Transcript: David Petraeus and Richard Holbrooke on CNN (29 March)

HOST JOHN KING: General Petraeus, let me start with the threshold question for you, how many troops will it take? How long will it be.

PETRAEUS: Well, as you know, John, the president and President Bush before him have set in motion orders for troops that will more than double the number that were on the ground at the beginning of the year. We'll get those on the ground. We'll take a lot of effort with infrastructure, logistics and so forth, start employing those in the months that lie ahead. They'll all be on the ground by the end of the summer and the early fall.

And along the way we'll be doing the assessments. And among those assessments, of course, will be the kinds of questions about force levels, about additional civilians and other resources as well.

KING: General McKiernan, your commander on the ground, had been up-front that he needed even more troops. Why did the president say no?

PETRAEUS: Well, he certainly hasn't said no.

What everyone has said is let's get these forces on the ground. Every request for forces and every recommendation that General McKiernan and I made through this year, this entire year, has been approved. And, as I said, we'll take that forward, do the assessments. And I think it'd be premature to get beyond that right now.

KING: Ambassador Holbrooke, before we get to your challenges in the diplomacy, I want you to take us inside the deliberations about this strategy, because as you know, many Democrats have warned this could be President Obama's Vietnam, that you're sending more troops into an area where you still have huge problems on the Pakistani side of the border -- and we'll talk about that -- with corruption and other issues on the Afghan side of the border. And we'll talk in more detail about that. But take us inside the room when it comes to the risk assessment for this president at this moment.

HOLBROOKE: First of all, John, I served in Vietnam for three and half years, and I'm aware of certain structural similarities. But there's a fundamental difference. The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese never posed any direct threat to the United States and its homeland. The people we are fighting in Afghanistan, and the people they are sheltering in Western Pakistan pose a direct threat. Those are the men of 9/11, the people who killed Benazir Bhutto. And you can be sure that, as we sit here today, they are planning further attacks on the United States and our allies.

In terms of the deliberation itself, the president shared at least four meetings, by my count, of the full National Security Council -- very unusual, very impressive. He ran the meetings himself. I've been in meetings with presidents since Lyndon Johnson in whose White House I served. And I have never seen a president take charge of a meeting the way President Obama did continually.

In other meetings without the president present, General Jones, his national security adviser, his deputy Tom Donilon, and the senior members of the administration, including Hillary Clinton, Bob Gates and the military command, including my colleague and friend David Petraeus, all had a vigorous debate. The vice president participated heavily. And in these discussions, John, I can assure you, and through you everyone who's watching, that every single option was considered, its pros and cons. A convergence and a consensus was immediate, that we couldn't walk away from the situation, no matter how bad it was and how bad the situation we had inherited was.

Then the issue became what do we do about it? All the options were considered. On the civilian side, we focused on the agricultural sector, which has been neglected. And yet it's an agricultural sector -- country. We focused on creating jobs. On the informational side, Dave Petraeus and I agree that we don't have a strong enough counter- informational program to combat the Taliban and Al Qaida, and so on and so forth down a wide range of issues.

From this review, Dave Petraeus and I are now going to sit down and plot the most serious integration of civilian and military activities that we can -- we have had in our time. We're going to integrate the policy like it's never been done before. And, in fact, Dave and I are now planning a retreat to do just that.

KING: Well, let me -- let me talk about the challenge ahead, because no matter how right or how smart the United States is this time -- and you, obviously, in saying what you just said, Mr. Ambassador, you're criticizing what happened in the previous administration. But I don't to look backwards. For you to succeed, you need partners. And I want to play something that then-Candidate Obama told our Fareed Zakaria back in 2008 about the president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai -- the president of the United States, now, saying, back then, he didn't have much trust. Let's listen

I'm sorry, we don't have that sound for you. But here is what he said back in 2008. He said: I think the Karzai government has not gotten out of the bunker and helped to organize Afghanistan and government, the judiciary, police forces, in ways that would give people confidence. So there are a lot of problems there.

General, if there are a lot of problems there, have those problems been fixed? Or are you sending more U.S. troops into a country that can't organize and run itself?

PETRAEUS: Well, first of all, it's a comprehensive effort. And among the various lines of operation, if you will, are diplomatic lines that will be spearheaded by the ambassadors in both countries and with Ambassador Holbrooke, of course overseeing that. Among that effort has to be, without question, the strengthening -- the building in some cases -- of the kind of trust, cooperation, coordination that is necessary to deal with the problems that have emerged over the years.

It is no secret that the legitimacy of the Afghan government has been challenged by the corruption and some of the other issues there. President Karzai has appointed corruption committees, has made important starts, appointed some good officials, among them Minister of Interior Atmar. That now needs to be moved forward, as we run up to the elections. And then beyond, of course, it would be very important that we all work together to combat the kinds of issues that we discussed.

KING: You say it needs to be more forward. But Ambassador, I want you in on this point, because you have called corruption a cancer in Afghanistan. President Karzai's been in charge of seven years, first of an interim government, a transitional government. He's been president for four and a half years. If there is a cancer of corruption in Afghanistan, and he has been in charge for seven years, is he not part of the problem?

HOLBROOKE: There isn't any question that the government has corruption at high levels. I've said it as a private citizen, and I'm not going to repudiate anything I said as a private citizen. President Karzai called me right after the president's speech, which he which he watched live on CNN. He said it was a great speech, and he agreed with every word of it. And you will note that the president, for the first time at the presidential level, addressed corruption directly and frontally.

