Friday
Mar202009
Three Degrees Of Engagement: The Obama Message To Iran
Friday, March 20, 2009 at 11:00
Latest Post: Iran Responds to Obama New Year Message
So President Obama, following weeks of discussion within his Administration, has made a very public move towards Iran with his Nohruz (Iranian New Year) video message. Will this clear away the "muddle" of US policy, which we were discussing only yesterday, and offer a productive resolution of the difficulties in US-Iran relations?
Here's a three-step process to follow the road of engagement:
1. US STRATEGY
The Obama message is a public diplomacy masterpiece, similar to his January interview with Al-Arabiya speaking to the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Like President Bush, Obama spoke to the Iranian people about their heritage and achievements and a common sense of humanity. Unlike Bush, however, Obama also addressed directly Iranian leaders with the proposal of a diplomatic route to settlement of the issues in US-Iranian relations, overcoming the hostilities of the last 30 years.
That is a huge difference, as it sets aside the impression that US policy is seeking a "velvet revolution" for regime change.
The public diplomacy of Obama's general statement, however, did not even begin to outline the US approach to the "issues". Beyond the call for Iranian leaders to choose peace, Obama did not refer to the Iran nuclear programme. Nor did he broach the regional issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine) shaping the US outlook.
That's to be expected, of course, in a message of goodwill: no need to complicate New Year with an overload of politics. Still, it means that the second step is awaited, and this has to come from Tehran not Washington.
2. IRAN'S RESPONSE
It would be foolhardy to expect Tehran to make any commitment or to raise the issues that Obama did not specify. There is, after all, a Presidential campaign being waged in Iran. President Ahmadinejad will not make any concession on Iran's current position, and it would be electoral suicide for any of his challengers to address the nuclear or regional issues in detail.
The most, therefore, that can be expected from Iran is a general response to match Obama's overture. That will still be very useful in "decoding" the Iranian perspective on engagement. Who offers the response? Does it propose direct talks? If so, will those talks occur before the elections in June? Is there a reference to the specific possibility of US-Iran co-operation on Afghanistan?
At the same time. this would only be a proposal to discuss. It would point to the continuation of the limited private talks that have probably occurred and possibly direct contacts later in the year.
Which puts the central question back to Washington.....
3. THE BROADER US APPROACH
The unanswerable question which has been percolating beneath US discussions since January is what happens if "engagement" doesn't unfold according to the American diplomatic script. Is the process one which will accept a negotiation with Iran to meet the interests of both sides? Or is it a case of seeing if Iran will diplomatically accept all US conditions and, if (and when) it does not do so, putting on more economic pressure?
Obama's message raises the prospect of a genuine negotiation, yet the pointed challenge to Iranian leaders to show that they are peaceful also indicates that Washington wants the higher ground from the start of talks.
In itself, that general position is to be expected. It is also to be expected, however, that Iran will portray itself as the peaceful party and ask the US to mend its past ways.
What is important is that Washington does not follow Obama's message by trying to box Iran in on issues such as the nuclear programme, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, and general relations with the Arab world. The Clinton tour of the Middle East was foolish, if not dangerous, in its ham-fisted attempt to unite Arabs against the Tehran menace, thus isolating Iran from any place in the post-Gaza discussions and outcomes.
That Clinton approach raised the spectre of a Dennis Ross, who has long advocated the velvet fist strategy, shaping US policy. It's a prospect that Stephen Walt has warned against, in a blog that we have reprinted today.
It is too much to expect Washington in the near-future, as Walt suggests, to re-define its strategy so it will accept an Iran nuclear programme. What is important, however, is that the US does not follow Obama's message with pressure for further economic sanctions and that it damps the public rhetoric blaming Tehran for stoking every Middle Eastern fire.
In short, if there is a period of relative silence, rather than diplomatic fury, then the prospect of engagement- long-term engagement- is very real.
[Read the full text of Obama's message to Iran here]
So President Obama, following weeks of discussion within his Administration, has made a very public move towards Iran with his Nohruz (Iranian New Year) video message. Will this clear away the "muddle" of US policy, which we were discussing only yesterday, and offer a productive resolution of the difficulties in US-Iran relations?Here's a three-step process to follow the road of engagement:
1. US STRATEGY
The Obama message is a public diplomacy masterpiece, similar to his January interview with Al-Arabiya speaking to the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Like President Bush, Obama spoke to the Iranian people about their heritage and achievements and a common sense of humanity. Unlike Bush, however, Obama also addressed directly Iranian leaders with the proposal of a diplomatic route to settlement of the issues in US-Iranian relations, overcoming the hostilities of the last 30 years.
