Iran: Or Is It the Supreme Leader v. the Revolutionary Guard?

The Latest from Iran (28 July): The Government Crumbles
Iran: Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?

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We began this morning with an analysis of the relationship between the Supreme Leader and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, asking if Ayatollah Khamenei would stand by or jettison his President. Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, drawing from a source, sees another, possibly bigger battle: the Supreme Leader v. the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Showdown between Khamenei and IRGC?

Two important developments over the past few days suggest a possible confrontation in the near future between Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khamenei, and the high command of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

One development was the order issued by Ayatollah Khamenei overruling Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as his First Vice President (Iran’s president has eight vice presidents). The second, firing ultra hardliner Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejehei, the Minister of Intelligence.

A reliable source in Tehran told the author that both episodes were meant to be signals by the IRGC’s high command to Ayatollah Khamenei that they were in control, and that he should toe the line — their line. According to the source, Ayatollah’s Khamenei’s order to fire Mashaei was delivered to the Voice and Visage (VaV) of the Islamic Republic (Iran’s national radio and television network) on the day Mashaei was appointed by Ahmadinejad. The VaV was asked to announce the order on national television and radio, but Ezzatollah Zarghami, the director of VaV and a former officer in the IRGC, refused to do so.

As if to make sure that the Ayatollah got the message loud and clear, it took Ahmadinejad one week to relent and go along with the order. And it was only then that the VaV broadcast the Ayatollah’s order. When he did accept the order, Ahmadinejad sent the Supreme Leader a terse and very formal letter, devoid of the usual praises that his past letters to Ayatollah Khamenei have carried. The letter was considered by many supporters of the Ayatollah as a total insult; but also a clear signal. In order to further demonstrate his defiance, Ahmadinejad appointed Mashaei, a close relative and friend, as his chief of staff and special adviser.

According to the source, Ejehei was fired because he was reporting to the Supreme Leader without first letting Ahmadinejad know. He had reportedly said that the Intelligence Ministry had concluded that the accusations by the IRGC high command, that the demonstrations after the election were linked to foreign powers and represented a “velvet revolution,” were baseless. He had also reportedly said that the demonstrations had neither been planned in advance, nor could they have been predicted. Finally, the Intelligence Ministry is said to have reported that Mashaei, as well as Hossein Taeb, a cleric who is the commander of the Basij militia, represented security risks. The report apparently countered all the accusations made by the IRGC high command.

There is a precedent that helps explain why Ejehei may have been put aside. In the spring of 2008, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, Ahmadinejad’s first Interior Minister, was also fired after he submitted a report to Ayatollah Khamenei about the elections for the 8^th Majles (parliament) without Ahmadinejad’s knowledge. In that report, Pourmohammadi reported irregularities committed by Ahmadinejad’s backers. When Ahmadinejad found out about the report, he fired Pourmohammadi almost immediately.

According to the source, Ayatollah Khamenei had also ordered the closure of one of the jails, one in which the demonstrators and some of the leading reformist leaders are being kept; but the order has been ignored by the intelligence and security unit of the IRGC, which runs the prison. Saeed Jalili, Secretary-General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, confirmed the Ayatollah’s order for the closure of a jail. Apparently, after the initial order was ignored, it was sent to the Council. While the source did not specify the prison, it might be the Kahrizak prison on the southern edge of Tehran near the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.

The prison is usually used to hold common criminals and narcotics traffickers, but there have been credible reports indicating that many people arrested in the post-election roundup have also been imprisoned there. Ejehei had apparently complained to Ayatollah Khamenei that the Intelligence Ministry had lost control over those arrested, and that the IRGC unit had taken control of the matter.

There is much speculation about Ejehei’s successor. According to Iranian law, the head of the Ministry of Intelligence must be a mojtahed (an Islamic scholar), and hence, a cleric. It will be interesting to see how Ahmadinejad navigates that one — finding a qualified cleric whose first loyalty is to him and the IRGC high command.

The author’s source also told him that the top commanders of the IRGC are firmly behind Ahmadinejad in his struggle to wrest full control of the government away from the clerics. But, the rank and file of the IRGC is divided into two main groups. The first group supports the reformist movement and remains silent for now (or perhaps it has been forced into silence). The second group is divided. One group is behind Ahmadinejad and the high command of the IRGC; they believe that the clerics should be purged from the government, and that Ayatollah Khamenei should be transformed into an ineffective and irrelevant figurehead. Others in the second group believe that Ayatollah Khamenei is Ma’soom (free of sin, from a religious perspective) and a deputy to Mahdi, the Shiites’ hidden 12^th Imam who is supposed to come back some day to rid the world of injustice and corruption. Members of this group believe that obedience to Ayatollah Khamenei is their duty.

According to the source, Hossein Saffar Harandi, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance and a former officer in the IRGC, belongs to this group and was forced to resign, after he protested the appointment of Mashaei as First VP. Officially, Saffar Harandi is still part of the cabinet, because if he is formally sacked, the Constitution requires Ahmadinejad to seek a vote of confidence from Majlis since he has replaced half of his cabinet during his four-year term. Since his first term will expire in about 10 days, however, Ahmadinejad does not want the issue before Majles for a vote.

