The Latest from Iran (2 July): Ahmadinejad v. Larijani?

1930 GMT: The Battle Within. Back from a break to find what may or may not be a significant incident in the internal tension between the President and Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani.

Iranian Labor News Agency reports that, after Qom Friday Prayers, a number of supporters of the Ahmadinejad Government issued a statement --- signed "People of Hezbollah" --- saying that they no longer regard Larijani as their representative in the Parliament and "want their votes back".

The statement claimed, "“It is said that you voted for Mr. Ahmadinejad’s opponent.”

NEW Iran: Establishing the First “Anti-Censorship Shelter”
NEW Iran Analysis: Assessing Europe’s Sanctions & Tehran’s Oil (Noel)
Iran Interview: Ahmad Batebi “The Green Movement Goes Underground”
The Latest from Iran (1 July): Establishing the Pattern

1755 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. HRANA reports that Hamed Rouhinejad is in critical condition in Evin Prison due to complications related to multiple sclerosis and a lack of proper medical care.

Rouhinejad, a philosophy student, has been in detention since April 2009 on charges of membership in an anti-government organization and has been refused medical leave. He was sentenced to death in a trial last autumn but this was later commuted to 10 years in prison.

The website also writes that authorities in Karaj’s Rajae Shahr Prison have extended Behrouz Javid Tehrani’s time in solitary confinement, which has now lasted more than a month, at the request of the Ministry of Intelligence.

Javid Tehrani is the last remaining political prisoner from the 1999 student protests, the anniversary of which takes place next week.

1420 GMT: Friday Prayers Goes to Penalties Update. Looks like Ayatollah Emami Kashani may have made it through to the next round with a couple of late, hard challenges in his Tehran Friday Prayers sermons (see 1320 GMT).

Having played a conventional, unexciting game, Kashani suddenly got aggressive and put his boot into lawyers: "Defending the false is religiously prohibited and court attorneys should only defend the rightful. When they read a file and realize that the client is not in the right, they should not defend them.”

1415 GMT: Assessing the Situation. The full interview with Professor Ardeshir Amir-Arjomand, an advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi, which we noted noted this morning (0725 GMT), is now in English.

1320 GMT: Your Friday Prayer Summary. Ayatollah Emami Kashani giving it his best today on the Tehran podium but I'm not sure he is going to eclipse World Cup fever.

Emami Kashani played it safe by going with a bash-the-West approach, "They accuse Iran of [efforts aimed at] producing nuclear weapons while Iran's [nuclear] program is scientific and industrial. Producing nuclear weapons has no place in Iran's nuclear pursuit."

There was the "they're keeping us down line" --- "They are well aware of this but they do not see Muslim states prosper. They do not want Islamic glory and awakening" --- which moved into the rallying call, "[Let's] join hands and through cooperation manage the country's affairs in the best possible way, particularly at present when the enemies are attacking the Islamic Republic with false accusations."

And Kashani went to the tried-and-true of Palestine, notably Gaza: "If Muslim states awaken and fulfill their duties, this land (Palestine) will not be swallowed up by the enemy."

So a competent performance but nothing too creative: I'm not sure if that would get Kashani past the quarter-finals of a major competition.

Then again, when are we likely to see the champions of recent years. e.g., H. Rafsanjani, vie for the Friday Prayers Cup?

1015 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Peyke Iran claims that Ghaemshahr Prison with a capacity of 250 prisoners, now has 763 detainees.

The website also has published this list of detainees in Rejai Shahr Prison:

Behrouz Javid Tehrani, 9 years imprisonment
Kobra Banazadeh, 5 years
Zahra Joushan, 1 year
Mansour Radpour, 8 years
Mansoor Osanloo, 5 years
Alireza Karami-Kheyrabadi, sentenced to death
Heshmatollah Tabarzadi, unclear status
Mostafa Eskandari, unclear status
Masoud Bastani, unclear status
Ahmad Zeyabadi, unclear status
Mehdi Mahmoudian, unclear status
Reza Rafiee, unclear status
Behnam Foyuji, unclear status
Rassoul Bodaghi, unclear status
Isa Saharkhiz, unclear status
Davoud Soleymani, unclear status
Ali Saremi, sentenced to death
Mohammad Ali Mansouri, 17 years of prison
Saeed Massouri, lifetime sentence
Houd Yazorlou, 3 years
Meyslogh Yazdannejad, 13 years
Ali Moubedi, 3 years
Afshin Baymani, lifetime sentence
Seyed Mehdi Fetrat, 3 years
Karim Marouf-Aziz, lifetime sentence
Hossein Tofah, 15 years
Shir-Mohammad Rezaie, 4 years
Farhang Pour-Mansouri, lifetime sentence
Reza Joushan, 1 year
Shahram Pour-Mansouri, lifetime sentence
Nasseh Yousefi, 5 years
Esmail Ordouie, 15 years

1010 GMT: More on the Drug Issue (see 0915 GMT). Abbas Deylamizadeh, the head of an Iranian welfare organisation, claims 300,000 poor drug users are in danger of becoming street addicts.

