"War on Terror": How to Remove Al Qa'eda From Under Your Bed

Sharmine Narwani, writing for The Huffington Post, takes a long look under her bed, and at the US and the world, to advise how to deal with the fear of Al Qa'eda:

I looked under my bed last night. Just in case. And don't tell me you haven't either. With Al Qaeda popping up in new countries every day, it seemed prudent to make sure a spanking new Salafi jihadist cell wasn't being formed under my California Kingsize mattress.

Known Al Qaeda host nations: Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Jordan - purportedly even Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Nigeria, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Jammu and Kashmir, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and - drum roll - the United States.

Actually, with Al Qaeda's strong internet recruitment abilities, let's just scratch that last paragraph and grandly state that this entrepreneurial Salafi franchise is in potentially as many nations as McDonald's.


Afghanistan was the start-up incubator. Operating out of a cave and strapped to a dialysis machine, the canny Saudi-born businessman Osama bin Laden took advantage of the hospitality of fellow Salafists -- the Taliban -- to engineer a magnificent American investment in his franchise, and grow a global brand. And so, thanks to the US's penchant for disproportionate reaction, a rag-tag group of Saudi-funded jihadists hiding out in rough Afghani terrain with a small cadre of operatives scattered around the world, became the new hot stock overnight.

And like any investor worth his salt, the United States looked to an untapped market -- Iraq -- where it then launched its first world-class subsidiary. Yes, that's right. There was no Al Qaeda in Iraq before the Bush administration initiated its ill-fated market penetration. Not under the watch of the fiercely-secular dictator Saddam Hussein, certainly.

But then American troops swooped in and Al Qaeda, Iraq was born. Every Salafi jihadist still smarting from the US occupation of sacred Muslim soil in Saudi Arabia during Iraq War I -- the raison d'etre of Al Qaeda -- now flocked into the new Iraqi battlefield to prevent a second occupation.

And when the US "surged" in Iraq and Afghanistan, they went elsewhere to revamp, re-arm and recruit. Hence, the presence in Pakistan. And when we "drone-d" in Pakistan, they swarmed to Yemen and Somalia. And when we "funded" Yemen, they reared up in Jordan.

Ergo, every time we make a move in the Muslim world, we invest in Al Qaeda's nimble fund-and-recruit franchise enterprise. In the world of venture capital, the US would be akin to a Greylock, Softbank or Kleiner-Perkins.

This is serious business. Al Qaeda and its copycats threaten not only our way of life, but that of most Muslims in whose nations we wage our silly battles. And after nine years of this, each and every time there is a new Salafi-related development in the Muslim world, we still react with the same bluster, bullying and stunning lack of creativity as we did when we embarrassingly threatened to "smoke them out of their caves" that first time.

Last July, building on the work of the acclaimed 9-11 Commission, the National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG) was formed to tackle changing security threats to the United States. A bi-partisan Who's Who of distinguished security experts, the group includes terrorism and insurgency authority Dr. Bruce Hoffman who recently authored an insightful opinion piece in the Washington Post entitled"Al Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one too."

Hoffman reveals how a "shrewdly opportunistic" Al Qaeda is playing to the US's weaknesses with only a handful of operatives, while the United States is "stuck in a pattern of belated responses." Having failed to recognize Al Qaeda's changing strategies, this systemic failure in US intelligence, security and military centers is doomed to continue unless we re-jig things. But I would argue that Hoffman and the NSPG are also doomed to fail if they do not consider a broader reshuffle of US Mideast policy to keep future Salafi groups at bay.

What is the solution? Look at it as a business venture, if you will.

A well-crafted exit strategy: Get out as quickly as possible without leaving a worse mess behind as we did in Afghanistan I and Iraq I.

Distribution: Hand over ops to sovereign states. And if we are going to fund them, make sure the funds are going to the right fights. Sometimes these are not military confrontations, but instead education, economic progress, human rights and democracy. Which means that we will have to stop propping up dictators in the Middle East, i.e., most of our closest allies, and start standing firmly behind genuine efforts for reform.

That may mean Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt - but you know what? Let them figure it out for themselves. If the Brotherhood, known as the Ikhwan, had been allowed to participate in Egyptian elections decades ago, the whole Middle East may have gone through and come out the other end of "political Islam," which incidentally isn't necessarily a bad thing. Think Turkey.