According to a second reliable source in Tehran, seven of Ahmadinejad’s ministers, including Saffar Harandi and Ejehei, wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei last week complaining about their boss and supporting Khamenei to sack Mashaei. It is widely believed that Ahmadinejad intends to fire the remaining five after he begins his second disputed term. The author already reported on two of the five ministers to be fired.

That the IRGC high command may wish to purge the government of clerics is no surprise. In addition to the fact that the IRGC did the bulk of the fighting with Iraq and eliminated the internal opposition to the political establishment in the 1980s, the IRGC has also been guarding and protecting the high-ranking clerics for the past three decades. Therefore, the IRGC has full knowledge of their secret wheeling and dealings. Privy to information on these cases of corruption and nepotism among clerics, their relatives and aids, the IRGC it like the Sword of Damocles over their heads.

When last year, Abbas Palizdar, an ally of Ahmadinejad, spoke of 123 cases of corruption among the clerics and their families, many interpreted that as a clear attempt by Ahmadinejad and his supporters to push most of the clerics out of power. Palizdar was later jailed and Ahmadinejad disowned him. But he was recently released from prison after posting a $300,000 bail. My sources in Tehran told me that the joke there was that after Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s Friday Prayer sermon of July 17, calling for the release of political prisoners, the hardliners released Palizadar!

Ayatollah Khamenei himself has played a major role in the rise of the IRGC. When Mohammad Khatami won the presidential election in 1997 by a landslide, a group of reformist leaders met with the supreme leader and asked him to heed the nation’s message of such a victory. In order to leave a credible legacy behind and save a political system in which had had played an important role, they advised the supreme leader to personally take a lead in the reform of the system. Not only did Ayatollah Khamenei refuse to do so, he more closely sided with the hardliners who were trying to gut the Khatami administration. It got to the point that when Khatami was president, he complained that the hardliners were creating a crisis for the country every nine days.

In 2005, after Khatami had to leave office after a second term, Ahmadinejad was elected president with the support of Ayatollah Khamenei. But practically from Day 1, Ahmadinejad began attacking many clerics in the name of fighting corruption. Ayatollah Khamenei continued to throw his support behind Ahmadinejad, presumably because he believed Ahmadinejad could force out his competitor Rafsanjani, his competitor in the power struggle.

Even when Rafsanjani wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei a few days before the election and warned him about possible fraud, the Ayatollah did not take any significant action. It is widely rumored that he told Rafsanjani that “Ahmadinejad’s defeat is my defeat.”

On Tuesday June 16, four days after the election, when the country was in deep crisis due to the huge demonstrations that had erupted, Ayatollah Khamenei summoned to his office representatives of all the presidential candidates, as well as members of the Expediency Council and the staff of the Interior Ministry, which supervises the election, in order to seek a solution to the crisis. Two people in that meeting, former Tehran Mayor Morteza Alviri (representing Mahdi Karroubi, one of the two reformist candidates), and former Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zangeneh, proposed that the problem be referred to the Expediency Council. But, Ayatollah Khamenei refused.

Instead, on June 19, during his Friday Prayer sermon, the Ayatollah threatened the Iranian nation and the reformists. When the next day demonstrations erupted again and many young people were killed, many Iranians held the Ayatollah (justifiably) responsible for the bloodshed. According to the author’s sources in Tehran, the high command of the IRGC recognized that the responsibility for the bloodshed would be squarely on the Ayatollah and therefore persuaded him to take a hard line. According to the same sources, the thinking of the high command of the IRGC is that, among conservative voters, Ahmadinejad is far more popular than Ayatollah Khamenei, and that therefore, the Ayatollah has trapped himself and has no clear way out of the difficult situation that he himself has created. This allows the IRGC high command to marginalize him.

What is not clear is the role of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Ayatollah’s son. Mojtaba is believed to be close to the high command of the IRGC. Will he be purged as well? Will the IRGC consider him as irrelevant, now that they have achieved their goal of “re-electing” Ahmadinejad? Or, does he have a role in any of this?

Ahmadinejad’s “re-election” is supposed to be confirmed by Ayatollah Khamenei on August 4, and he will take the oath of office in the Majles the next day. The next 10 days will be every bit as critical as they will be intriguing.

The Latest from Iran (27 July): A President Dangling in the Wind?

The Latest from Iran (28 July): Will the Supreme Leader Give Up Ahmadinejad?

NEW Iran: English Text of Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi Letter to Grand Ayatollahs (25 July)
NEW Another View from Iran: Seyed Mohammad Marandi on CNN (26 July)
The Latest from Iran (26 July): Four Days to The Green Movement’s Next Wave

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2035 GMT: Bad Cop, Good Cop on Detentions. "Principlist" Member of Parliament Ali Motahari presses the head of Iran's judiciary to give up the name of the killer of detainee Mohsen Roosul Amini (1945 GMT). President candidate Mohsen Rezaei, whose campaign manager was the father of Roosul Amini, praises the head of the judiciary: “I would like to express my gratitude toward Your Excellency for setting a one-week deadline for the determination of the fate of the prisoners of the unrest.”

“I hope that judiciary officials will carry out your orders as soon as possible and relieve the concerns of the families of the detainees.”