1005 GMT: The Battle Within. Hojatoleslam Mohammad Ashrafi Esfahani has warned that "radicals", with their unwillingness to discussion, have divided the "hard-line" camp in Iran, splitting it into two groups.

0959 GMT: The Budget Battle. The Parliament has passed President Ahmadinejad's 5th Plan on Monday with the cancellation of three articles. One of the cancelled provisions would have given the President millions in spending for "cultural purposes". Ahmadinejad's representatives reportedly were offended and left the session.

0955 GMT: The Oil Squeeze. Rah-e-Sabz reports that the Kuwaiti Independent Oil Group has joined the international suspension of gasoline sales to Iran.

0945 GMT: Labour Front. Peyke Iran claims that dismissed workers in Sanandaj in Kurdistan have gathered in front of the work ministry and that workers of Tabriz Tile Company have not been paid for four months.

0940 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. RAHANA reports that detained student Zia Nabavi is in serious condition after hysteria and convulsions in Evin Prison.

0915 GMT: "Psyche Spinners" in Tehran. Writing for The Huffington Post, Setareh Sabety takes a look at disillusionment and drug use in Iran's capital.

0910 GMT: The Labour Front. Iran Labor Report claims that many Tehran Bus Company employees with more than 20 years of service have been offered a "buyout" of $15,000. The website adds that, to put pressure on  the workers, the company has moved depots farther from the city and even to other cities such as Karaj while reducing employee bus shuttles.

Human Rights and Democracy Activists in Iran asserts the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps is starting a takeover of the company with purchase of buses and new bus lines. The chief executive of the company is alleged to be Revolutionary Guards commander Ardeshir Moghimpour, using the pseudonym Hossein Bijani.

There is still no news from detained bus union members Saeed Torabian and Reza Shahabi.

0905 GMT: We have posted a separate feature on the establishment of the world's first "anti-censorship shelter".

0735 GMT: The Oil Front. Amidst our discussion today of Iran's energy sector, a point to note about its internal production: Deutsche Welle claims that a fire at the Naft Shahr wells is still burning 40 days after it started.

And, with thanks to EA readers, another item about foreign investment: "South Korea's GS Engineering & Construction ( said on Thursday that it has called off a 1.42 trillion won ($1.2 billion) gas project in Iran following sanctions on the Middle East nation."

0730 GMT: The Battle Within. The Motalefeh party, fighting back against pressure from Ahmadinejad supporters, has asserted its "good" credentials, declaring that the hope for leaders of "fitna" (sedition") to return to the Revolution has faded.

0725 GMT: Challenging the Radicals. Mohammad Salamati, secretary-general of the reformist Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, says that radicals have "no real understanding of leading a country". Professor Ardeshir Amir-Arjomand claims "hardliners" are implementing a new constitution and declares that an independent media is needed.

Those criticisms do not appear to have had any effect, however, on Gholam-Hossein Elham, a member of the Guardian Council. He says those who want to change the religious regime into a secular state, on the basis of the Constitution and "wrong" reformist currents, are a symbol of division.

0715 GMT: Nuclear Front. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko has announced that the P5+1 group (US, UK, Russia, France, Germany, China) will meet today in Brussels.

0605 GMT: We start today with a look at Iran's economic position and sanctions. In a separate feature, Pierre Noël looks at Europe's sanctions and their effect on Iran's oil and gas sectors.

The Christian Science Monitor runs with the "Ahmadinejad bans Coca-Cola" story, which links up with Tehran's public spin of defiance: Press TV is headlining, "Iran Sanctions May Hit Japanese Firms".

More significantly, Press is featuring a sign of hope amidst the growing international pressure on Iran. Turkey's Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz said in an interview, "Turkey will continue to cooperate with Iran because the sanctions did not include any specific restriction on energy deals....Energy is not part of the UN sanctions."

Oh, I guess we should also mention that President Obama has signed the new US legislation passed by Congress earlier this week: "With these sanctions --- along with others --- we are striking at the heart of the Iranian government's ability to fund and develop its nuclear programmes."

Obama added:

To date, Iran has chosen the path of defiance. The door to diplomacy remains open. Iran can prove that its intentions are peaceful. It can meet its obligations under the [nuclear non-proliferation treaty) and achieve the security and prosperity worthy of a great nation.

