation that Blackwater is in fact in Pakistan in a support role to CIA drone attacks in the country's mountainous Northwest on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets).


Dawn, a relatively pro-Western English daily, quoted the exchange, saying Gates was asked by the interviewer on a private television station,

' “And I want to talk, of course, about another issue that has come up again and again about the private security companies that have been operating in Iraq, in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan. . . Xe International, formerly known as Blackwater and Dyncorp. Under what rules are they operating here in Pakistan?”

Gates replied,

' “Well, they’re operating as individual companies here in Pakistan, in Afghanistan and in Iraq because there are theatres of war involving the United States.”

The Urdu press concluded that he had admitted Blackwater is active on Pakistani soil, while noting denials from the US embassy in Islamabad that that was what Gates had meant. The News, the mainstream English-language sister of Jang, was also insistent that Gates had let the cat out of the bag.

Gates had one strike against him, since he came to Pakistan from India. Moreover while in New Delhi he clearly was a traveling salesman for the US war materiel industries, who would like to pick up some of the $60 billion India is planning to spend on weapons in the next few years. During the Cold War, the US had mainly supplied Pakistan's military, and had been lukewarm to India, which Washington felt tilted toward Moscow. The current shift of US strategy to wooing India to offset growing Chinese power in Asia is taken by some Pakistanis as a demotion.

Then, he encouraged a greater Indian role in Afghanistan, including, according to the Times of London, possibly in training Afghan police. Pakistan considers Afghanistan its sphere of influence and the last thing it wants is a role for Indian security forces in training (and perhaps shaping the loyalty) of Afghan police. Germany is currently in charge of the police training program, but India is afraid that in the next few years NATO will depart, and that Pakistan will then redeploy its Taliban allies to capture the country for Islamabad's purposes. India is also concerned about significant Chinese investments, as in a big copper mine, in Afghanistan. So New Delhi is considering the police training mission.

In addition, Gates had praised Indian restraint in the face of the fall, 2008 attack on Mumbai (Bombay) by the Pakistani terrorist organization, the Lashkar-i Tayyiba [Army of the Good]. He warned the Pakistani leadership that India's forbearance could not be taken for granted the next time. That is a fair point, but it is not the sort of thing you say publicly on your way to Islamabad from Delhi if you want to be received as an honest broker. Pakistanis feel that India has inflicted many provocations on them, too, not least of which was the Indian security forces' often brutal repression in Muslim-majority Kashmir, where thousands have died since 1989 in a separatist movement with which Pakistanis deeply sympathize. (Pakistani guerrilla groups also did routinely slip into Indian Kashmir in support of local separatists).

Prominent members of the Pakistani Senate denounced Gates for setting up Pakistan as a sort of patsy and hostage to communal violence in India, and of fomenting a Washington-New Delhi 'conspiracy' against Islamabad. What if some Indian terrorist group carried out an attack in India? wasn't Gates giving New Delhi carte blanche, they asked, to blame Pakistan for it even in the absence of any evidence, and then to launch a war of aggression on Pakistan with the incident as a pretext?

The Los Angeles Times said that "Gates, on the first day of a visit here, urged government officials to build on their offensives against militants . . ."

In fact, Gates was careful not to over-emphasize such demands, but there was a general public perception that he was doing so. The editorials in Urdu newspapers on Jan. 23, which the USG Open Source Center analyzed, complained bitterly about this further demand. Express sniffed that the US should establish security in Afghanistan and then everything would settle down in Pakistan's northwest. Khabrain rather cleverly pointed out that Pakistan has concentrated on limited territory in fighting its Taliban, which is wiser than the US policy of opening several fronts at once and getting bogged down.

Jang, which is mildly anti-American, said,

Describing Robert Gates' pro-Indian statements irresponsible, the editorial says: "It is believed that the political and military leaderships of Pakistan, with one voice, have made it clear to Gates and the titanic-size delegation accompanying him that in the present circumstances, it is not possible for Pakistan to accede to the persistent US demands of 'do more' and to further expand military operations in the tribal areas, because Pakistan not only has to secure the areas that it has taken control of from the militants but also has to strengthen and stabilize its position there."