2005 GMT: Oops, Another Crack in the Cabinet. Associated Press has published the news we reported yesterday: an appeals court upheld the fraud conviction of Minister of Industry Ali Akbar Mehrabian, a close ally of the President. Researcher Farzan Salimi claimed Mehrabian had stolen his idea for an "earthquake saferoom" in homes. The court ordered the registration of the design to be taken from Mehrabian and an associate and given to Salimi, but did not otherwise assign punishment. Salimi confirmed the ruling to The Associated Press.

So, since Ahmadinejad has just fired one Minister, will the conviction of another leave his Government vulnerable to a Parliamentary vote of confidence? Apparently not. Mohsen Koohkan, a prominent legislator, said Parliament will consider Mehrabian's conviction, but in the context of the next Government after Ahmadinejad's 5 August inauguration rather than the current one.

And there's some good news for the President. His name was also on the 2005 book that published the design for the "earthquake saferoom", but he escaped being named as a defendant.

1945 GMT: Calling the Bluff on Detainees. "Principlist" Member of Parliament Ali Motahari, an increasingly vocal critic of the Government, has demanded that the head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Sharoudi, release the name of the interrogator that killed Mohsen Roohul Amini.

The declaration is not only a test of the Government's willingness to deal with the issue of detainee rights. It is an indication that the regime has been damaged amongst its own supporters by the case of Ruhol Amini, who was the son of a prominent "conservative" political activist.

1855 GMT: In a separate entry, we have published the English translation of Ayatollah Yousef Sanei's response to the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi letter to the Grand Ayatollahs on detainees.

1830 GMT: Did Ali Larijani Save Ahmadinejad? Jam-e-Jam Online has claimed that, after Ahmadinejad finishing his "firing spree", dismissing four ministers, Larijani informed him that firing more than one minister would require a Parliamentary vote of confidence for the Government to resume operations. This forced Ahmadinejad to reinstate Minister of Culture Saffar-Harandi and, presumably, never confirm the firings of the Ministers of Health and Labour.

1820 GMT: The conservative press is claiming that Hashemi Rafsanjani is boycotting Ahmadinejad's inauguration on 5 August.

1815 GMT: It has emerged that 205 "conservative" Members of Parliament signed an open letter to the Supreme Leader, re-stating their general support of his position and his specific actions over First Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. The letter was publicly read in parliament, while one Member of Parliament said another private letter was sent to the President: "In this letter we expressed our support for the GovernmentP but we also have asked the President to improve his behavior in a way that will facilitate rapid implementation of the Supreme Leader's comments and opinions".

The "reformists" refrained from signing this letter. One said, "[We] are of the opinion that critical letters will have a very little effect on Ahmadinejad's behavior, we doubt the efficacy of such letters and therefore have refrained from signing it."

1805 GMT: After yesterday's fun and games, the President has been quieter today, but there is one report mixing politics, amusement, and a bit of irony. Tabnak claims that Ali Kordan, the former Interior Minister, was asked to become the Inspector General of the Presidency, but that he rejected the post.

Kordan was forced to step down last year when he was inspected and found wanting: he had claimed, falsely, to have a Ph.D. from Oxford University.

1745 GMT: Another (Small) Concession. Just over two hours after we reported signs from the head of Iran's judiciary that there might be some movement regarding detainees, Press TV confirms Internet chatter of a token order by the Supreme Leader: "The head of Iran's National Security Council [Saeed Jalili] said Monday that Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei had demanded that [a "non-standard"] prison which did not measure up to the required standards to be shut down. "In the course of recent events, the Leader has ordered officials (to take measures), so that no one, God forbid, suffers injustice."

Jalili added, "Ayatollah Khamenei had insisted that officials were obliged to 'precisely' probe into incidents in which wrongdoings may have been committed against detainees."

1535 GMT: Old People Can't Drive and They Can't Run a Country. This summary of the Friday address of Hojjatoleslam Gholam-Reza Hassani, the leader is Urumiyeh, is offered without further comment:

Hassani thanked Security forces for restoring and maintaining calm throughout the country.

Hassani said that seniors should refrain from participating in activities they are incapable of doing properly. He went on to use driving as an example and opined that to prevent inflecting harm on themselves and others, seniors who cannot control their cars must stay off the road.

The senior West Azarbaijan cleric then noted the “desires of certain presidential candidates in their advanced age” and queried, “Those who do lack physical and mental capacity, why do they try to wreck havoc in the country? When you cannot even keep your ammameh (clerical hat) on your head and your dentures in your mouth how do you want to govern the country?”

NOTE 1: Attending Friday prayers in Tehran on 17 June, Mehdi Karroubi's ammameh was knocked off when he was jostled by security forces.

NOTE 2: The Supreme Leader turned 70 earlier this month.

1520 GMT: The Detentions Issue. In a clear sign that the opposition demands are having some effect, a spokesman for the head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, said that a decision must come within a week on the fate of prisoners, and he indicated some prisoners should be freed. The spokesman, Ali Reza Jamshidi, said about 300 people were still detained. (English-language version of story)

1500 GMT: Keeping the Pressure On. We referred in our first update today (0545 GMT) to the "valuable breathing space [offered by President Ahmadinejad's troubles] for the opposition as they plan the memorial and other political moves". Following up his statement with Medhi Karroubi, Mohammad Khatami, and others to Grand Ayatollahs (see separate entry), Mir Hossein Mousavi has given a clear signal on his website about the importance of the "40th Day" memorial on 30 July: ""The pro-reform path will continue. The establishment should respect the constitution and let us to gather to commemorate our killed loved ones on Thursday."