Iran Analysis: Assessing Europe's Sanctions & Tehran's Oil (Noel)

Writing on Race for Iran, Pierre Noël offers an interesting analysis of European sanctions and Iran's oil and gas position, both regarding exports and imports. In the end, its significance is not as much economic --- Noël does not, for me, get to the heart of the tensions over whether Iran can satisfy its domestic demand, given the gap in imports and production left by the withdrawal of foreign companies, as well as cope with the restrictions on its exports --- as political: "Any issue that allows EU [European Union] member states to present a united front and make Europe exist on the world stage looks like a gift from heaven":

Iran is a country with very large reserves of natural gas, a lot of it relatively low-cost to produce.  With the right investment, Iran could become a gas exporter of global significance in about a decade.  Europe is one of the largest gas markets in the world.  Its combination of liberalized electricity markets and ambitious environmental policies has the effect of favoring gas as a fuel for power generation, at least in the mid-term.  Russia’s position in the European gas market raises concerns about market power and the politicization of gas supplies from Russia.  The EU supports new gas pipeline projects from Central Asia and the Middle East through Turkey to diversify Europe’s sources of natural gas; the availability of Iranian gas could be essential to the success of this diversification strategy.  Russia, on the other hand, should want to prevent or delay the emergence of Iran as a large gas exporter.

However, there are a number of uncertainties, which, taken together, raise serious questions about the practical validity of these interlinked propositions.  First, at the moment we do not know to what extent the latest EU sanctions will add to the difficulties already experienced by the Iranian oil and gas industry to source technology and finance.  These is a log of oil and gas activity going on in Iran, but large-scale gas export projects combining complex financing and cutting-edge engineering are not part of this activity.  This is certainly the case for LNG [liquified natural gas] projects, an area where the relevant technology is still largely controlled by Western companies; it is unclear to what extent big pipeline export projects could be carried on.

Second—and more fundamentally—it is far from certain that becoming a large gas exporter is a strategic priority for Iran, or even a clearly defined objective.  Iran’s potential to become a large gas exporter has been recognized for decades, but that potential has never materialized.  Iran imports roughly 5 billion cubic meters of gas per year (bcm/y) from Turkmenistan and exports roughly the same amount to Turkey.  The Islamic Republic’s small export contract with Turkey is notoriously unstable and has led to numerous rows over price and delivery.  European majors such as Total and Shell have had a terrible experience negotiating with Iran over LNG projects (and, during the 1990s, over oil projects as well).  When the European companies pulled back from new projects in Iran three years ago, ostensibly because of sanctions, the companies were not in a position to make final investment decisions on these projects for commercial reasons.

Becoming a large gas exporter would require a strategic decision by Iran, based on a wide political consensus—such as the one underpinning the Iranian nuclear program—to open the sector for real to foreign investors.  There is deep opposition to such a move in the Iranian political culture and the culture of its oil and gas bureaucracy, rooted in the memories of the U.S.-sponsored coup of 1953 following the nationalization of British oil concessions by the nationalist Mossadegh government.  If becoming a large gas exporter was a strategic objective for Iran, then the Iranian government would appear hopelessly incompetent at pursuing it.  Bu tgeology is not destiny; Iran may not want to be the next Qatar.

Furthermore, Iran is itself a large and fast-growing gas market, now 30% larger than the largest European markets, the UK and Germany.  Iran needs to continue developing some of its reserves simply to supply its domestic market; that is what Iran’s gas-related exploration and production activity has been about for some time and—I would suggest—that is what Iran’s gas-related exploration and production activity will continue to be mainly about.  The existing sanctions have been effective at killing proposed LNG export projects—but these projects might not have gone ahead anyway, in the absence of sanctions, for commercial reasons.  There is no indication that the sanctions have had any impact on the growth of gas production in Iran.  I do not know to what extent the Iranian industry’s exploration and production effort relies on European technology and services that would be made unavailable by new EU sanctions, and would not be replaceable by technology and services from Asian or South American companies.

This does not mean that Iran has no strategic energy policy.  In the context of the standoff with the “international community” over its nuclear program, Iran is obviously trying to use the attractiveness of its energy resources and geographical position to its political benefit.  The growing interest of Chinese oil and gas companies in Iran has been widely documented—but it has not led to any new gas export project.  Turkey’s ambition to increase its access to Turkmen gas via Iran has already been discussed on www.TheRaceForIran.com (see here andhere).  Given how strategic Turkmen gas (and the trans-Caspian pipeline) is to Europe’s Nabucco concept, Iran has an option to provide Turkey with both access to gas and leverage on Europe.  The Iran-Pakistan pipeline project, for which the Pakistani government has just reaffirmed its support, is another example where Iran uses its energy assets strategically to raise the cost of the U.S.-EU Iran policy.

The final point is about Europe’s plans for a large pipeline across Turkey that would bring gas from Central Asia and the Middle East to the EU, especially south-east and central Europe....

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