And we don't have to take on the Mideast's problems ourselves. Distribute the workload and delegate responsibility to other influential nations who have more nuanced relationships with regional players -- some EU nations, Russia, China, Turkey, India and Qatar come to mind.

Partnerships: As hard as this may be for a US administration to stomach, this may be the time to invoke the "your enemy's enemy is your friend" doctrine of foreign policy. Which effectively means that we need to partner with Al Qaeda's biggest regional targets and foes. Who are they? Think Shiites. That means Iran - a country that rang alarm bells when the Taliban rose to power, although we didn't listen then. A country that has offered and delivered help during our worst times in Afghanistan and Iraq, even though we showed no gratitude. More importantly, a country that has been on the receiving end of the same kinds of Salafi attacks by Al Qaeda supported groups as have US troops.

Iran leads a regional bloc of nations and groups included on our dated State Department terrorism lists. We need to start to distinguish between Islamist groups with nationalist agendas (Hezbollah) and those with "cosmic" plans (Al Qaeda) because Iran, Hezbollah, Syria and Hamas have all been under Salafi jihadist threat of some sort this past year. They would make smart, resourceful and powerful regional allies - unlike our alliances with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both supremely impotent despite their claims otherwise, and boasting zero street cred, unlike the former bloc.

Troubleshoot: Deal swiftly and creatively with the Palestinian issue. This is the one regional issue that will continue to be exploited effectively by Al Qaeda and its franchises - the crux of Bin Laden's most recent audiotape message last weekend. Open up Gaza's Rafah border with Egypt and start physically monitoring the delivery of widespread humanitarian aid to the 1.5 million Gazans living under siege - we will build instant goodwill with Palestinians at the negotiating table and remind Arabs of their hopes in a pre-Cairo Obama.

If we can move mountains and send manpower to Haiti in a nanosecond, we can loosen a crumby little border in Rafah, surely?

Strike Deals: Sponsor a timelined Palestinian-Israeli agreement on final solution issues - borders, refugees, sovereignty, natural resources and Jerusalem. Enough with the spineless pussy-footing around the hard issues that has been "all process and no peace" for 18 years now. Utilize J-Street and other sane voices in the American Jewish community to back up a new, firm approach to Israel - the Jewish state, the occupying entity, needs to make some significant concessions for any peaceful resolution of the conflict . Or...get out of peacemaking altogether and let the Palestinians and Israelis find their own way to a One State Solution. Colonial-settler movements never last, and the establishment of a single democratic state consisting of Jews, Muslims and Christians is the natural, organic direction of things without our overbearing, one-sided participation.

And table the failed Iran nuclear talks to deal with the more pressing issues of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan where both the US and the Islamic Republic have an "existential" stake and share much common ground. A focused, mutually-beneficial game plan here will create the necessary trust to tackle the nuclear issue further down the road, which will in turn diffuse a regional nuclear race.

As any savvy CEO will tell you, don't say or do anything unless there are clear quantifiable and qualitative benefits to be reaped. From his lips to Obama's ears...

While it looks like Al Qaeda is spreading like wildfire, the fact is, it isn't. Their numbers have dwindled in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their popularity has generally plummeted amongst Mideast populations. But there is a marked increase in the number of Salafi, jihad-mindedindividuals who are fed-up with the status quo and are happy to risk life and limb. Every silly move we make - and we really know how to do silly - beefs up the Al Qaeda brand and extends the franchise.

So in places like Yemen and Jordan, where local governments have until recently played a careful balancing act and kept their Salafists under wraps, one false American move threatens -- always -- to crack open a can of worms. Think healthcare reform and Teabaggers for a closer-to-home analogy.

And it only takes one bus bombing, one aircraft explosion, one restaurant pipe-bomb to level economies, cripple tourism, incite insurgencies and create an environment of fear. We need to exit these battles and fundamentally alter our disingenuous Middle East policies to allow anger to subside and reform to flourish.

Or I will have to check my closets next.

Afghanistan: Will US Back Taliban Talks?

Gareth Porter writes for Inter Press Service:

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal's very cautiously-worded support for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban leadership, in an interview published Monday, is only the first public signal of a policy decision by the Barack Obama administration to support a political settlement between the Hamid Karzai regime and the Taliban, an official of McChrystal's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command has revealed in an interview with IPS.