(Far from incidentally, Reuters, which reported this news, still does not understand the significance of Thursday's gathering, failing to note that it is for those killed in demonstrations on 20 June.)

The Mousavi page also endorses the moves against pro-Government members of the Assembly of Experts, publishing Ayatollah Dastghaib's letter (0708 GMT).

1200 GMT: Today's "Really? No Kidding?" Headline. In The New York Times: "Ahmadinejad Seen as Increasingly Vulnerable Since Re-election".

0930 GMT: Reports that the Iranian actress Pegah Ahangarani has been arrested.

0755 GMT: A seven-member Parliamentary committee, "despite the explicit opposition of some institutions", has visited Evin and Rajayi Prisons this morning to assess the situation and condition of detainees.

0708 GMT: After Ayatollah Hareesi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, declared that last week's letter --- issued in the name of the Assembly but signed by only 16 of the 86 Experts --- denouncing Hashemi Rafsanjani was invalid, Dastgheib has supported Rafsanjani in even stronger terms, publishing a scathing reply that seriously questions the motives and integrity of Rafsanjani's right wing critics:

Some people think that any support of Ayatollah Hashemi [Rafsanjani]'s speech is equivalent to a personal defense of Hashemi and a swipe at his enemies. As a matter of fact this is not the case, any reasonable listener will admire this speech and realize that [adherence to] its statements leads to a long term strengthening of the Islamic Republic....

You advise ethics and morality. [If you were sincere] it would have been moral if you had condemened all the instances that Islamic law was ignored during the televised presidential debates, or if you had condemned all the Anti-Islamic torture that goes on in state prisons, prisons that deliver dead bodies every day.

Be sure that if you treat people with sincerity they would treat the clerical class with the correct respect and deference.... Your policy of defamation, supression and accusations of heresy, treason, working against the establishment has repelled any reputable personality or society. Instead of this...it would be much better if you treat people with kindness, apologize for your behavior, free prisoners, by freeing them you are attending the demands of the majority.

0700 GMT: Untangling the Government mess. The Minister of Intelligence was fired. Minister of Culture Saffar-Harandi, after Ahmadinejad tried to fire him but then pulled back, submitted a letter of resignation. However, Saffar-Harandi said that he would postpone the effective date of resignation "so that he can merely be used as a number [to prevent a vote of confidence] in the remaining eight days of Ahmadinejad's Government"

0545 GMT: More than 12 hours after news first appeared of the firing of Cabinet members, it is still unclear how far President Ahmadinejad has gone to remake his Government and how effective he will be. It appears that at least one Minister, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie (Intelligence), has been fired, but reports vary on whether a second Minister, Mohammad-Hossein Saffar-Harandi (Culture), has been dismissed. Earlier reports of the firing of the Ministers of Health and Labour were never verified.

At this point, the best explanation for the confusion (although there is no way of knowing if it is true without the confirmation of Ahmadinejad) is that the President considered removing all four ministers, leading to stories of a mass firing, but then pulled back when he realised his Government would no longer be able to act without a Parliamentary vote of confidence.

After his defeat over the appointment of First Vice President Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, has Ahmadinejad been able to salvage some authority? Equally important, has he been able to establish the legitimacy of his Government, a legitimacy in question ever since the election on 12 June? We're working on an analysis, which we hope to publish later today.

Ahmadinejad's troubles are a double-edged development for the opposition. The news has overshadowed the announcement of the next major show of protest, the "40th Day" memorial service on 30 July for those who died in demonstrations on 20 June. Many in the media appear to have missed the significance of the event. Although there will be no speeches, only readings from the Koran, the memorial will be a public sign that people will come out in large numbers to challenge the regime. (There is a parallel with the only other legal gathering allowed by the Government since 15 June, the memorial service 13 days later at Qoba Mosque for Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti. On that occasion, the opposition was in disarray and had little time or space to organise the demonstration. Still, thousands of people turned up.)

Our correspondent Mani summarises the practical and symbolic importance of the location for the event:

1) It was an prayer area that was designed when Mir Hossein Mousavi was Prime Minister in the late 1980s.
2) It is located in a highly accessible area of Tehran but not in downtown Tehran.
3) It can accommodate a huge number of people. If Mousavi and Karroubi are able to fill it (and personally I have no doubt than they can do so). they will show a strength in numbers that is an challenge that will make it difficult for the conservatives to respond. Given the contrast between the number of people participating in Rafsanjani's Friday prayers with the audience at the other Friday prayers, I doubt that the conservatives will be able to amass the same number of supporters.
4) It is also interesting that in the request it has been explicitly stated that no speeches and rallys will take place and only traditional Koran recitations will happen. I think this has been a stroke of genius. First, it will make it very hard for the Government to deny a orderly request to pay respects, which isItotally within the framework of islamic protocol. Second, Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi are publicly avowing the islamic nature of their protest. Third, Mousavi and Karroubi by organizing this memorial service have constructed an orderly conduit for their supporters (especially the younger more hotheaded elements) to express their grief and frustration, preventing the possibility that this grief and frustration will be converted into a rage that would be uncontrollable by the organizers. This will help demoMousavi and Karroubi to demonstrate, calmly yet effectively, the level of societal support that exists for their movement in a controlled fashion.