I will be meeting with President Karzai tomorrow in the Hague, in advance of the secretary of state's arrival there for this big international conference. Hillary Clinton will meet with Karzai the following day, the day after tomorrow. We will talk about corruption to him as we have before.

We do think it's a cancer. President Karzai says publicly that he agrees with that. And now it's up to his government to take action. But I would stress to you, John, that there is an election coming up on August 20th, the second election in Afghanistan's history. It's a hugely important election. President -- Secretary Clinton will address that in her remarks on Tuesday. And that election will be a chance for the people to vote on these issues.

KING: General Petraeus, I want you to come with me so we can take a closer look at the source of the issue here. And Ambassador Holbrooke, I believe you can see this on a monitor you have up in New York. This is your range of territory, General. You cover all this. But the problem at the moment is right here. And I want to pull out this border region just a little bit more and bring it over to the center, and pull this out a bit, so people can see what we're looking at.

Now, you believe the problem is as much on this side as on this side. So the U.S. troops are going here into Afghanistan. But many would say you're sending the fire department here, when the fire is here, that Al Qaida and the Taliban are on this side of the border. How confident are you that sending troops here will deal with the problem here in the context of trust? We just talked about trust with President Karzai. Do you trust -- let me ask you a simple question first. Do you tell the Pakistani military the most sensitive U.S. secrets? Or can you not trust that that information will be passed on to their security services and them onto the terrorists?

PETRAEUS: Well, first, let me just say that it's very important that the fire department address the fires that have sprung up in the eastern and southern parts of Afghanistan without question.

PETRAEUS: And then it's critically important that the fire department, if you will, in Pakistan, do the same thing in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

And if you move this down here, in fact, I just talked to General Kayani and had an update from him on operations that are ongoing in Bajaur and Mohmand, which are part of the Federally Administered Tribal agencies, some of which you have here.

And also in Khyber. They have just launched another operation in Mohmand. Clearly there has to be the establishment of true trust there as well. We discussed that actually this morning.

There is a substantial and significant and sustained commitment that is part of this Af-Pak strategy that was announced on Friday. We've had ups and downs between our countries over the years. We've now got to get on an up and stay on an up with them. And again, working our way forward in that regard has to be critical.

KING: And when you say we need to establish true trust, again, at a time of economic recession at home, when American families are struggling, we have given Pakistan more than $12 billion in recent years in aid and we don't have true trust?

PETRAEUS: Well, we have had ups and downs. Now, it is important to point out that there has been progress in these areas. It's significant to note that for a variety -- through a variety of ways, nine of the top 20 extremist leaders in this area -- let's remember, this is where the al Qaeda and transnational extremists are that have -- that were the ones that launched the 9/11 attacks, of course, and have launched attacks more recently in the U.K., Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and other areas.

So very important to get into this. We have established, as an example, a joint coordination center just here just across the Khyber Pass. That is the kind of building trust that is very important where we're providing the products of intelligence activities and so forth and we see the building with the frontier core, with the other elements of the Pakistani military that are active there, the kind of cooperation and coordination necessary.

I should add that it's also important that this be trilateral. And in fact, as Richard explains frequently, the intelligence services of these two countries, which have had quite a bit enmity between them, they also have to cooperate and we're going to work together, all of us, to try to foster that cooperation as well. KING: And, Ambassador, to that point, how difficult is -- already difficult and incredibly complicated and sensitive diplomacy, how much more difficult is it if you can't be sure that you share a secret, you share some sensitive information with somebody in Pakistan and there is a history of this information being passed on to the security services and then in some cases passed on to the al Qaeda and Taliban?

HOLBROOKE: Well, of course, you're absolutely right, John. It's a huge concern for General Petraeus and me. Leon Panetta made his first trip as director of central intelligence to this region. This is going to be his focus.

We have started a new trilateral process of the leaders of the two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, coming to the United States. They came in late February to advise us on the strategic review. Both -- Karzai also praised the president's speech, by the way.

And now we are planning a new session for early May which Leon Panetta, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack, Vice President Biden, and others will join Secretary Clinton, General Petraeus, and me, and Bob Gates to participate in.

In all of these issues, we have to break down what you just referred to and what the Pakistani foreign minister himself called the trust deficit. You're absolutely right. There is a -- the relationship between Pakistan and the United States is immensely complicated and it isn't quite where it should be.

And the new focus on Pakistan and what General Petraeus just referred to as Af-Pak, Afghanistan-Pakistan, is designed to emphasize the fact that as we move forward, we need to focus as much on Pakistan, but with one key caveat, John. As the foreign minister of Pakistan has said publicly and repeatedly, there cannot be American combat boots, combat troops on the ground in western Pakistan.

So when you talk about fighting the fire on the other side of the border, we are constrained in going after people on that side of the border, even though they are the ones, to a large extent, planning further attacks.

This is the challenge of a uniquely difficult problem. Now we're recommitted to it and General Petraeus and I are shoulder-to-shoulder in this effort.

KING: I want to go to a quick break, but before I do, on this point -- and we'll have much more discussion, but on that key point that you're not allowed -- the Pakistani government says you're not allowed to put people in here.