That is a huge difference, as it sets aside the impression that US policy is seeking a "velvet revolution" for regime change.
The public diplomacy of Obama's general statement, however, did not even begin to outline the US approach to the "issues". Beyond the call for Iranian leaders to choose peace, Obama did not refer to the Iran nuclear programme. Nor did he broach the regional issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Palestine) shaping the US outlook.
That's to be expected, of course, in a message of goodwill: no need to complicate New Year with an overload of politics. Still, it means that the second step is awaited, and this has to come from Tehran not Washington.
2. IRAN'S RESPONSE
It would be foolhardy to expect Tehran to make any commitment or to raise the issues that Obama did not specify. There is, after all, a Presidential campaign being waged in Iran. President Ahmadinejad will not make any concession on Iran's current position, and it would be electoral suicide for any of his challengers to address the nuclear or regional issues in detail.
The most, therefore, that can be expected from Iran is a general response to match Obama's overture. That will still be very useful in "decoding" the Iranian perspective on engagement. Who offers the response? Does it propose direct talks? If so, will those talks occur before the elections in June? Is there a reference to the specific possibility of US-Iran co-operation on Afghanistan?
At the same time. this would only be a proposal to discuss. It would point to the continuation of the limited private talks that have probably occurred and possibly direct contacts later in the year.
Which puts the central question back to Washington.....
3. THE BROADER US APPROACH
The unanswerable question which has been percolating beneath US discussions since January is what happens if "engagement" doesn't unfold according to the American diplomatic script. Is the process one which will accept a negotiation with Iran to meet the interests of both sides? Or is it a case of seeing if Iran will diplomatically accept all US conditions and, if (and when) it does not do so, putting on more economic pressure?
Obama's message raises the prospect of a genuine negotiation, yet the pointed challenge to Iranian leaders to show that they are peaceful also indicates that Washington wants the higher ground from the start of talks.
In itself, that general position is to be expected. It is also to be expected, however, that Iran will portray itself as the peaceful party and ask the US to mend its past ways.
What is important is that Washington does not follow Obama's message by trying to box Iran in on issues such as the nuclear programme, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, and general relations with the Arab world. The Clinton tour of the Middle East was foolish, if not dangerous, in its ham-fisted attempt to unite Arabs against the Tehran menace, thus isolating Iran from any place in the post-Gaza discussions and outcomes.
That Clinton approach raised the spectre of a Dennis Ross, who has long advocated the velvet fist strategy, shaping US policy. It's a prospect that Stephen Walt has warned against, in a blog that we have reprinted today.
It is too much to expect Washington in the near-future, as Walt suggests, to re-define its strategy so it will accept an Iran nuclear programme. What is important, however, is that the US does not follow Obama's message with pressure for further economic sanctions and that it damps the public rhetoric blaming Tehran for stoking every Middle Eastern fire.
In short, if there is a period of relative silence, rather than diplomatic fury, then the prospect of engagement- long-term engagement- is very real.
[Read the full text of Obama's message to Iran here]
tagged Barack Obama, Iran, Iranian New Year, Nowruz, Obama in Middle East & Iran
Barack Obama, Iran, Iranian New Year, Nowruz, Obama in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (2)
Spot on, Scott!
Not only did Obama address the leaders directly, which Bush has done, but he addressed them specifically as "your leaders" of "the Islamic Republic of Iran." It implies the Iranian people chose (and thus can choose again) for themselves their legitimate sovereign government, which certainly signals a PUBLIC end to the policy of regime change (see my post on leaking Israel's covert war). But by using its proper name of IRI, Obama clearly acknowledges a secure Islamic identity for Iran, which has obvious implications far beyond Central Asia (Turkey, Serbia, Palestine, Egypt), as well as putting to rest some of Iran's broader strategic fears of a secular, imperial enemy at their gates (Reza Pahlavi and CIA, the Commie atheists and Jundallah, etc.)