Yet, if the President has taken the headlines with his Cabinet discussions, this also gives valuable breathing space for the opposition as they plan the memorial and other political moves. We are still awaiting, for example, the effects of Saturday's call by Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami to Grand Ayatollahs to intervene on behalf of detainees.

It is far from incidental that former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, amidst the gathering news of Ahmadinejad's troubles, seized the opportunity to give a carefully-calibrated interview. His public support for the Supreme Leader, coupled with his continued references to the difficulties raised by the election, keep up pressure on the Government while protecting Rafsanjani from the charges --- levelled by his hard-line opponents in the Assembly of Experts --- that he is undermining Khamenei. Correspondent Mani sets out the position:

Behind all the polite talk Rafsanjani is sticking to his guns. If indeed " the Supreme Leader solves the current problems based on ... the solutions I [Rafsanjani] offered in the Friday prayer", a very weak and irrelevant Khamenei will be the result. What we must remember is that the opposition is protesting from within the system, so it is Khamenei's weakening not his elimination that they are seeking. One must remember that saving face is the underlying principle of all interactions between clerics.

On the clerical front, but almost lost in yesterday's drama, Ayatollah Mousavi-Ardebili issued a public statement demanding that: 1) the rights of the detainees be respected; b) detainees who have not committed any crime be freed immediately; c) families who have lost members be compensated. The Ayatollah stated,

The recent regrettable events are incompatible with the dignity of Islamic Establishment....and have caused a great concern for all true supporters of the country and the Islamic Republic.....Unsubstantiated accusations and disrespect towards prominent national and religious figures will not only fail to pacify the country but will in fact feed the flames of the crisis.......I fear that prolonging the cuurent situation will both weaken the foundations of the establishment and the erode the trust of the people in the establishment and will lead to an exacerbation of the crisis.... I demand that all officials and influential individuals try to reverse the damage that has already been done and try to rebuild the confidence of the people in this establishment.

The Ayatollah concluded with an apparent hint to Rafsanjani, and possibly Khatami-Karroubi-Mousavi, as he hoped "that the prudence of capable people that have already served this establishment for a long time will provide a solution for rescuing the country from this painfully complicated situation and that the experience gained through these events will provide a blueprint for a much better methodolgy for administering the issues of society".

Iran: English Text of Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi Letter to Grand Ayatollahs (25 July)

The Latest from Iran (27 July): A President Dangling in the Wind?

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UPDATE (27 July, 1900 GMT): Ayatollah Yousuf Sanei has offered the first response to the letter:

The people according the the constitution must be in charge of their fate. Therefore we must move in a direction that logic, freedom of speech, honesty and defending human rights will replace oppression, perfidy, injustice, and torture --- concepts that are the results of selfish and autocratic and unpopular governments. Unfortunately....we have been witnessing the defamation, perfidy, imprisonment, oppression, torture, and even killing of those people who have peacefully demonstrated to defend their rights.

Therefore, due to the necessity that is religiously incumbent upon me to prevent the tyranny of oppressors, I declare to all individuals who are responsible (either by participation or causation) of subjecting the people to killings, brutal physical violence, imprisonment and torture in prisons..that oppressing people that have only God to defend them qualifies as one of the worst kinds of mortal sin....and all such individuals must repent and try to obtain the forgiveness of those whom they have oppressed...and in fact attend to the kindly advice of Ayatollah Rafsanjani...so that the Government does not add any more sins to its already heavy conscience....I also would like to reiterate to you [Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi], and all beloved citizens of Islamic Iran both within and without the country, and to all of those that are trying to provide a conduit so that the voice of the protesters to the election can be heard: do not let the pressures, violence and suppressions to cause you to lose heart and thereby allow the will of the oppressors to happen....

I thank God for the fact that you gentlemen by maintaining a united front...have been able concurrently to attract the support of the people especially that of the younger generation....[Your efforts] in defending the rights of humanity and popular governance will leave a long lasting mark in society.

On Saturday, our correspondent Mani broke the news (0900 GMT): "In an open letter, a number of reformist politicians led by Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have asked the Grand Ayatollahs of Qom to remind 'relevant segments of the establishment' of 'the dire consequences” of their 'anti-legal methodologies'. The letter asks the Grand Ayatollahs to intervene to free the current post-election detainees."

Subsequently, Keeping the Change evaluated: “Should the Reformists be able to win over a majority of the marjahs [high-ranking clerics], it…would constitute the serious religiously-based challenge to the regime’s behavior that the Reformists have been after, but have heretofore been unable to obtain.”

The English translation of the letter, provided by Mir Hossein Mousavi's Facebook page:

In the name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful

To the honourable grand Marjahs (may God keep them for us):

Greetings. As you are aware, at the same time as the announcement of the results of the tenth presidential election, an extensive wave of arrests of many campaign activists from the non-governmental candidates as well as citizens who took part in the peaceful demonstrations started, which in its continuation, because of the expansion of the people’s objections to the various and extensive violations that happened before, during and after the election, has increased and is still ongoing. The individual or group arrests of the people in different social classes such as University professors, political activists and journalists, without the legal warrant and by violent confrontations and use of interrogation methods that are reminiscence of the dark days of Shah’s ruling, which most of the individuals signing this letter were for several times victims of them during those days, under no circumstances is and will be appropriate for a government and a country that claims to have established justice and fairness, and will taint Islamic Republic’s face in hearts and spirits of every Iranian and in world spotlight.