From time to time we know there have been Special Forces operations in this area. How much of that is for public consumption? And how much of -- do you have the freedom, if you see something right here and you can get to it before the Pakistanis can, would you do it?

PETRAEUS: Well, I think the president made that clear the other day where he talked about consulting with the Pakistanis. But if it ultimately comes to it that we will, if necessary, take action.

Let me caveat that very, very carefully though. And that is that there is no intention for us to be conducting operations in there certainly on the ground, and there is every intention by the Pakistani military and their other forces to conduct those operations.

This is a very proud country. It has existing institutions. Our job is to enable those institutions, to help them develop the kinds of counterinsurgency capabilities that are needed and to help their entire government at large to conduct the kind of comprehensive effort that is necessary well beyond just the military effort, but one that then looks after displaced citizens, that tries to foster local economic development, and there was some of that in the president's speech as well.

KING: Much more to discuss with our two distinguished guests, General Petraeus and Ambassador Holbrooke. We'll be back in a minute. Among the topics, U.S. tensions with Iran. How close is that country to a nuclear weapon?

And of course, we're keeping our eye on the North Dakota where the Red River remains a flooding threat. We'll talk to Senator Kent Conrad, who is assessing the situation in his home state. STATE OF THE UNION will be right back.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

KING: We're discussing the many challenges here with General David Petraeus and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke discussing the many challenges here.

We were just talking, gentlemen, about the problems, the many issues you have to deal with, the tough jobs you have with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I want to move, a little bit this way in the neighborhood is Iran.

Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs, was on this program a couple of weeks ago. And I put to him the question, does he agree with international assessments that Iran now has enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon?

Let's listen to Admiral Mullen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Does Iran have enough to make a bomb?

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN (USN), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: We think they do, quite frankly. And Iran having a nuclear weapon, I've believed, for a long time, is a very, very bad outcome to for the region and the world.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Now, General, Secretary Gates, the same weekend, said, yes, they may have enough material but he doesn't think they're close to a weapon yet.

What is your assessment of the -- where they are in development of the weapon and what kind of a threat and a complication that makes your efforts in the rest of the very troubled neighborhood?

PETRAEUS: Well, Admiral Mullen clarified what it was that he was saying and he pointed out that there are additional steps required between having enough low-enriched uranium and actually having something that can be weaponized.

You have to highly enrich it. You have to actually do the physical package. You have to have delivery and so forth. The bottom line is that we think it's at least a couple of years away in that regard. It could be more. It could be a little bit less. There are certainly a lot of facts that we don't know about what goes on inside Iran.

KING: And is this -- is this regime being helpful when you deal with Afghanistan and Pakistan or are they trying to undermine what you doing over here, just as the administration -- the previous administration said repeatedly they tried to do what you were trying to solve in Iraq?

PETRAEUS: I think it's probably a mix. We have common objectives with Iran with respect to Afghanistan. They don't want to see the Taliban and the extremists elements that sought sanctuary there before return to running that country, certainly, a Sunni extremist organization, they, of course, being a Shia country.

They want to see a reduction in the flow of the illegal narcotics that has trapped many of their own citizens in addiction and so forth.

So there are common interests here, but there's also a sense, at times, we think, where they would certainly like us to bleed a bit more perhaps. They don't want to make it too easy for us. And certainly, they want to have a degree of influence, some of that legitimate, some perhaps a little less legitimate.

KING: Well, Ambassador Holbrooke, you will be in a meeting in the week ahead, I believe. I know Secretary Clinton will be there, in which Iranian diplomats will be in the room.

It is the highest-level contact in quite some time. What are your guidelines?

Where has the president said, Richard, if this comes up, you're allowed to talk about this. Let's say the Iranians come in and they're in a talkative mood and they want to talk about a lot of things. Where's your red line?

HOLBROOKE: Well, let's just see what happens in the Hague, John. I don't want to -- I don't want to forecast what's going to happen. Red lines? Well, we're not going to eradicate 30 years of bitter disagreements in one meeting.

But I want to be clear here that the United States has been asked repeatedly since January 20th how we feel about Iran participating in meetings on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And we've given the same answer to everyone. We have no objections. Iran is a neighbor. And as David Petraeus has just said, they have -- we and they have common concerns.

In 2002 they helped stand up the Karzai government. They hate the Taliban and they need stability on their eastern frontier.

On the other hand, we have enormous differences with them on their nuclear program, on Hezbollah, Hamas and many other issues. So this is a work in progress. We also have to be mindful of the interests of our very important friends and allies in the rest of the region.

And so it's a very complicated issue. But the door is open for Iran to participate in international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Those must involve all the neighbors, including India, China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, plus our NATO allies.

So this -- we'll see how it goes.

KING: The vice president (sic) of the United States was a guest on this program two weeks ago. And he said something that caused a bit of a stir over at the White House and around town. I want you to listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

KING: Do you believe the president of the United States has made Americans less safe?

FORMER VICE PRESIDENT DICK CHENEY: I do. He is making some choices that, in my mind, will, in fact, raise the risk to the American people of another attack.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: General Petraeus, you served in the Bush administration under Vice President Cheney and President Bush. You're now serving in the Obama administration.

Are the American people less safe because of this new president, as Vice President Cheney says?

PETRAEUS: Well, I wouldn't necessarily agree with that, John. I think that, in fact, there is a good debate going on about the importance of values in all that we do. I think that, if one violates the values that we hold so dear, that we...

