The Latest on Iran (12 July): When Is Normal Not Normal?

The Latest from Iran (13 July): Challenge Renewed

Iran Opposition Alert: Friday is the Day?
Iran Idiocy of the Day: Bushmen Claim Credit for “Regime Change”
Iran: Tehran's Immediate Response to the G8 Summit

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2210 GMT: Press TV's website is featuring the six-point programme of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei for a compromise resolution to post-election conflict (see 1510 GMT). It's one of a number of signs, which we'll discuss tomorrow, that the regime may be willing to make some concessions (albeit limited ones) to ease opposition.

2123 GMT: We have posted in a separate entry what we think may be an analysis of a major development in opposition  strategy, the combination of Hashemi Rafsanjani's leadership of Friday prayers in Tehran with a large march including Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami.

2120 GMT: Reliable websites are now agreeing that Sohrab Arabi was killed by Basiji gunfire on 15 June in Azadi Square.

1800 GMT: Some confusion over the death of Sohrab Arabi (pictured), who was reported to have died in detention in Evin Prison. According to a website, a family member has said that Arabi was among those killed in Azadi Square on 15 June, the day of the largest post-election demonstrations, when Basiji opened fire.

The report continues that Arabi's mother, unaware of her son's death, had prepared the bail money to release him from detention. She spent days outside Evin Prison, holding Sohrab's picture and asking if anyone had seen him.

1700 GMT: We've posted a separate blog entry on a disturbing, and frankly ludicrous, attempt by a Bush Administration official to claim credit, in the name of Dubya, for Iranian "regime change".

1540 GMT: Families of detainees have gathered once more in front of Evin Prison.

1522 GMT: Political Rumour of the Day. Former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, having declined in recent weeks to lead weekly prayers in Tehran, will be making the address this Friday.

1520 GMT: Yet, even as the dispute over detentions succeeds questions over the elections as the touchstone challenge to the regime, the Government presses ahead. Mohsen Hajjarian, the son of detained politician Saeed Hajjarian, has been arrested.

1510 GMT: As we thought, the issues of political activism and detentions are emerging as the key challenges to the regime. Now Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei has written an open letter. While separating legitimate protest from that spurred by foreign influence, Rezaei has emphasized the "duties of state institutions to establish in law the rights of people": "The Islamic Republic without religious freedom and democracy can not exist."

Meanwhile, Etamade Melli has maintained its pressure by publishing a summary of Mehdi Karroubi's meetings last week with the families of detainees.

1500 GMT: A day after he received Mehdi Karroubi's letter about detainees, Ayatollah Shahroudi, the head of the Iranian judiciary, has been addressed by the Iranian Association of Journalists. The association has asked Shahroudi to observe the Iranian Constitution with respect to detentions, confession, and torture. Human rights organisation have claimed that Iran leads the world in the detention of journalists.

1220 GMT: In an interview with Rooz, legal scholar Mohammad Seifzadeh and lawmaker Dariush Ghanbari announced that confessions extracted in prison lack legal validity and only serve political purposes. On the contrary of what is written and broadcasted by pro-government media organisations, Seifzadeh accused officials of defaming detainees.

Moreover, lawmaker Dariush Ghanbari, who is also the spokesperson for the Line of the Imam faction in the Majlis and Emad Hosseini, who is also member of the same faction claimed that the government was "imposing certain views on society." Rooz reports that many members of the judiciary ignored the significance of the situation when asked whether rights of detainees were violated.

1200 GMT: Another young martyr? Twitter users iranriggedelect and iranbaan report on 19 year old Sohrab Arabi, who they say died in Evin prison despite being due for release on Tuesday. Two reports on Rooz (article 1: Persian / English translation; article 2: Persian / English translation) suggest that he was involved in post-election protests, and remained in Evin even after his mother posted bail. Iranbaan also links to a video which she says shows his mother showing his picture to released detainees outside Evin in the hope that they will recognise him.

1145 GMT: CNN reports that, "A top Iranian general said government troops are "ready to sacrifice our lives" rather than back down in the face of protests over June's disputed presidential election." [link via iranrevolution]

0710 GMT: The First Post-election "Reform"? Press TV's website reports that the Expediency Council has ruled that, in future, a member of the President's Cabinet cannot also serve on the Guardian Council. Currently, Justice Minister Gholamhossein Elham, who also serves as President Ahmadinejad's primary spokesman, and Ebrahim Azizi, deputy head of the presidential office for human resources, are also on the Guardian Council.

0655 GMT: An important sign that "uneasy settling" (0615 GMT) does not mean that the situation has been resolved. A reader has confirmed, from Iranian media, yesterday's report of a statement that much of Tehran is a "crisis zone". The claim of police commander Ahmadi-Moghaddam was made in Aftab News.

Blame for the crisis was placed on people using computer software, encouraged by the BBC.

0650 GMT: Josh Shahryar's latest "Green Brief" claims, "Vast weekly protests and the heavy presence of Basiji’s have had a negative impact on Iranian bazaars; they are finding it harder and harder to stay open. As a result, commerce is slowly coming to a standstill."