Even more disastrous is the fact that the security systems are insisting on proving their fictional and completely wrong theories for introducing the activists as foreign agents or intriguers of velvet revolution, and for this reason have committed to unlawful, unethical and illegitimate attempts to get confessions. The governmental propaganda tools and especially IRIB (the state-run televisions and radios) are taking part in this project and by presenting staged confessions try to prove such imaginary accusations against the movement of the people which has formed only to protect the “republic” in the government. These days the worried families, left unaware of the fate of their loved ones whom their only crime is having had an active role in the campaigns of the non-governmental candidates, are facing closed doors in their repeated inquiries to the officials. The conspirator organizations have elevated the situation to a degree that are portraying membership in the campaigns as an unforgivable crime; and this is despite the fact the departed founder of the Revolution (Imam Khomeini) and the high-ranked officials of the government have encouraged and approved such activities. Really based on what legal, religious or logical principle can one explain the practice of repeated torture against those who live under the protection of Islam? And with silence in front of all this violence and cruelty, how can one brag about the kindness of the government that has set the religion of Mohammad as its guidance? These days receiving disturbing news about the physical and mental health of several of the detainees has added to the uncertainties. The principle of being innocent [until proven guilty] and avoiding prejudgment are easily overlooked (“Judging the trusted by relying on the assumption is against justice”) and violating the rights stated in the constitution and ordinary laws has become routine and of course will have no outcome other than elevating public mistrust and distancing them from the government. These uncertainties and anxieties have shadowed over the lives of a large number of Iranian citizens; and because of the practice of illegal means and the narcissism of the security forces on one hand and the patriotism and loyalty to the Islamic Republic as well as reluctance toward petitioning to the international authorities on the other hand, have created a very difficult situation for the families of the prisoners.

The only way out of this situation is clear and strong action for stopping the militarization of the environment after the election, cutting off the hands of irresponsible agents, releasing all detainees and returning the process of investigation of the accusations to its legal course. We plea to you, the Maraje, as being the reference and support of the great nation of Iran, to remind the government about the damaging outcomes of their unlawful acts and warn them about the expansion of oppression in the Islamic Republic. All this was mentioned in accordance with the words of the Imam of justice that “people will not improve unless the government does, and the government won’t improve unless by the persistence of people” and we call almighty God as our witness that we are not thinking about anything other than the improvement in the affairs of the country and the people.

With wishing you peace and the kindness of God and his blessings

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Mehdi Karoubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Morteza Alviri, Seyyed Kazem Akrami, Rahim Abolhasani, Mahnaz Azarnia, Ahmadipour, Jamshid Ansari, Seyyed Hashem Aghajari, Mohsen Armin, Ghorban Behzadian-Nejad, Saeed Bigdeli, Mohammad Bagherian, Mohsen Beheshti-Seresht, Behnam Bohloumi, Ali Bagheri, Hasan Bigham, Alireza Beheshti-Shirazi, Mohammad-Reza Tajik, Mohammad Taghikhani, Mohsen Tarkashvand, Mohammad-Ali Tofighi, Mehdi Tahaghoghi, Abed Jafari, Seyyed Mohammad-Reza Hosseini-Beheshti, Seyyed Ali-Reza Hosseini-Beheshti, Najafgholi Habibi, Ali-Mohammad Hazeri, Seyyed Mahmoud Hosseini, Farhad Darvish-Setalani, Abdolreza Rokneldin-Eftekhari, Mohsen Rahami, Mohammad Rahimian, Masoud Roughani-Zanjani, Ali Zamani, Saeed Semnanian, Ali Saee, Mohammad Salamati, Gholamreza Shah-Hosseini, Mohammad Shahrestanaki, Mahmoud Sadeghi, Hosein Sadeghi, Abdollah Tootian, Gholamreza Zarifian, Mohammad-Reza Zafarghandi, Ali Arabmazar-Yazdi, Ali-Akbar Enayati, Hassan Azimi, Seyyed Nour-Mohammad Aghili, Abas Abdi, Mohammad-Reza Ali-Hosseini, Faramarz Falahi, Mohammad Farhadi, Hossein Forotan, Abolfazl Ghadiani, Mohammad-Kazem Kouhi, Abolfazl Kazazi, Farshad Moumeni, Abas Manouchehri, Mohammad Moghadam, Ali Mohades, Hossein Mortazavi, Hamid Mirzadeh, Korous Nik-Niayee, Abdollah Naseri, Mohammad-Ali Najafi, Seyyed Hashem Hedayati, Abas Yazdanfar.

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0630 GMT (26 July): An apology for an exaggeration in the previous entry. The editor of Kayhan did not apologise for the publication of Khamenei's letter; however, he regretted calling First Vice President Rahim-Mashai an "agent of the velvet coup" and claiming that President Ahmadinejad had abandoned the line of the Supreme Leader".