Speaking to the Financial Times, McChrystal couched his position on negotiations in terms of an abstract support for negotiated settlements of wars, saying, "I believe that a political solution to all conflicts is the inevitable outcome." The ISAF commander avoided a direct answer to the question of whether the Taliban could play a role in a future Afghan government.

When pressed by the interviewer on the issue, McChrystal would only say that "any Afghan can play a role if they focus on the future and not the past".

Afghanistan-Pakistan Special: Mr Obama’s Revenge of the Drones

The ISAF official, who spoke with IPS on condition that he would not be named, was much more candid about the centrality of peace negotiations with the Taliban leadership in the Obama administration's strategy in Afghanistan and about the understanding of the ISAF command that the Taliban leadership is independent of al Qaeda and is already positioning itself for a political settlement.


The official said the objective of the troop surge and the ISAF strategy accompanying it is to support a negotiated political settlement. "The story of the next 18 months is the story of establishing the conditions under which reconciliation will take place," said the official.

"Reconciliation" is the term used within the U.S. military for an understanding between the Karzai regime and the leadership of the insurgency, whereas "reintegration" refers to a strategy for bringing mid-level Taliban commanders and their troops back into society.

The counterinsurgency strategy now being mounted in Afghanistan by ISAF "is aimed at providing time and space" for "reconciliation", according to the official, as well as governance reforms and increasing the capacity of the national army and police force during that 18-month period.

The ISAF official said there has been a debate among U.S. officials about "the terms on which the Taliban will become part of the political fabric". The debate is not on whether the Taliban movement will be participating in the Afghan political system, however, but on whether or not the administration could accept the participation of a specific individual -- Mullah Omar, the leader of the organisation and former chief of state of the Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001 -- in the political future of Afghanistan.

Some U.S. officials have argued that the Taliban leader should be barred from participation, because of his role in protecting Osama bin Laden before the 9/11 terror attacks and refusing to hand over the al Qaeda leader in the weeks that followed the attacks.

The official suggested that the Obama administration and its NATO allies need to reach a consensus about the issue, and that recent events make the present moment "seem like a good time to deal with that."

Despite their interest in that issue, the ISAF official said, the United States won't determine the outcome of the negotiations. "Reconciliation is considered to be in the purview of the Afghan government and international mediators," the official said.

Nevertheless, the official left no doubt that the United States will participate in the negotiations. "I don't think anybody is under the misconception we are not going to negotiate," he said.

Read rest of article....

Pakistan: US "Public Relations Disaster" in Gates Mission

Juan Cole is scathing about the most recent political effort by the Obama Administration in Pakistan:

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates's trip to Pakistan this weekend has in many ways been a public relations disaster, and I think it is fair to say that he came away empty-handed with regard to his chief policy goals in Islamabad. Getting Pakistan right is key to President Barack Obama's policy of escalating the Afghanistan War, and judging by Gates's visit to Islamabad, Obama is in worse shape on the AfPak front than he is even in Massachusetts [after the unexpected Republican victory in the US Senate vote]. Since he has bet so heavily on Afghanistan and Pakistan, this rocky road could be momentous for his presidency.

In one of a series of gaffes, he seemed to admit in a television interview that the private security firm, Blackwater, was active in Pakistan.

The Pakistani public has a widespread resentment against US incursions against the country's sovereignty (64% say the US is a danger to the country's stability). But it also has a sort of paranoid obsession with Blackwater, which they suspect of covert operations to disrupt security in the country (i.e. they blame Blackwater for bombings that Americans see as the work of the Taliban). Thus, Gates's statement produced a media frenzy. (Jeremy Scahill has alleged in The Nation that Blackwater is in fact in Pakistan in a support role to CIA drone attacks in the country's mountainous Northwest on Taliban and al-Qaeda targets).


Dawn, a relatively pro-Western English daily, quoted the exchange, saying Gates was asked by the interviewer on a private television station,

' “And I want to talk, of course, about another issue that has come up again and again about the private security companies that have been operating in Iraq, in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan. . . Xe International, formerly known as Blackwater and Dyncorp. Under what rules are they operating here in Pakistan?”