KING: You mean torture?

PETRAEUS: ... we jeopardize -- well, in fact, I put out a memorandum to the soldiers in the Multinational Force-Iraq, when I was the commander, because of concern that we may not be taking some of these seriously enough.

As you know, the field manual came out, from the Army, that is used by all of the different services that completely, clearly outlaws torture. So we think for the military, in particular, that can't -- that's a line that can't be crossed.

(CROSSTALK)

KING: So was the line crossed in the Bush administration?

Was the line crossed? Did you do things which you fundamentally thought were wrong and immoral?

PETRAEUS: We certainly did not. Now, there were some incidents that did, and we learned some very hard lessons from Abu Ghraib and other cases. And we believe that we took corrective measures in the wake of that. And that is very, very important.

But it is hugely significant to us to live the values that we hold so dear and that we have fought so hard to protect over the years.

KING: I want to talk through a timeline of Iraq. The American people came to know General David Petraeus as the general who turned around -- and many would accept that statement -- a flawed strategy in Iraq.

I want to go through a timeline. Then-state senator Barack Obama, way back in 2002, said he thought the Iraq war was a fundamental mistake and he opposed it.

And then, as a senator of the United States and a candidate for president, he spoke out quite passionately against the surge strategy. Let's listen.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: The responsible course of action for the United States, for Iraq and for our troops is to oppose this reckless escalation and to pursue a new policy.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: As president of the United States, shortly after taking office, he was unveiling new Iraq strategy. He called you "brilliant," General Petraeus, and he said this. It sounds a little different.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: Under tough circumstances, the men and women of the United States military had served with honor and succeeded beyond any expectation.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: And then recently, in a 60 minutes interview, he, almost under his breath, said something to the effect of who knew Iraq would be the least of his problems as president of the United States.

He has never publicly -- President Obama has never publicly said, you know what, I was wrong; the surge was the right strategy. Has he told you that?

PETRAEUS: Well, we haven't actually talked about the surge. What we talked about is looking forward. And I think it's very important, actually, at points like this, to take the rearview mirrors off the bus, as we say, and look -- look ahead. That has been the focus.

I think you know that, on the day after the inauguration, the first full day in office, the president sat down with the commander from Iraq by video teleconference, myself in the situation room, the chairman, the secretary of defense, the other members of the national security team and discussed Iraq.

And that's what launched the review of the Iraq policy that eventually culminated in the address at Camp Lejeune, something that General Odierno, Ambassador Crocker and I support, something to which we had substantial input, and we think quite a pragmatic and proper, prudent way forward.

KING: Ambassador Holbrooke, you were a fierce critic of the Bush approach in Iraq. In the political debate about it here in Washington, though, many Democrats will tell you privately, you know what, I was wrong; the surge worked because of David Petraeus and that, you know, President Bush, in the end, and John McCain and Joe Lieberman were right.

Why is that such a hard thing for Democrats to say?

HOLBROOKE: I -- I'm not going to partisanize the discussion here. But I do want to say something about Dave Petraeus, whom I did not know until about three months ago and then fate and destiny put us together as counterparts.

I think the nation owes General Petraeus a debt of gratitude for what he's achieved in Iraq. And I am confident, absolutely confident, having known the entire United States military chain of command from General Westmoreland in Vietnam on, that we now have the best team we possibly could have on the ground, from Admiral Mullen to General Petraeus to the command in Afghanistan.

And I'm proud to work with them. And we all ought to acknowledge what has been achieved.

Now, in regard to the previous comment that you played, by the former vice president of the United States, I need to say -- and I hope I can do this in a spirit of bipartisanship and nonbipartisanship, that I don't have a clue what he's talking about.

We are treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater. We are going to address it in an integrated way. We are going to give it more resources. And that is where the people planning the next attack on the United States or on our European allies are certainly doing it. So I just do not understand what his comments were referenced to.

KING: All right. We will leave it there. Ambassador Holbrooke being very diplomatic. We'll catch you next campaign season. We'll see if that stays the same.

(LAUGHTER) Ambassador Holbrooke, General Petraeus, on a serious note, you both have very difficult work in the days and weeks ahead and we certainly, as Americans, we wish you very well in that work.

Good luck to both of you. And thanks for coming in this morning.

Exclusive: US, NATO Talking With Iran About Afghanistan

This week Iranian representatives will join those of other countries at the US-led conference on Afghanistan at The Hague. Most of the media will note this, rightly, as a breakthrough in US-Iran engagement.

Guess what? Those discussions have already started. The Voice of America reported Friday:

Asia's six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization, or SCO, held a meeting in Moscow Friday to discuss ways of combating terrorism, drug-trafficking, and organized crime in Afghanistan. Among those invited to the meeting were diplomats from the United States and Iran.

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Patrick Moon, and Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhonzadeh spoke within minutes of one another at the SCO's Special Conference on Afghanistan.

While Iranian and US representatives repeated the political line that, in VOA's words, "it is not unusual for them to attend the same international forums", a senior American official emphasised that "the U.S. considers Iran to be an important player related to Afghanistan".