0615 GMT: On the surface, there is an uneasy settling of the political situation in Iran. For the second day in a row, there were no significant open demonstrations, and statements were limited, with the most significant challenge coming in Mehdi Karroubi's letter to the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, calling for the release of detainees (see yesterday's updates). Ayatollah Montazeri also issued a fatwa condemning the Government as "un-Islamic" for its support of violence against demonstrations. Rooz Online offers a summary (in Farsi) of the clerical debate over the political and security issues.

In short, the impression was that both sides were catching their breath before next moves. This, however, should not be mistaken for "calm". As long as the Iranian Government continues to hold hundreds of detainees without charge, including leading politicians and activists, then there will be an immediate cause for protest that could always be the platform for wider criticism of the system. On Saturday, for example, the women’s wing of Mir Hossein Mousavi’s Participation Front wrote an open letter, saying that Iranian mothers were awaiting the release of their loved ones with teary eyes and aching hearts.

That is why a lot of Internet discussion yesterday was about the alleged mistreatment of detainees and poor conditions in Evin Prison. And that is why there has been so much attention to the Basiji and the Revolutionary Guard. We were caught up in the debate over the authenticity of the leaked audio tape of Revolutionary Guard discussions on how to handle protest (although we are still unsure whether the tape is from 1999 or 2009), and much attention was paid to an article in The Wall Street Journal giving inside detail on members of the Basiji, closing with the puzzlement of one Basij over why his fiancee had left him.

There is also discussion on a possible "cyber-attack" on Twitter, with the key topic "#iranelection" being flooded with spam to obscure the latest posts on political, clerical, and security developments.

Iran Idiocy of the Day: Bushmen Claim Credit for "Regime Change"

The Latest on Iran (12 July): When Is Normal Not Normal?

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John Hannah, one of the advisors to Vice President Dick Cheney trying to remake the world in the Bush years, looks to claim the Iranian protest movement as Dubya's legacy. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, Hannah claims, "The reality is that large-scale anti-regime protests erupted on multiple occasions throughout Mr. Bush's first term -- the very moment when his Iran policy was most aggressive."

Leave aside the fact that it is impossible for Hannah to envisage that protest was due to internal factors, since he shows no knowledge of Iranian politics or society. His article (unintentionally) upholds the charge that he and his fellow Bush officials undermined Iranian political discussion because they tried to tie it to the US Government's aim of toppling Iran's political system.

In spring 2003, just after the invasion of Iraq, the story leaked --- with some evidence behind it --- that Washington was ready to go as far as military operations, supporting covert action, to get rid of the "mullahs". And, as discussion on this board has highlighted, the Bush Administration's loud promotion and funding of "democracy promotion" in Iran could easily be represented as the pursuit of a "velvet revolution". Inevitably, the Iranian regime used the spectre of the "foreign threat" to limit and even put down the opposition.

Even today, however, an official like Hannah --- who showed little concern for "human rights" except when it could be used as a lever to get a Government in power whom he and his colleagues liked --- has no comprehension of this complexity:

Mr. Bush always understood that large swaths of Iranian society do not consider their regime to be legitimate. They detest it and yearn for freedom and democracy. Mr. Bush knew that regime change was not the crazed fantasy of a small cabal of American neoconservatives. It was the deepest desire of tens of millions of Iranians.

This is a matter of concern for anyone who revisits the events of 2002 and 2003. However, it is of far more concern --- as Mr Hannah moves onto another topic to find some vindication for the misspent Bush years --- for those who worry that, in 2009, the Iranian Government can seize upon fatuous statements of "regime change" to justify their suppression of dissent.

Iran: Tehran's Immediate Response to the G8 Summit

After the warning of the G8 Summit to Tehran, Iran response came quickly. On Saturday, Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, said that they had not received "a new message" and would propose a package "containing Iran's stances on political, security and international issues." Mottaki said: "We have not received any new message from the G8. But based on the news we have received, they had different views on different issues which did not lead to a unanimous agreement in some areas."

Mottaki is correct, in the sense that, except from a September deadline for negotiations, there were nothing new in the G8 declaration. However, despite Mottaki's declaration, "The package can be a good basis for talks with the West," there was nothing new in Iran's response, either. According to Al-Jazeera, it will not be beyond a new version of a May 2008 list of discussion points stating "the creation of an international consortium" to enrich uranium on its own soil as a way of defusing the tense standoff over its nuclear programme.

Britain's Foreign Office and the White House have avoided giving immediate responses so far. Instead, the "5+1" (the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany) await Tehran's next step.

Afghanistan: The Irresistible Illusion of an Unobtainable Victory

Rory Stewart, who served as a British Government official in Iraq and Afghanistan, has written eloquently of the difficulties of intervention. However, his latest article, in The London Review of Books, is exceptional. It is a lengthy examination both of the impulse to expand the current political and military approach and of the difficulties, if not futility, of doing so: "After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative."

The Irresistible Illusion

We are accustomed to seeing Afghans through bars, or smeared windows, or the sight of a rifle: turbaned men carrying rockets, praying in unison, or lying in pools of blood; boys squabbling in an empty swimming-pool; women in burn wards, or begging in burqas. Kabul is a South Asian city of millions. Bollywood music blares out in its crowded spice markets and flower gardens, but it seems that images conveying colour and humour are reserved for Rajasthan.