Then the Pakistani military spokesman came out and flatly told Gates that the Swat and South Waziristan campaigns were it for now. The BBC reports, 'Maj Gen Abbas, head of public relations for the Pakistan army, told the BBC: "We are not going to conduct any major new operations against the militants over the next 12 months. . . The Pakistan army is overstretched and it is not in a position to open any new fronts. Obviously, we will continue our present operations in Waziristan and Swat." '

To be fair, the Pakistani military committed tens of thousands of troops to these two campaigns, in Swat and South Waziristan, and is in fact attempting to garrison the captured areas so as to prevent the return of the Pakistani Taliban. In the past two years, the Pakistani army has lost over 2,000 soldiers in such fighting against Taliban in the Northwest, a little less than half the troops the US lost in its 6-year Iraq War.

The Pakistani military campaigns of the past year, however, have not targeted those radical groups most active in cross-border raids into Afghanistan-- the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar's Old Taliban, the Haqqani Network of Siraj Haqqani in North Waziristan, or whatever cells exist in Pakistan of the largely Afghanistan-based Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Washington worries that the effectiveness of its own troop escalation in Afghanistan will be blunted if these three continue to have havens on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. And, Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani worries that the US offensive in Afghanistan will push thousands radicals over the border into Pakistan, further destabilizing the country's northwest.

Gates made a clumsy attempt to mollify Pakistani public opinion over the very unpopular US drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban cells in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, by offering the Pakistani military 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones of its own. But the Pakistani military pointed out that the outdated RQ-7 Shadow UAV's on offer were unarmed and merely for aerial reconnaissance, and maintained that Pakistan's arsenal already contained such drones.

Gates addressed the Pakistani cadets at the National Defense University, attempting to emphasize that he wanted more of these future officers to study in the US, and that Pakistan is in the driver's seat with regard to the anti-Taliban counter-insurgency campaign. Its message was largely missed in the civilian Urdu press.

Does it matter? One sometimes see Americans dismiss Pakistan as "small" or "unimportant." Think again. Pakistan is the world's sixth-largest country by population (170 million),just after Brazil (200 million). It is as big as California, Oregon and Washington state rolled together. Pakistan's 550,000-man military is among the best-trained and best-equipped in the global South. Pakistan has within it a middle class with a Western-style education and way of life (automobiles, access to internet and international media) of some 37 million-- roughly 5 million families. (Pakistan has over 5 million automobiles now and is an emerging auto producer and market, with auto production at 16 percent of its manufaturing sector). If we go by local purchasing power, it is the world's 27th largest economy. It is a nuclear power with a sophisticated if small scientific establishment, and produced a Nobelist in physics.

Gates went to Pakistan to emphasize to Islamabad that the US was not again going to abandon it and Afghanistan, as it had in the past. Pakistan, he wanted to say, is now a very long-term ally of Washington. He hoped for cooperation against the Haqqani, Taliban and Hizb-i Islami guerrillas. He wanted to allay conspiracy theories about US mercenary armies crawling over Pakistan, occasionally blowing things up (and then blaming the explosions on Pakistanis) in order to destabilize the country and manipulate its policies.

The message his mission inadvertently sent was that the US is now increasingly tilting to India and wants to put it in charge of Afghanistan security; that Pakistan is isolated; that he is pressuring Pakistan to take on further counter-insurgency operations against Taliban in the Northwest, which the country flatly lacks the resources to do; and that Pakistani conspiracy theories about Blackwater were perfectly correct and he had admitted it.

In baseball terms, Gates struck out. In cricket terms, Gates was out in the most embarrassing way a batsman can be out, that is, leg before wicket.

Obama Reflects: Domestic Problems, Wars Abroad, and the Difficult Middle East

In interview with Time Magazine this week , Barack Obama faced up to disappointments at home and abroad

After covering his health care proposals and underlining the importance of financial reform, Obama turned to foreign policy. He talked of the "Administration taking out more al-Qaeda high-level operatives". He admitted that the decision to increased the number of troops in Afghanistan was one of the toughest he had ever made, adding that his Administration is doing a good job in getting troops out of Iraq even though it is not an easy process. On Iran, Obama reiterated the dual-track approach of engagement and sanctions.