Gates replied,

' “Well, they’re operating as individual companies here in Pakistan, in Afghanistan and in Iraq because there are theatres of war involving the United States.”

The Urdu press concluded that he had admitted Blackwater is active on Pakistani soil, while noting denials from the US embassy in Islamabad that that was what Gates had meant. The News, the mainstream English-language sister of Jang, was also insistent that Gates had let the cat out of the bag.

Gates had one strike against him, since he came to Pakistan from India. Moreover while in New Delhi he clearly was a traveling salesman for the US war materiel industries, who would like to pick up some of the $60 billion India is planning to spend on weapons in the next few years. During the Cold War, the US had mainly supplied Pakistan's military, and had been lukewarm to India, which Washington felt tilted toward Moscow. The current shift of US strategy to wooing India to offset growing Chinese power in Asia is taken by some Pakistanis as a demotion.

Then, he encouraged a greater Indian role in Afghanistan, including, according to the Times of London, possibly in training Afghan police. Pakistan considers Afghanistan its sphere of influence and the last thing it wants is a role for Indian security forces in training (and perhaps shaping the loyalty) of Afghan police. Germany is currently in charge of the police training program, but India is afraid that in the next few years NATO will depart, and that Pakistan will then redeploy its Taliban allies to capture the country for Islamabad's purposes. India is also concerned about significant Chinese investments, as in a big copper mine, in Afghanistan. So New Delhi is considering the police training mission.

In addition, Gates had praised Indian restraint in the face of the fall, 2008 attack on Mumbai (Bombay) by the Pakistani terrorist organization, the Lashkar-i Tayyiba [Army of the Good]. He warned the Pakistani leadership that India's forbearance could not be taken for granted the next time. That is a fair point, but it is not the sort of thing you say publicly on your way to Islamabad from Delhi if you want to be received as an honest broker. Pakistanis feel that India has inflicted many provocations on them, too, not least of which was the Indian security forces' often brutal repression in Muslim-majority Kashmir, where thousands have died since 1989 in a separatist movement with which Pakistanis deeply sympathize. (Pakistani guerrilla groups also did routinely slip into Indian Kashmir in support of local separatists).

Prominent members of the Pakistani Senate denounced Gates for setting up Pakistan as a sort of patsy and hostage to communal violence in India, and of fomenting a Washington-New Delhi 'conspiracy' against Islamabad. What if some Indian terrorist group carried out an attack in India? wasn't Gates giving New Delhi carte blanche, they asked, to blame Pakistan for it even in the absence of any evidence, and then to launch a war of aggression on Pakistan with the incident as a pretext?

The Los Angeles Times said that "Gates, on the first day of a visit here, urged government officials to build on their offensives against militants . . ."

In fact, Gates was careful not to over-emphasize such demands, but there was a general public perception that he was doing so. The editorials in Urdu newspapers on Jan. 23, which the USG Open Source Center analyzed, complained bitterly about this further demand. Express sniffed that the US should establish security in Afghanistan and then everything would settle down in Pakistan's northwest. Khabrain rather cleverly pointed out that Pakistan has concentrated on limited territory in fighting its Taliban, which is wiser than the US policy of opening several fronts at once and getting bogged down.

Jang, which is mildly anti-American, said,

Describing Robert Gates' pro-Indian statements irresponsible, the editorial says: "It is believed that the political and military leaderships of Pakistan, with one voice, have made it clear to Gates and the titanic-size delegation accompanying him that in the present circumstances, it is not possible for Pakistan to accede to the persistent US demands of 'do more' and to further expand military operations in the tribal areas, because Pakistan not only has to secure the areas that it has taken control of from the militants but also has to strengthen and stabilize its position there."

Then the Pakistani military spokesman came out and flatly told Gates that the Swat and South Waziristan campaigns were it for now. The BBC reports, 'Maj Gen Abbas, head of public relations for the Pakistan army, told the BBC: "We are not going to conduct any major new operations against the militants over the next 12 months. . . The Pakistan army is overstretched and it is not in a position to open any new fronts. Obviously, we will continue our present operations in Waziristan and Swat." '

To be fair, the Pakistani military committed tens of thousands of troops to these two campaigns, in Swat and South Waziristan, and is in fact attempting to garrison the captured areas so as to prevent the return of the Pakistani Taliban. In the past two years, the Pakistani army has lost over 2,000 soldiers in such fighting against Taliban in the Northwest, a little less than half the troops the US lost in its 6-year Iraq War.