So, while Bush Administration officials (and US military commanders like David Petraeus up to last month) accused Tehran of running weapons to the Taliban across the Afghan border, their Obama successors are discussing how to work with Iran to secure that border. Even more importantly, those talks are coming in a regional context: the other members of the Shanghai group are Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The significance of the evolving US-Iran relationship of Afghanistan was reinforced by the confirmation that an Iranian diplomat had held informal talks with NATO officials for the first time since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Senior NATO negotiator Martin Erdmann met with Iran's ambassador to the European Union, Ali-Asghar Khaji, and commented, "This is another good step in engaging Iran in the international community."

A NATO spokesman confirmed that the talks with Mr Khaji had concentrated on Afghanistan.

Breaking News: Iran to Attend US-Led Talks on Afghanistan

The Iranian Foreign Ministry has confirmed reports from Dutch sources, which emerged last night but were missed by the US media, that Tehran representatives will attend next week's talks on Afghanistan in The Hague.

Iran has not confirmed the level of the officials who will be sent to the discussions, where the US will be represented by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. However, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said yesterday during a trip to Brazil, ""We believe that a regional solution should be found for the Afghanistan crisis. Iran's goal in the region is to help peace, stability and calm which is necessary for the region's progress."

Peace in Iraq: Baghdad as a "Walled Fortress Town"

This may be one of the strangest pieces of journalism, hiding a significant story, I have ever read.

Today's New York Times has an article by Rod Nordland, "Iran’s Parliament Speaker Disparages Obama’s Video Overture". It's a sloppy, misleading report of a speech by Ali Larijani, misreading the significance. The Speaker's "pointed and abrasive tone", like that of Supreme Leader Khamenei last Friday, was not to reject discussions but to ensure that the US put no preconditions on the talks.

Nordland's distortion, however, is far from strange. The weirdness comes halfway down the article when he suddenly announces:

Meanwhile in Baghdad on Wednesday, Iraqi officials announced that work had begun to convert the city into a modern version of a walled fortress town.

Maj. Gen. Qassim Atta, spokesman for the Baghdad operations command of the Iraqi military, outlined plans to build four major entry points to the city, as well as 18 minor ones, and force all traffic through them to submit to systematic searches, using sophisticated X-ray and sonar equipment, and explosives detectors.

Some of the construction on the checkpoints has already begun, but General Atta did not say when it would be complete.

“Everyone who comes to Baghdad will be thoroughly searched so we can make sure the terrorist groups cannot come into the area,” he said.

I don't mind Times writers maintaining that Orwellian vision of Iraq as "violent semi-peace" --- heck, it even got Enduring America a mention amongst All the News Fit to Print --- but surely they can do better than to tuck the news of that violent semi-peace behind a story about a different country.

Hamas' Khalid Meshaal on Relations with Israel, US

Hamas political director Khalid Meshaal spoke for three hours last week with Paul McGeough, an Australian journalist who has written a book about the rise of Hamas and Israel's attempts to kill Meshaal. In the interview, Meshaal talked about relations with Israel (“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with" and relations with countries outside the region ("We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe....But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”), and the political prospects of the organisation (“If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas").

This is McGeough's summary, reprinted from Syria Comment:

DAMASCUS: The tea-cup stops short of his lip, as Khalid Mishal pauses to consider the ironies of trench warfare in the Middle East - a lurch to the political right has anointed as Israel’s next prime minister the man who, 11 years ago, sent Mossad agents on a bizarre mission to assassinate Mishal.

It is late Wednesday evening - March 18 - and Mishal sits deep in a plump armchair, in a second-floor reception room. “Netanyahu…,” he asks, returning to his cup of tea. “Its fate, God’s destiny, but we can’t set policy on the basis of personal grudges.”

The Palestinian resistance leader, whose suicide bombers and assassins have taken their own toll on Israeli life over the years, then declares his would-be-killer to be a man of straw. “We’ve already experienced Netanyahu as prime minister of Israel, so Palestinians are not afraid of him second time round,” Mishal vouches.

“After the battle of Gaza [in December-January] and the steadfastness of our people in the face of the Zionist war machine, do you expect a single Palestinian to be scared of this man? It doesn’t matter if he tries again to kill me, because he’s already killed my people.”

At the time of the 1997 attempt on his life, Mishal was an unlikely target - a mid-level Hamas operative, based in Amman, the capital of Jordan.

These days he is the supreme leader of Hamas, hunkering in a bunker set against a scrabbly hillside in the southern suburbs of the Syrian capital, deep inside a secure enclave which is reserved for high officials of the Damascus regime, foreign diplomats and the staff of foreign NGOs.

It is an unmarked, nondescript apartment block that doubles as jihad headquarters and as Mishal’s family home, where his teenage children are just as likely to wander in, taking a seat for the most intense discussions on Hamas operations.

Festooned with swivelling security cameras, the building also is watched over by an outer ring of leather-jacketed security men who juggle firearms and walkie-talkies as they prowl the pavement.

A Hamas car collects select visitors from city hotels - only by prior arrangement. When discretion is needed, one of a fleet of heavy black Mercedes Benz sedans is wheeled out - black curtains are drawn behind the tinted glass.

When greater discretion is required, the Hamas driver jumps the car on to the pavement, easing to a halt under an outstretched awning that hangs from the perimeter wall of the Hamas HQ. The house guards, moving with practised precision, then seize the loose ends of two bunched canvas flaps suspended from the awning, and draw them quickly out to the edge of the pavement, enveloping vehicles as they arrive, before some of Mishal’s more mysterious callers dare to alight.