Perhaps the most striking Obama reflection, however, was on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process: "The Middle East peace process has not moved forward. And I think it's fair to say that for all our efforts at early engagement, it is not where I want it to be."

The interview in full:

Klein: I talked to a bunch a folks — friends, my kids — what should I ask the President? It was almost unanimous: the thing that people remarked on is just how crazy things are. How difficult it is. Focused on the health care process — what have you learned from that process, what's your takeaway? How is it going to influence the rest of your presidency?

Obama: Look, even if we hadn't tackled health care, this year was going to be a tough year. During the transition period last year, it became apparent very quickly that we were going to have to make some fast, tough and in some cases politically unpopular decisions to make sure the financial system didn't melt down and we did not spiral into a second Great Depression. We made those decisions and executed them, and I am absolutely convinced that had we not acted the way we did that the situation would've been far worse.

Having said that, we've still lost 7 million jobs over the last two years. People who are out of work or have seen their 401(k)s diminish or their hours reduced understandably are frustrated when they see big banks getting money for a problem that they helped cause. And when you see the unemployment rate spike to 10%, it was inevitable and justifiable that the political climate would become very difficult. So health care was done against the backdrop of what was already going to be a tough political climate.

Having said that, there is no doubt that the process for doing big, important things in this country has become far more difficult because of the way Congress is working right now. I came in expressing a strong spirit of bipartisanship, and what was clear was that even in the midst of crisis, there were those who made decisions based on a quick political calculus rather than on what the country needed. The classic example being me heading over to meet with the House Republican caucus to discuss the stimulus and finding out that [House minority leader John] Boehner had already released a statement saying, We're going to vote against the bill before we've even had a chance to exchange ideas.

So I understand the strategy that the Republicans decided to pursue. There is a good political argument for it. I don't think it has served the country well, and it hasn't served the process well. Health care then became caught up in that process. And I think that what's clear is that if you have an opposition party that is determined to say no [and] sees their political survival dependent on gridlock, things can get tied up in knots. So that's the second point.

And the final point is that health care was going to be hard in any environment with any Congress. There's a reason why seven Presidents and seven Congresses have failed to do it. It is a massive undertaking. It involves every special interest imaginable. The American people know that the status quo isn't working, and yet sometimes the devil you know is better than the devil you don't. So it is very easy to caricature any efforts at reform as negative.

Now, I've given you three big reasons why this was so tough. Having said all that, I think we're going to get it done. And I think this is going to be a framework that allows us to genuinely say that every American is going to have access to quality, affordable health care. And that people who have health care have security in the coverage that they've purchased. That is an enormous accomplishment, and the thing that I'm most proud of is that not only will we have dealt with access, not only will we have dealt with accountability when it comes to insurance companies, but when all is said and done, this offers our best chance at significant deficit reduction, of any of the other options that are out there.

Klein: But it comes with a high opportunity cost, given the political hot spot of the moment. Say you're sitting in Belmont, Mass., or Needham, and you're watching the unions get their deal and Nebraska get its deal and everybody else get their deals. What would you say to that person, who probably voted for you because you promised change and — I was just reading David Plouffe's book [The Audacity to Win] — the emphasis on going after the special interests? But you've made deals with all the special interests to get this done.

Obama: Well, I'll tell you what, Joe. What I would say is, If you look at this bill when it is said and done — not where it was coming out of one committee or where it was coming out of another committee, but the bill that I actually sign. I think what you're going to see is that there have been very few instances where something of this magnitude had relatively few provisions in there that weren't for the broad public. Getting something through 535 members of Congress involves some trade-offs.

When I promised change, I didn't promise that somehow members of Congress weren't going to be looking to try to get a project in their district or help a hospital in their neighborhood. What I promised was that this White House was going to constantly be pursuing the people's interests. And this bill will pass that bar by a mile.

One last thing I'll say about this: There is no doubt that politically speaking, having this intense a focus on the sausage-making process in Congress is never helpful.