The Pakistani military campaigns of the past year, however, have not targeted those radical groups most active in cross-border raids into Afghanistan-- the Quetta Shura of Mullah Omar's Old Taliban, the Haqqani Network of Siraj Haqqani in North Waziristan, or whatever cells exist in Pakistan of the largely Afghanistan-based Hizb-i Islami (Islamic Party) of Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Washington worries that the effectiveness of its own troop escalation in Afghanistan will be blunted if these three continue to have havens on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. And, Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani worries that the US offensive in Afghanistan will push thousands radicals over the border into Pakistan, further destabilizing the country's northwest.

Gates made a clumsy attempt to mollify Pakistani public opinion over the very unpopular US drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban cells in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, by offering the Pakistani military 12 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones of its own. But the Pakistani military pointed out that the outdated RQ-7 Shadow UAV's on offer were unarmed and merely for aerial reconnaissance, and maintained that Pakistan's arsenal already contained such drones.

Gates addressed the Pakistani cadets at the National Defense University, attempting to emphasize that he wanted more of these future officers to study in the US, and that Pakistan is in the driver's seat with regard to the anti-Taliban counter-insurgency campaign. Its message was largely missed in the civilian Urdu press.

Does it matter? One sometimes see Americans dismiss Pakistan as "small" or "unimportant." Think again. Pakistan is the world's sixth-largest country by population (170 million),just after Brazil (200 million). It is as big as California, Oregon and Washington state rolled together. Pakistan's 550,000-man military is among the best-trained and best-equipped in the global South. Pakistan has within it a middle class with a Western-style education and way of life (automobiles, access to internet and international media) of some 37 million-- roughly 5 million families. (Pakistan has over 5 million automobiles now and is an emerging auto producer and market, with auto production at 16 percent of its manufaturing sector). If we go by local purchasing power, it is the world's 27th largest economy. It is a nuclear power with a sophisticated if small scientific establishment, and produced a Nobelist in physics.

Gates went to Pakistan to emphasize to Islamabad that the US was not again going to abandon it and Afghanistan, as it had in the past. Pakistan, he wanted to say, is now a very long-term ally of Washington. He hoped for cooperation against the Haqqani, Taliban and Hizb-i Islami guerrillas. He wanted to allay conspiracy theories about US mercenary armies crawling over Pakistan, occasionally blowing things up (and then blaming the explosions on Pakistanis) in order to destabilize the country and manipulate its policies.

The message his mission inadvertently sent was that the US is now increasingly tilting to India and wants to put it in charge of Afghanistan security; that Pakistan is isolated; that he is pressuring Pakistan to take on further counter-insurgency operations against Taliban in the Northwest, which the country flatly lacks the resources to do; and that Pakistani conspiracy theories about Blackwater were perfectly correct and he had admitted it.

In baseball terms, Gates struck out. In cricket terms, Gates was out in the most embarrassing way a batsman can be out, that is, leg before wicket.

Today on EA (18 January 2010)

Iran: There's a lot going on in and about Iran today - the trials are continuing; the Regime's propaganda machine trundles on too! All the news, including links to our own stories and other news media, can be found on our live weblog.

In the light of the Ashura demonstrators' trial starting this morning, and as they are charged with "Mohareb" (offending God and the prophet), Edward Yeranian assesses how this may hurt the regime.

We’ve got the video of the CNN interview in which Tehran University academic Seyed Mohammad Marandi lays out, in the guise of reporting and analysis, the strategy. (Apologies to those of you in the US whom CNN have blocked from seeing the video; the alternative, as laid out by our readers, is to download the video from CNN’s Amanpour website and play it back using QuickTime.)

Afghanistan: We have an evaluation from Juan Cole on this morning's Taliban bomb attack in Kabul, which reportedly killed five and injured eight people. A video of the Esanech (Press TV) report on the attack can be viewed here.

Haiti: EA's Josh Shahyrar has been producing an almost constant humanitarian liveblog since the Haiti earthquake disaster last Tuesday - read his latest posts (17-18 January) here.