The interpretation, therefore, is not of a Presidential fightback but of a (token) face-saver for Ahmadinejad so he can return to his proper (now very limited) Presidential role in the current political battle.

2120 GMT: A Presidential Fightback? Evening news is dominated by the "United4Iran" demonstrations in 100+ cities across the world, but one intriguing development on the homefront. Ahmadinejad's advisors, through Press Secretary Ali Akbar Javanfekr,  have been criticising the media for publishing the Supreme Leader's letter about Vice President Rahim-Mashai yesterday.

They may have had some effect. This evening. the editor of Kayhan, Hossein Shariatmadari, appeared to apologise for the public attention given to the Khamenei order.


1720 GMT: The Opposition Politicians and Qom. More on the important news of the day, the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi letter to Grand Ayatollahs asking them to intervene to free detainees. Keeping the Change has an incisive analysis on both the immediate issue and the wider significance: "Should the Reformists be able to win over a majority of the marjahs [high-ranking clerics], it...would constitute the serious religiously-based challenge to the regime's behavior that the Reformists have been after, but have heretofore been unable to obtain."

1715 GMT: The Confessions Pressure Escalates. Allaeddin Boroujerdi, the head of the Parliamentary commission on national security and foreign policy has also stated his objections to broadcasting the confessions of detainees. Boroujerdi said that, during the meeting of this committee last week with Minister of Intelligence Ejeie, the minister stated "that legal issues make this broadcasting impractical".

1605 GMT: The Next Achilles' Heel? Member of Parliament Ali Motahari has stated: "If the confessions of the detainees are to be broadcast, all instances in which the interrogators have broken the law during the process which sometimes has lead to fatalities must also be investigated".

The statement, echoing the clerical fatwas of Ayatollah Sanei and Bayat-Zanjani, continues, "If these confessions were obtained under normal conditions they would have a useful role in enlightening the public, however, if they are obtained under irregularites they have no use at all....It is possible that the arrests themselves may be legal, but the important issue is whether the detainees have been treated according to islamic regulations, and have they been subjected to mental and physical pressures....We all must uphold the law and try to improve the current situation."

The significance is that Motahari, like Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, is considered a "principlist", the political bloc in Iran distinct from both "conservative" and "reformist" factions. With clerical pressure on the Government increasing, this could be an indication that some outside the Green Movement will be focusing on detentions and interrogations to demand changes in the system.

1600 GMT: Defending the Nation. The lead Iran story on Press TV's website today has been the statement by Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari: "Iranian missiles have the capacity to target Israeli soil if the Zionist regime commits such stupidity including its nuclear sites."

I am sure that the content and timing of Jafari's statement have nothing to do whatsoever with the domestic blows to the Ahmadinejad Presidency, with which the Revolutionary Guard has been closely associated, in the last 48 hours.

1545 GMT: Reports of protests, and action by security forces to break them up, in Vanak and Azadi Squares in Tehran.

1340 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's staff have vigorously denied any contact with foreign embassies over Iran's post-election conflict. The allegation was made on Friday both by Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the leader of Tehran's prayers.

1330 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Yazdan Panah, a journalist and member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been released from detention.

1035 GMT: I am in the midst of an interesting and challenging discussion with Kevin Sullivan of Real Clear World, sparked by a column by Joe Klein of Time. Which should come first: a focus on Iran and the nuclear issue or consideration of the internal political dynamics between the Government and the post-election Green Movement?

0950 GMT: How serious was the argument over the First Vice President? The head of Iran's armed forces, Major General Seyed Hassan Firouzabadi, had written President Ahmadinejad to ask for Rahim-Mashai's dismissal.

0935 GMT: The resignation letter of former First Vice President Rahim-Mashai has been published. Ahmadinejad's response has also appeared: " I had hoped that with the elimination of some negative pressure, you could remain in the First Deputy position."

0900 GMT: Our correspondent Mani sends in important news:

In an open letter, a number of reformist politicians led by Mohammad Khatami, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have asked the Grand Ayatollahs of Qom to remind "relevant segments of the establishment" of "the dire consequences" of their "anti-legal methodologies". The letter asks the Grand Ayatollahs to intervene to free the current post-election detainees.

The reformist politicians, stating that arrests have been done with "no legal justification" and have "blackened the name of the Islamic Republic both within Iran and abroad", declare, "The only solution to this situation would include the following: A clear and serious effort to stop the post-election atmosphere of fear and coercion caused by the increased presence of security forces, freeing all detainees, and restoration of the mechanisms by which the accusations of election irregulariites can be legally addressed."

They add, "The families of the detainees have been stonewalled by officials when they have tried to obtain legal recourse; this has caused many problems for these families". The "disturbing news" regarding the physical and mental well-being of the prisoners has exacerbated the level of anxiety already felt by these families.

The authors also challenge state media, calling Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting "the propaganda machine of the coerced confessions project". IRIB, "by broadcasting staged confessions, is attempting to prove spurious charges that have been made against a popular movement".

0725 GMT: Protests are being held in more than 100 cities across the world today in support of the Green Movement. Information is available on the United4Iran website.