Klein: But it's impossible to avoid.

Obama: It's impossible to avoid if you're trying to do big stuff. Now it is even more difficult in a 24-hour news cycle. I have no idea what Lyndon Johnson had to do to get the Civil Rights Act done. Or if I have an idea, it's because I read Robert Caro's biography 40 or 50 years later. So that process is one that people have legitimate concerns about. And one of the things that I think is very important for us to do moving forward on financial reform, on energy legislation, on the jobs package that we're going to put forward, is we've got to do a better job highlighting what's good in these measures.

But I also think that I have to make sure that our team doesn't lose sight of our broader message. Which is that the American people have a right to see what's going on, understand what's going on. That there are some things you can compromise, but there are some things you shouldn't compromise. If you're dealing with the interest groups here in Washington, don't get too comfortable. That's something you have to constantly reinforce and remind.

Klein: What do you mean, "Don't get too comfortable"?

Obama: Don't get too comfortable in the sense that there's a culture in this town, which is an insider culture. That's what I think people outside of Washington legitimately can't stand. A sense that they're not being heard. I think we've done actually a pretty good job of working in this town without being completely consumed by it. But from the outside, if you're just watching TV and all you're hearing about is the reports, people may get the false impression that somehow [the insiders] are the folks we're spending more time listening to.

In fact, I spend most of my time listening to the people who — through their letters or through town-hall meetings or in my travels throughout the country — are telling me the stories of hardship and heartache. Losing their house because they don't have health insurance. That's what moves us here, but that's not always what comes across in the day-to-day combat that we're going through.

Klein: Well, it seems obvious that when you get through with this bill, you're going to be turning to some of the things that upset people and the perception that you're at one with Wall Street, at one with Big Government. And obviously that means financial reform and also I think budget and infrastructure are going to be big things this year. But let me ask you first about the financial reform part of it. One of your advisers, Paul Volcker, has said that none of the financial instruments that have been developed over the past 20 years have added anything to our economy. And I remember you and I talking during the campaign about how the economy was going to have to change. Do you agree with Volcker?

Obama: Well, what I agree with Paul about, and I agree with him on a lot of things, is that sophisticated financial tricks and fancy hedge instruments, etc., aren't valuable just because they're making somebody $100 million worth of bonuses. And I think it is very important that we understand first principles when it comes to our financial sector. The role of the financial sector is to raise capital for businesses that actually make things and provide services to people. To help grow this economy. They should make a profit doing it.

I think the fact that we have a diverse and sophisticated and innovative financial marketplace is a positive. It gives more businesses more tools to raise capital for good ideas, entrepreneurs to start businesses. But when you see more and more of the financial sector basically churning transactions and engaging in reckless speculation and obscuring underlying risks in a way that makes a few people obscene amounts of money but doesn't add value to the economy — and in fact puts the entire economy at enormous risk — then something's got to change.

Now, I want to go back to your initial premise of us being close to Wall Street. We knew that this would be a consequence of us managing TARP. It was inevitable. One of the things that we have to do is just remind people that having inherited this financial disaster as well as the TARP structure, this thing was managed in as prudent a way as any financial-crisis management has ever been managed.

Klein: I think they'll give you that.

Obama: And what we're now doing, for example, on the fee on these big financial institutions is not designed to punish; it's just designed to meet what was in the legislation originally, which was: This was not going to cost taxpayers a dime's worth of money. Something, by the way, that nobody believed, but something that we may actually be able to deliver on.

With respect to financial reform: This was always one of our top agendas. I started talking about this during the campaign, and I made a major speech about how we're going to move forward [last] March. My hope had been that health care wouldn't take this long. And that we would've teed up both energy and financial reform before the end of the first year. If there's one thing I have learned — you asked earlier about something I've learned about this process — it always takes longer than you think.

Let me just close on financial regulatory reform. This is going to be a top priority. You are already seeing the big banks and some of these other interests lining up in opposition to basic core reforms, like making sure that consumers know what the fine print is when it comes to their credit cards or their debit cards or their mortgages. You're already seeing them resisting the idea that they should have a regulatory regime that isn't full of loopholes.