The arrival of an outsider is an emergency event for Mishal’s suit-and-tied inner security ring. These men frequently speak into microphones concealed in the cuff of their jacket sleeve. Their thoroughness reveals an understanding that their boss is a constant target for a determined enemy.

Beyond an airport-like, walk-through security scanner and up a set of stairs with a dog-legged turn, a heavy, double-bolted door leads into a hallway, from which a visitor is escorted through a set of big double doors into Mishal’s diwan, or meeting place.

Armchairs line the long walls and the décor is various shades of Hamas green. But upon entering, it is a wall of mostly gaunt faces that locks the attention of a visitor - arranged in a honeycomb pattern; they are 20 Hamas leaders, fighters and bomb-makers, all victims of Israel’s campaign of targeted assassination. It is a sobering achievement in life that Mishal has reached age 53 without his visage being added to this wall of death.

The Hamas leader holds forth expansively, negotiating the tripwires of the diplomatic and political minefields that he inhabits daily, with certainty and a confidence that verges on bombast, as he lectures a fast-changing world on how it should respond to his movement - not than the reverse.

This is the first interview in which Mishal, designated a terrorist by Washington and Europe, makes his first detailed response to the outcome of transformative elections in the US and Israel; the Gaza war; and the imminent return to power in Israel of his would-be assassin - Benjamin Netanyahu.

Mishal starts, on what he genuinely seems to believe is a conciliatory note. However, in the corridors of power in Washington and the other capitals of the Middle East Quartet, they likely will be heard as a challenge.

“We’re willing to open a new page with the US and Europe,” he says through an interpreter, daring President Barack Obama to chart a radical change of course in the Middle East as an acknowledgement of decades of failed US policy in the region. “He’ll continue to repeat the mistakes of those who went before him, unless there is a marked change.”

But as Mishal expanded on his ‘new page’ theme, it soon emerges that what he really means to say is that Hamas requires the US and the European Union to open a new page with the Palestinian Islamist movement.

“I don’t mean that Hamas will take a new [policy] position. I’m talking about a readiness on our part to deal with Washington and Europe. But they have to be serious about dealing with us on Palestinian rights.”

Arguing that Washington and its European allied need to abandon their policy of isolating Hamas until the movement folds to conditions set by the Middle East Quartet, Mishal lectures: “They’ve been trying the wrong way and the wrong approach.”

Then he takes apart what he sees as early signs that nothing has changed in Washington since George W. Bush departed the White House in January.

There is little value, Mishal says, in appointing the experienced Northern Irish peace-broker George Mitchell as a US envoy to the Middle East, if he is not authorised to talk to Hamas. “Would he have succeeded in Belfast if he was ordered to ignore the IRA?”

Mishal is derisory of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s ready acceptance of the Bush Administrations’ insistence that Hamas accede to Quartet demands that the Islamists renounce violence, recognise the state of Israel and abide by all previous undertakings on behalf of the Palestinian people.

He belittles Clinton’s warning that international donations for the reconstruction of Gaza had to be kept out of the “wrong hands.” And he ridiculed the seeming contradiction in her invitation to Iran to attend a regional conference on the future of Afghanistan, at the same time as she shunned Hamas on the grounds that not only was it a terrorist group, but “increasingly it was a client of Iran.”

“So despite a new presidency, it’s the same attitude in Washington,” Mishal says. “We expected real change from Obama - not just talk about change.

“They refused to accept the results of the Palestinian election because Hamas won - that failed. They resorted to imposing a siege on the Gaza Strip - that failed. Then they went to war against the Palestinians - and that failed.

“Despite all this, Hamas has advanced and grown, [so] within the logic of real politick, it is Washington that must reconsider its position if they want to achieve an outcome that is not failure.

“The US and Europe have become accustomed to insisting, that the change they demand of the Arabs will be that which is demanded by Israel, [but] the Israeli vision of peace creates only war and chaos.”

The bulk of the Hamas leader’s critique is aimed at Washington’s conduct of what Mishal calls the Palestinian file. And he denies there can be any reason for concern in Hamas at the Obama Administrations dramatic departure from the other policies of its predecessor in the region - its efforts to engage Tehran and Damascus, which could expose Hamas to uncertainties about its future.

Washington is seeking a thaw in its relations with Syria. At the same time it has asked Russia to intervene with Iran, hoping Moscow middlemen might persuade the Iranian regime to back away from its nuclear program. But Syria and Iran are Hamas’ principal sponsors in the region.

Mishal concedes that these indeed are significant events unfolding around his movement. But he prefers to cast them as Obama’s admission of the errors of the Bush II era, or as he puts it, “Washington having to deal with parties that have proved themselves on the ground.”

There’s more lecturing on this theme before he will address the question - which is about the risk that Hamas might become a sacrificial small-fry in any big-picture horse-trading between Washington and Damascus and or Tehran. Mishal inches up to the issue, warning that the U.S. should not seek to “isolate certain parties at the expense of other parties.”

Finally he bites in terms of the position of Hamas. “We’re not worried,” he says. “Hamas is not a card in anyone’s hand. We play an effective role, even in times of dramatic change. Nothing is going to happen in this region until the Palestinian issue is properly addressed - and many countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, hold a principled commitment to the Palestinian cause.”