0720 GMT: Amidst the uncertainty over how many of the 86 members of the Assembly of Experts have turned against Hashemi Rafsanjani (see 0645 GMT), one has made his position clear. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Akbar Qoreyshi has written an open letter criticising Rafsanjani for not separating himself from the post-election opposition: “After the Leader’s strong defense [of you] in his Friday Prayers sermon, I told you in a letter that the leader’s defense had solved everything and it would be best that you apologize to him and tell the nation that you have nothing to do with your child or children’s actions....Unfortunately my letter was ignored.”

0710 GMT: More on Karroubi and Iran's Security Forces (see 0645 GMT). Mehdi Karroubi has criticized the treatment of detainees by the security forces in an open letter to Minister of Information Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie. Karroubi said recent information from reliable sources caused him deep concern about the conditions of confinement and demanded that Ejeie, carrying out his responsibilities, identify all parties responsible for recent horrific events and asserts that this is the minister's responsibility.

Karroubi, adidng that the withholding of information from the families of detainees is also a cause for great concern, concluded that it is a sorry state of affairs that citizens are treated so poorly by an Islamic Government.

0645 GMT: A relatively quiet Friday sprang into life during the afternoon with the emerging opposition, not only from the Supreme Leader but from across "conservative" ranks, to President Ahmadinejad over the Vice-Presidential appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. Ahmadinejad's capitulation last night is so significant that we've covered it in a separate analysis.

Meanwhile, Ayatollah Yousef Sanei has extended his public support of the protest movement with a fatwa moving religious blame from the detainee to the Iranian authorities:

1) If you are under arrest, coerced and put under extreme pressure and forced to make a false confession to stop torture, your false confession is not a sin. However, those responsible for such methods have committed a sin;
2) Confessions that are obtained under duress and torture have absolutely no validity in an Islamic court;
3) Under Islamic and Shia law, interminable interrogations, especially those done arround midnight, are absolutely forbidden.

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri has issued a fatwa condemning the behaviour of the security forces towards Mehdi Karroubi as he arrived at Friday prayers in Tehran last week. In an incident picked up in widely-distributed photographs, Iranian police jostled Karroubi, knocking off his turban.

Covering the other side of the clerical debate, Keeping the Change digs into this week's supposed declaration of the 86-member Assembly of Experts reaffirming support of the Supreme Leader and, more importantly, seeking the dismissal of Hashemi Rafsanjani as head of the Assembly. The analysis notes the discrepancy between only 16 signatures and state media's claim that 50 clerics (in other words, a majority) support the declaration. In contrast to our own interpretation that this is a power-play by an important pro-regime minority on the Assembly, Keeping the Change concludes:

Many of the Assembly's members owe their positions to Khamanei and have deep loyalties to the Supreme Leader. For them to support the letter, while withholding their names, may be a compromise position that suits both their political passivity and their fidelity to Khamanei.

Iran: A Clerical Front Against the Supreme Leader?

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The Latest from Iran (24 July): Waiting for the Next Move

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The Arabic-language newspaper Asharq al-Awsat is reporting today, based on statements from "a prominent member of the reformist party" that there is now a co-ordinated move amongst leading clerics against not only the Government but also the authority of the Supreme Leader.

The source claims, "The Grand Ayatollahs of Iran, such as Ayatollahs Sanei, Bayat-Zanjani, Montazeri and Javadi-Amoli, as well as other high-ranking clerics such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani, Seyed Mohammad Khatami, and Mehdi Karroubi and "businessmen, intellectuals, and eminent thinkers", have started a new movement. The goal of this movement is not limited to questioning the legality of this recent election and condemning the recent violence that the government has commited upon the protesters, but aims to question the legality of Khamenei's position as the supreme leader, thereby neutralizing him."

The confidential source also asserts that Mohammad Khatami's suggestion of a referendum on the post-election legitimacy of the Government must have the tacit support of these Grand Ayatollahs. The reformist activist adds, "In recent days the political activities of these individuals has undergone a major increase."

There are numerous reasons for caution with this story. It is based on a single confidential source, making verification almost impossible. Much of the Arabic-language media is hostile to the Iranian Government. (The English-language version of Asharq al-Awsat does not carry the story, although it has written about "a fight for power within the ruling religious establishment itself".) On the substance of the story, the protest of individual clerics over the Government's conduct is far different from the more substantial step of forging an activist front, and a challenge to Ayatollah Khameini is far beyond fatwas criticising the President. And, even if the story is true, the question remains whether the group of ayatollahs named can gather more support from bodies like the Assembly of Experts, given that pro-Government clerics such as Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi can still put out statements of support for Khamenei (and denunciation of Rafsanjani) in the Assembly's name.

Still, the Grand Ayatollahs listed have come out in support of the demonstrations (Javadi-Amoli has been listed by other reliable outlets as "relatively neutral", but our own information indicates he is critical of the Government --- see "Easy-to-Use Ayatollah Scorecard"). It is not only a case of the longer that this crisis goes on, the more scope there is for higher-profile protest; recent steps such as the argument over the appointment of the First Vice President, Rahim-Mashai, and the lack of flexibility in the Supreme Leader's statements offer a foundation for further challenges.

I wouldn't go as far as Asharq al-Awsat to frame this as a challenge to the "legality" of Ayatollah Khamenei, but he may soon be facing the choice of distancing himself from the President (and accepting at least limited "reform) or of preparing himself for the biggest fight of his 20 years as Supreme Leader.