And my attitude is that this is a fight that is entirely consistent with what we've done last year, it's entirely consistent with who I am and how I campaigned, and it's a fight that I welcome. And it'll be interesting to see how some who have tried to exploit legitimate anger at the big banks this year by trying to put it on us are going to position themselves when in fact they're going to want to protect all these financial institutions from the regulations that will prevent the kind of disaster that we've seen over the past couple of years.

Klein: They're going to have to vote yea or nay, aren't they?

Obama: Right.

Klein: During the campaign, the one program that you proposed that everybody from the left to the right loved was the infrastructure bank. And it seems to me that was another thing that kind of fell by the wayside this year.

Obama: You're wrong about that. Well, you're right that people liked it.

Klein: But that's the good government fight. That's the fight against the appropriators in Congress.

Obama: You're absolutely right, and look, one of the things we've got to do better is to tell the story of what was in the [American Recovery and Reinvestment Act]. That was the largest investment in research and development in our history.

Klein: And it's coming online this year?

Obama: And it's moving. One constituency that I know is happy with me are scientists, inventors, entrepreneurs who are in the high-tech sectors, because they are seeing already the incredible investments that are happening that are going to have 20-, 30-year payoffs. It was the biggest investment in education. And it wasn't just the usual formulas. Some of it was helping to make sure teachers didn't get laid off, but what [Secretary of Education] Arne Duncan is doing with our Race to the Top Fund — we've already had 48 states react by implementing reforms that had been resisted for years. And you're starting to see the teachers' unions really think through how can they be a partner in the process of reform. And when it comes to infrastructure, not only was it the biggest investment in infrastructure since the Eisenhower Interstate Highway System, but we actually introduced the infrastructure-bank concept in the Recovery Act.

Now, you are absolutely right that this seed that we've planted is going to have to be carefully nurtured. And for readers who aren't familiar, the basic idea is that we should not only fund the usual repaving of highways — although that's important — but we should also think, What's the 21st century infrastructure that's out there? And those decisions should be made by people who really have clear ideas about the kind of infrastructure we're going to need. As opposed to it being determined solely by, you know, "Who's the chairman of the transportation committee from what state?"

But I am sensitive to the fact that Congress has its prerogatives. We're trying to nudge them in the direction of rationalizing our transportation knowledge — particularly in a time of fiscal constraint. And by the way, that's a principle that's going to apply, Joe, to all of government. You mentioned earlier the pivot that we have to make. It's not driven by politics. We had to do what we had to do last year, whether it was politically popular or not. Now that we have begun the recovery process and the economy has stabilized, we have to deal with our long-term fiscal problems, whether it's politically popular or not. And some of those decisions are going to be just as unpopular.

But part of that pivot, then, is to say, "How are we going to make sure that we squeeze every ounce of value out of every dollar that we spend?" We began that process with Pentagon reform. And the victories that [Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates helped win are ones that this town completely discounted when we started. We are scrubbing the budget once again to make sure that every program that we're funding actually has some justification — it actually works. Yesterday we had a whole bunch of CEOs and innovators here to talk about modernization of government. The infrastructure bank falls in that broader category of, How do we make these dollars work better? Because we're going to have to make some very difficult spending decisions moving forward.

Klein: It seems to me that these are ways — the Wall Street battle — to start building trust in a small way. People have had 30 years of propaganda telling them that government doesn't work.

Obama: And my theory, Joe, has always been, A) A lot of people's skepticism is entirely justified. B) There's no reason that government should inherently be inefficient. C) At a time when we've got such enormous problems and such limited resources, people are going to be looking to government for help. But they want to make sure that their dollars are well spent, because those are the same decisions that they're having to make in their own lives. They're looking for value. Whether they're shopping for a pair of jeans or they're going to a restaurant or they're buying a new car. And right now, they don't feel like they're getting good value out of their government.

Klein: Let me ask you one foreign policy question. My sense is that — just my own personal sense, but also from people I talk to — the overall conception of your foreign policy has been absolutely right. Necessary, corrective. Subtle, comprehensive.