As much as Mishal criticises Washington, he also pitches a quick plea that it not accept an argument in some quarters that perhaps the U.S. should seek achievable goals elsewhere, while leaving the Palestine-Israel diplomacy to regional players - like Cairo and an increasingly assertive Istanbul. “Israel doesn’t listen to the regional players. The only party that has the power to pressure Israel and to dictate terms to it is Washington.”

Does Khalid Mishal have any regrets about the extent of the damage Israeli forces inflicted on Gaza in December-January - about 1300 Palestinians dead, thousands injured and thousands of homes and other buildings damaged and destroyed? The assault came after Hamas refused to renegotiate a truce, on the grounds that Israel had consistently violated what Hamas understood to be the terms of the six-month ceasefire.

Reminded that the Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had publicly acknowledged that had he known the ferocity of the Israeli retaliation when it invaded Lebanon after the abduction of three Israeli soldiers in 2006, he would not have taken the soldiers, Mishal insists that Gaza and Hamas are different cases.

“The 2006 captures were an option, a choice for Hezbollah; so they are entitled to assess the validity of what they did in terms of the consequences for Lebanon. But for the Palestinians, Gaza wasn’t a question of choice.

“Israel was supposed to end the siege and open the border-crossings in return for a halt to the rockets - the rockets stopped, but the siege remained and the crossings stayed closed. It’s unfair to ask Palestinians if they want to die slowly under siege, or quickly under fire.”

Hamas senses a thaw in its isolation. Mishal’s visitors on the day he is interviewed, include parliamentary delegations from Greece and Italy. A few days previously, they came from the British and European parliaments.

These MPs come in a wave of publicity, challenging their governments to engage Hamas. But the trail-blazers came earlier - analysts from American and European think-tanks who decided the time had come to make discrete efforts to understand the Hamas mindset.

These are small, non-government delegations. But they are signs of different times for Hamas, of feelers being extended from corners of the world that till now have gone along with the US-led campaign to keep Hamas snap-frozen. And they are in marked contrast to the cold shoulder Israel is feeling around the world in the aftermath of its ferocious assault on Gaza, a chill that is billed in Israel as the country’s worst diplomatic crisis in two decades.

As Israel increases its PR spend in a bid to arrest its plummeting stocks internationally in the aftermath of Gaza, Hamas is buoyed by confirmation from Britain that, notwithstanding consternation in Washington, it is moving to ease its isolation of Hezbollah, Hamas’ counterpart in Lebanon, by agreeing to talk to its political wing.

London says the move is justified because Hezbollah joined a government of national unity. Given that national unity talks are on foot in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, an argument is being formulated in Hamas that it should be granted the same dispensation by London.

France too has intimated a willingness to open dialogue with Hamas and a growing army of former government officials and international peace negotiators is urging that Hamas be given a seat at the table. Led by former US president Jimmy Carter, who has visited Mishal in Damascus, it includes the likes of former British Prime Minister Tony Bair and the head of Saudi intelligence, Prince Turki Bin Faisal.

Despite, or perhaps because of the carnage in Gaza, the mood in the Hamas bunker is upbeat - support for the Islamist movement among Palestinians rose markedly after the January hostility, just as it fell for the US-backed Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and his enfeebled Fatah faction, whose writ is confined to the West Bank.

“More and more, the US and Israel and others in their camp understand that they cannot implement their agenda against us - because of the strength that we have acquired,” Mishal says. “Netanyahu destroyed the peace process the last time he was prime minister and his plan now for Palestinians to be limited to some kind of economic independence will fail too.”

Pressed on what policy changes Hamas might make as a gesture to a new regional order, Mishal offers little, arguing: “Hamas has already changed - we accepted the national accords for a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and we took part in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Where is the response by Washington and the others? All we got was hostility and negativity.”

In particular, Mishal refuses to entertain rewriting Hamas’ offensive charter, despite the chance that such a move could alter perceptions of the movement at the same time as it might serve to protect the movement’s underbelly from sniping by its critics.

In 2005, the Hamas had appointed a committee to review its controversial 1988 Charter - with its offensive language, its anti Semitism, its incitement to battle and is calls for the elimination f the state of Israel. In a costly fit of pique over being consigned to the sinbin by the US and others after its election win, Hamas shelved the review.

Policy changes by Hamas have rendered much of the document redundant. But the continued inclusion of the call for the destruction of Israel has exposes Hamas to regular atacks.

Revealing that the pique of 2006 is just as potent today, Mishal says: “They didn’t give us a chance after we won the election, irrespective of what we might have done.” Will the charter be rewritten - “not a chance.”

“The message to us from the world was absolute rejection of the election outcome, because the result was not acceptable to the US and to corrupt elements of the Palestinian community [read Fatah].

“Our approach is not by means of changing the charter, a document written in 1988, but by virtue of our policy program today. Judge us by what we do today - not by what was written more than 20 years ago.

“Hamas has declared it’s acceptance of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories; we have joined the political process; we have entered short-term truces with Israel - this is the reality that the world needs to deal with. You say people use the Charter as a weapon against us - well, let them.”

For now, at least, Mishal’s public face is that Hamas is prepared to engage the world - but on his terms.

He becomes irritable when questioned about a letter from Hamas to President Obama, which reportedly was passed to US Senator John Kerry during a recent visit to Israel and Gaza.