Israel: EA's Ali Yenidunya reports on the "strategic" relationship between Israel and Turkey, following Sunday's 3.5 hour meeting in Ankara between Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. An Israeli official said the meeting was conducted "in a very friendly atmosphere".

Palestine: After Israel's Foreign Minister said on Sunday that it would make no further "gestures" towards the Palestinians, Palestinian Authority Leader Mahmoud Abbas has called on Washington to "Draw Red Lines".

Afghanistan Bombing: Taliban's "Boldest & Most Ambitious Assault"

Juan Cole evaluates this morning's attack in Afghanistan, which reportedly killed 5 and injured 38 people:

The Taliban mounted their boldest and most ambitious assault on the capital of Kabul in recent years on Monday, with a series of well-coordinated bombings in the vicinity of the presidential palace and a platoon-sized expeditionary force wreaking havoc. The Afghan Voice Agency reports in Dari Persian that numerous bombs were set off near the presidential palace, shaking Kabul. The first was detonated at 9:45 am local time at the five-star Hotel Kabul Serena, 500 meters (yards) from the presidential palace, where many diplomats and journalists stay. The Serena was still on fire Monday night. As ambulances raced to the site to pick up the wounded, the attackers set off a second bomb at the Malik Asghar intersection in the capital. This blast was close to the central government ministries of foreign affairs, the economy, education, and Kabul municipality.

Afghanistan “Hearts and Minds” Special: Take a Photo, Win a Camera!

This tweet from Kabul says that there were lots of bombs going off.

Other news sources speak of machine gun fire echoing through Kabul all day, as streets were deserted.

The gunmen then engaged with Afghan National Army troops. Afghan government and NATO helicopters arrived to give air support against the attackers. Eyewitnesses report that the attackers killed and wounded dozens of people.

Then the shopping center caught or was set on fire, and the fire brigrades raced toward it and toward the Hotel Serena. A second shopping center, Gulbahar, was also bombed or set ablaze, according to AFP.

The News (Pakistan) reports that by mid-afternoon Afghanistan officials were saying that the situation was under control. At least ten persons were left dead, including four suicide bombers. AFP reported 13 injured. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that 20 guerrillas, some armed with suicide belts, had come into the city to target the presidential palace and government edifices.

The terrorist tactic here, of targeting nice hotels, shopping districts and government buildings, seems to me to be modeled on what Sunni extremists did twice in 2009 (August and November) to Baghdad, though this Kabul operation was not nearly as sophisticated or destructive. The choice to use a guerrilla platoon, some with vest bombs, limited its scope, as compared to what could have been achieved with car bombs (but perhaps NATO is better at searching trunks than are the Baghdad authorities.)

The attack seems likely to have aimed at making Karzai look weak and not in control on the eve of his attendance at the upcoming London international conference on Afghanistan. It may also have been a reply to Karzai's appointment of about half the ministers on the way to forming a new government.

At the same time the bombs were being set off, a platoon of armed insurgents holding a five-story downtown Kabul City Center shopping mall began firing at nearby government buildings and banks.

The gunmen then engaged with Afghan National Army troops. Afghan government and NATO helicopters arrived to give air support against the attackers. Eyewitnesses report that the attackers killed and wounded dozens of people.

Then the shopping center caught or was set on fire, and the fire brigrades raced toward it and toward the Hotel Serena. A second shopping center, Gulbahar, was also bombed or set ablaze, according to AFP.

The News (Pakistan) reports that by mid-afternoon Afghanistan officials were saying that the situation was under control. At least ten persons were left dead, including four suicide bombers. AFP reported 13 injured. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that 20 guerrillas, some armed with suicide belts, had come into the city to target the presidential palace and government edifices.

The terrorist tactic here, of targeting nice hotels, shopping districts and government buildings, seems to me to be modeled on what Sunni extremists did twice in 2009 (August and November) to Baghdad, though this Kabul operation was not nearly as sophisticated or destructive. The choice to use a guerrilla platoon, some with vest bombs, limited its scope, as compared to what could have been achieved with car bombs (but perhaps NATO is better at searching trunks than are the Baghdad authorities.)

The attack seems likely to have aimed at making Karzai look weak and not in control on the eve of his attendance at the upcoming London international conference on Afghanistan. It may also have been a reply to Karzai's appointment of about half the ministers on the way to forming a new government.