Obama: We have a good team.

Klein: But there have been some problems in execution.

Obama: Well, I would not deny that, but let me say that given what's on our plate — and you know the list. I don't need to tick them off.

Klein: I've been to most of them in the past year.

Obama: I actually think that our execution has been sound as well. I'll give you the examples of where I think our foreign policy team has gotten the right strategy and has executed well even though the outcomes are still uncertain — because these are tough problems that aren't subject to easy solutions. I think that in Iraq, we are moving forward and on pace to get our troops out. It's messy, it's imperfect, but I think that our team has done a very good job managing that process.

I think in Afghanistan, as difficult as those choices were — and me sending in additional troops over the next two years was probably the toughest decision that I've made this year among a lot of very tough decisions, because it involved the lives of young men and women in uniform. We are monitoring very carefully how it's being executed. And I think that General [Stanley] McChrystal, General [David] Petraeus, [U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan] Karl Eikenberry and others are working double time to successfully implement this. I know that you've written, Joe, that there may be some questions in terms of pace of getting troops in. I can assure you that a fire is lit under them about making that happen.

Klein: That's one of the reasons I wrote that.

Obama: They want it to happen. And we are more or less going to be on schedule. We are probably ahead of schedule so far in terms of recruiting and training Afghans. Although I've said that we should set very modest expectations of what's sustainable to transfer to an Afghan government.

On Iran, one of our trickiest foreign policy challenges, we have held the international community together, both in our engagement strategy, but also now as we move into a dual-track approach. Which is, If they don't accept the open hand, we've got to make sure they understand there are consequences for breaking international rules. It's going to be tough, but I think the relationship we've developed with Russia will be very helpful. The outreach we've done to our traditional NATO allies will be very helpful. The work that we've done with China — including the work we've done with China to enforce sanctions against North Korea — will help us in dealing more effectively with Iran.

I mentioned North Korea — everybody was skeptical at the beginning of this year that we could get serious sanctions. Not only have we gotten serious sanctions, but they've actually been implemented. And finally — because this has been the area of most immediate concern — when it comes to counterterrorism, this Administration has taken out more al-Qaeda high-level operatives, has been more aggressive in pinning them down, not just in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also working with our international partners in places like Yemen and Somalia, than a lot of what's taken place previously.

Having said that, there's no doubt, as I said, that I think our intelligence failures in picking up [Nigerian terrorism suspect Umar Farouk] Abdulmutallab shows how much more has to be done. I think everybody understands that this is an area where we have to be relentless regardless of what else is on our plate. The other area which I think is worth noting is that the Middle East peace process has not moved forward. And I think it's fair to say that for all our efforts at early engagement, it is not where I want it to be.

Klein: Why is that? My sense of it is that [U.S. special envoy to the Middle East George] Mitchell spent a number of months negotiating a settlement deal and saw some progress from the Israelis and kind of got blinded by that, because he didn't see that it wasn't sufficient progress for the Palestinians.

Obama: I'll be honest with you. A) This is just really hard. Even for a guy like George Mitchell, who helped bring about the peace in Northern Ireland. This is as intractable a problem as you get. B) Both sides — the Israelis and the Palestinians — have found that the political environment, the nature of their coalitions or the divisions within their societies, were such that it was very hard for them to start engaging in a meaningful conversation. And I think that we overestimated our ability to persuade them to do so when their politics ran contrary to that. From [Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud] Abbas' perspective, he's got Hamas looking over his shoulder and, I think, an environment generally within the Arab world that feels impatient with any process.

And on the Israeli front — although the Israelis, I think, after a lot of time showed a willingness to make some modifications in their policies, they still found it very hard to move with any bold gestures. And so what we're going to have to do — I think it is absolutely true that what we did this year didn't produce the kind of breakthrough that we wanted, and if we had anticipated some of these political problems on both sides earlier, we might not have raised expectations as high. Moving forward, though, we are going to continue to work with both parties to recognize what I think is ultimately their deep-seated interest in a two-state solution in which Israel is secure and the Palestinians have sovereignty and can start focusing on developing their economy and improving the lives of their children and grandchildren.