“I don’t want to talk about it,” he says. Pressed, he claims that the letter was on behalf of an individual - not the movement.

“If Hamas wishes to communicate with the US Administration, it will do so in a different way - at the right time; in the appropriate manner. Up to now, the Americans have rejected any communication with us. Hamas knows itself well and those who reject it today will find themselves compelled to deal with it tomorrow,” he says.

“In the meantime, Hamas will communicate with Washington through its actions on the ground - I’m talking about all our activities; about our weight and effectiveness; our social welfare and our resistance.”

If that’s how he feels about talking to Washington, what about direct talks with Israel?

Neither side likes to admit it, but Israel and Hamas have demonstrated that they actually can negotiate and in some circumstances, achieve outcomes that are acceptable to each other.

For all the squabbling over how the Gaza truce was breached and by which party, they did agree to a six-month ceasefire last summer - which Hamas held to, despite its view that Israel did not stick to its side of the deal.

There was no agreed text. This was an indirect understanding, arrived at through talks by negotiators for Hamas and Israel who met separately with Egyptian middlemen.

Israel believed that Hamas had agreed to stop the rain of rockets fired from Gaza into nearby Israeli communities. Hoping to breathe some life back into the strip’s comatose economy, Hamas understood that in exchange, Israel would end its year-long siege of Gaza.

Figures quoted by The New York Times, indicate that the rocket-rate was reduced by as much as 80-90 per cent as Hamas curbed its own fire and that of the lesser militia groups in Gaza.

But in comparison, the number of trucks entering Gaza increased only marginally. By closing its border crossings into Gaza, Israel can stop the movement of goods, fuel and people, often allowing a trickle of movement that imposes a level of hardship that amounts to total economic collapse.

Under the June deal, the daily rate of trucks entering Gaza did increase - but only from about 70 a day to about 90 which, according to the figures quoted in The New York Times - well short of a pre-siege delivery-rate of 500-600 trucks a day.

In light of that experience, would Hamas negotiate directly with Israel, to produce documented deals that might allow third parties to more accurately verify compliance or violations?

“Direct or indirect is not the point,” Mishal says. “What really matters is will Israel be truly ready to recognise Palestinian rights and to end the occupation? When Israel is ready to accept this,” he goes on, “we will decide what to do … but we’ll not give them a platform for useless negotiation, for trying to improve their image internationally [because] they always try to buy time and to create new facts on the ground.”

When the shooting stopped in Gaza earlier this year, there were more indirect talks. But Hamas refuses to buckle to Israel’s terms and as Mishal describes it, rather cumbersomely, “the situation is not war like it was in January … and it’s not a state of calm.”

At this point, the Hamas leader stubbornly refuses to acknowledge a more colourful description of events on the ground by one of his colleagues, who told reporters in February, “the [smuggling] tunnels are still operating and rockets are still being fired.”

Mishal refuses to take the question. Pressed to explain, he says: “I am a leader. From my position as leader, I describe and express myself in a manner which I deem to be best when I speak about the situation.”

“But the tunnels are open and rockets are firing, aren’t they?” he is asked. At this point, Mishal becomes Delphic: “You know my way of talking. There is an Arab proverb -‘every situation has its way of being expressed’!”

Mishal insists that it is the Israelis who must explain why the latest truce negotiations collapsed - including their failure to agree terms for the release of the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. But in what Israel will read as a threat, he warns there is a risk that more Israeli troops will captured by Hamas - to increase the pressure for Israel to agree to Hamas’ demand for the release of as many as 1400 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

Asked about reports the accuracy of reports that Hamas is seeking freedom for 1400 prisoners, Mishal explains the calculus of the negotiations - from Hamas’ perspective.

In the most celebrated exchanged in the past, three Israeli soldiers were swapped, in 1985, for 1150 Palestinians - almost 400 Palestinians for each Israeli.

Asked how Hamas now could demand more than three times that many Palestinians in return for Shalit’s freedom, he says: “Israel’s prisoner numbers were relatively low in ‘85 - 1150 would have been most of those they held. The number we are seeking for Shalit is only one-tenth of today’s number of Palestinians in Israeli jails.

“The Israelis just don’t learn. When they refuse to release Palestinians, it forces the Palestinians to resort to other means to gain their release - and inevitable this incudes the capture of more Israeli soldiers.”

In the March 18 interview in Damascus, Mishal recommits Hamas to the electoral process in the Occupied Territories - despite Israel rounding up and jailing more than 30 of Hamas’ West Bank MPs in the aftermath of the 2006 election. And in the days after the interview, taking in 10 senior Hamas figures in the West Bank, including four MPs, who Israel described as ‘terror operatives’ - reportedly in a bid to pressure Hamas to accept Israel’s terms in the haggling over Shalit.

Underlying Mishal’s analysis is Hamas’ determination to avoid what it sees as the pitfalls, for the Palestinian side, of the years that followed the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, the Fatah movement and the PLO renounced violence as a weapon and recognised the state of Israel, but achieved little in endless rounds of so-called peace talks as Israel continued to carve up the Occupied Territories to suit its own needs. Since Arafat’s death at the end of 2004, his successor Mahmoud Abbas has made no headway either.

Finishing up, Mishal lays out the pieces of the geopolitical puzzle and he laughs. Despite Islam’s prohibition on gambling, he concludes: “If the Palestinian people were gamblers, they would bet on Hamas.”