Barack Obama, in a recent speech, set out our fears. The Afghan government is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaida terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.

It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida.

It is tempting to assume that economic growth will not make Afghanistan into Obama’s terrorist haven or Brown’s strong democracy but rather into something more like its wealthier neighbours. Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan were at various points under the same Muslim empires. There are Persian, Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik populations in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Pushtun are only arbitrarily divided by the Durand Line from their Pakistani kinsmen. The economies are linked and millions of Afghans have studied and worked in Iran or Pakistan. There are more reasons for Afghanistan to develop into a country like one of its neighbours than for it to collapse into Somalian civil war or solidify into Malaysian democracy. But Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan present a bewildering variety of states: an Islamist theocracy, a surreal mock-tribal autocracy, a repressive secular dictatorship, a country trembling on the edge of civil war, a military dictatorship cum democracy. And it will be many years before Afghanistan’s economy or its institutions draw level with those of its neighbours.

Read rest of article....

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1800 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi's letter to the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, has been published on a Facebook page of Mohammad Khatami: "All protesting the election results agree with the original system, but its defenders have confiscated the electoral process."

1455 GMT: The mysterious of the "Basiji" audio tape (0825 and 1130 GMT): A very helpful reader has listened to four hours of the tapes and offers the following: "Each [of the four] segments is about an hour and on different aspect of protests and how to understand and neutralize it. The audio seems to be from the Revolutionary Guard who criticize the Basiji for ineffectiveness and lack of training. The 4th segment in the audio is creepy and openly talks about why ppeople are talking about a coup, psychological operations, ideology, etc."

Another reader adds, "This seems leaked audio from immediately after 1999 raids [on the 18 Tir] demonstrations. Still, given ranking figures supposedly in recordings, worth examining." The first reader, however, points us to a document, "Mechanisms for Suppression of Mobilization", which seems to correspond to aspect of the audio discussion.

(Again, our gratitude to both sources for assistance above and beyond the call of duty.)

1445 GMT: Citing a "security source", Lara Setrakian of ABC News (US) says that President Ahmadinejad's national broadcast on Tuesday was hindered by blackouts, caused by deliberate power surges from protestors' use of electrical appliances.

1430 GMT: Ayatollah Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, has issued another fatwa condemning the violence used against protestors. Any Government sanctioning such violence is "un-Islamic".

1230 GMT: Al Arabiya is reporting that Tehran's police chief has declared half of the city a "crisis zone".

1130 GMT: Correction. Our latest information is that the leaked audio of Basiji conversation (0825 GMT) is analysis and training in security methods.

1025 GMT: Election Past, Engagement Present. In the first clear sign that the post-election conflict is pushing the regime towards discussions with the "West" on Iran's nuclear programme and other matters of concern, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has told a news conference that Iran will present a package of "political, security, and international issues" for consideration: ""The package can be a good basis for talks with the West. The package will contain Iran's stances on political, security and international issues."

0935 GMT: The Silence is Broken. Mehdi Karroubi has issued a strong statement this morning, calling on the head of the Iranian judiciary, Ayatollah Shahroudi, to release detained protesters: "Constitutionalism and sovereignty of the people are opposed to tyranny."

0825 GMT: A lot of chatter this morning about a leaked audio, allegedly of Basiji discussing plans to raid university dormitories.

0800 GMT: More on the arrest of Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh (see yesterday's updates). The important link: Tajbakhsh was one of four US citizens detained in 2007 by the Iranian Government, the most prominent of whom was Haleh Esfiandiari. He was released after four months.

So the Iranian regime is still pursuing --- for public consumption, from their suspicions, or both --- the idea of a "velvet revolution" backed by US groups and possibly the American government.

0715 GMT: A reader tips us off to a development which we missed yesterday: according to the German news service Deutsche Welle, the 27-nation European Union has suspended all visas or visa extensions for Iranian diplomats and their families.

0630 GMT: A very quiet start to the day, with no breaking news.

The question we raised yesterday, "What next?", after the 18 Tir protests on Thursday, still hangs in the air. The only visible protests were small gatherings of the families of detainees in several locations in Tehran. Not a public word from figures such as Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani maintaining a mysterious silence. And the regime took a breather as well: beyond Ayatollah Kashani's relatively low-key address at Tehran prayers, the headline pronouncement was "a 50,000-strong special constable-like force called 'honorary police officers' to provide assistance to police support units".

There was one statement of note. Ayatollah Hashim Hashim-Zadeh Hareesi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, declared that people had started to distrust the system because of the election process. The government needed to restore people’s trust to prevent more serious problems. In itself, that statement could complement, rather than challenge, Ayatollah Kashani's request to the Iranian Parliament to review the electoral law and the Guardian Council's promise of a report on the election.

Press TV takes a look outside, "Obama ends G8 with warning to Iran". BBC English, whose coverage of Iran has almost collapsed, also devotes its limited attention to the G8 summit. CNN briefly refers to the arrest of academic Kian Tajbakhsh, primarily because he has American citizenship.